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1Chapter 1: Public Administration and the Policy Process
Public Administration: Definition and Approaches
Put in the most general way this thesis concerns .the role of the 
public administrator in the policy process. Specifically it is about 
the evolution of government policy toward "Highland Development” and the 
part played by the Highlands and Islands Development Board in this process. 
For the remainder of the chapter I propose to look briefly at some 
problems of definition of the term "public administration" and at a 
number of approaches to its study. I will take two of these approaches - 
public administration as decision-making and the relation of the adminin- 
istrative agency with its political environment - for more detailed 
consideration. Pour themes will be particularly stressed: the charac­
terisation of the policy process (or the decision-making process, I use 
the terms synonymously) as a 'tree1 of possible choices; the lack of 
specificity in many policy commitments and the associated use of "un­
analysed abstractions" to describe the policy; the "multi-organisational" 
nature of much public administration; and the importance of selective 
perceptions in determining policy choices.
Attempts to give vigorous and watertight definitions to concepts 
in the social sciences tend to be futile, for it the definition remains 
down-to-earth enougn to refer clearly to some identifiable part of the 
world it is almost inevitable that certain phenomena that it should 
eawaos manage to escape the net of the definition and others that should 
not be there creep under this net. So for example, if we attempt 
(naively I admit) to define 'public' bodies as ones having statutory 
powers or responsibilities then we find that a body such as the old 
HighlandsJ.rnnd Islands' Advisory Panel  ^will not count as 'public', an
1. See chapter 2.
2odd state of affairs. By using the most highly abstract, vague and
general social science comcepts (e.g. structure, function, system etc.)
this problem can sometimes be avoided but only at the expense of making
the definition of little practical use and probably almost meaningless 
2
as well. Therefore I will avoid formal definitions and content myself 
with a brief discussion of a few of the ambiguities inherent in the term 
"public administration".
The distinction between public and private is a slippery one.
Dunsire points out that "public" means both"belonging to all" and "open 
to all" ' and using the second meaning it could be argued that all organ­
isation recruiting from the world at large and not just from a small group 
having personal or kinship ties are "public"; that indeed one of the most 
salient facts about Western Industrial society is its pervasive "public - 
ness". But this is not the sense of the word used here. I am using
the public-private distinction, in the conventional manner, to have the
■Uie
same sense as governmental - non-governmental: that is/more directly
controlled by the political executive the more public. So, for instance, 
the Scottish Office, as a Central department, is public, I.C.I. is private.
The problems come at the margins; British Rail is surely public but what
B.P.? A hard and fast dichotomy will not hold; what we have is a rather 
blurred spectrum. It is characteristic of public bodies to have statutory 
powers and responsibilities, to receive substantial sums by way of grant- 
in-aid from the Treasury, to be subject to ministerial authority, to have 
their official head either elected by the adult population as a whole or 
appointed by a minister, and to perform functions other than the earning 
of profits or the promotion of their members* interests. ^ Many bodies
T, A similar pointis made by P. Appleby, Policy & Administration (University 
of Alabama Press, 1949)» P*15*
3. A. Dunsire, Administration: The Word and the Science (Martin Robertson,
1973), P.166.
4. i.e. they are "service" or "commonweal" organisations not "business 
concerns" or "mutual-benefit associations" to use the classification in P.M. 
Blau & W.R. Scott, Formal Organisations (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963)»P»43*
3will only have some of these attributes but the more of them an organisa­
tion has the more public we can say it is. Viewed in this light the 
Highlands and Islands Development Board comes well over on the public 
side of the spectrum.
If the word ’'public" is not blessed with a single unambiguous
meaning, it cannot compare with "administration" ^for which no less
5
than fifteen meanings have been established. The possible variations
are breathtaking but f^ortunately, not very important for our purposes.
It is probably enough here simply to reject the traditional dichotomy 
between "policy* and "administration". This is no bold new doctrine; 
few academics since the War seem to have maintained the distinction  ^
and its earlier use was based not so much on empirical grounds as on 
the normative desire to establish a clear constitutional division of 
labour between politicians dealing with controversial policy matters 
and impartial Civil Servants merely implementing in the most efficient 
way whatever had been decided. As it is one of the themes of this chapter 
to portray policy-making as a series of choices and to deny that there is 
any cut-off point between the establishment of broad goals and the re­
latively detailed commitment of resources we shall return to this point 
later. As for "administration" the word will be used to cover all acti­
vities ranging from the most exalted "policy-making" to mundane management
functions - in other words the work of the members and staff of public 
7
bodies.
Organisations involved in public administration can be treated in 
a number of different ways, many of them equally appropriate to any
5. By Dunsire in chapters1-3 of Admini st rat ion.
6. A very effective attack was made on it by Appleby in Policy and 
Administration but as Dunsire shows it still lives on in the minds of those 
like the Maud Committee who have to wrestle with the practical problems of 
what constitutes the proper spheres of activity of the politician and the 
official. (DunsiTe, p.153-5)•
7. Which actually doesn't quite correspond to any of Dunsire's meanings but 
lumps several of them together.
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organisation private or public (but of course 'organisation' is yet 
another slippery term). Perhaps the most prevalent approach is to 
focus on organisational structure. Chief among the originators of this 
approach was Max Weber who analysed "bureaucracy” - that is, the mode of 
organisation applicable to the 'rational/legal' type of authority found 
in Western industrial nations and characterised by the strict application 
of formal rules and the firm delimitation of official duties and spheres 
of Authority. Weber's work was extended and modified by Ifertdn and 
others and has inspired more recent writers reacting against different 
traditions. ^  One of the earliest of these other traditions was that 
of 'scientific management'. Started by PaytgBi (dealing with top manage­
ment) and Taylor (dealing with the shop floor), 'scientific management' 
was taken up by numerous writers and soon formed a large corpus of pro­
verbial knowledge symbolised by the term P.O.S.D.C.O.R.B. - the first 
letters of the various supposed stages of administration (planning,
12organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting). 
Scientific management was essentially prescriptive in content - describing 
how organisations should be structured rather than looking at how they 
were - and as such it lives on still. However, the whole tradition has 
been subjected to severe criticism, most notably by Simon (in Administrative 
Behaviour) who attacked its proverbial and non-empirical character. ^
8. A discussion of different approaches (from a bibliographical point of 
view), the outline of which is followed here can be found in R.L. Peasbody & 
P.E. Rourke, "Public Bureaucracies" in J.G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organisa­
tions (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1965)> p.802-837*
9. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills (eds.) 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), p.196-244.
10. See for instance R.K. Merton, A.P. Gray, B. Hockey & H.H. Selvin (ed8s) 
Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Free Press, 1952) and P.M. Elau, The Dynamics 
of Bureacracy (University of Chicago Press, 1955).
11. See for instance A. Etzioni, Modern Organisations (Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall, 1964)» P»41.
12. A full discussion of the development of their school is found in J.L. 
Massie, "Management Theory" in March, p.387-422. P.O.S.D.C.O.R.B. itself was
4a
footnotes continued -
an invention of L. Gulick and is to be found in L. Gulick and L. Urwick 
(eds.) Papers on the science of administration (New York, Institute of 
Public Administration, 1937)*
13. H.A. Simon. Administrative Behaviour (2nd Edition, New York, 
Macmillan, 1957) p.20-36.
5Simon himself had been preceded in his attempt to construct a more
behaviourly based theory by C.I. Barnard. ^  Even earlier, another
source of criticism had emerged - the Human relations school. Led by 
15Mayo, they stressed the importance of the ’human factor1 and directed
attention to the informal structure that grows within the shell of the
formal one. The tendency for this school to play down disagreement and
to preach that all parts of an organisation (especially management and
workers) could get along with one another if they tried, in turn led to
a reaction and several later writers, such as Etzioni and Crozier, ^  have
emphasised the inherent conflicts present in many organisations.
Closely connected with the study of organisational structure is the
intention of improving the efficiency of the organisation. This of course
was the raison d’etre of the scientific management approach and is also to
be found in present day operational research. Sometimes prescriptions
for greater efficiency amounted to no more than tampering with the charts of
the formal organisation, and as this did not always have the desired effect,
many of those involved in management (as reported by Simon who deprecates the
idea) came to feel that "organisation” was unimportant and "personality"
17counted for all. While not necessarily going to such extremes, it is
clear that the people within any organisation are of considerable importance, 
and this fact provides an alternative focus to structure when studying
14. C.I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Harvard University Press, 
1938).
15. E. Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New York, 
Macmillan, 1933)•
16. A. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations (Glencoe, 
Free Press, 196l) and M. Crozier. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Tavistock. 
1964).
17. Simon, p.XV.
6organisation: that of personnel and personalities. There are fewer
works on this topic than on organisational structure which have become
classics but the writings of Merton, Gouldner and Argyris, for instance,
18
are notable. Other attempts to explore the relationship between
organisation and personality-in general are provided by Presthus and, in
19an axiomatic way, by Downs. ' In Britain studies of the personnel of
public bodies have tended to concentrate on higher civil servants - those
of the former Administrative class - as, for example, in the books by
20Kelsall and R.A. Chapman.
To study structure or personnel is to investigate the building blocks
of organisations, but as such bodies are not static edifices but groups
of people involved collectively in doing something, another approach is
to look at what is being done and the way it is performed. To use
Stein's description of what his "Inter-University Case Program" book is
21about, we can study "public administration as process". Central to
this approach are the concepts of organisational goal, - the end which the 
organisation is supposed to achieve - and decision-making. The two things 
are necessarily closely connected. Decisions are made in order to achieve 
certain goals, goals are changed (sometimes inadvertently) because of 
particular decisions. A classic study of how an original goal was dis­
placed by a commitment to arrangements which are in fact, though not 
transparently, incompatible with it is Selznick's TVA and the Grass Roots.
As Selznick shows, procedures may become "the receptacle of positive
22emotional values" which would normally be attached to goals and because
18. See for example, R.l. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure & Personality" in 
Merton et. al. (1952), p.361; A.W. Gouldner "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward 
an Analysis of Latent Social Roles", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.2. 
1958 (two articles), and C, Argyris, Personality and Organisation« (New York, 
Harper & Row, 1957)*
19. R.Y. Presthus.The Organizational Society (New York, Knopf. 1962) and
A. Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, Little Brown, 1967) ®sp. chaps. YII-IX.
20. R.k. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1955) and R.A. Chapman, The Higher Civil Service in Britain (Constable 1970)
6a
footnotes continued-
21. H. Stein (ed.), Public Administration and Policy Development; A 
Case Book. (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1952), p.XIII.
22. P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (New York, Harper Torchbooks,
1 9 6 6 )  p . 6 2 .
7of this a heavy reliance on the analytic distinction between means and
ends is usually inappropriate when applied to public administration - or
any other political process. There are other arguments against such a
distinction, ends are often not clearly stated, or even known, and when
they are they will often be expressed in terms too vague to be a guide to
action; not only^can one end be served by mariy means but multiple ends are
often furthered by a single means; what is an end for one man might only be
a means for another, yet they may cooperate for all that; finally, as
Lindblom has shown, there can be agreement on means without agreement on 
23ends.
This has a bearing on what has perhaps been the major debate about 
decision-making models: the validity and usefulness of the "rational
maximiser" assumption of human behaviour. Rational man must be able to 
distinguish clearly between means and ends otherwise his ability to maximise 
his utility becomes greatly impaired. It is hardly necessary to go into 
great detail in criticising this particular "model of man" for to do so 
would be to attack what is now an Aunt Sally (but dc the economists realise 
it?). All we need do is to point to the two main alternative models de­
veloped by the critics; Simon's 'Satisficers' and Lindblom's 'mutual ad­
justers'. ^  Administrative man, the satisficer, differs from economic 
man in that he does not maximise - which would require the extremely 
laborious process of discovering all possible courses of action open to 
him and working out the best alternative - but simply chooses a solution 
that is 'good enough'. Furthermore he makes no idle pretence at perfect 
information but deliberately works with a highly simplified view of the 
variables relevant to his interests; the complexity of the real world is
23. C.E. Lindblom "The Science of Muddling Through" reprinted in R.E. Wolfingei 
(ed.) Readings in American Political Behaviour (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice 
Hall, 1966) p.218-219-
24. Simon, P.XXV - XXVI and also his "A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice" 
in Models of Man, (New York, John Wiley, 1957)* Lindblom, "Muddling Through" 
and also The Intelligence of Democracy (New York, jRree Press, 196^.
825reduced to a few "relatively simple rules of thumb". For all .his
differences from Simon's "administrative man", Lindblom's administrator
has similar tendencies: he does not believe in the possibility of clearly
separating means and ends so he cannot establish the 'one best way' to
achieve his objectives, his analysis is drastically limited and proceeds
by a succession of limited comparisons; and he considers the test of a
'good' policy to be whether a number of people can agree on it without
26necessarily agreeing as to final objectives.
The above approaches to organisations - concerned with their structure,
their personnel or the decision-making processes within them are equally
relevant to public or private bodies. By comparison the study of the
organisation's political environment and its relations with this environment
seems particularly appropriate to public administration. Of course all
organisations have an environment and there have been studies relating
27purely private bodies to their surroundings but, as Self puts it,
28business firms inhabit a market rather than a political environment and 
the problem becomes especially important for public bodies because of their 
peculiar interrelatedness. Making due allowance for the lack of firmness 
of the public-private distinction, already discussed, there is a case for 
saying that while, say, a firm or a trade union have some sort of autonomous 
existence a public body is only there because of the part it plays in the 
overall process of government. In other words a large part, if not all,
29of the public sector can be considered as several giant 'multiorfanisations' ' 
whose component units eannot. sensibly be treated separately from the 
other units they are
25. Simon, Administrative Behaviour, p.XXV-XXVI.
26. Lindblom, "Muodling Through" p.215 and 218. There are of course major 
differences between the views of Simon and Lindblom but I cannot agree with 
Self that the two are in "complete opposition", see P. Self, Administration 
Theories and Politics (Allen & Unwin, 1972), p.39*
27. A. K. Rice, The Enterprise & its Environment (Tavistock, 1963)> which uses
a "system" approach.
28. Self, p.262.
29. For a discussion of this concept see J* Stringer "Operational J*esearck for
'Multi-organizations' "Operational Research Quarterly« Vol.18, Ho.2 (1967)*
930related to. To put it yet another way while a private body has goals
dependent only upon itself the goals of a public organisation cannot be
divorced from wider government aims. The interaction between a public
body and the elements of its environment (which may include other public
bodies, political parties, interest groups and much else) is necessarily
political, being concerned with, in Easton’s phrase, "the authorative
31allocation of values" and it was this aspect of administration that
32led Appleby to call it 'the eighth political process'. Its greater
visibility in the U.S.A., where the bureaucracy is both more fragmented
33and less secretive than in Britain has led to a number of studies. '
34Less work has been done in this country. On the theoretical side,
35Down's analysis of the empire building tendencies inherent in bureaucracy 
should perhaps be mentioned.
The preceding schematic characterisation of studies relevant to public 
administration provides a context for the material in this thesis. Briefly, 
though neither structure and personnel can be ignored, they do not provide
30. Self, p.251, makes much the same point and calls this the "macro­
approach" to public administration.
31. D. Easton, The Political System (New York, Knapp, 1953)» p.129.
32. Appleby, p.29-30, several of the other seven processes have a speci­
fically U.S. relevence.
33. e.g. the volume edited by Stein; M. Meyerson & E.C. Banfield, Politics 
Planning & the Public Interest (Glencoe, Free Press, 1955); and y.R.I&winin & 
N.A. Abend, Bureaucrats in Collision (M.I.T. 1971).
34. Though there are the Administrators in Action books, Volume I by
F.M.G. Wilbnott (R.I.P.A. I96I) and Vol. II by G. Rhodes (R.I.P.A., 19^5) 8111(1 
at the local level D.V. Donnison and V. Chapman and others, Social Policy 
and Administration (Allen & Unwin, 1965).
35* Downs, p.211-216.
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the chief focus for the following study of the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board. Rather, as I am interested in the part played by the 
Board in the policy-making process, the most relevant two approaches are 
those that have been characterised as being concerned with decision making 
on the one hand and the political environment on the other. Something 
more now needs to be said on these topics.
The Policy Process
Policy-making, I have already asserted, is not to be treated as one horn
of a dichotomy, the other being administration. Still less useful is the
trichotomy policy-programme-administration a division that is beginning to
go the way of P.O.S.D.C.O.R.B. "which proves on inspection to be almost de-
36void of practical content."' If a distinction is wanted between policy­
making and administration it is probably best simply to treat them as referring 
to different aspects of the same basic activity. Policy-making lies at the 
heart of government and "to govern", Mendfcs-France, the former French Prime 
Minister is supposed to have said, "is to choose" (a claim that had some force 
in the context of shilly-shallying 4th Republican governments). This is 
exactly right for policy-making. Policy-making is choice and choice moreover 
by those whose authority is such that their choices tend to stick (and so 
back to Easton*s definition). It is true that not all choices made within 
an administrative apparatus would be called "policy-making" in any ordinary 
sense of the term, it is only the more important choices that are so designated. 
This is easy enough to illustrate: a decision to expand the road-building
programme would be a policy matter but not one to buy carbon paper from 
supplier x rather than from supplier y. But because of the inveterately 
vague nature of a phrase like "more important?*: there is no possibility or
36. Y/.J.M. MacKenzie, Politics and Social Science (Penguin, 1967)* p.247.
11
indeed any need to establish a cut-off point above which decisions are
called policy matters and below which they are merely administration.
Such an attempt is particularly harmful if it leads to the belief that
themselves
there is one group of men who are policy-makers and another who confine /
to administration. In reality effective involvement in policy-making
may stretch quite far down the organisation (and will certainly involve
personnel other than, in the case of a body like H.I.D.B., the handful of
Board members) and even the most purely "administrative" natters, such as
the choice of carbon paper supplier, can in certain circumstances become
"political" and require a decision from the very top. "Political activity
is like lightening, in that it may suddenly strike into any corner of the
37administrative system, but only rarely does so”.
The way I wish to conceive of the policy process is best illustrated 
by reference to a "games tree" such as the one shown in the diagram below:-
A B C
In a game such as chess (where of course the number of possible choices-L&t
each move far exceeds the few shown in the diagram) a player at A is faced
with three possibilities, his decision in turn gives four choices to his
opponent at B who in turn gives the first player two moves at C and so on.
It is not necessary for the game to involve only two people or for the tree
to refer to a game at all. It is appropriate to any situation where one
choice opens up others which in turn open up still more and so on until
there is no further scope for choice.
37. Self, p.151.
12
the
The use of a 'tree' to represent/decision-making situation seems to 
go back many decades but its relevance to administrative behaviour was 
first brought out by Simon in his book of that name. ^  It is used here 
not as part of any formal theory of rational choice but merely for heuristic 
purposes and its advantage is that it underlines the continuous nature of 
the policy process. Donnison and Chapman are using much the same idea 
when they say that the administrative process "may be regarded as a con­
tinuous series of 'decisions' or 'choices'" and that "Each decision that is 
made, thereafter reduces the number of alternatives still available, until 
the last act is reached which determines the final outcome .... At certain
stages in this process decisions are taken which select one route and ex-
39elude many others potentially available up to that point". y Khat I 
wish to get away from is the idea that"policy-making" ends when high level 
goals have been set - let us say it has been decided to pursue Highland 
development - and all else is simply a technical matter of 'best means'.
This is simply not the case. Rather the high level choice gives way to 
another level of choices and so on until the most detailed action has been 
taken (or not as the case may be). In fact, a point I wish to return to 
later, the high level choices may be the least controversial and it is 
the more detailed decisions that produce political opposition.
The disadvantage of the 'tree' model is that it seems to suggest that 
decisions are both the basic analysable unit and that they are sharp and 
definite things. This is not necessarily entailed however and it would be 
a very unfortunate step to take. Just because at every fork in the tree 
a clear and obvious number of choices are apparent it does not mean that
58; Administrative Behaviour, p.XXVII.
59. Donnison and Chapman, p.34-35* The authors state that their views derive 
from Simon. I do not think it matters whether the process is called "adminis­
trative, "policy-making" or "decision-making".
13
the real world of the administrator will look at all like that. Chess, a 
game of perfect information, is in many ways a quite inappropriate analogy. 
Simon, fertile as always, has suggested that the decision premise be made 
the basic unit of analysis. This has the considerable advantage of
taking into account the lack of information, or even misinformation, of the 
decision-maker as well as his possibly blurred perception of exactly what 
possibilities are open to him but it still leaves the impression that when 
a decision is taken something definite happens. No doubt this is true in 
some cases but there are situations which in retrospect seem to have pro­
duced a clear choice whereas at the time the decision was not so much taken 
as emerged out of the interaction of actors all of whose main concerns were 
peripheral to 'this decision. The policy urocess is conceived as a "tree" 
then, but with due caution about just how the choices come to be made.
A recent refinement of the concept of decision-making has been made 
by P .H. Levin. He suggests that all decisions need to be analysed along 
the dimensions of "specificity" and "commitment". ^  (The two terms are 
not used in an unusual way and are therefore self-explanatory). All decisions 
are resolutions to do something (or nothing) but what is resolved upon may
vary in specificity from the most general and hazy of commitments to a de­
allocation
tailed " / , of resources. Similarly, but independently, all decisions
imply some sort of commitment but the commitment may range from something 
that can be changed with the minimum of difficulty to a passionately held 
conviction or a legally binding promise. To understand clearly the importance 
of any decision it has to be asked "how specific is it?" and "what degree of 
commitment does it generate?".
40. Simon, Administrative Behaviour. P.XII and chapters IV and V.
41. P.H. Levin, "On Decisions & Decision Making", Public Administration.
Vol. 50, 1972, p.24-25. The article says quite a lot of other things about 
decisions as well but these, while interesting, I find less useful in this case.
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To relate the "tree” idea to the Highlands and Islands Development 
Board it can be said that what we are at is an account of the
policy of Highland development from early recognition of the problem,' 
down to the Board's detailed actions - that is an account of the growth 
of this particular "tree" analysing the choices perceived at each fork and 
describing those that were actually made. And within this framework it is 
a study of the part played by the Board in the process.
What were the major stages in the development of this policy, that is 
to say the major forks in the tree? It has to be admitted that there is 
something a little arbitrary in dividing a policy - a seamless web - up into 
stages but with this reservation it may nevertheless add to the clarity of 
the picture. In an investigation of the work of 18 U.S. federal field 
offices Gore developed four phases of the policy process: problem perception,
A 0
interpretation, the struggle for power and formalization. ^ Gore's phases 
concern the development of policies by agencies already in existence, whereas 
in the Highland case H.I.D.B. was created in the course of the policy process; 
the phases therefore are not quite compatible. We can of course accept 
that the first stage is the perception of a problem. Obviously nothing 
else will happen until this has occured though it is far from trivial to 
ask why a particular situation came to be perceived as a problem. The
perception of a problem is the equivalent of a decision to play a game; in
terms of the tree of future choices it simply means that such a tree now 
becomes relevant.
It is at the second phase that our case diverges from Gore's outline.
This seems rather odd, surely there must have been a variety of inter­
pretations of the problem? There were, but they did not really have much
42. W.J. Gore, "Administrative Decision-Making in Federal Field Offices", 
Public Administration Review. 16 (1956) p.284-91.
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practical importance -until later on in the policy progress. As soon as
the problem was perceived in its contemporary form, i.e. as a problem of
depopulation (and another complication was that the perception of the problem
had changed in the early part of this century), the basic question - the
first fork of the tree - became whether to have an executive development
board or not. For a long time the answer was 'not' and further policy 
proceed
developments had to i\yw..c from there. It was not -until the Labour
victory of 1964 that the creation of a board was accepted (and here again
policy processes show themselves quite unlike games - a chess player
cannot change his first move in the middle of a game). Once the idea
of a development board was accepted the next major range of choices
concerned the kind of Board and only after that did analysis of the
Highland problem with accompanying recommendations for the basic strategy
following
of the new board become relevant. The final stage, fil/ing a choice of 
strategy, were the detailed decisions about actions.
Looked at casually there is something cockeyed about this whole 
policy process for instead of deciding what needed to be done to solve 
the Highland problem and then creating instruments to do it, the Govern­
ment created the instrument (i.e. H.I.D.B.) first. In fact this is a 
fairly common way of proceeding and fits in with Lindblom's analysis of
the incremental approach to policy whereby the policy-makers can often
45 1 ^agree on means without necessarily agreeing on objectives. Put in
the form of a behaviour 'tree' diagram the successive stages of the
45. Lindblom "Muddling Through", p.219.
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policy outlined above appear as:-
r—Board---
Problem
perceived....
in contemporary 
form
„ . - oi 
— H.I.D.B.
l No Board-
^H.I.D.B._
strategy
Type of 
Board
Variety of 
strategies
Choices of 
particular 
actions
(The diagram is an oversimplification as separate "trees" could 
be drawn for each of the Board’s "actions" e.g. the revival of the 
Highland fishing industry or the promotion of tourism). What we see 
here is the 'crystallization' of policy. Prom the first hazy concep­
tion (by the relevant authority) that something is wrong a policy is 
slowly worked out into more and more specific and concrete forms until 
it ends up in a detailed commitment of resources - for example a loan 
to a fisherman to buy a boat (of course it may end with a refusal to 
act). At each stage in this process of crystallization it can be asked 
(though it^not always possible to find answers), who was involved and 
what were their preconceptions and information? What influences and 
constraints did they perceive themselves to be under? What interests 
were involved and did they clash?
Applying the notions of specificity and commitment to the various
decisions that brought about the crystallization of the policy of 
Highland development, it is interesting to note that at several stages
in the process a high level of commitment was associated with a low
17
level of specificity. So, for instance, the Liberal Party were for a 
long time committed to the creation of a development board without being 
very specific about its powers, membership, etc. And after the Board 
was created (or before for that matter) a strong commitment to "Highland 
development" was often expressed in what Selznick has called "unanalysed 
abstraction^"that is abstract slogans which, not having been unpacked, 
beg a good many questions and are equally applicable to a variety of contra­
dictory procedures. Policies expressed in such terms may be agreed upon 
by numerous people who in fact disagree quite sharply when it comes to a 
more precise specification of what needs doing. Such policies are in 
Professor Grieve's phrase "unexceptionable sentiments" (and he went on to 
say that it was the Board's job to transform them into "the terror of 
action"^). The prevalence of unanalysed abstractions explains why 
numbers of supporters of the idea of a development board later expressed 
disappointment with it and disatisfaction with its policies and why much of 
the conflict generated accured at the "administrative” stage rather than at 
the "policy" stage of the process i (to relapse briefly into the con­
ventional distinction).
lhis fiuea of unanalysed abstractions with which to describe policies 
seems widespread. Levin and Abend, commenting on American experience,note 
that government aims are often expressed in vague and generalised terms, ^  
and Self, reflecting generally on administrative c!ompetition»says that a 
basic cause of p'olicy Conflict "is the frequent inconsistency or vagueness
44. . Selznick, p. 59-64.
45. Professor R. Grieve in a letter to The Scotsman, 7/8/68.
46. Levin & Abend, p.255. A similar point is made by D.P. Moyniham, Maximum 
Feasible Misunderstanding. (New York, Free Press, 1970), p.XVI.
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of public policy goals”. He adds, "These difficulties are not necessarily 
apparent during the phase of general policy formation but may become 
apparent when policies are translated by agencies into specific programmes".^ 
It is not difficult to see the advantages to the politician in expressing 
his policies for as long as possible in unexceptionable sentiments: it
neutralises conflict during the stages when he is most closely involved 
and ensures that opposition will emerge only to relatively detailed "ad- 
ministrative"proposals from which he is often far removed.
The use of such "unexceptionable sentiments" in the Highlands led to a 
regular rhetoric of development. This existed at various levels of general­
ity; the highest and vaguest being summed up by the phrase "promoting the 
economic and social development of the Highlands and Islands" itself.
This was so abstract and so unanalysed that it came close to meaning all 
things to all men yet no more detailed specification of what was expected 
of H.I.D.B. was produced by the Government throughout the time preceding 
the Board's creation. Once they were established and were preparing 
their strategy it was necessary to be a little more precise but the 
phrases could still be comfortable 6nd unthreatening. Most people could 
agree with the need to encourage manufacturing industry for example; it 
was only when the policy was taken one stage further and the Board tried 
to establish a petro-chemical plant on the Cromarty Firth that the contra­
dictory views sharing the same attachment to "Highland development" were 
48brought out.
The Political Environment
Partly because of ray original intention and partly through lack of 
information, the description of the policy development given in the
47. Self, p.103.
48. This incident is described in chapter 6.
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following chapters says relatively little about the internal decision­
making processes of the Highlands and Islands Development Board. Occa­
sionally internal conflicts become sufficiently severe to require comment 
but for the most part the Board is treated as an undivided unit; that is 
to say the dominant ideas on the Board - those of the Chairman and the 
majority of Board members - are treated as being the ideas of the whole 
organisation including all members and staff (undoubtedly an oversimpli­
fication). The effect of this is to make the main v,focus., the external 
relations of the Board and, in terms of the policy process, to concentrate 
on how the Board*s actions were affected by its political environment.
If we conceive of the whole administrative structure concerned with 
the Highlands as a sort of hierarchy with the Secretary of State at the 
top and individual members of the public at the bottom then the Board 
comes somewhere in the middle and can be said to have three levels of 
relationships (i) above, with the Secretary of State for Scotland, his 
political assistants and his departments, collectively known as the Scottish 
Office, the Treasury and other U.K. departments and, ultimately, the 
Cabinet; (ii) at the same level, with the other statutory bodies (e.g. 
the Crofters Commission and the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board), 
non-statutory but semi-official organisations (e.g. the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry) and the Scottish Agricultural Organisation 
Society), ^  and the local authorities, (iii) below, with interest groups* 
local voluntary bodies like the Councils of Social Service and the public 
at large.
Each of these levels of relationship brings its own characteristic 
conflicts and frictions The Scottish Office wishes to keep the Board 
under control whereas the Board wants autonomy. All the bodies at the
49. All these organisations are described and placed in the administrative 
matrix in chapter 2.
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same level want to control the policies they consider are under their
jurisdication hut there will inevitably be some overlapping of what
50Downs calls "policy space". Interest groups wish to influence the
Board’s activities as much as possible, the Board wants to escape from 
such pressures. In reality conflicts of this sort are likely to be 
considerably mitigated by ambivalence on the part of the organisations 
concerned. The Scottish Office cannot afford to keep H.I.D.B. too closely 
under its thumb or initiative will be destroyed and its job done badly ^  
and the Board in turn cannot break away from the Scottish Office so com­
pletely that it is exposed without protection to the icy blast of political 
controversy. The empire building tactics of different bodies will be 
checked by the unwillingness to get landed with somebody else's difficult 
problem. And in its relationship with groups the Board cannot risk 
losing all support by being too unresponsive but neither can the group 
allow itself to be seen as indulging in excessive influence.
One theme runs throughout all the levels of relationship, and that is 
the importance of different perceptions. There are many reasons why one 
man might see the world in a different light from another, a different 
upbringing for instance or different information, but for the purposes 
of this study probably the most significant source of varying perceptions 
is position in the administrative matrix. This is pithily expressed
in the spoof social law quoted by Seidman: "where one stands depends on 
52where one sits". Someone sitting at a desk in St. Andrew's House must 
have a different perspective on Highland affairs from a man with a very
50. Downs, p.212.
51. The tension between "autonomy and goal effectiveness" on the one hand 
and "policy control and coordination" on the other is described by Self,
P.90-91.
52. H. Seidman, Politics. Position and Power; The dynamics of federal organ­
isation (Oxford University Press, 1970), p.20. Seidman calls the law, "Miles' 
Law" apparently after one Rufus Miles, a U.S. Government employee.
21
similar background, receiving much the same information but sitting in
Inverness. What is of central importance to one might be peripheral
to the other*, and the difference in perception as to what is important
may generate v conflict.
All of the bodies in the Board*s political environment have main
53concerns or "primary tasks" that differ somewhat from those of H.I.D.B.
and they will therefore differ in their perspectives. (This is not to
say of course that they may not differ even more radically). S<a>, for
instance, the Board will see the best interest of Highland development
being served if it is given the autonomy to act flexibly, whereas the
Scottish Office will be more concerned with assuring that all the various
statutory bodies do not come into conflict or do embarrassing and expensive
things, and with maintaining a reasonable kind of regional balance.
An attempt to operationalise the idea of varying perceptions was made
by Levin in the article on decision-making quoted previously. He describes
decision-makers as acting in accordance with some "action schema"’ whose
components are (i) perceived courses of action, (ii) desired outcomes, and
54(iii) action/outcome relationships. Though his use of the concept is
interesting I do not think that in the end it comes down to more than the 
addition of the old means-ends dichotomy (withr all its difficulties) to 
the basic idea that people see the world in different ways and this affects 
their actions.
Three other themes connected with the political environment of H.I.D.B. 
deserve mention; differences in administrative 'style1, the conception of 
public administration as a multiorganisation, and the rhetoric of Highland
53. The concept is to be found in Rice, P.13» and refers to a task whose 
performance is the reason for an organisation's existence.
54. Levin, P.25-26.
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development. Many things might be meant by an organisation's character-
55istic 'style' but I conceive of it as embracing those crucial policy
precedents that form a guideline for future actions and the organisation's
habitual way of going about its business. Clearly 'style' in this sense
56is closely related to what Downs calls a 'bureaucratic ideology' or
what in Whitehall language is referred to as the 'departmental philosophy';
in fact style can be seen as the working of this philosophy in practice.
A newly created body like the Board could hardly have its own style to
begin with and this in turn tgasmm far more scope to the ideas, approaches
and even idiosyncracies of the dominant personalities within it. What is
perhaps surprising is the speed with which H.I.D.B. did get some sort of
collective style so that after five years, when there was a change of
chairman, the relatively large differences in personality between Sir
Robert Grieve and Sir Andrew Gilchrist had only a slight effect on the
activities of the Board.
As the most important of the administrative bodies in the region the
style of the Scottish Office's approach to Highland problems is interesting.
It can be characterised as 'ameliorative' or less kindly 'keeping the
57Highlanders quiet*. The assumption was that little could be done for
such an unpromising area to make it permanently economically prosperous 
and so the best approach was simply to pump in enough money to give the 
small population a reasonable standard of life. Not surprisingly, this 
view conflicted with that of most Board members and added to the friction 
between the two bodies in the early years.
55. The idea of administrative style is explored in A.F. Davies, "The Con­
cept of Administrative Sytle", Australian Journal of Politics & History,
Vol.XII. No.l (April 1966) but the author is concerned here with the 'style' 
of individual administrators not whole organisations. And see also R.A.
Chapman & A. Dunsire, (eds.), Style in Administration (Allen & Unwin, 1971)
Part 1 which seeks to explariei the "style" of British Administration as a whole.
56. Downs, chapter XIX.
57. ttiis inevitably rather subjective assessment of the attitude of the Scott­
ish Office, which they quite probably would not accept, is not my own but that 
of a number of people involved in Highland affairs who I talked to. It was for I 
instance the view of professor Grieve. (Who stated it in a lecture to the J 
University of Glasgow Economic History Society in early 1975). -M
23
I have already mentioned that most of the bodies involved in public
administration may be conceived of as forming "multi-organisations". This
is undoubtedly true of Highland administration. According to Stringer
"multi-organisations" differ from ordinary organisations in lacking
essential unifying characteristics e.g. a set of goals applicable to all
its parts, established means for pursuing these goals and an ultimate 
58 .authority. Multi-organisations are "the unioEt/fcarts of several
organisations each being a subset of the interests of its own organisation^
and they are defined " by the performance of a particular task (which may
\ 59be a continuing one)".  ^ An example would be the Outer Isles Fisheries 
That.iriing':-nt Scheme in which the multiorganisation consisted of relevant 
parts of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, the White Fish 
Authority, the Herring Industry Board, the Highland Fund and the Macauley 
Trust. It might be objected that with regard to Highland Administration 
there is an ultimate authority, the Secretary of State. But apart from
the fact that autonomous bodies such as the Highland Fund and the 
Macauley Trust often play a part, even when the multi-organisation con­
sists only of statutory organisations the authority of the Secretary of 
State is rarely exercised in a sufficiently continuous and detailed way 
to be much of a unifying factor. (This is partly because, for "goal- 
effectiveness" reasons, the statutory bodies are supposed to be auto­
nomous and hence too much Scottish Office interference would be considered 
undesirable).
The multi-organisational nattis?# of the administrative matrix has several 
results for a body like the Highlands and Islands development Board. First-
y o g
ly, when it i/s new, it meant that it had to adapt and accommodate itself to 
some extent to existing patterns of cooperation - as we shall see, one
58. Stringer, p.107.
59. Itoid.
60. In chapter 5*
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of its problems was to 'fit' itself into the existing multi-organisation 
dealing with assistance to agriculture. In a situation where very few 
major tasks are performed wholly by one organisation a new body must dis­
cover whose cooporation it needs in o^der to achieve anything, and it must 
enter into suitable relations with them.- This naturally has repercussions 
for policy since it means that no new sganoje finds itself in a policy 
vacuum in which it can please itself what it does. On the contrary there 
will be a prevailing "policy atmosphere" (to extend the metaphor) and new 
policies cannot ignore it if the necessary cooperation is to be achieved.
Once the new institution has become established its problems are not 
over; the raulti-organisational situation is by definition one in which more 
than one body is needed to do anything and this ensures the need for coordina­
tion. Obviously the more organisations?the more difficult is their coordina­
tion and it has often been remarked ^  that Highland administration involves 
a surprising number of bodies. It is undeniable that there are a lot. (their 
nature and functions are described in chapter 2), but it should be stressed
that it is not a specifically Highland problems the New York Metropolitan
62Area boasts no less than 1467 separate agencies. The coordination problem
has two separate aspects, the political and the technical. The first arises
because different organisations persist in going their own way whatever others
63are doing; a result, Levin and Abend have suggested of each of them being 
able to claim (credibly) that their policies and aims are in the public 
interest, when unfortunately these claims often conflict - which takes us 
back to unanalysed abstractions and differences in perception. The tech­
nical aspect of the coordination problem occurs when ends are agreed upon 
but their achievement is thwarted by difficulties in working together;
61. For instance M.Magnusson, "Highland Administration" in D.S. Thomson & I. 
Grimble, "The Future of the Highlands (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p.246, 
and the Economist 17/9/66.
62. R.C. Wood, 1400 Governments. (Harvard U.P. 1961), p.l.
63. Levin and Abend, p.232.
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it is essentially a communication problem and is inherent in a multi-
organisational situation.
The final theme I wish to mention in connection with the political
environment of H.I.D.B. is the nature of Highland rhetoric. This was
important for the Board if for no other reason, (and there probably were
other reasons) than it created a highly charged atmosphere in which they
had to work. One of Professor Grievefs strongest impressions of his
five years as Chairman was the intense emotion brought to bear on many 
« 64 /issues. Highland rhetoric (by which I mean rhetoric about the High­
lands no matter what the origins of the speaker) tended to have two maip 
characteristics: an apocalyptic tendency and a strong sense of grievance;
The apocalyptic tendency is brought out by the innumerable statements,
both before the Board's creation and afterwards, that this was the 'last
65chance' for the Highlands. Exactly what was to happen to the region,
if this "last chance" failed, to make it impossible to try something else,
was never specified, and one suspects that the assertion began to take on
a rather ritualistic character. However it had the effect of generating
an atmosphere of impending doom. Given the persistant economic deprivation
viz-a-viz the rest of Britain the sense of grievance is hardly surprising.
It was directed against two main objects: aloof and remote governments who
knew little and cared less about the Highlands and who had subjected them
66to "generations of neglect"; and, a less universal but still common theme,
the big landowners whose estates occupied tens of thousands of acres which
67they selfishly refused to develop in order to use for sporting purposes.
64. It was a point he reiterated in my interviews with him.
65. See for instance the leader in The Scotsman. 31/7/70 (which however 
thought that this 'last desparate effort' had succeeded)and a similar point 
by Lord Lovat in H.L. Deb, Vol.291, col.1091 and Lord Cameron in Glasgow 
Herald, 7/8/65.
66. As Donald Stewart, the S.N.P., M.P. for the Western Isles put it in a 
recent statement, see Glasgow Herald, 17/4/73* Statements of the same sort 
were made by Lord Bannerman in H.L. Deb., Vol.291, col.1102 and in a BBC 
"Current Account" programme on H.I.D.B. in Autumn 1970 (transcript available).
67. For examples of this view see the speeches from the Labour and Liberal 
benches during the Second Reading of the Highland Development(Scotland)Bill,
H.C. Deb, Vol. 708, cols.1079-204.
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There was also a tendency, though I strongly suspect that this has nothing
to do with the Highlands as such hut occurs anywhere where strong emotions 
68are involved, to resort to a 'devil* theory of politics, i.e. to 
believe that the motives of one's political opponents are of the most 
dubious kind and to think the® engaged in dark and underhand machinations. 
This point is brought out particulary strongly by the controversy over 
Moray Firth Development described in chapter 6.
The Arrangement of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 deals 
with the environment of the Board at the time of its creation (1965). Ihe 
first section on the general social and political environment is quite brief 
but there is more detail on the administrative environment in section two. 
Chapter 3 is a history of Highland development and of Government efforts to 
promote it from the 18th Century to 196?. (but concentrating on the 2oth 
Century). These two chapters together in effect describe the situation the 
Board was faced with when it began work. Chapter 4 deals with the creation 
of H.I.D.B. Beginning/$ie build up of demands for a development board and 
the Government's growing concern with regional policy it goes on to discuss 
the 1965 A.ct and the powers and members of the Board it created. The 
chapter ends with a brief note of international comparisons. What the 
Board actually did between 19^5 1970, with one exception, is described
in chapter 5. The one exception is Moray Firth Development which is 
explored in more depth in chapter 6. Chapter 7 sums up the Board's first 
five years, makes an assessment and notes the criticisms commonly made.
It goes on to relate the conception of the policy process and the political 
environment discussed in this chapter to the empirical material. Finally, 
there is an appendix which takes a brief look at H.I.D.B. since 1970.
68. Levin and Abend, found similar responses in their studies of transporta­
tion planning and comment, "It requires wisdom and calm reason to decide that 
opponents are not necessarily wicked, stupid, shortsighted or untrustworthy"
(p.275).
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Chapter 2: The Environment of the Highlands and Islands Development Board
The Physical, Social and Political Environment
The Highlands and Islands Development Board was created in 1965* In 
this chapter I wish to explore the environment into which it was placed.
The first part deals with the general aspects of this environment and the 
second with the other administrative bodies already at work there.
For administrative purposes the 'Highlands and Islands' have, been 
identified since 18861 as the seven 'Crofting Counties* of Argyllshire, 
Caithness, Inverness-shire, Orkney, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland and Zetland. 
It is a coramonj^ace^ that this area does not form a satisfactory natural unit. 
Arran, much of Perthshire and varying amounts of the other neighbouring 
counties all have 'Highland' characteristics; Orkney and Shetland, although 
showing many of the geographical features of the rest of the region,cannot 
on cultural or historical grounds be considered as part of the Highlands. 
However, by the time the Highlands and Islands Development Board was created 
the administrative boundaries of the region had become firmly fixed and 
henceforward if the 'Highlands and Islands' (or simply the 'Highlands') are 
mentioned in this thesis, for any period after 1886, it will be the Seven 
Crofting Counties that are referred to.
The whole region comprises 9>020,474 acres, about 47% of the area of 
Scotland, and has a number of distinctive features: a rugged and hilly
terrain, poor soils, a wet and blustery climate, a low population density, 
economic backwardness, poor communications and a peripheral position with 
regard to the main centres of population and activity in Britain. Not all 
these features are found equally in all areas; those parts fringing the 
inner Moray Firth have relatively gentle slopes, fertile soils, little wind
1. See next chapter.
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and an average rainfall of only about 25-30 inches. Orkney is also 
unusual for its fertility and much of Caithness for its flatness. These 
sire the main exceptions to the general roughness of the country. A further 
distinction can be made between the warmer and wetter Western parts of the 
region and the colder and drier East.
A difficult climate and a geological structure that tends to prevent the 
formation of good soil have combined with human activity to make much of the
3
Highlands what Fraser Darling calls a devastated area1. According to Darling 
some 2,000 years ago about 50% of the land may have been tree covered but 
since then the development of blanket bog plus deforestation by man, either 
for economic or security reasons (i.e. to destroy the hiding places of wolves 
or 'rebels1) has reduced this climax vegetation to a fraction of its original 
extent. The situation became • worse after the late 18th Century with the 
introduction of large scale sheep farming. Since then over-grazing by sheep 
and a widening of cattle-sheep ratios have further depressed the fertility 
of the region so that today much of it is infertile moorland. ^
Table I shows the distribution of population in the Highlands for the 
decade and a half prior to the creation of HIDB. Two points should be noted:
(i) the general decline in population over most parts of the region (for the 
seven counties as a whole, population had been declining steadily since 1841);
(ii) the wide variation between areas in the concentration of population and 
in the rate (and even direction) of its change. So, for instance, both 
Caithness and Lochaber defy the general trend toward depopulation quite 
dramatically, due to the build up of Thurso (a result of the development of 
Dounreay) and Fort William, respectively. The other main population centres
2. A.C. O'Dell & K. Walton, The Highlands and Islands of Scotland (Nelson. 1962) 
p.47-48.
3. F.F. Darling. West Highland Survey (Oxford U.P., 1955)» P*192.
4. Darling, p.159-173.
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Table I: The Population of the Crofting Counties 1951-66
(absolute numbers and percentages of 1961 total)
Area 1951 - % 1961 - % 1966 - %
1/ Shetland 19352 - 109 17812 - 100 17371 - 98
2/ Orkney 21255 - 113 18747 - 100 18102 - 97
3/ Caithness 22710 - 83 27370 - 100 28257 - 103
4/ N. W. Sutherland 4283 - 108 3961 - 100 3750 - 95
5/ S.E. Sutherland 9387 - 98 9546 - 100 9393 - 98
6/ Wester Ross 7321 - 108 6807 - 100 6600 - 97
7/ East Ross 29456 - 102 28898 - 100 29208 - 101
8/ Inverness 45620 - 100 45820 - 100 46178 - 101
9/ Badenoch 6814 - 105 6473 - 100 6429 - 99
10/ Skye 8632 - Ill 7772 - 100 7150 - 92
11/ Lewis & Harris 27722 - 110 25222 - 100 24302 - 96
12/ Uists & Barra 7869 - 107 7387 - 100 6600 - 89
13/ Lochaber & W. 
Argyll 13783 - 97 14236 _ 100 16586 _ 117
14/ Argyll Islands 8849 -■ 114 7772 - 100 7617 - 98
15/ Oban & Lorn 14615 -■ 96 15162 - 100 15238 - 101
16/ Mid Argyll & 
Kintyre 20217 -• 108 18716 100 18022 _ 96
17/ Dunoon & Cowal 17901 -■ 110 16247 - 100 16533 - 102
Total Crofting
Counties 285786 - 105 277948 - 100 277334 - 100
Source: H.I.D.B., Sixth Report (1971)> Appendix VI
(The extent of the statistical areas 1-17 is shown on Map I).
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are the Inner Moray Firth, including Inverness, parts of Argyllshire, 
particularly around the burghs like Oban or Dunoon; and, for entirely different 
reasons, Lewis. Some 60/6 of this population was rural  ^the remainder 
living in 21 burghs, only one of which - Inverness - had over 10,000 people 
(in 1966;. Not surprisingly Inverness provided the main service Centre for 
the region although Orkney and Shetland tend to look towards Aberdeen and 
much of the South West is in Glasgow*s orbit.
With its poor rugged land, sparse and unurbanised population and general 
remoteness the Highlands show great similarities with other parts of the 
*North Atlantic periphery1 - Iceland, Norway, the West of Ireland and 
Newfoundland, for instance - but in the British context it is distinctive, 
not only geographically but in terms of its social structure. Table II 
shows the active male population of the Crofting Counties and Scotland as 
a whole divided up into broad socio-economic categories. As can be seen 
the lower middle and (non-agricultural; working classes, which together make 
up over J of the country's population, are significantly less well represented 
in the Highlands. The professional and managerial classes are slightly 
over-represented due mainly to a higher proportion of employers and managers 
in small concerns but the groups that are exceptionally well represented in 
the region are all those connected with agriculture whether large farmers, 
small farmers or agricultural workers.
The figures in Table II concern only the active male population and
they do not distinguish between full-time non-agricultural workers and
those who combine such employment - perhaps as weavers - with work on a
small holding. Uiey therefore tend to obscure the existence of the most
distinctive Highland Class - the crofters. Crofters, whose origins and
complex legal position are discussed in the next chapter, comprise some
60,000 people {22% of the Highland population)  ^Table III shows the
"5! Ihe Scottish Economy 1965-1970: A Plan for Expansion, Cmnd 2864 (HMS0,
1966), p.135.
6. Ibid. p.141.
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Table II: Socio-Economic Groups in the Crofting Counties
_________ Group % in Crofting Counties % in Scotland
A/ Professional & Managerial groups 
(non-agricultural)
Employers & Managers in Large concerns 2-3% 2*6%
" ” " Small concerns 6« 6% 5*196
Self-employed professionals 1* 6% 0-9%
Professional employees 2-1% 2- 296
Total 12* 6% 10-85,
B/ Other White Collar Workers
Intermediate non-manual workers 3-5°/ 3-4%
Junior " " " 8- 3% 12-196
Personnel Service Workers 1*1% 1-096
Total 12* 7% 16-5%
C/ Manual Workers (non-agricultural)
Foremen & Supervisors 2* 6% 3*396
Skilled Manual 22*5% 34-2%
Semi-skilled Manual 11*0% 14*7%
Unskilled Manual 8*6% 9*896
Total 44* 7% 62-0%
D/ Agriculturalists
Farmers - employers & Managers 4-3% 1-896
Farmers - own account 6* 6% 1-096
Agricultural Workers 10*1% 3-9%
Total 21-096 6-7%
E/ Own Account Workers (excluding 
professionals & farmers) 5*196 2-0%
F/ Armed Services 2-0% 1* 3%
G/ Indefinite 1*796 0*8%
All groups 100% 100%
Sources 1961 Census
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Table III; Crofts: Number of Working Units by area & arable acreage in 1965
Arable Acreage
Area Up to 5 5 - 1 0  10 - 20 20 - 30 Over 30 Totals
Argyll
Mainland 314 105 61 16 28 524
Islands 92 108 130 70 63 463
Caithflestf n . - 121 133 190 101 325 870
Inverness
East Mainland 128 115 106 47 126 522
West H 166 98 46 14 8 - 332
Skye & Small
Isles 833 558 292 71 38 1792
Outer Isles 650 569 586 210 197 2212
Orkney 44 68 105 81 223 521
Ross & Cromarty
East Mainland 80 88 120 68 176 532
West " 839 205 74 10 10 1138
Lewis H 2535 759 108 8 3 5413
Sutherland
East 204 206 184 54 52 700
West 611 187 88 17 20 923
Shetland 1182 594 272 52 62 2162
Totals 7799 3793 2362 819 1331 16104
Note: The numbers of Working Units (given above) is smaller than the
number of individual crofts as one man may work more than one 
croft.
Source: ftie Crofters Commission, Annual Report for 1965*
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distribution of crofts in 1965s the main crofting areas are the Outer 
Isles, Shetland and Skye. The same table also illustrates the tiny nature 
of most of the holdings, only a very few are large enough to provide a 
full-time living and many crofters also have another occupation such as 
weaving (on Lewis) or inshore fishing. The crofting townships are further 
distinguished by a feature common to many other parts of the Highlands - 
an imbalanced age structure with a high proportion of people over 65. ^
At the other end of the social scale are the *lairds', many of whom 
are absentees. The estates of the largest landowners are vast, but nowadays 
their economic importance, for good or evil, is probably, except in a few 
areas, only small.
The Highlands are the home of Gaelic and though the total Gaelic­
speaking population had shrunk to about 80,000 by 1961 there were still 
parts of the West where it was the everyday tongue. Table IV shows the 
distribution of the language: Skye and the Outer Isles are the main centres
but there are substantial numbers of Gaelic-speakers on the other Hebridean 
Islands and the North West Mainland. Shetland, Orkney and much of Caithness 
were never Gaelic areas.
In religion too the Highlands are distinctive. They are the home of 
the Free Church of Scotland and the Free Presbyterian Church, the most 
fundamentalist and puritanical of the presbyterian churches. Their rigid 
morality, which condemns such things as music and dancing within the Highland 
communities, led one Presbytery to declare that bed-and-breakfast was a
Q
source of 'mibral and spiritual degradation'. Such attitudes have an 
obvious bearing on attempts to develop tourism and the efforts of a Skye 
minister to prevent the introduction of Sunday ferries are well known.
More recently the Lewis and Harris Lords Lay Observance Society came into
7. Ibid. p.156-7.
8. Quoted by G.A. MacKay, "Regional Planning Problems: Scotland" in M. Broady
(Ed.) M*-rginal Regions (Bedford Square Press, 1972), p.25.
Table IV: Numbers and Percentages of Gaelic Speakers by Area
Area Total Population Gaelic Speakers % of Gaelic Speakers
Shetland 17812 18 0*10%
Orkney 18747 46 0*25%
Caithness 27370 235 0*85%
N.W. Sutherland 3961 1575 39-8%
S.E. Sutherland 9546 847 8*88%
Wester Ross 6807 3276 48*1%
East Ross 28898 1520 5* 26%
East Inverness-shire 52293 3303 6*32%
Skye & Small Isles 7941 5682 71- 5%
Outer Hebrides 32609 26840 82 • 3%
Lochaber & W. Argyll 14061 3285 23- 3%
Argyll Islands 7936 4305 54-2%
Argyll Mainland 49962 4729 9-4796
Total, Crofting
Counties 277,948 55,659 20*0%
Total, Scotland 5>179»344 80,978 1-56%
Note: Not all 'Gaelic speakers* necessarily use Gaelic as their first
language.
Source: 1961 Census.
(The statistical areas are the same as those used in Table I and shown in 
Map I except (i) Lewis & Harris and Uists & Barra have been combined into 
•Outer Hebrides*; (ii) Inverness & Badenoch have been combined into *East 
Inverness-shire*; (iii) the three areas of East Argyll have been combined into 
•Argyll Mainland'; (iv) the Small Isles are included with Skye rather than 
Lochaber and several small islands have been transferred to 'Argyll Islands').
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conflict with the proprietor of "Acres" hotel in Stornoway who persisted
in opening for Sunday drinking. It looked for a time as if the Society
would force a Veto Poll hut it is perhaps an indication of the decline in
9
the power of religion that"AcresMis still open on a Sunday. Alongside 
the strict presbyterianism of most areas are small pockets of Catholicism 
that have survived since pre-Reformation times. In the Isles, Barra and 
South Uist are the largest Catholic centres,and among the mainland examples 
are the West Coast areas of Moidart and Knoydart. ^  In general the 
Catholic Church seems to have a more liberal attitude to the traditional 
Highland amusements.
To complete their distinctiveness the Highlands have persistently 
refused to follow the conventional pattern of the British two-party system. ^  
Even since 1884 when the Crofters got the vote and gave their support to the 
Crofters Party, the six constituencies making up the Crofting Counties have 
been a haven for smaller parties. Even in their doldrums of the mid-fifties, 
the Liberals - in the shape of Jo Grimond - managed to hang on to Orkney and 
Shetland and in 1964 they swept through the Highlands gaining Inverness, Ross 
and Cromarty, >and Caithness and Sutherland. Labour kept the Western Isles, 
captured and defended by Malcolm Macmillan since 1935» and the Conservatives 
retained Argyll - the most consistent (least Highland?) seat - with Michael 
Noble. In I966 the only change was in Caithness and Sutherland where 
Robert Maclennan for Labour beat George MacKie, the incumbant, but in 1970 
another small party - the Scottish National Party - managed to get a toehold 
and incidently chalk up their first win in a General Election, when Donald 
Stewart gained the Western Isles. In the same election Alasdair Mackenzie 
was beaten in Ross and Cromarty by the Conservative candidate, Hamish Gray.
9. Glasgow Herald. 28/9/72 and 24/11/72.
10. F. F. Darling, West Highland Survey (Oxford U.F., 1955) p.315.
11. J. G. Kellas, The Scottish Political System (Cambridge, U.P., 1973)» p.221.
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In Inverness on the other hand, Russell Johnstone seems to have established 
himself firmly (albeit, like every other Highland M.P., on a minority vote). ^
It is commonly reckoned that the candidate is of primary importance in 
Highland elections and this seems to be borne out by election results. ^
Malcolm Macmillan probably retained the Western Isles for all those years 
and almost certainly lost them in 1970 for personal rather than party reasons; 
the explanation for Jo Grimond*s success is similar and further evidence 
is provided by Sir David Robertson who sat as a Conservative for Caithness 
and Sutherland from 1950 to 1959 when he resigned the Whip, because he did 
not consider the Government were doing enough for the Highlands, and won as 
an independent. Kellas argues that peripheral areas like the Highlands 
need 'political entrepreneurs' - men who link the local community with the 
centres of government - and it seems likely that the successful M.B.'s are 
those that best perform this 'entrepreneurial' function. ^
Local Councillors tend to be independents, though some of the burghs - 
Labour controlled Campbeltown is the most notable example - have members 
with party labels. According to Magnusson's survey (which needs to be 
treated with considerable caution because of the selectivity of the response)^ 
the average age of County Councillors was around 58 and there were very few 
Manual-Wprkers, Crofters or housewives on the Councils. ^  On the other 
hand the landowner/farmer group who might be expected to dominate only pro­
vided some 26-27% of the Councillors, though this of course is not a measure
17of their influence. In Inverness-shire particularly, many large land­
owners such as Lords Lovat, Burton, and Macdonald and Colonel Cameron of 
Lochiel, held Committee Chairmanships in the period considered in this thesis.
12. These results are summarised in Table V.
15* Kellas, p.225.
14. Ibid, p.225-6*
15. Which was only 60% of the total and almost certainly biased - perhaps in 
favour of the more active and more educated councillors? M. Magnusson,"Highland 
Administration" in Thomson & Grimble (eds.) The Future of the Highlands (Routledg 
& Kegan Paul, 1968)y, p.259-260. Magnueson says however that the County Clerks 
filled in some missing information.
P-T.O.
1 6 .  Ibid, p . 5 0 0 -5 0 1 .
17. Ibid.
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Table V: Summary of flection besuits in Pi ah land Constituencies IS1
Party Lumber1 of Seat
i1Ii 
oj
1! 
CO
i m 12£A 1566 15.7P
Con.servative 3 l 1 2
Independent Conservative 1 0 0 0
Labour 1 i 2 1
Liberal 1 4 3 2
Scottish National Party 0 0 0 1
%A list of all the voluntary groups that have an interest (in one or 
both senses of the word) in the Highlands would be extensive but the 
overwhelming majority of them would not have a mainly Highland membership. 
Indeed the point about a region like the Highlands with its extensive and 
beautiful tracks of undeveloped land is that it attracts the attention of 
many groups concerned with tourism, sport, recreation or conservation who 
may only have the most minimal Highland membership; that is to say their 
interest is in the Highlands as an area, irrespective of where their members 
come from. A (fairly random) list of such bodies could include the Caravan 
Club, the Camping Club of Great Britain and Ireland, the Scottish Wildlife 
Trust, the Association for the Preservation of Rural Scotland, the Scottish 
Mountaineering Club, the Scottish Federation of Sea Anglers, the British 
Federation of Land Sand Yacht Clubs and the Automobile Association. The 
National Trust for Scotland might be added here except that for various 
reasons I have chosen to consider it as an administrative body and it 
therefore finds itself in the next section.
Secondly there are groups whose interest in the Highlands derive 
from local members but which are dominated by non-Highland interests and 
spend relatively little time concerned with specifically Highland matters, 
e.g. the British Hotels, Restaurants and Caterers Association, the Association 
of County Councils, the Confederation of British Industries (very poorly 
represented in the region) and a number of unions such an the Transport 
and General Workers Union - which represents farm workers in Scotland.
The Scottish Trade Union Congress might be included in this group except for 
the fact that, despite a dearth of members north of the Highland line (a 
simple result of a small manufacturing sector), the S.T.U.C. does in fact 
give quite a lot of thought to Highland affairs. As we shall see in 
Chapter 4, they were the group who most consistently pressed for a develop­
ment board and since the War they have organised numerous conferences in
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and about the Highlands.
Thirdly there are the groups that are either Highland in origin or,
more often,are especially concerned with Highland matters, for one reason
or another. The most important of these are probably An Comunn Gaidhealach,
the Federation of Crofters Unions, the Scottish Landowners Federation, the
Scottish Woodland Owners Association and the National Farmers Union of
Scotland; something more needs to be said about each of these.
An Comunn Gaidhealach is not the only organisation dedicated to the
preservation of Gaelic (there is also the Scottish Language Society -
Comunn na Canain Albanaarbft, for instance) but it is the largest and best
known. Founded in 1891, its biggest single achievement is the organisation
of the National Mod, though nowadays its leaders are anxious to get away
from the idea that their main function is to arrange a sort of "Mammoth 
18•jamboree". Other activities include, or have included, pressure for the
teaching of Gaelic in schools, educational publishing, running Youth Camps
and Summer Schools and more recently *the promotion of the social and economic
19welfare of the Highland area*, though one suspects there is more hope than 
concrete achievement in this last category. The headquarters of An Comunn 
are at Inverness and in our period (1965-70) it was organised into two 
regions (North and South); since then a third region - the Western Isles - has 
been added. It has some 62 branches, over 4,000 members and a permanent 
staff of 10 headed by a Director; in 1970 an Assistant Director with an
office in Stornoway was appointed, and there is another office in Glasgow.
20At the head of the organisation is an Executive Council and President.
The Federation of Crofters Unions is, as its name suggests, an association 
joining together a number of individual territorial units. The various
Tq ". G.N.Bums, "An Comunn Gaidhealach", University of Edinburgh Journal. Dec. 
1971, p.132 and 133. Bums (the Director of An Comunn) does not accept that the 
Mod is just an entertainment but considers that it gives*positive encouragement 
to the language1.
19. Ibid, p.134*
20. Ibid, p.133.
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Crofters Unions were originally formed in the late 19th Century to fight 
for improvements in the Crofters1 position but with the decline in poverty 
and insecurity they had become largely moribund by the post-war years. Two 
proposals, one to change the rating position of crofters and the other the 
Crofters Commissions recommendation for amending legislation in 1959 (see
2i
Chapter 2) brought about their revival and in July 1962 the Federation was 
22set up. To begin with it seemed to incline towards state ownership of all
crofting land but after discussions with the Crofters Commision it came round
24
23
to favouring owner occupation, as did the Commision itself. The Crofters
Unions provide representatives on the Crofters Commision1s Panel of Assessors.
The Scottish Landowners Federation claims to be "the only body representa-
"25tive of rural land ownership in Scotland. It has a sort of division of
labour with the Scottish Woodland Owners Association and the N.F.U., the
former representing owners in so far as they are "foresters, the latter
representing them when they are agriculturalists (it also represents tenants
too) and the landowners federation itself representing them simply as owners.
Formed in 1906 its aims axe avowedly political: (ii "The encouragement of
legislative or administrative measures for the development of land and
property " and (ii) "The defence of the rights and interests of all
persons connected with the land against injurious legislation or administra-
26tion and exceptional and oppresive taxation." It also attempts to assist
its members to solve any problems they might have in the management of their
land. The Federation calculate that of the roughly 16J million acreas of
agricultural land, rough grazing and woodland in Scotland (of which some 
are
2 million acreas / publicly owned), their membership covers approximately
21. Crofters Commission, Annual Report for I960, p.7 and 1961, p.21-22.
22. " " « " " 1962, p.24.
23. " " " " 1966, p.13-14 and 1967, p.9.
24. » " " »t h 1966, p.9.
25. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs (sub-committee A), Session 1971-72 
"land Resource Use". Minutes of Evidence, 1/2/72, House of Go neons Paper 51-TI
P*145* ' P.T.O.
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27million acres. This membership includes both large and small owners
but the "man who simply owns his own farm and nothing else” is relatively
28less well represented. They oppose the Crofters Commission’s plan for
converting crofts to owner occupation, suggesting instead that only the
house and garden go to the Crofter, the rest of the croft land being made
29
available "for consolidation and reorganisation". x The Landowners 
Federation (like the Woodland Owners and the Farmers Union) is far from 
being a purely Highland body though that region probably gets a dispro­
portionate amount of attention.
Until 1959 private foresters were not represented other than through 
the Landowners Federation but in that year, as a result of recommendations 
made by the Committee on Marketing of Forest Produce (the Watson Committee), 
the Scottish Woodland Owners Association (S.W.O.A.) was formed. By the 
early seventies the area of managed private Woodlands stood at 600,000 
acres (Forestry Commission had just over 900,000 acres) and S.W.O.A. had
1,400 members, who between them owned about 370-380,000 acres; over half
30of the members were only small timber growers with less than 100 acres.
About 3>500-4,000 people were estimated to be wholly or partly employed in
31private woodlands. Like the N.F.U. but not the Landowners Federation,
S.W.O.A. stands in an ambiguous relationship towards the government for
while it is a pressure group pushing hard for more support for forestry
(in face of strong Treasury scepticism) it also cooperates with the Forestry
Commission to perform a number of administrative tasks concerned with such
32things as marketing, education and training, and research. As well as 
support of commercial forestry the Association also takes an interest in the
W.  Ibid.
28. Ibid, p.149.
29. Ibid, p.147.
30. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Minutes 28/3/72, H. of C. 51-xiii 
p.3^3 and Minutes, 18/1/72, H. of C. 51“iy» P-87* For detailed breakdown of 
membership see S.W.O.A. Ltd., Report of National Board and Statement of Account1 
30/9/72, p.13.
31. Seleot Committee, Minutes 18/1/72, H. of C. 51-iv, p.89.
P.T.0.
Scottish ..oodland Owners Association, Chairman's Statement, 30/9/72>
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use of woodland for the purposes of shelter and environmental improvement.
Less needs to be said about the National Farmers Union of Scotland as
the role of farmers unions in the political process has been the subject of
33much more discussion than any of the other groups. The Scottish N.F.U.
is organised into a number of Committees and sub-committees, some of which, 
like the Highland Committee and the Crofters Committee, deal solely with 
issues relevant to the Highlands, while others, like the Hill Farming Sub­
committee, concern matters which are very important to the region though not 
confined to it. Some of these committees spawn their own sub-committees 
dealing with particular issues or areas, such as the Moray Firth sub-committee 
of the Highland Committee, which from 1969 collaborated with H.I.D.B. in a
study of the effect on agriculture of the various urban and industrial
34developments that were beginning in the area. As might be expected the
general line of the N.F.U. towards (non-agricultural) development is that only
35in the most extreme cases should it be allowed to use up good farming land.
The final category of interest group that deserves a mention is that 
containing the one-issue groups whose concerns involve the Highlands. The 
activities of the Scottish Vigilantes Association in fighting against the 
.Beeching proposals to close the Highland railways are described in Chapter 
three and the Easter Ross Land Use Committee, a farmers1 group pressing for 
the preservation of agricultural land against the encroachment of industry 
on the Cromarty Firth, will play a big part in Chapter Six (Moray Firth 
Development). Two other single-issue groups perhaps deserve mention. One 
was the "North of Scotland Sponsoring Committee" whose aim was to persuade 
the U. Cr~.C• to set up a University of Inverness. Hiey were active in the 
early sixties and by the time H.I.D.B. came onto the scene they had already
33. See for instance P. Self and . v St at e and the Farmer (Allen &
Unwin, 1962). This actually deals with the National Farmers Union of England and 
Wales, but the Scottish position is not very different.
34. H.I.D.B. 4th Report, 1969* P*87 and 5th Report, 1970, p.28.
35» Select Committee, Minutes 25/1/72, H. of C. 51-v> p.113*
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lost to Stirling. More recently - at the end of the period under 
consideration - the "Save the Kyle Railway Line Committee" was created 
to do just what its name suggests. It is still active. And more 
recently still, developments related to North Sea Oil have caused the 
formation of a number of local groups; but this takes us outside the 
1965-70 period.
The Administrative Environment
In his chapter on Highland Administration, Magnus Magnusson quotes
one Farquhar Macintosh, a Skye headmaster, who in a letter to the *Glasgow
Herald1 counted forty-seven different bodies with some responsibility for
36administeringv the Highlands. One wonders why he got so few: appendix
VI to the Highlands and Islands Development Board*s memorandum to the 
Select Committee on Scottish Affairs in 19&9 lists "Departments and Bodies 
etc. connected with the Highlands and Islands and with whom the Board have 
contact" and names well over fifty not counting local authorities or 
private associations. Even then one of the members of the Select Committee 
complained that the list was not exhaustive; indeed it is fairly easy to find 
omissions. But mere enumeration is not a very instructive game and besides 
it is quite irrelevant to the Highlands as such. For, apart from local 
bodies, which would be replicated elsewhere, only six of the many agencies 
with some responsibilities in the area in 19^5 (before the introduction of 
H.I.D.B.) were specifically Highland bodies: the Highlands and Islands
Advisory Panel; the Highland Transport Board; the Crofters Commission and 
the Red Deer Commission - all Government appointed bodies - and the 
Highland Fund and Highland Home Industries which are closer to the non­
government -sod of the spectrum. Perhaps MacBraynes ought also to be
36. Magnusson, p.246.
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mentioned but that was (in 1965) an off-shoot of the Transport Holding
Company which had wider National responsibilities. The Multiplicity
of administrative agencies is, therefore, a national rather than a
37Highland phenomenon, ' the exceptional thing about the Highlands being 
the small number of people at the receiving end of all this administration; 
they suffer from a system designed for densely populated areas.
It is hardly possible to give an adequate description of all the 
administrative agencies that may at some time play a part in the Highlands.
To begin with this would mean mentioning all the Whitehall departments as 
even the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has some responsibili­
ties in Scotland (e.g. control of operations against foot and mouth disease). 
Obviously a selection has to be made on the grounds of importance and rele­
vance. The relevant agencies for our purposes are those concerned with 
the regional economy, its development and with land use. At the level 
of Great Britain departments, taking 19^5 as the base year, this meant 
chiefly the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour and secondarily 
the Ministries of Technology, Aviation,and Transport, and the Department 
of Economic Affairs. Perhaps mention ought also to be made of the Treasury 
not only for its role in the overall direction of the economy which would 
of course effect the Highlands like the rest of the country, but also 
because it is the department that services the Development Commission 
(see below). The importance of the Board of Trade lay in its responsibility 
for the issue of Industrial Development Certificates and its power to offer 
grants and loans to firms starting up in Development Districts (which 
included all parts of the Highlands). In order to try and coordinate the 
Board’.sduties concerning the distribution of industry with the interests of 
other departments in Scotland there was an interdepartmental committee 
called the Distribution of Industry Panel for Scotland to discuss such
37. Or even an international one cf. Wood’s 1400 fcovts. mentioned in 
Chapter One.
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matters. The Ministry of Labour's functions in Highland development 
were the obvious ones of the provision of Labour Exchanges and industrial 
and vocational training. Both the Ministry of Labour and the Board of 
Trade, though, ,h G.B. departments, had sizeable regional offices in 
Scotland based in Edinburgh and Glasgow respectively. The Ministry of 
Transport had responsibility for British Railways, the Transport Holding 
Company which controlled the Scottish Bus Group - providers of bus services 
in the Highlandsr- "MacBraynes, and the British Waterways Board (whose 
responsibilities in the Highlands were the Caledonian and Crinan canals).
It was not however in charge of roads or of subsidies to shipping services 
to the Islands. The organisation of transport, which is complex, is 
discussed in more detail below. Highland airports at this time came under 
Aviation and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Commission's establishment 
at Dounreay under Technology. Finally we have the Department of Economic 
Affairs, newly formed in 1965t with overall responsibilities for economic 
planning in general and regional development in particular. The Secretary 
of State for Scotland, working through the Regional Development Division 
at the Scottish Office, shared with the Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs responsibility for Scottish economic development and to this end 
two instruments were created - the Scottish Economic Planning Council and 
the Scottish Economic Planning Board. (These bodies replaced the Scottish 
Board for Industry, a Board of Trade off-shoot). The first was a broadly 
based advisory body consisting of (nominated) individuals from industry, 
local government, the trade unions, the universities, etc. and the second, 
which did the details of planning work, was made up of senior officials 
from the Scottish Office, Board of Trade, Ministry of Labour and other 
relevant departments. The Board was chaired by the Assistant Under 
Secretary of state who headed the Regional Development Division and both
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of the above bodies were serviced by this Division.
From 1965 to 1970 these G.B. departments underwent a bewildering 
variety of transformations. The Ministry of Aviation disappeared entirely 
in 1966, its airport and civil aviation functions, going to the B.O.T. and 
most of the rest to the Ministry of Technology. Mintech itself grew 
prodigiously, picking up odd functions from the ailing D.E.A. and in 1969 
absorbing the whole Ministry of Power, as well as assorted bits of the B.O.T.
such as responsibility for investment grants and Industrial Developments 
Certificates (B.O.T.'S powers in the field of regional development had grown 
enormously between 1965 and 1969 - see chapter 4). However, Mintech 
suffered the same fate as the old lady who swallowed a horse and after the 
1970 election it was merged with the B.O.T. to form the mighty Department 
of Trade and Industry. The D.E.A. was by this time already dead, its 
function^ parcelled out to the Treasury, Mintech and the Department of 
Employment and Productivity - a refurbished Ministry of Labour with prices 
and incomes responsibilities. The change of mood after the 1970 Con­
servative victory meant that prices and incomes policy and economic planning 
were no longer seen as wholly good things so the Department of Employment 
and Productivity became the plain Department of Employment, and the 
Scottish Economic Planning Council became the more neutral (or neutered) 
sounding Scottish Economic Council with its organisation cut down.
Finally the Ministry of Transport lost some of its responsibilities in 
Scotland with the 1968 Transport Act (see below) and was later combined 
with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of 
Public Buildings and Works to form the Department of the Environment
which is not of great importance in Scotland, (other than through its 
and
‘public building/^rorks* function).
TSie other section of the central government with duties affecting
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Highland development is of course the Secretary of State for Scotland 
and his four departments collectively making up the Scottish Office.
The departments are the Scottish Home and Health Department, the Scottish 
Education Department, the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for 
Scotland and the Scottish Development Department. The last two are the 
more important for our purposes. The Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for Scotland was, in 1965» the department chiefly concerned 
with Highland Development in all its aspects. Apart from its involve­
ment in the purely agricultural field - with price support, subsidies, 
grants and loans for land improvement and the like - it was the body 
with overall responsibility for harbours, ferries, steamer services and 
related matters in the Highlands, the department in charge of rural 
development through which Development Fund money was allocated, (see 
below), the servicing organisation for the Highlands and Islands Advisory 
$anel, (which however was wound up in 1965) * the department responsible 
for the Crofters Commission and the Red Deer Commission as well as the 
department involved with all aspects of Scottish fisheries. As in 
England, help in the performance of certain agricultural functions was 
given by^advisory committees and Agricultural Executive Committees con­
sisting of farmers nominated by the Secretary of State and organised by- 
areas (consisting of groups of counties).
The Scottish Development Department, established in 1962 after a 
reorganisation of the Scottish Office, was responsible for physical 
planning, housing, electricity(but not gas or coal which were under the 
Ministry of Power) water supplies and sewerage, local government and roads. 
The aspects of its work most closely related to Highland development 
were its responsibilities for Highland roads, the North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board, and the development of the Tourist potential of
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the countryside. In 1968 there was a major transfer of responsibility 
for rural development from D.A.F.S. to S.D.D. in which the latter won 
responsibility for the disbursement of Development Fund money (and 
therefore also for the organisationsdependant on that money),for shipping 
services in the Highlands and Islands and for the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board. In the same year the Countryside Commission was 
created and the Transport Act set up the Scottish Transport Group.
In 1969 a Statutory Scottish Tourist Board was formed. These bodies 
were under S.D.D., so that by 1970 it could be called the chief *Highland 
development1 department•
From central government to local, and the local authorities that 
have most importance for this study are the Councils of the seven counties 
of the area plus the one large burgh (Inverness). The Councils of the 
20 small burghs and, to an even greater extent, the 65 districts have 
only minor powers that are relevant to development. The importance of 
the County Councils lies in their physical planning and infrastructural 
powers - granting planning permission, building non-trunk roads, provision 
of sewerage and water supplies and the like. (Though since the 1967 
Water (Scotland) Act water supplies have been the responsibility of 
regional water boards and not Counties). One of the most notable things 
about Highland County Councils is their poverty - because of low rateable 
valuation, a large proportion of their income has to come from Government 
grants. In Orkney, Sutherland and Zetland over 'JQf/o of the relevant local 
expenditure was paid for by exchequer equalisation grant in 1959-60; only 
in Argyll did this figure drop to below 40% - and this does not include
2D
Government grants for specific undertakings. With large or widely
scattered areas (often separated by water) to administer and little
58. Review of Highland Policy, G M U - 1  785 (H.M.S.O., 1959)> p.10.
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revenue to do it on ,this alone would be likely to hamper the development 
effort of the local authorities.
In addition to what may be called the orthodox branches of government - 
the central departments and local authorities - modem administration 
breeds a very large number of ad hoc agencies - committees, commissions, 
boards and associations, with varying constitutions and functions. In 
any discussion of Highland administration, again taking 1965 as the base 
year, would have to mention the following at leasts the Forestry Commission; 
North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board; Crofters Commission; Red Deer 
Commission; Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel; Highland Transport Board; 
Herring Industry Board; White Fish Authority; United Kingdom Atomic Ehergy 
Authority; Development Commission; Nature Conservancy; the North of Scotland 
College of Agriculture and the West of Scotland Agricultural College; 
Scottish Country Industries Development Trust; Highland Fund; Highland 
Home Industries; Scottish Agricultural Organisation Society and the 
societies affiliated to it; National Trust for Scotland; Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry); Scottish Council of Social Service and the 
various local Councils of Social Service; Scottish Land Court; Scottish 
Tourist Board; the relevant off-shoots of the Transport Holding Company,
i.e. MacBraynes and the Scottish Bus Group. Perhaps mention should 
also be made of the Agricultural Research Institutes; the Marketing 
Boards (Wool, Milk, etc.), the Scottish Craft Centre and the Industrial 
Estates Management Corporation for Scotland (later renamed the Scottish 
Industrial Estates Corporation) which was to be given the power to act 
as agent for the Highlands and Islands Development Board in the management 
of land and the erection of buildings (e.g. advance factories).
Each of these bodies had carved itself a niche by the time that 
H.I.D.B. was created and the introduction of the latter brought about 
very few admixiistrative casualities. The Highlands and Islands Advisory
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Panel disappeared, its advisory work going to H.I.D.B. itself and to its 
Consultative Council. The Highland Transport Board, which anyway had 
only "been appointed for three years in 1963> was wound up after it 
produced its report late in 1%6 - oversight (but not executive powers) 
of Highland transport also passing to H.I.D.B. Apart from this the 
only change was that the Scottish Country Industry Development Trust was 
limited in its work to counties other than the seven crofting ones.
During 1965-70 there were other changes: a Countryside Commission for Scotland
was created, the Scottish Tourist Board became a statutary body, the 
Scottish Transport Group was formed and took over the Scottish duties of 
the Transport Holding Company, a Joint Committee of Industrial Training 
Boards for the Highlands and Islands was constituted and there were various 
smaller changes which are mentioned below.
It should not be thought that all the bodies that have been cavalierly 
lumped together above in fact belong to the same species of organisation.
Not only do they differ widely in size and range of activities, they have 
also, more crucially, very different relations with the government. For 
although, (as was said in chapter one) it is not possible to draw a clear 
line between bodies that are state, governmental or ’public* organisations 
and those that are non-state, non-governmental or ’private*, nevertheless 
some of the agencies mentioned can definitely be called government bodies 
whereas others come much nearer the private end of the spectrum. To give 
examples of the range: the Forestry Commission is in some ways like an
ordinary department receiving its money by direct parliamentary vote and 
also directly responsible to a Minister (or rather three ministers-in 1965» 
the Minister of Land and Natural Resources in England and the Secretar^esfof 
State for Scotland and Wales in those two countries). On the other hand 
its staff are not recruited as ordinary civil servants and it is headed 
by a specially appointed body of Commissioners. Bodies like the Herring
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Industry Board and the Crofters Commission, though statutory, differ from the 
Forestry Commission in being financially and politically directed through 
other departments - in the case of the Crofters Commission it is D.A.F.S.
The Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel had no statutory powers or duties 
but was wholly government appointed whereas the Scottish Tourist Board, 
also non-statutory (in 1965)» had some of its members appointed by the 
Secretary of State, some by local authority associations, and some by 
private bodies. The Scottish CouiST^^I^^^uid Industry) is similar to 
the Tourist Board but with a lower proportion of Government nominees.
Finally the Highland Fund and the Scottish Agricultural Organisation 
Society have no members appointed by the Government but because they are 
performing functions approved 'of by the Government they do receive 
grants-in-aid - a category of not-quite-non-govemmental.
How do all these organisations, whatever their relation to the 
Government, fit into Highland administration? In order to look at this 
the field can be divided up for convenience into a number of areas e.g. 
development of rural industries, agriculture, fisheries, tourism and 
recreation, and transport. Until H.I.D.B. was set up the main source of 
finance for the development of specifically rural industries, in the 
Highlands and Islands as in Britain as a whole, was the Development 
Commission. Set up by the Development and Road Improvement Funds Acts 
1909 and 1910, mainly to promote agricultural research and advisory 
services and improvement of rural transport,the Commissionbaoadtrivi'feies 
gradually declined as these functions increasingly became the responsibility 
of Government departments. This is reflected in the fact that after the 
Commission abandoned annual reports in 1940 another report was not produced 
until 1961. ^  Though a shadow of its former self the Commission did
39. Thirtieth Report of the Development Commissioners for the period 
ended the 31st March 1961# H.C.ll (1961-62), (H.M.S.O. 1961), p.l.
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not wither away entirely. Instead the Commissioners broadly interpreted 
the Acts and sought to fill the remaining lacunae left by the rapidly 
expanding government concern for * rural development1. By the 1960's 
this meant they were providing money for the following things: (i) advice
and instruction to rural industries; (ii) experimental schemes; (iii)
Voluntary bodies; (iv) provision of rural factories; (v) marketing and 
cooperative schemes; (vi) research, especially as regards fisheries. ^
The Development Commission was under the Treasury and consisted of
8 Commissioners who included (in 19^5) William Scholes, a Scottish Trade
Unionist who was to become a part-time member of H.I.D.B. Their job was
to consider and report to the Treasury all applications for advances from
the Development Fund. Such advances could be claimed by any organisation,
not trading for profit, whose work was relevant to rural development.
Applications are referred to the relevant Government departments for their
advice and any grant or loan given is not paid direct from the Commissioner’s
office but through a department - in the case of Scotland it was D.A.F.S.
until 1968 and S.D.D. thereafter. The Treasury can veto any recommendation
41made by the Commissioners but cannot advance its own. It all seems an
elaborately cautious and no doubt time consuming procedure for what are, 
after all, fairly small sums - a reflection of the possibly excessive 
Treasury concern that ’public money* should not be mis-spent.
Who were the beneficiaries of the Development Fund? One of them was 
the Scottish Country Industries Development Trust. This body, whose 
members are appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with 
the Development Commission, assisted the development of small rural industries 
by giving advice and instruction and acting as agents for the Rural Industries
40. Ibid, p.2-3.
41. Ibid, p.3.
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Loan Fund in Scotland. In 1968 the Trust was transformed into the 
Small Industries Council for ftural Areas of Scotland but long before 
that time its role in the Highland counties had become minimal, firstly 
because of a division of labour between it and the Highland Fund in 1963 
over the granting of loans and then after 1965 because the same functions 
were performed by H.I.D.B.
The Highland Fund began life in 1953 as a completely private organi­
sation free of any government ties. It was formed, as a non-profit 
making company limited by guarantee, specifically for the purpose of providing 
loans in the Highlands and Islands "at marginal rates of interest and without
A  O
security other than the applicants character and ability”. Most of
its money was a gift of one businessman who contributed in all £144*945 
to the Fund. In 1963 the Treasury, through the Development Commission, set 
up an official loan fund of £150,000 in the seven crofting countries for 
which the Highland Fund became agents. The Rural Industries Loan Fund 
administered by the Scottish Country Industries Development Trust was 
limited to other parts of Scotland. HVhen H.I.D.B. was set up the Treasury 
Scheme was suspended and as the loans were repaid the money was taken back 
again by the Treasury and the Highland Fund again reverting to a more private 
status. In 1965 (and since) the Chairman of the Fund was John Rollo, the 
first Deputy Chairman of H.I.D.B.
Other Highland bodies getting money from the Development Fund, either
a
regularly or from time to time, include Highland Home Industries, /non-profit 
involved
making bodyy / in marketing Highland products like woollens and knitwear; 
various cooperatives like Shetland Knitters Association ,7.:. Hebridian 
Bulb Growers and Lewis Crofters Ltd. - all aided through the Scottish 
Agricultural Organisation Society (see below) - and, through the Scottish 
Council of Social Service, money is given to the various Rural Councils
42. Hie Highland Fund, 1971* Annual Report, p.7*
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of Social Service in the Highlands; by 19&5 such local councils existed 
on Skye, Mull and Iona, Shetland, Harris and in North a£ad West Sutherland.
Both the Scottish Council of Social Service and the local Rural
Councils are voluntary bodies with members consisting both of individuals
and other organisations, particularly voluntary associations, but, in the
case of S.C.S.S. at least, also trade unions and professional associations,
religious bodies and the local authority association. S.C.S.S. involves
itself in a variety of activities including rural development, particularly
of a 1 social* kind (e.g. building village halls), the welfare of the aged,
the handicapp^scf^hildren and the running of Citizens Advice Bureaux. . Like
Development
the Scottish Council (_/\ and Industry) iis links with the govemmeai are 
financial—in the financial year 1965-66, over £16,000 of its total income 
of £28,287 came from Government sources the largest of which was the grant 
of £7,185 from the Development Commission. ^  As is usual with organisations 
receiving government money, assessors from the relevant departments were 
members of the Council.
The S.C.S.S. has a Rural Community Development committee which deals 
with the topics of greatest interest to the local Rural Councils (themselves 
members of S.C.S.S.). These Rural Councils of Social Service, despite 
their name seem chiefly to deal, in the Highlands at least, with community 
development, including the promotion of their areas for tourist purposes, 
rather than * social service ■* as such. They were used by the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board as broadly based representation bodies whose views 
were a good indication of opinion in the area and perhaps because of this 
they began to mushroom between 1965-70 with councils created in Barra and 
Vatersay, Tiree, Islay, Orkney, Lewis, South Uist and Benbecula, Morvem, 
Ardnamurchan and Moidart, and Easter Ross and Black Isle. A Federation of
43. Scottish Council of Social Service, 23rd Annual Report 1965-66, p.21.
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Highlands and Islands Councils of Social Service was also formed. Small
grants from the Development Commission, channelled through S.C.S.S., were
available and by 1970 the larger Councils-Orkney, Shetland and Lewis-had
44full-time secretaries paid out of Development Commission money.
Clearly the Development Fund was a useful source of finance for bodies
in the Highlands that would otherwise be very hard up but the sums involved
were in fact very small. In 1965 over "the country as a whole the Development
45Commission only spent £741,165 agricultural and rural development,
and there were many rural areas other than the Highlands claiming their ahaofe*.,
Whatever proportion went to the Highlands it would have been a tiny fraction
of the £35™. spent by the Secretary of Separtments and the Forestry
46Commission in the area.
There is another body interested in the promotion of 'the industrial
and social development' of Scotland and that is the Scottish Council
(Development and Industry). As a body concerned with the whole of Scotland
and chiefly interested in industry its activities are not surprisingly
heavily concentrated in the Central lowlands. Formed in 1946 by a mstger
on
of the Scottish Development Council and the Scottish Council/industry it is* 
like the S.C.S.S., a voluntary body whose members consist mainly of other 
organisations with a sprinkling of private individuals. In this case the 
organisations are Qompanies, banks, Chambers of Commerce, Trade Unions, local 
authorities and their associations. The Secretary of State for Scotland 
nominatesthe Chairman and two members of ifche executive, thus giving the body 
a semi-official status. Other members of the executive are supposed to 
represent the various member organisations. The Council receives a government
44. S.C.S.S., 28th Annual Report 1970/71, p.13*
45» Aspects of Rural Development, 32nd Report of the Development Commissions 
for the three Years Ended 31st March, 1965, H.C.100 (1966-67) (H.M.S.O. 1966) 
p.37. A further £801,407 was given towards fisheries research.
46. H. C. Deb., Vol.725,Cbls.'287-8.
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grant but it is a fairly small proportion of its total income (some of
which also comes from local authorities, (through their membership). Its
Upwork is mainly promotional and educational including the setting />f committees 
of inquiry, and it played a part in getting Wiggins Teape to come to 
Lochaber. (see chapter 3).
The main industry in the Highlands is agriculture and that is the 
province of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland with 
its executive committees and field officers. In addition to D.A.F.S. 
the colleges of agriculture play an important part in research and educational
work. The seven crofting counties are divided between two of Scotlands's
of
3 colleges and neither / them are chiefly concerned with the problems
of hill farming. Argyll comes under the West of Scotland Agricultural
College in Glasgow and all the other counties are under the North of Scotland
College of Agriculture in Aberdeen. It was a division that particularly
47incensed Fraser Darling in the 7/est Highland Survey. In addition to
the Colleges are the various specialised agricultural research institutes,
e.g. the Macaulay Institute for Soil Research and the Hill Farming Research
Institute, doing work work of varying relevance to the Highlands.
Cooperatives have their own special body, the Scottish Agricultural
Organisation Society Ltd., the central organisation in Scotland for the
promotion and organisation of cooperation in agriculture, horticulture,
48fisheries and rural industries." As this description suggests S.A.O.S. 
does not trade on its own account but offers a management consultancy and 
accountancy services for the cooperatives affiliated to it. By 1970/71 
there were 26 affiliated societies (not counting rabbit clearance societies) 
in the Highlands, 14 of them in Orkney alone. Other members of S.A.O.S. 
include the Federation of Crofters Unions, the National Farmers Union of 
Scotland, the Scottish Landowners Federation and private individuals.
47. Darling, p. 360.
48. Scottish Agricultural Organisation Society Ltd., 65th Annual Report,
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cooperatives
S.A.O.S. is a sort of cooperative of ooo^-:.■ n with each member,
individual ot°cS$X?t?* holding one £1 share. Although once again it is
an apparently private body it is performing services considered desirable
49by the government and over 80% of its income comes from D.A.F.S.
S.A.O.S. is the channel through which money from the Development Commission 
to individual cooperatives passes and it also manages a credit giving body 
of its own called Agri-Finance (Scotland) Ltd. Prophet Smith, one of the 
members of H.I.D.B., was until 1965 a senior member of the Society’s staff.
One aspect of the agricultural situation in the Highlands is unique: 
crofting. This has its own administrative bodies consisting of the 
Crofters Commission and the Scottish Land Court. The background to 
crofting and the work of the Commission are described in chapter 3> here it is 
only necessary to look at its organisational aspects. The Crofters Commission 
is an ad hoc statutory body with powers and duties defined by the Crofters 
(Scotland) Acts 1955 a^d 1961. In 1965 it consisted of one full-time member, 
James Shaw Grant,and seven part-time members, one of whom, J.C. Robertson, 
left in that year to become a full-time member of H.I.D.B. All the members 
of the Commission were appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland and 
the Commission is accountable to D.A.F.S. using r~ that department’s staff 
in the field, as the Commissions own small staff a±e balbg at the head 
office in Inverness. Despite these ties to D.A.F.S. the Commission was 
anxious to establish itself in the eyes of the crofters as independent of 
the ’government* - perceived as being remote and unsympathetic. By 1965 
the Commissioners were organised by area - each one being responsible for 
a part of the seven counties. The Commission also has a Panel of Assessors, 
a sort of consultative council selected by the Commission on the basis of 
recommendations by the crofters and made up of a number of people (themselves 
crofters) drawn from each area, actual numbers depending on the strength of
49* Scottish Agricultural Organisation Society Ltd., 65th Report
1971, p.17.
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crofting in the area. (e.g. Shetland has fifteen assessors and Orkney
consultative council type bodies to have any pretension to popular 
selection of its members.
The other institution dealing with crofting is the Scottish Land 
Court. In fact this body has responsibilities for the whole of Scotland 
but the overwhelming bulk of its work is in the crofting counties: in
511965 of 1284 applications for hearings, 1208 came from the seven counties. 
Most of its work proceeds under the Small Landholders (Scotland) Acts 1886 
to 1951 a*1*! "the Crofters (Scotland) Acts 1955 and 1961; it consists of 
rulings and decisions concerning such things as fair rents, compensation, 
resumption of crofting land, enlargements of holdings, and the like.
As has been noted before, crofters are by no means solely agricul­
turalists. Many have 'ancillary* occupations which in some cases provide
52the bulk of their income; fishing is one of the most important of these.
In Scotland it comes under D.A.F.S. but there are also two U.K. wide 
statutory bodies involved in its administration - the Herring Industry 
Board and the White Fish Authority. Both have certain similarities - 
they come under a triumvirate of ministers, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food for England and Wales, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland and the Home Secretary for northern Ireland,and they are unusual 
among the statutory bodies discussed here in getting much of their finance 
from a levy on the relevant industry so that the beneficiaries of their 
administrative work have to pay for it. The Herring Industry Board is
50. The Crofters Commission, Annual Report for 1970 (H.M.S.O. 197l),p.39.
51. The Scottish Land Court, Report as to Proceedings, January 1965 to 
31st December 1965» Cmnd. 2967 (H.M.SOO., 1966), p.22.
52. An up to date discussion of fishing administration in general is given 
by C.C. Hood, "Fishing Politics^ and Administration” (Unpublished, Glasgow 
University, 1972).
five). The function of this Panel is to keep the Commission in
touch with crofting opinion unusual in being one of the few
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the older body going back to 1935, its concerns are those its name suggests -
herring fisheries - and as these are concentrated in Scottish waters the
Board itself is primarily a Scottish body, based in Edinburgh. As well
as regulating the domestic herring industry and sponsoring research the
board also has a grants and loans scheme for new boats and for processing
plants which by 1965 was regulated by the Sea Fish Industry Act 1962 and
subsequent statutory instruments (as was a similar scheme run by the
White Fish Authority). H.I.B. consisted of a Chairman and three members
and was backed up by a Herring Industiy Advisory' Council representing not
only fishermen but the dealers on shore and consumers. In 1964 the Board
gave grants totalling £27,213 and loans amounting to £40,613 in the
Highlands and Islands again. Their total expenditure was £172,047
(in the financial year 1964-65) of which some £101,470 came from the levy. ^
The White Fish Authority was only set up in its present form after the
Sea Fish Industry Act 1951 But it did have a predesessor in the White Fish
Commission created in 1938* It has a rather broader field than H.I.B. as
it deals not. only with aftiL-lMhdtftibfish but with shell fish as well. The
Committee of six members sits in London but there is a special Committee
for Scotland and Northern Ireland in Edinburgh (this was in 1965). The
latter however has no power to offer money without the approval of the main
Committee. W.F.A. fs functions are similar to H.I.B.'s - it regulates the
industry, sponsors research and offers grants and loans. It too is supported
of
by an advisory Committee composed "/representatives of all parts of the white
fish industry plus consumers. The income of W.F.A. in 1964/65 was £1,763,733
of which £526,715 came from the levy and most of the rest was interest on 
55loans (the Authority borrows from the exchequer and reloans at greater 
rate of interest). In the Highlands the Authority gave £26,928 in grants
53. H.C. Deb. Vol.708, cols 199-202.
54. Herring Industry Board, 31st Annual Report, Cmnd. 3003.
55. White Fish Authority Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31st 
March 1965, (H.C.246 (1964-65), (H.M.S.0. 1965), p.50.
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and lent £50,153:^  in other words though W.F.A. is much bigger than H.I.B.
in terms of money disbursed it spent proportionately much less in the
Highlands. Much of the most valuable white fishing is done by the trawler
fleet, boats over 80ft. registered length, based in the large ports like
Aberdeen, Hull and Grimbsy. The Highland ports had no boats of this size
and although W.F.A. also dealt with inshore fishing it appears to take
more interest in the East Coast. The Herring Industry Board had a larger
role in the Highlands and even had a processing factory in Stornoway, but all
in all, fishing in the region, particularly on the West Coast and Western
Isles,was at a low ebb by the early I960*s. It was because of this that
the Highland Fund, D.A.F.S., the Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel and
the Macaulay Trust (which dealt with the bequest of a Lewis man who had
emigrated to Rhodesia and made his fortune) got together to set up, with
the assistance of the two fishing authorities, the Outer Isles Fisheries
57Training Scheme which was adopted and extended by H.I.D.B. after 1965*
Another industry of great importance to the Highlands, tourism, 
took rather longer to be brou^vt under the web of statutory authorities.
By 1965 the Scottish Tourist Board, for long unsupported financially by
CO
the government  ^ was still only receiving small sums. Of the board of 13*
3 members were nominees of the Secretary of State for Scotland though the 
•public1 complement was in reality higher as another 3 members represented 
the transport interests, many of which axe nationalised industries. The 
Tourist Board engaged in publicity, promotions, making registers of approved 
accommodation and general exhortation of all concerned to try harder. In 
1965 it received £75*000 from the Gojy®rnment for three years research ^
56. H.C. Deb, Vol. 708, Cols. 199-207.
57. ftie Highland Fund, 1971 Annual Report, p.9. For details see chap. 5.
58. From choice rather than necessity - at least at first. See T. Johnston, 
Memories. (Collins, 1952) p.191-2.
59. Magnusson, p.281. The Tourist Board had been getting £15,000 a year 
from the Government since i960.
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but by the time the results were published the old voluntary Board had
been replaced by a statutory body resulting from the Development of
Tourism Act 1969. This act set up a British Tourist Authority as an
overall coordinating body and the official organisation for selling Britain
to potential visitors a b r o a d b e l o w  it were English, Scottish and
Welsh Tourist Boards. The Scottish Tourist Board is appointed by the
Secretary of State for Scotland, and, like its sister Boards, engages in
publicity, research etc. and also has the power to prepare and finance
schemes to improve tourist facilities or to aid by grant, loan or the
purchase of stocks or shares other organisations improving such facilities.
On top of this the Boards are empowered to aid hotel development by offering
grants and loans. It would probably be fair to say that these powers would
five years before, have been rather surprising and that they were accepted
in 1969 at least partly because the Highlands and Islands Development Board
had paved the way. One of Scotland’s chief attraction for tourists is
generally considered to be its scenery, so of course it would hardly do if
there were no institutions to look after it. The Countryside (Scotland)
Act 1967 duly created the Countryside Commission for Scotland which began
work on 1st April 1968. Its duties are to keep under review all matters
relating to the improvement of facilities for enjoying the countryside,
securing public access to it and conserving its natural beauty. To these
ends it may initiate its own schemes and advise local authorities as to
their powers under the act - such as those relating to the creation of
country parks. The Commission has no full-time members - the Chairman is
part-time and, all the other 13 members are unpaid. They included Sir 
a
James MacKay,/member of H.I.D.B. (and also a member of the Scottish Tourist 
Board). In 1969-70 the grant-in-aid to the Countryside Commission was 
£73.000.60
60. Countryside Commission for Scotland, Third Report, 1st January, 1970 to 
31at December 1970, p.44.
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The Commission was charged with conserving the natural beauty of the 
countryside but the main body concerned with conservation of flora and fauna 
in general is the Nature Conservancy. Formed by Royal Charter in 1949 and 
concerned with ecology long before that subject was blessed with the 
accolade of fashion, the Conservancy was until 1965 311 independent body 
of scientists (including Dudley Stamp and Frank Fraser Darling). Its 
functions were the conservation and control of natural flora and fauna in 
Britain, ecological and other relevant scientific research!.and creation and 
management of National Nature Reserves. In 1965, following recommendations 
of the Committee of Enquiry into the Organisation of the Civil Service,a 
Natural Environment Research Council, responsible to the Department of 
Education and Science, was created and the Nature Conservancy became part 
of it. The change was only relevant at the very top as the whole organisation 
of the Nature Conservancy was otherwise kept intact and it simply became one 
of the four Committees of the Natural Environment Research Council. As by 
far the largest area of 'wild* and sparsely inhabited country in Britain, 
the Highlands and Islands were a particularly important region for the 
Conservancy - which among other areas owns the whole of the island of Ehum.
That bit of Highland fauna that must be one of the main candidates for 
Conservation and control* is the red deer, Britian*s largest wild animal.
Deer have come to symbolize one aspect of the Highland scene and quarrels 
between agricultural and sporting interests over their control have a long 
and singularly acrimonious histoxy. Naturally the sportsmen were in favour 
of keeping numbers up and preventing poaching whereas farmers and crofters 
who suffered the depredations of marauding deer wanted the herds culled and 
the right to shoot deer on their land. This right they gained - provided 
the land was enclosed - in the Agriculture (Scotland) Act 1948. This act 
had other provisions relating to deer but these remained a dead letter as 
the interests continued wrangling. Not until 1959 was enough agreement
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reached to pass a Deer (Scotland) Act which established a close season for 
shooting deer, penalties for poaching and set up a Red Deer Commission.
The Commission contains a nice balance of interests - under an independent 
chairman there are 12 members, five representing sporting and landowning 
interests, five agricultural and crofting interests and two nominees of 
the Nature Conservancy. Their job is the conservation and control of red 
deer and while the conservation function only consists of giving advice, 
control includes such things as the -shooting of marauding deer and culling 
stocks by agreement with the landowner. The Commission also conduct a 
deer census and organise:, deer management studies. Their powers were 
extended in various minor ways by the Deer (Amendment) (Scotland) Act, 1967 
and the Sale of Venison (Scotland) Act 1968.
There is one other body involved in a major way with conservation - the 
National Trust for Scotland. It is the only institution mentioned in this 
section that does not receive a large sum of money from the exchequer and 
as it has no government appointed members on its executive it might be 
thought that it should be discussed under the heading of interest groups.
Yet it acts more like an arm of the administration than a private interest 
group - a memorandum submitted by Trust said that it was analogous to the 
U.S. National Park Service and as its purposes and duties are defined 
by a series of acts called the National Trust for Scotland Order Conformation 
Acts 1935-1961 Xon top of which it is named as a beneficiary in legislature 
like the Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act, 1953, and the Country­
side (Scotland) Act 1967) it can hardly be said to be a wholly non-govem- 
mental body. Set up in 1931 with the status of a charity, it had by 1965 
about 29,000 members. It is governed by a council mostly consisting of 
individuals elected, at least in theory, by the members and of representatives
61. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs (Sub-Committee A), Session 1971-72, 
Land Resource Use; Minutes of Evidence Tuesday, 8th Feb. 1972. H.C.51-vii 
(H.M.S.O., 1972), p.168.
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of various interested bodies (which range from the City Corporations to the
Scottish Mountaineering Club). Its aim is the preservation of land or
buildings of historical, aesthetic or scientific interest and to this end
62
it owns 80 properties and 80,000 acres of land.
Transport is a major, pdrjiaps the major source of friction between
the Highlands and, especially, the Islands as a whole and the Central
criticised
Government but although its organisation is sometimes c / : it is
are
coststhat-i/ the main source of complaint. The administration of
transport is in fact complex and will only be sketched here. Firstly
air services,which are quite separate from the rest, came in 19&5 "under
the Ministry of Aviation and when that was wound up in 1966 under the
Board of Trade. Aviation/B.O.T. ran the Highland airports and were
responsible for the Main Airline providing the services - B.E.A. In
63its evidence to the Edwards Committee  ^ H.I.D.B. asked for a special 
Highland network as a subsidiary*of B.E.A. and the Committee agreed that 
the region required some special status. Roads since 1962 have been 
under S.D.D. It builds trunk roads, the Counties the others, but under 
the Crofter Counties Programme they get 100% grants for improving principal
64 /■roads. In 1965 most other transport administration was governed by
the provisions of the 1962 Act. This set up, under the Ministry of 
Transport, a number of bodies including The British Railways Board,
(whose Highland responsibilities included not only railways but the 
Caledonian Steam Packet Co. which operated the Clyde Coast Shipping 
services) and the British Waterways Board responsible for the Caledonian 
and Crinan Canals. There was also the Transport Holding Company among 
whose subsidiaries were the component companies of the Scottish Bus Group, 
the various nationalised road freight companies and David MacBrayne Ltd. 
the company providing shipping, other transport, and tourist services in
62. The National Trust for Scotland, Yearbook 1966, p.38 gives the 
membership statistics.
63. Committee of Inquiry into Transport, British Air Transport
P.T.O.
in the Seventies Cmnd 4018, (: .'..3.0. 1969; paragraph 786-9.
64. ocottish nevelooment department, Pieoort for 1970, Cr.nd. 4675 6 * 
1971), p.63.
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the Western Highlands and Islands. 50% of MacBrayne*s..Shares belonged 
to the Transport Holding Company and the other 50%, to Coast Lines Ltd.
The Transport Holding Company as a whole was run on a commercial under­
taking but MacBraynes received a subsidy from D.A.F.S. which also sub­
sidised the private shipping lines serving Orkney and Shetland (chiefly 
the North of Scotland, Orkney and Shetland Shipping Co.).
All this was transformed by the 1968 Transport Act. The Transport
Holding Co. ceased to be, a new National Freight Corporation taking over
its road haulage subsidiaries. A Scottish Transport Group under S.D.D.
was formed and this became responsible for MacBrayneA, J the Scottish
Bus Group Companies and the Caledonian Steam Packet Co. S.D.D. took
over from D.A.F.S. responsibility for subsidies to shipping companies
in the Highlands and Islands. In July 1969 the Scottish Transport Group
65acquired the remaining half share in MacBraynes. Overseeing all this
from the consumers point of view is the Scottish Transport Users Consul­
tative Committee, appointed by the Minister of Transport up to 1968 and 
the Secretary of State for Scotland thereafter. They consider the 
services provided by the nationalised transport companies and give re­
commendations to the Minister/Secretary of State. Finally and peculiar 
to the Highlands was the Highland Transport Board commissioned in 1963 
by the Secretary of State for Scotland to take a detailed look at Highland 
Transport for three years and to make recommendations on how it might be 
improved. This body had no executive powers and when it produced its 
report after 3 years it was wound up and its advisory function passed to 
H.I.D.B.
In this discussion of all the many bodies, statutory and voluntary, 
that play some part in the administration of Highland Development no 
mention has yet been made of the two that were in 1965 easily the most 
important in terms of money spent, jobs produced and the geographical 
range of their activities: the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board
65. Ibid, p.53.
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and the Forestry Commission. The Hydro Board, to give it its popular 
name, spent, in the financial year 1964-65» £18*4m. °n capital invest- 
ment in fixed assets and employed 3*725 people. Not all this
expenditure or employment would have "been in the Crofting Counties as 
the Hydro Board*s area extends over the whole of Scotland, north of a 
line joining the lower Clyde to the Tay and including Aberdeen, Dundee 
and Perth but their major concern is hydro electric generation and 
much of this takes place within the crofting counties (although the Tay 
catchment is outside). The North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board was 
formed in 1943 following the Hydro-Electric Development (Scotland) Act 
1943 and was concerned only with water power. After all electricity 
generation and distribution was nationalised under the Electricity Act 
1947 it gained responsibility for steam and diesel generators within its 
area.' as well. It is a typical public corporation, formally autonomous 
in day to day matters but under the general direction of the Secretary 
of State for Scotland through S.D.D. The Board itself has a chairman 
and nine members, all part time except for the general manager,and is 
advised in the usual way by an Electricity Consultative Committee appointed 
by the Secretary of State; since 1965 it has gained statutory committees 
on fisheries and amenity which give some more precise meaning to the 
vague * social clauses' in the original acts. The Hydro Board can
done
involve itself with industrial promotion but it doesn't seem to have/so
to any great extent by 1965t concentrating instead on a campaign of rural 
electrification
^  /.’ic-Lkji so that by that year 93% of all premises had electricity supplies. 
N.S.H.E.B. is not the only producer of power in the crofting counties:
in 1954 the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Commission came to Dounreay in
66. S.D.D. Report for 1965, Cmnd 2948 (H.M.S.O. 1966) p.33.
67. The North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board, Report for the Year 1st April 
1964 to 31st March 1965, H.C. 207 (1964)^5) H.M.S.O. 1965), p.28.
68. See Map II.
69. Ibid, p.x.
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Caithness. The Authority, constituted under the Atomic Energy Authority
Act 1954, whose members were (in 1965) appointed by the Ministry of
Technology is important in the Highlands mainly because of the employment
it creates in the Thurso area.
The Forestry Commission is also a major source of jobs - it employed
703890 workers in Scotland in 1965 ' of which, at an estimation, somewhat
71less than half would have been in the seven counties. Its expenditure
in the Highlands was £l»5m. in 1964 ,39% the Scottish total for that
72year (the average is nearer 42%). The Commission was first formed in 
1919 but was reconstituted by the Forestry Act 1945 and changed again in 1965 
when it was decided that a proportion of the Forestry Commission, hitherto 
all part-timers, should be full-time executives. After this reform the 
Chairman and five members remained part time but the Director General 
became deputy Chairman and there were three other full time members. It
has already been said that the Forestry Commission received its money by
a direct parliamentary vote and not through any other department and that 
it is under the control of three ministers. Like most of the other 
statutory bodies it has its advisory committees - a regular army of them 
in this case, one for each of the regional conservancies (there are four
in Scotland), one for each nation and the Home Grown Timber Advisory
Committee for the whole country. Both the Forestry Commission and the 
Hydro Board are under serious cross-pressures - on the one hand to be 
’commercially viable*, that is make as much money as they can, and on 
the other to accept 'social responsibilities' which means in effect 
doing things that are liable to lose money, like starting a plantation 
on not very suitable land in order to provide employment for a crofting 
community.
70. 46th Annual Report of the Forestry Commissioners for the year ended 30th 
September, 1965, H.C.97 (1966/67) (H.M.S.O. 1966), p.57.
71. Cmnd. 2864, p.143 gives the total number of those employed in connection 
with forestry in the Highlands, as 2,900 but this includes private forestry 
workers, contractors, haulage workers, etc.
P.T.0.
72. c.C. Ueb, Vol.708, cols. 199-202.
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Finally, a brief word about the Highlands and Islands Advisory 
Panel. As the activities of this body will be mentioned in the next 
chapter, there is very little that needs saying especially as the Panel 
has only slight relevance as an administrative body, partly because it 
had no ?xecu#±ve functions and partly because it ceased to exist with 
the birth of H.I.D.B. It was in fact another of these advisory or
consultative committees that abound, differing from most of them in that 
it did not advise any particular agency but the Secretary of State for 
Scotland himself, on all matters relating to the Highlands and Islands.
It was formed in 1947 hut showed most signs of life in the sixties. Some 
of its members, including Lord Cameron the second Chairman, went on to 
become members of the Highlands -arid Islands Development Consultative 
and there was a considerable overlap in membership with the 
Crofters Commission.
Such a large number of bodies working in the same area are an 
obvious source of potential problems. Firstly there are administrative 
lacunae, the gaps that occur when each agency thinks that such and such 
a thing is the responsibility of somebody else so that it is simply 
forgotten about by everybody. Then there are cross purposes which 
occur when two or more bodies are busily executing policies which seem 
in practice designed to have almost precisely opposite effects. The 
most notorious example of this in the years 1965-70 was the creation of
H.I.D.B. to put money into the Highlands and the imposition of Selective 
Employment Tax which took it out again. Finally there are conflicts 
between agencies which may be simply due to organisational jjealousies - 
a desire by each institution to be ikihgg of its own patch and not to 
have it queered by any rival body - or, more seriously perhaps, because 
of a real clash of interests. It is probably inevitable that if an 
agency is given the responsibility to look after a certain bit of the 
world it will become what Almond and Coleman have called an "institutional
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interest group" defending its particular concern in alliance with the
private3^  interest groups in the same field. In other words
each administrative agency has its own constituency and when' so many
aspects of life are seen as relevant fields for government activity there
are hound to be clashes of interest between constituencies: the Forestry
Commission's job is to plant trees, D.A.F.S. to encourage agriculture;
both want to use the same land. H.I.D.B. was set up to 'develop* the
Highlands, the Nature Conservancy to conserve, and so on.
This is the multi-organizational situation mentioned in chapter one
with its attendant problems of coordination. One of the central
governmenta attempted solutions - the use of overlapping lay membership
has
of the various boards and commissions -/ the interesting result of creating
77
a class of what J.M. Lee has called "public persons" but how far it 
has been effective is another matter. We will return to these issues 
again in chapter seven when we consider hoHr.E.I.D.B. fitted itself into 
this complex administrative matrix.
73* J.M. Lee, Social Leaders and Public Persons. (Oxford I963).
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Chapter 5: Highland Development from the 18th Century to 1965
The Highland Economy prior to 1884
In the early part of the 18th Century the ‘Highland problem' as 
perceived by the Central Government was, not for the first time, chiefly 
a military problem - how to prevent the clans breaking out into open and 
dangerous revolt. At first the response was more or less purely repressive 
and even the positive contribution such as Wade's roads were of little 
economic importance. 1 After the Forty-Five however although repressive 
measures such as the banning of the kilt and the enforced disarming of the 
clans continued, there was also an attempt to pacify the region by turning 
its population to more peaceful pursuits. The Forfeited Estates Commissioners, 
set up to administer the estates taken from rebel lairds, used the income from 
the property on public works, includiriga grant of £3,000 per annum to the
Board of Trustees for Fisheries and Manufactures 3 to encourage the cultivation
2
of flax and the manufacture of linen in the Highlands and Islands. By 
the 1780's the Military problem had effectively ceased to exist, the kilt 
was again permitted, forfeited estates returned and Highlanders were re­
cruited in increasing numbers to the British Army.
The basis of the regional economy was still at this time, as it had 
been in the earlier part of the century, a combination of subsistance 
arable farming and a trade in cattle. The chief crops were oats and bere 
(a sort of barley); the potato, introduced in mid-century, was gaining 
in importance but still took second place to meal in the diet of ordinary 
Highlanders. The region was not self-sufficient in these staples and 
meal had to be imported using the money earned by the sale of Highland
1. M. Gray, The Highland Economy 1750-1850 (Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd, 1957), 
p.170.
2. J.P. Day, Public Administration in the Highlands & Islands of Scotland. 
(University of London, 1918), pp.83 and 287.
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cattle in the Lowlands.  ^ Agriculture was organised according to the
traditional pattern of *runr*rig' ,that is, after being ploughed in common,
the land was divided into sections of uniform quality and each farmer
would receive one portion from each section - though not all portions
need be of the same size. ^ Techniques were primitive: in some areas
rather ineffective wooden ploughs needing teams of four horses to pull
them were used, in others, particularly where the terrain demanded it, the
more laborious but more effective cas chrom (a sort of spade) predominated.
The Highland farmers* great problem was to feed his stock - horses, sheep,
but above all, cattle - during the winter. In summer he could turn them
loose on the hill or take them to the shieling (upland pasture); after
harvest they could be allowed to feed off the stubble; but this still left
a difficult period when there was simply not enough food. This problem
5
severely limited the amount of stock any farmer could manage to keep.
The rather artificial unit of the ’crofting counties* had no relevance 
at all in the 18th century. Orkney and Shetland (with Caithness in a 
marginal position) being non-Gaelic were hardly part of the Highlands at all 
and within the Highland area itself the distinction between the North West - 
i.e. the west mainland north of the Firth of Lome and the Western Isles - 
and the more southerly and easterly parts (including the Highland areas of 
counties like Perthshire and Aberdeenshire) was already beginning to be 
significant. Nevertheless the Gaelic areas did have a unity due to a common 
culture and social structure. The latter consisted of a four class system; 
at the top were the clan chiefs, the landowners, below them and usually 
related to them, the tacksmen - tenants but with large holdings - and below
3. Gray, p. 42-44.
4. Ibid, p.19-20.
5. Ibid, p.36-37.
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them again the actual cultivators of the land consisting of an upper group
of tenants proper, with perhaps no more than 2 or 3 acres each in the more
crowded areas, and a lower group of dependents with only tiny fragments of
land held from the tenants. This lowest group formed in places a majority
of the population.  ^ All the tenants, from the tacksman down, had no
legal title to their land hut held at will with the security - or apparent
security - of long tradition.
Four trends rnafck the agricultural economy of the Highlands in the
last half of the 18th Century and the first half of the 19ths the spread of
the potato, the replacement of runrig, the rise and then fall of cattle
prices and the introduction of large scale sheep farming. The increase
in potato cultivation, toihe extent that in some parts (especially in the
n
North West) it became the overwhelmingly important food'source, meant
that a greater number of people could subsist - though no more- on the same
amount of land as before. In that way it helped to contribute to congestion
in many areas of the North West. The distinction between this area and the
trends
more southerly and easterly parts was increased by the others’/, a j too.
The transformation of :onn»*»rif into a system of consolidated holdings tended
to produce medium sized farms and a labouring class chiefly dependent on
wages (rather than the produce of their own plots) in the latter, whereas
in the North West the typical result was the crofting township - a collection
differentiated
of small fragments of arable land not greatly dif' / -;nLial in size, together 
with a common grazing. Shetland (and some parts of Orkney), though outside 
the Gaelic area, shared this feature of tiny crofts.
The areas with fragmented holdings, not surprisingly, were the areas 
where improved* agriculture -crop rotation, the planting of turnips and 
artificial grasses etc. - made little headway. As long as cattle prices
T. Ibid, p.12, 18 and 21-22.
7. Ibid, p,207-8*
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went on rising, which they continued to do throughout the second half of 
the 18th century and the first decade of the 19th, the effects of this 
failure were masked but with the slump in cattle prices in the second 
decade of the 19th century (when the demand for kelp too was falling - 
see below) the people of the North-West area, always poor, were pushed 
nearer to the margin of subsistance.
The fourth, and perhaps most important change was the introduction of 
sheep fanning. Sheep had always been kept in the Highlands but they were 
of a relatively unproductive breed whose wool was used only for domestic 
consumption and they did not compare in economic importance with cattle.
What happened after about 1760 was that Lowland and Northumberland graziers 
with new breeds such as Cheviots and Black-faced Lintons began to move into the 
Highlands and to farm on a commercial basis with larger areas of land given 
over purely to sheep. The effect of this on the local population again 
emphasised the growing distinction between different parts of the region.
In the south -Argyll and Perthshire - there were evictions but not, it
9
seems, on a massive scale. North of the Great Glen, where the intro­
duction of sheep farming was more sudden, whole glens and straths were 
’cleared* of their populations, to be turned into sheep walks. ^  The 
clearances produced hardship to the families affected and bitterness through­
out the Highlands but there is no evidence that they caused depopulation ^  - 
rather they crowded the crofters more closely together. Neither did they 
have the effect that many *improvers* had hoped for - that they would make the 
Highland population win its living from the sea and thus be more productive; 
in fact Highlanders continued to be agriculturalists first and foremost, 
despite the tiny amounts of land available to them.
8. Ibid, p.241.
9. Ibid, p.95.
10. A fairly detailed, though highly coloured, description is made in J. 
Prebble, The Highland Clearances, (Seeker A Warburg, 1963).
11. Gray, p.99»
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The main occupation of the Highlanders^then, remained agriculture
throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries, but it was not the only one -
linen, kelp production and fishing all need mentioning. Linen spinning
was chiefly important in Perthshire but it also affected other parts of
12the southerly and easterly Highlands. The flax was not grown in the 
region nor, except in rare cases, was the y a m  woven, which made the 
Highland industry dependent on other areas. Already by the last decades 
of the 18th Century it was suffering from competition from the Baltic and 
with the interruption of supplies during the Napoleonic War it began to 
wither away. Before the mid 19th Century it had died completely.
Kelp suffered a similar fate after a more spectacular rise. The
collection and burning of seaweed to produce the alkali kelp, used in glass
and soap making, was an industry of the north and west. Its centres were
Orkney, the Outer Isles, Skye, Mull and some of the smaller Islands of the
Inner Hebrides, and parts of the coast of the north west mainland - particularly
13Ardnamurchan and Morvem. Except in Orkney the industry scarcely existed 
before 1750 but after that date grew prodigiously, reaching a peak in the 
decade 1800-1810 when supplies of Spanish barilla, a competitor, were cut 
off. In the next decades however, foreign supplies were resumed and the 
duty on them was cut. Worse still the duty on salt, which became the chief 
source of alkali, was removed and the kelp industry went into an irrevocable 
decline. Its enormous profits had been concentrated into the hands of a 
few landlords and in many cases had done little but relieve their persistant 
indebtedness for a short while. The effect on the Highlands as a whole 
was simply to concentrate the population — kelp production being labour 
intensive - into areas where alternative methods of support were difficult 
to find.
12. Ibid, p.139.
13. Ibid, p.127.
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The fishing industry had a more variable progress and may be
divided into two parts; herring and white fishing. White fishing was
important in some parts , Shetland before the 19th Century herring boom
and Barra for instance, but it lacked the possibilities for spectacular
gain possessed by herring fishing and over the greater part of the Highlands
was not pursued seriously. In the 18th Century the herring fishing of
the East coast was largely controlled by the Dutch which made Scottish
merchants look all the more eagerly to the West Coast. In South Argyllshire,
mainly on those lochs with outlets to the Firth of Clyde, a regular and
significant herring industry did develop.^ Over the rest of the West
various difficulties such as the variability in catch in any single area,
the lack of equipment or capital possessed by the local people, relative
distance from markets and the complexities of the salt duties kept the
industry small; an important addition to diet but not a major commercial
activity. Even the activities of such Government supported bodies as the
British Fisheries Society (incorporated in 1786;, which built harbours, stores
15and houses at Tobermory, Lochbay (Skye) and Ullapool - as well as at 
Wick - failed to make any impression. By 1842 the last of these West 
Highland fishing settlements had been sold.^
The destruction of the Dutch fishing fleet during the Napoleonic Wars 
plus the later repeal of the salt duty created the conditions for a boom 
in herring fisheries of the East coast. In the course of the 19th Century 
Shetland, Orkney, Caithness and Sutherland, as well as the East coast towns 
outwith the Highlands all developed major herring fishing industries. For 
the most part the West Highlands missed out on this expansion and ;ihou^i it 
provided a source of livlihood for west Highlanders this was because they
14* Ibid, p.168.
15. Day, p.251.
16. Ibid, p.258.
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migrated seasonally to the East coast ports, especially those of Caithness,
and became hired hands, not because they owned their own boats.
Probably during the second half of the 18th Century and certainly in
the first four decades of the 19th century, the population of the Highlands
17as a whole was increasing. The distinction must once again be made
between the Southerly and Easterly parts and the North-West, for whereas
the former area showed little,if any,gain the latter had dramatic population
increases. The most likely reason for this difference is the attraction
of the Lowlands which worked much more strongly upon contiguous areas than
18on more remote parts. It is true that emigration to the colonies (which
19occurred in four waves between 1760 and 1850) affected the North-West
but while a more visible, and therefore commented on, process, this did not
involve nearly as many people as the gradual drift to other parts of Britain.
The parishes of the North-West were able to support an increasing population
partly because of the spread of the potato - which gave a higher food yield
per acre than grain - and partly, until the second decade of the 19th
Century, because of the kelp industry which permitted-and indeed required -
a large population, dependent upon wages from kelp production.
After the collapse of kelp the Highland population continued to rise
for several decades and as this was a period of a trough in cattle prices
poverty
as well the inevitable result was &h increasfe in the / of the population
of the North-West so that in 1831 the Inverness Courier could say that
"a more deep and universal distress prevails on the Western Coast than
20was ever before remembered. '* The lowest point in the fortunes of the 
crofters however came with the potato famine in the years following 1845*
17. Gray, p. 58. The figures for the decennial censuses since 1801 are 
given in A. Collier, The Crofting Problem (Cambridge TJ.P., 1953)» p.128, but 
note that the unit used here is the * Crofting Counties' rather than the 
Highlands more generally defined. The distinction between the South and East 
and the North-West is brought out in figures in Gray, p.254.
18. Gray, p.63-66.
19« Bay, p.26.
20. Ibid, p.86.
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The economic position of the landowners at this time, though hardly 
comparable with that of their tenants, was also a difficult one. Often 
faced with considerable rent arrears (the crofters had nothing to pay with) 
and sometimes bound by feelings of patriarchal duty to provide free meal
to the destitute, they became more and more indebted. The majority of
21Highland estates in fact changed hands before 1350.
The persistent economic and social difficulties of the Highlands
brought the region back to the attention of the government. It would
not be quite true to say that between the days of the Forfeited Estates
Commissioners and the British Fisheries Society and 1840 the region was
totally ignored: at the beginning of the 19th Century a number of important
public works - parliamentary roads and the Caledonian and Crinan Canals -
were undertaken, though in general this was a time of laissez-faire. By
1840 the Highland problem was generally perceived as being one of 'congestion
too many people and too little land - and the obvious remedy was therefore
emigration. In 1840 the Government established a Colonial Land and Emigration
department and in the following year a Select Committee was appointed to
consider the practicability of assisting the Highlands and Islands through
emigration. The Committee reported in favour of such assistance but the
lack of funds alloted to the Enigration Department prevented it from doing
22more than a moderate amount. The other response was the creation of a 
more efficient system of welfare to relieve destitution. This was begun 
in 1843 with an Act ammending the Scottish Poor Law and creating a Board 
of Supervision to oversee its functioning.
After the 1840's the population - with some exception? notably Lewis - 
began to decline.25 But even with the population declining and increasing 
Government involvement, the people of the crofting areas remained crowded
21. Gray, p.194.
22. Day, p.89-90.
23. The 1841 maximum population again applies to the unit of the Crofting 
Counties but the detailed figures given for the West Highlands in P.P.
P.T.0.
Darling (ad.) ,.est Highland Survey ( O x f o r c  XT• 1 ., 1955) pp.76-83, shov 
almost all parts of that area reached their maximum within 20 years oi 1 
date.
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together on too little land and desperately poor. Fishing in the West 
remained unable to turn itself into the lucrative occupation that it was 
in the East though as the 19th Century progressed West Highlanders began, 
for the first time, to earn a larger revenue from the sea than from the 
land. ^ By I860 eviction had ceased but the crofters remained understand­
ably embittered and when in 1880 a 'League for the Nationalisation of the 
Land' was started in Scotland the reformers took up the crofters' case.
Land agitation reached a climax when violence broke out in Skye (in 1882) 
where clearances had been extensive, and later in Lewis where there had been 
few evictions but there was an acute shortage of land. By this time sheep 
farming was itself in decline because of the competition from imported wool 
and sheep farms were being turned into deer forests to meet the growing 
demand for deer-stalking. Although the creation of deer forests did not 
lead to any more clearances the fact that large areas of land were given 
over to deer, while people were crowded together on tiny holdings,was a 
source of considerable irritation.
The trouble in Skye led the government to set up a Commission under 
Lord Napier in 1883 to investigate the conditions of the crofters. This 
Commission and the subsequent legislation marks the beginning of considerable 
government involvement in the Highlands and Islands and the 'modem period' 
of Highland development can be said to begin.
Crofting since.1884
The 'Inquiry into the conditions of the Srofters and Cotters in the 
Highlands and Islands of Scotland' by a Commission in 1883“4» usually called 
after its Chairman, Lord Napier, was a very thorough affair. They inter­
viewed 775 people in a variety of local centres and supplemented the oral 
evidence with written depositions (which,they pointed out, had a class bias) 
and statistical information.^ From this they concluded that though mass
24. Day, p.265-6.
r C o t S r r ^ t h f H i & I s ^ r ? , °£. Cr°£t*"
IT
evictions had almost entirely ceased and the population was probably no 
worse off than they had been at any time in the past, they nevertheless 
had considerable grievances: the tiny size of many holdings, insecurity
of tenure, high rents, lack of compensation for improvements, withdrawal 
of land for sporting purposes, and (for those engaged in fishing) a lack 
of piers and harbours and the inability to buy boats and tackle suitable 
for deep-sea use. They also commented on the poor communications, defects 
in the machinery of justice and lack of facilities for emigration.
In their recommendations the Commissioners illustrate the spirit of 
their times; they are very unwilling to suggest much in the way of govern­
ment expenditure (such as loans to crofters}. Nevertheless they did pro­
pose some significant reforms. Townships should be recognised as statutory 
units and given powers and immunities such as the right not to be dissolved 
without the consent of a majority of their members, (this would prevent 
further clearances). They should be given powers with regard to the 
provision of fences and roads, the acquisition of fuel and, if a majority 
of the township agreed, they should have the right to claim money from the 
proprietor for the erection of fences and the construction of roads on the 
basis that they would share the cost with him. They could also claim an 
enlargement of the arable land or pasture of the township from their 
landlord and the Commission further recommended that new townships be 
formed to take some of the occupants from existing over-crowded ones.
The other major reform suggested in the Napier report was the granting 
of ’improving leases’, running for 30 years in the first instance, to 
those whose rent was more than £6 per annum. This would give the more 
substantial crofters much greater security of tenure and ensure that they 
received compensation for whatever improvements they made. In order to 
ensure that there were more holdings of a large enough size the Commissioners
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proposed that the smaller ones should be consolidated and/holdings of less
than £20 in rent should be allowed to be sub-divided. Ihat the Commision
did not propose was security of tenure for all crofters. On the contrary
they took the position that all the poorer crofters (i.e. those paying under
£6 in rent - the great majority) if they could not afford larger holdings
26should be 1 resolutely though gently withdrawn* from the land and either 
become fishermen or labourers or emigrate.
27This might have made good economic sense in the long run but it was
not sound politics at the time. Feeling among the crofters and those who
sympathised with ttiem was high ('Crofters Party1 candidates were being returned
for most of the Highland Constituency following the extension of the 
28franchise) and the Act which followed the Napier report, the Crofters
Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886, was far more generous in its granting of
rights. It guaranteed complete security of tenure to the crofter subject
only to certain statutory condition (e.g. no sub-letting) and allowed him
to bequeath his holding to a member of his family; it gave him the right
to claim compensation for permanent improvements on renouncing his holding
and it allowed him to apply to the Land Court to fix a fair rent. A
Crofters Commision was set up both to administer the act and, by sitting as
a Land Court, to deal with its judicial aspects. The act applied only to
the "crofting parishes'* - defined in terms of rights to common pasturage -
ahd the Crofters Commission was left to decide that these included all but
12 parishes (8 in Southern Argyllshire) in the seven crofting counties.
A Crofter was defined as being a "tenant of a holding from year to year, who
29resides on his holding, the annual rent of which does not exceed £30".
26. Ibid, p.39»
27. The Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Crofting Conditions.
Cmd. 9091,(1954) (The Taylor Commission) seems to think so.(Henceforward
referred to as 'Taylof).
28. Kellas, The Scottish Political System (Cambridge U.P., 1973) p.221.
29. Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act, 1886. Section 34.
V9
The 1886 Act followed the Napier Commission in one respect - it
made provision for holdings to be enlarged, compulsorily if necessary,
the Crofters Commission doing the administration. Tilhat it totally 
failed to mention was the position of townships; this turned out to be a mis­
take as it meant there was insufficient control of the common grazings 
and consequent over-stocking. As a remedy the Crofters Common Grazings 
Regulation Act 1891 was passed. This permitted the election of Township 
Common Grazing Committees (/the smallest units of local government in Britain1) 
to control the grazings but because the act was purely permissive and relied 
on either the crofters or the landlord taking some action it often amounted 
to nothing. It was amended by another similarly named act in 1908 which
30allowed the Land Court to take the initiative and appoint Grazing Committees.
The Crofters Holdings Act of 1886 does at least seem to have given the
crofters some security and put an end to the 'open lawlessness' and 'reign
of terror' that the Crofters Commission colourfully insisted prevailed in 
the Highlands and Islands from 1882-1887.^ It did not however greatly 
improve their economic position and so two further commissions were set 
up to look into this: the Walpole Commission which produced two reports
32
over the years 1890-92 and was concerned with transport and public worksf 
Its first report led to the Highlands and Islands Works Act in 1891> and 
the Royal Commission on the Highlands and Islands, appointed‘in 1892, to 
see what land might be reclaimed from the rapidly growing and very unpopular 
deer forests. They scheduled 1,782,785 acres of land, wholly or partly 
under deer, as suitable for settlement - though not all of this was to go 
to crofters. ^  Ttie reports of these two Commissions led to the Congested 
Districts (Scotland) Act 1897 and the Congested _D^t^c£^;Bosuri. This 
Board, headed by the Secretary of State for Scotland himself, had quite
30. Day, p.196-197.
31. Pinal Report of the Crofters Commission, 1913» p.xxvi.
32. First Report of Royal Commission appointed to inquire into certain matters 
affecting the interests of the Population of the Western Highlands and Islands
P.T.O.
of Scotland, 0.6135 (1890); 2nd Report C.62/12 (1890— 'I).
31. deport of the Royal Commission (riahlands end Islands, 189?,', C. 76 31 
(h .j .3.0. 1895) (Deer forests Commission) p.xxii.
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wide powers within the officially designated congested districts (which
amounted to some 56 parishes mostly in the Yfest and NorthJ:^ they could
acquire land, drain, fence and construct roads on it and dispose of it
by sub-dividing it among crofters or cotters; they could assist the
migration of crofters to the areas where there was land; they could erect
fisherman*s dwellings and construct piers or harbours; they could give
various sorts of financial assistance to agriculture, fisheries or home
industries. The problem was that they were short of money and the 1897
Act gave them no powers of borrowing. Further difficulties arose because
few crofters had enough capital to stock the new larger holdings and the
Board had no power to help in that respect either. Thirdly there was a
35great unwillingness among people to migrate.  ^ Despite all these difficult­
ies the Congested Districts Board did manage to create 640 new holdings and
361138 enlargements of holdings in the years 1897-1912 and the Crofters
Commission during its life (which ended at the same time as the Boards)
37also managed to enlarge holdings to the extent of 72,341 acres.
In 1911 Crofting law was significantly altered by the Small Landholders 
(Scotland) Act. This established the Board j>f Agriculture for Scotland, 
which took over, with important extensions, the powers of the Crofters 
Commission and the Congested Districts Board. Those two bodies disappeared 
except that the Land Court functions of the Commission were vested in a 
seperate ^Scottish Land Court - still in existence. This Act extended the 
benefits of the 1886 Acts to all parts of Scotland and not just the Crofting  ^
parishes. It also made some changes in crofting tenures the obligation 
for the crofter to reside on his land was removed with the unfortunate 
consequence ■ of creating absentee crofters; the 'small landholder* (a
34. See Map II •
35. Day, p.208-209*
36. Taylor, p . 14*
37. Day, p. 94*
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term which replaced * crofter' as a legal definition) was defined as a
tenant of an agricultural subject rented at less than £50 a year (£50
on Lewis) or not exceeding 50 acres in size; sub-letting to holiday
visitors was permitted; a landholder unable to work his own land was
allowed to assign it to a member of his family with the permission of
the Land Court. The 1911 act remained the basis of crofting tenure
right down to 1955 though there were some minor additions in the Land
Settlement (Scotland) Act, 1919 - which mainly granted new powers to the Board
of Agriculture to obtain land for settlement, by compulsion if necessary,
and the Small Landholders and Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1931*
The Board of Agriculture used its land settlement powers quite vigorously
at first, particularly in the decade or so following the First World Vfar
when there was a considerable demand for land in the Highlands from ex-
servicemen. From 1920-29 1>344 new holdings were constituted in the
crofting counties, 711 of them on state land, and there were 1,179 en- 
58largements. However, during the 1930fs the pace slackened off and
39after 1940 almost came to a halt.
As an attempt to create economic holdings in the Highlands, this 
policy does not seem to have been very successful. "It is significant", 
says the Taylor Commission, "that the sixty nine years which have elppsed 
since the Napier Commission's investigations have not seen any major 
transformation in the number or size of agricultural holdings in the 
crofting dounties".^ In 1885 there were 28,858 seperate holdings, in 
1952 it was 29,416; of these 2,798 had over 50 acres and 12,048 under 
five acres in 1885, the equivalent figures for the later year being 
2,741 and 11,441. ^  In terms of agricultural activity there was an 
actual decline - 70,252 acres under tillage in 1886, only 58,000 acres in
58. Taylor, p.15*
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid, p.l6.
41. Ibid.
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1952; 95»041 cattle in 1886 and 58>000 in 1952. Sheep alone maintained 
and even increased their number from 947>955 to 1,090,000 ^  but this is 
hardly symptomatic of a healthy agriculture as an increase in the sheep./
cattle ratio, causes a decline in the quality of pasturage because of
A X
the selective grazing habits of sheep. In addition the souming -
the number of animals a crofter was officially permitted to graze on the
common grazings - was cuften exceeded, which led to over-grazing and a
decline in fertility.
Yet despite this the crofters by the post-War years, if not the
richest class in Britain, did not suffer from the degree of poverty
apparent in Napier*s time. Obviously various factors were at work to
bring more wealth into the Highlands. Among these were the drop in the
price of imported grain and meal that occurred around the end of the last
century ^  . which enabled the crofter to give up producing his own
bread com and concentrate on rearing livestock for sale - an activity
more suitable to the climate and soils of the Highlands. There was
also an increase in sources of income other than the traditional farming
and fishing - tourism, forestry, tweed manufacture, the construction of
hydro-electric schemes - none of them adding all that much but collectively
making a difference. Above all there was the increasing intervention of
the state - subsidies for agriculture, grants and loans for housing, old
age pensions and unemployment benefits and the provision of various services
by the Local Authorities or the Central Government with the associated
employment they .brought in road-making, education, the post office, etc.
According to Collier*s calculation of regional income in 1935> a quarter
came directly from the Government through its services or its payments
(in pensions etc.) and this does not include the contribution of bodies
4*5like the Forestry Commission. By I960 D. Simpson estimated that over
42. Ibid, Pp. 13 and 15.
43* Barling, p.169.
44. A. Collier, The Crofting Problem (Cambridge TJ.P.,1953) P-59.
45. Ibid, p. 117.
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50/' of the regional income was generated directly by the Government. ^
A decline in subsistance agriculture, a rising standard of living, 
a greater variety of employment coupled with compulsory education, 
improved communications and military service in two lbrid Wars all tended 
to break down the old distinctive crofting way of life and the Gaelic 
language that went with it so that by 1950 the Highlanders were far more 
integrated into British society than they had been in the 1880fs. Even
so there remained enough of their distinctiTenseper&teneSiss for the 
Government to consider it necessary to appoint another Commission in 
1951 "to look at the special problems of crofting. This Commission, 
chaired by T.M. Taylor, reported in 1954 and made numerous recommendations 
regarding the legal and administrative background to crofting, the chief 
of which was that a new Crofters Commission should be set up. This new 
body was to have extensive land settlement powers; to take over the 
function of the landlord regarding the re-letting of vacant crofts; to 
terminate the tenancy of absentee crofters subject to safeguards concerning 
the croft house; to try and persuade the elderly who no longer worked their 
land to give it up; to have power to reorganise townships if a majority of 
the crofters agreed; to gain from the Land Court control over resumption 
of holdings and the regulation of common grazings; to be able to apportion 
the common grazings on application from one or more crofters; to adminis­
ter, land improvement grants and make loans for working capital; and to 
prepare a register of all crofter holdings in the seven counties. In 
addition the Taylor report recommended that crofters should have extended 
powers of assignation and bequest 3 subject to the consent of the new 
Commission but that this body should be able to remove landholders for
46*, D. Simpson, "Investment. Employment and Government Expenditure in 
the Highlands. 1951-60". Scottish Journal of Political Economy, November, 
1963, (Vol. II).
84
bad husbandry and to control subdivision. The agricultural colleges
were urged to strengthen their advisory services in the crofting districts
was
and to set up demonstration crofts and the Forestry Commissionyfrecommended 
to step up their afforestation of the North and West Mainland. Finally 
the Crofters Commission was to keep under review such important matters 
to crofters as freight charges and marketing arrangements.
History did not repeat itself and the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955 
followed the Taypor Report far more closely that the 1886 act followed 
Napier. Qhe only major deviation was that the Act put much less stress 
on land settlement than the report had done. The new Crofters Commission 
was constituted and consisted of a Chairman, two full time members and 
three part time. The Chairman, Sir Robert Urquhart^was an ex-diplomat - 
not the last time one of his profession was to administer the Highlands 
(an interesting illustration of the (government's attitude towards them 
perhaps?).
The Commission^ relatively straightforward administrative functions, 
such as reletting vacant crofts, proceeded satisfactorily enough and 
after a slow start the apportionment of commoia grazings went well, 
especially on Shetland and Lewis. The improvement grants - given for 
such things as land improvement, drainage and farm equipment-soon became 
popular. (In 1964 for instance, the Commission spent £472,648 on various 
grants). Less successful were the Reorganisation schemes whose purpose 
was to rearrange the townshijgdn a more rational way. The procedure in­
volved was so slow and cumbersome that the Commission became thoroughly
disenchanted.^ They did not even attempt land settlement schemes which
48caused disappointment in some quarters. By their 1959 Report the
47. The Crofters Commission, Annual Report for 1958, (H.M.S.O. 1957), brings 
this out strongly.
48. For example Farquhar Gillanders on P. 100 of his chapter "The Economic Life 
of Gaelic Scotland Today” in Derick S. Thomson and Ian Grimble (ed.), The 
Future of the Highlands. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968). His view reflected 
the opinion of taShy brofters.
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Commission were beginning to talk more strongly about the under-cultivation 
of available land - the system, they said, needed "unfreezing" so that land 
would pass into tfce hands of those who would work it and the reorganisation 
of townships needed to be changed so that an inactive majority could not 
hamper the active minority.
In i960 a Bill (for which however the Commission disclaimed responsi­
bility) was put before Parliament which changed the reorganisation procedure 
and gave the Commission much stronger poweis to dispossess crofters not using
their land than the 1955 Act had done. The 1959 report and this Bill
49met with considerable hostility from crofters who feared that their
sacred security of tenure was being eroded (as indeed was inevitable if
land was to be effectively reorganised); this led to the creation or revival
of C-rofters Unions in ujany parts. The opposition was successful;: ' that
part of the Bill that gave the Commission powers to dispossess was amended
so that it coould not be brought into operation without a resolution to the
50effect being passed in both Houses of Parliament. Such a resolution
has never been put. The Crofters (Scotland) Act 1961 is to some extent 
then,a dead letter but it did change the procedure involved in reorganisation 
and it did allow sub-tenants of crofts and owner occupiers of holdings of 
croft size to benefit from the same financial assistance as regular crofters. 
By the 1961 report the Commission had decided that even this new Act did not 
give them powers that would permit them to undertake effective reorganisation 
and they more or less washed their hands off it. Instead they pinned their 
hopes on land improvement,over which crofters (again especially on Lewis 
and Shetland) had become enthusiastic, and turned more and more attention 
to their advisory and review functions. Having decided that it was the
49. Crofters Commission, i960 Report and Gillanders, p.106.
50. Gillanders, p.112.
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' ancilliary* occupations that held out the best hope of keeping the 
crofting population in the Highlands and Islands, the Commission were in 
the frustrating position of having no powers to do anything about these 
except act as a ginger group.
In 1963 J.S. Grant, editor and proprietor of the Stornoway Gazette, 
replaced Urquhart as Chairman of the Crofters Commission and became its 
only full time member. With the creation of H.I.D.B. the advisory and 
review functions of the Commission were hardly necessary but it continued 
as a sort of pressure group for the remote areas in case they were forgotten 
about. By 1968 they finally came round to the opinion, specifically rejected 
by the Taylor report, that the only way to let some air into the atrophied 
crofting system was to convert crofters into owner occupiers while allowing 
them to retain such advantages as housing grants, and they concluded that
"many of the provisions of the Crofters (Scotland) Acts of 1955 and. 1961
51 52are now obsolete". By that year there were 18,754 registered crofts,
a slight drop on the figure of 20,909 holdings of under £50 rent given by 
55Taylor, concentrated on Shetland, Skye and in the Outer Hebrides. Crofters
are often tenants of two or more crofts so the actual number of agricultural
units was rather less - 15,093 - of which only 526 were large enough to be
54considered full-time working units. The crofts are dispersed in some
55
700 townships.
These figures illustrate the basic difficulty of anyone trying to 
maintain crofting as a way of life: if all crofters are to have an economic­
ally viable small holding the total population of the crofting areas will 
have to decrease drastically, a result people, in the region want least of 
all. This fact is clearly recognised by the Crofters Commission which 
therefore opposes the unreflecting amalgamation of crofts. On the other
51. Crofters Commission, 1968 Heport, p. 27-
52. Ibid, p.15.
53» Taylor, p. 17.
P.T.O.
54. Crofters Commission, 1968 Report, p.45. For complete information of the 
position in 1965 see fable III in Chapter 2.
55* at le-st. so says "She Scottish economy 1965 - 70," Cr.nd 2364 (H..V.3.C. It" 
p.141 but about 1947-4 7 the best Highland Survey found 1040 townships (see 
p.252) in their survey area alone, which did not cover the important croft in 
district of Shetland. No doubt between say 1949 end 1966 some townships 
ceased to exist and others were amalgamated, but the rate of decline seems 
excessively large.
hand if crofters are to earn a substantial part of their living from 
non-agricultural occupations, economic pressures will be such that these 
occupations will probably take up all their working life and they will 
cease to use their croft. (Which has already happened to many crofters 
who live near, and work in, Stornoway). In other words they will cease
to be crofters proper and lose those Yeoman virtues that it has been de
56rigeur to praise in official reports from Napier on. The Crofters
Commission keep their spirits up by talking of a 'new form of industrial
society which will be inherently healthier and more stable than any
57completely urbanised society* but with land free from the rigidities 
of crofting tenure and development policy aimed at creating *holding 
points' i.e. towns in which employment is concentrated it is difficult 
to see wh> the North and West Highlands and Islands should be different 
from any other predominantly rural area.
The Highland Economy in the 20th Century
Crofting is unique to the Highlands and Islands and it makes up a
large part of what is meant by 'the Highland Way of Life' but by 1965
only about 60,000 people or of the population of the crofting
bounties lived on drofts - and because of the high proportion of old
people in the townships probably only 15-18% of the working population
were crofters. ^  In the same year, of the gross agricultural output
of about £20m. in the region only \ came from drofts, the rest was from
59some 4,600 full-time farms. A substantial proportion of this would 
have been from the prosperous farming areas of the more fertile and 
drier East, especially Easter Ross, the Black Isle and Orkney where
56. cf. Taylor, p.9.
57. Crofters Commission* 1968 Report, p.13# lfoere are strange contradictions 
here; the overwhelming impression one gets from reading the Commissioners* 
Reports is that crofters are deeply conservative and resistant to change yet 
in their general remarks the Commission call them 'more adaptable than the
average industrial worker*.
mni. 2864, p. 121 for all the precelin^ figures In this paragraph, 
bin, 0.14C.
mixed farming is undertaken and the crops often used as feed for beef 
cattle. Orkney is also renowned for its egg production and Kintyre 
has a reasonable dairy industry. In these parts conditions differ very 
little from those of the Lowlands, except that Orkney has the usual 
island problem of communications, but over most of the remainder of the 
Highlands and Islands the land is only really suitable for pastural 
agriculture - and in modern times this has meant sheep.
The great age of the sheep farmer was the first two thirds of the 
19th Century when demand for wool and mutton from the growing industrial 
areas of the South was strong. During the 1860's however cheap imports 
begin to arrive and the domestic farmer was increasingly less able to 
compete. The number of sheep began to decline and so did rents. At 
the same time a new sport was becoming increasingly popular - deer-stalking 
and landlords found that they could get more money by replacing sheep with 
deer and renting the land to shooting tenants. Just as sheep had driven 
the clans and their cattle from the glens so deer now took over the 
position of the sheep - a historical process that seems to have been 
telescoped in some minds leading to the idea the deer were a cause of 
depopulation. Of course there had always been deer in the Highlands 
but never in such numbers and never before in their own special preserves 
(curiously called 'forests'). Deer forests multiplied apace during the 
last part of the 19th Century and the first part of the 20th. In 1883 
it was calculated that they occupied 1*975 million acrea and by 1912, 
the maximum year, had reached 3*432 million acres.^ (Not all of this 
was in the Crofting Counties by any means and there were some forests 
outwith the Highlands altogether, in Kirkcudbrightshire^. Then tastes 
and economics changed and the landlords found that deer forests were
60. A.C. O'Dell and Kenneth Walton, The Highlands and Islands of Scotland. 
(Nelson 1962), p.333. Actually the figure given is 3»452 million acres 
but there are reasons for suspecting a misprint.
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less profitable. They have since declined in area though by 1965 ^ ey 
still occupied 2^ million acres. ^  (Not all of this was exclusively 
given over to deer). Sheep and deer compete for the same land and 
marauding deer cause havoc among crops so it is not surprising that 
farmers (including crofters) and sportsmen should have come into conflict.
An attempt to adjudicate between the two interests was made by setting up 
a Red Deer Commission in 1959 (see previous chapter).
Deer stalking is not the only sport that has added to the rentals of 
Highland Estates. Grouse shooting is also important though many of the 
best grouse moors are in the Easten Highlands, outwith the crofting counties. 
And in the rivers and lochs salmon and trout provide valuable fishing - 
and another source of conflict between landowners and others.
Sheep have made rather a come-back since 1950* Sheep farming was 
stimulated by the 2nd World War, when the country needed to produce all it 
could, and by the Hill Farming Acts of 1946 and 1956 and the Livestock 
Rearing Act of 1951* This legislation introduced a variety of subsidies 
without which hill farming would hardly be profitable. Under the same
stimulus cattle farming also developed since the War. A 9% increase in
62members of cattle was recorded during the 1950’s and further, though
65smaller, gains were made during the sixties. In addition to this, two
attempts to bring large scale cattle ranching to the Highlands have been 
tried since the War: J.W. Hobb*s Great Glen Cattle Ranch and the
activities of Lord Lovat and associates, further north. Other agricultural 
developments included bulb growing by crofters in the Western Isles pro­
moted by Hebridean Bulb Growers Ltd., a cooperative established in 1957*^
The third great user of Highland land, in competition with sheep and 
deer, is forestry. In pre-historic times the Highlands were heavily 
forested. Since then (as was said in the previous chapter) human
61. Crand. 2864* p.140.
62. Review of Highland Policy, Cmnd. 7B5t (H.M.S.O. 1959)> P*6.
63. Highlands and Islands Development Board, Fifth Report, 1970, Appendix vii.
64. Crand. 785» P»6.
depredations,coupled with an expansion of blanket bog that militated 
against natural regeneration,havereduced the amount of timber enormously.
With the notable exception of the Duke of Atholl there was little 
attempt to replace the felled woodlands until after the First World 
War, during which large quantities of home grown timber had been felled.
To try and replace it the Forestry Commission was set up in 1919 "but had 
only just started when, in 1922, the Geddes Committee cut its grant and 
rejected the strategic and social arguments for forestry. In their 
opinion it was not justifiable to create employment on an ’uneconomic 
basis* - a most unfortunate argument when applied to the Highlands and 
Islands. Substantial planting was undertaken especially in the Great 
Glen and Southern Argyll areas but it was not enough to reverse the
losses of the First War so that by 1939 there wan less effective woodland
65than in 1914* The 2nd World War naturally brought about further losses
and the post War Governments, less inhibited than their predecessors,
committed themselves to large scale replanting and the establishment of
at least 750*000 acres of effective forest. ^  By 1965 400,000 acres
had-b6en-planted.in the Crofting Counties and it was increasing by about
6820,000 acres a year. The tree mainly grown is the Sitka Spruce, a
sombre conifer which when planted in close packed straight lines is rather
69lacking in amenity value.
The Forestry Commission did not escape without criticism: it was 
accused by irate farmers of pursuing an unbalanced land-use policy. By 
planting the lower valley slopes it was said to render the implanted tops
useless, both because they were made inaccessible by the Commission’s six
foot anti-deer fences and because they had lost their sheltered lower
pastures necessary for wintering. Since 1945* while conflicts have not
65. David Turnock, Patterns of Highland Development. (Macmillan, 1970),p.83.
66. A Programme of Highland Development, Cm|ftL 7976, (H.M.S.0. 1950)p#15*
67. Cmnd. 2864, p.143*
68* H.I.D.B., Fifth Report, 1970 AppendixVII.
69. To be fair to the Commission in a lot of areas they have trie! to 
leaven the lump by interspeirsinr /larch.
with
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ceased, there has been greater integration between different forms of
land use and, from 1966* crofters whose grazings are withdrawn for forestry
purposes have been mollified by reveiving a development grant from the
70Forestry Commission. Private planting has been encouraged by a
dedication* scheme through which landowners got a Commission grant of
£22.4s*per acre (in 1965) provided they agreed to -.manage their woodlands
71in an approved manner. One of the most notable private developments
is that by the Duke of Westminster at Kinlochbervie.
Along with forestry go timber using industries. A few small firms
grew up before the 60*s, especially around Inverness and Dingwal], but
the real breakthrough came when Wiggins Teape were persuaded to build a
72large integrated pulp and paper Mill at Annat near Fort William.
They got planning permission from Inverness County Council in I960, made 
an agreement about wood supplies with the Forestiy Commission a year 
later and work on the mill began in 1963 sifter a special Act had been 
passed allowing the Government to leradb them £10m. to help finance 
the initial phase costing £20m. It was officially opened in 1966 and 
was at that time the largest single manufacturing concern in the 
Highlands. ^
Before 1965 the Highlands had produced little in the way of mineral 
wealth - fortunately perhaps for the sake of their natural beauty. There 
was a minor gold rush to the Strath of Kildonan in the 19th Century.
Strontian produced lead ores and gave its name to another metal but these 
things had passed as had the extraction of diatomite in Skye and the 
quarrying of Caithness flagstone. The slate quarries of Ballachulish, 
opened in 1760, had a rather longer life but closed in 1955* Coal had
70. Crofters Commission, 1966 Report.
71. Tumock, p.84.
72. Strictly speaking the company conemawfrcbras Scottish Pulp (Development) Ltd. 
later Scottish Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. but it was wholly a subsidiary of 
Wiggins Teape.
73. Unless Dounreay is counted as ’manufacturing*.
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been mined at Machrihanish near Campbeltown and at Brora in Sutherland.
The Kintyre mine was opened at the beginning of the century, closed after
flooding in 1926, reopened again in 1946 and was finally abandoned in 1967. ^
Brora had been in operation since 1529 and when the current operating
company went into liquidation in 1961 it was reopened under the miners
7 5
ownership with money from the Highland Fund. Silica sand, valuable in
the manufacturing of optical glass was extracted in Morven and provided a small
but important centre of employment. The glass manufacturing industry at
Wick used this sand.
Peat is so extensive in the Highlands and Islands that it is hardly
surprising that a lot of people got the idea of utilising it for something
or other. But despite the investigations of the Scottish Peat Committees
in the 1950's, the experiments by the North of Scotland Hydro-ELectric
Board and the publication of the Scottish Peat Surveys by the Department of
Agriculture for Scotland, peat still seems to be used in nothing more than
the manufacture of whisky. Seaweed has a more interesting history. After
its dramatic decline as a source of alkali, kelp made a slight come back
as a source of iodine. This industry was never on the scale of the
previous one but it provided a small amount of wealth until a price war
among the major foreign producers of iodine depressed its price early in
this Century and the Highland seaweed industry was killed off altogether.
Not for ever, as it turned out, for in the 1930's yet another chemical
was extracted from seaweed as a commercial proposition - alginic acid,
used as a stabiliser and thickener in products ranging from instant
desserts to paints. Soon after the war the Scottish Seaweed Research
Association established that the Highland resources of seaweed are sufficient
76to provide for a considerable industry.
74. Turrock, p.158.
75. ttie Highland Fund, 1971» Annual Report, p. 11.
76. Cmnd. 7976, p.18.
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Since the Second World War, at least, the water resources of the 
Highlands have been utilised more effectively than most of the products 
of the land. The first major hydro-electric scheme in the Highlands 
was begun by the North British Aluminium Company at Foyers in 1896 in 
order to produce Aluminium by the reduction of its oxide (alumina) - a 
process that requires a plentiful supply of electricity. The Foyers 
plant was tiny by modem standards (it was shut down in 1967) and was 
followed by considerably bigger ones - at Kinlochleven, starting in 1909» 
and at Fort William in 1929* An electro-chemical industry might also 
have been set up had it not been that the Caledonian Power Bill, which 
permitted the production of calcium carbide from the water power of Lochs 
Quoich and Houm, was rejected three times by Parliament in 1936, 1937 
and 1938. 77
Between the wars various hydro-electric schemes producing domestic 
power were started but the whole development was bedevilled by the hostility 
of landowners. Only after Thomas Johnston became Secretary of State during 
the Second World War, and set up a committee of enquiry to look into the 
problem, was substantial progress made. The committee reported in favour
78of creating a government body to develop hydro-electricity in the Highlands
and Jofcmston pushed a bill through Parliament, with very little opposition,
79setting up the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board in 1943* After
the War he became the Board's Chairman and continued championing its
cause. Progress was rapid and installed capacity from conventional
generators increased from 86,900 Kilowatts in 1949 to 1,047 in 1966/67
80with a further 300,000 Kw. available from pumped storage schemes.
77. Tumock, p.164.
78. Report of the Committee on Hydro-ELectric Development in Scotland,
Cmnd. 6406 (H.M.S.0. 1943) (Cooper Committee).
79. T. Johnston, Memories (Collins, 1952), p.149-50.
80. Tumock, p.169.
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It has already been said (in chapter 2) that most of this power goes
81to domestic consumers. This was always the intention but even if it 
had not been it is doubtful that power cheap enough to have attracted a 
large number of electricity-using industries could have been produced 
because of unsatisfactory geographical conditions. (Few Highland rivers 
have both a heavy regular discharge and steep gradients).
The Hydro Board is now perceived by many in the North of Scotland as 
something particularly 'theirs1 so that when the MacKenzie Committee re­
commended the merging of the two Scottish electricity boards in 1962 the 
opposition was sufficiently great for the government to drop the idea.
The Board does not have things all its own way however, its scheme to 
utilize Glen Nevis ran into oppdsition from Aims of Industry and was
rejected by the Secretary of State, as were later projects at Laiden and
82
IFada Fionn on the grounds that they were not immediately necessary.
The other large source of power in the region was the Atomic Eliergy 
Authority's Experimental Fast Reactor at Dounreay. Originally brought to 
Caithness for reasons other than Highland development - it was thought 
that such a potentially" dangerous project should be well away from the 
major population centres and the Dounreay area offered an abundance of 
cooling water - it has since won enthusiastic local acceptance because of 
the employment it brought and any threat to its continued existence brings
07
about an immediate political outcry. Being a research centre as well
as a power station Dounreay employed a large number of people and was the 
chief reason why the population of Caithness rose by almost a quarter 
between 1951-1961 in the face of the predominant Highland trend.
81. Johnston, p.175*
82. North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board, Report 1/4/64 - 31/3/65* House of 
Commons 207 (H.M.S.O. 1965) Tumock p.171.
83. See for instance Cousins speech in H.C. Deb. Vol.724* cols.408-413* This 
issue is raised again in chapter 5*
84. See Table I, Chapter 2.
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The Napier Commission Report had stated that a greater proportion of 
the income of crofters came from the sea than from the land, proving that 
fishing had become of increasing importance throughout the 19th Century.
A distinction has already been made between the East Coast including 
Shetland and Caithness where the industry relied on home-based boats 
and the West coast where the people tended to be employed on boats from 
elsewhere. As the century progressed the boom in herring fisheries be­
came greater and it was to this branch of the industry that fishermen in 
all parts of the Highlands increasingly turned. Shetland, previously a 
white fishing centre, became the greatest herring fishery area with 114 
curing stations on the Islands and an estimated 12,000 people employed in
Q C
all. The boom continued up until the First World War while the
technology of the industry changed with the replacement of sailing boats 
by steam drifters. This fact, which meant that more capital was necessary, 
together with changes in marketing procedures,tended to centralise fishing 
in a few large ports to the detriment of the small harbours. Increasingly 
the centre of gravity of the industry shifted southwards to the ports of 
Banff-shire and Buchan.
An average of 70% of the herring catch had been exported to Germany
and Russia; following the First War these markets collapsed and the number
of Highlanders employed in fishing dropped from 35,000 in 1915 to 13,400 
86in 1958* White fishing did not suffer so disastrously but Highlanders 
were unable to afford trawlers and could not compete with them using the 
old line methods. The famous attempts by Lord Leverhulme to reorganise 
fishing in Lewis and Harris where a total failure though there is some 
disagreement as to whether this was due to the intransigence of the local 
people or because the scheme was ill thought out. Highland fisheries 
remained in the doldrums throughout the fifties and it became clear, as
85. Collier, p.79*
86. Collier, p.82. The figures include shore-based workers.
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the Crofters Commission pointed out, that the traditional combination
of crofting and fishing was no longer possible; modem conditions
necessitated fishing becoming a full-time occupation. In order to
facilitate this an Outer Isles Fisheries Training Scheme was set up
(by the organisations mentioned in the last chapter) but as late as 1966
the official Government view was that "it would be quite wrong to imagine
that fishing can be looked to as a significantly expanding sector of the
88Highland economy".
Manufacturing industry never has played a large part in the Highland 
economy. Apart from fish processing the only two industries with any 
traditional claims on the area are whisky distillation and textile manu­
facture. The distillation of malt scotch is thought of as something 
typically Highland though in fact the greatest concentration of distilleries
is on lower Speyside outwith the Crofting counties; Islay is the second
89most important centre. Grain whisky tends to be produced in the
lowlands but there is also a large distillery at Invergordon. Though a 
successful industry it is unlikely that whisky distillation adds much to 
regional income.
Textile production in the region means tweed and knitwear. It was 
only in the second half of the last century that the weaving of the Outer 
Hebrides became organised for commercial production, its increasing pop­
ularity corresponding with the boom in deer stalking. At first a purely 
domestic industry, as demand began to rise tweed production became a 
curious mixture of mass production techniques and genuine domestic craft- 
manship. The balance was struck in 1934 when it was decided that the 
'orb' stamp guaranteeing genuine Harris Tweed could only be given to a 
tweed 'made from pure virgin wool, produced in Scotland, spun, dyed and 
finished in the Outer Hebrides and hand-woven by the Islanders at their
87. In their 1957 Report, para. 45.
88. Cmnd. 2864, p.143.
89. O'Dell and Walton, p.230.
97
own homes'. This formula had. several advantages - it had a large enough
'home-made' component to provide sales value but it allowed all but the
weaving to be done by machines. It also ensured a monopoly for the Outer
Hebrides. Tweed consumed a third of the Scottish Wool clip, employed
901,400 weavers and 1,000 mill employees. Production was concentrated
in Lewis with the mills in Stornoway. Knitwear was on a smaller scale
and was chiefly important in Shetland.
Throughout the period described here tourists have come into the
Highlands in increasingly large numbers but not until the post-War period
was there any attempt to develop the industry in a systematic way as a
source of wealth and employment. Apart from giving small sums to the
Scottish Tourist Board - which of course had responsibilities outside the
Highlands - the Government's main effort to this end came in 1959 when
Sir Hugh Fraser was invited to prepare and carry out plans for tourist
development with Scottish Office assistance. Fraser chose Badenoch and
the Bonar Bridge - Lairg district as special target areas and launched
the Highland Tourist Development Co. Ltd., with Government support, to
91give loans for tourist accommodation and facilities. But his main
effort was at Aviemore. During the late '5o's and early '60's there
was a rapid increase in skiing in the Cairngorms under the auspices of
the Cairngorm Winter Sports Development Board, which constructed ski-tows.
Fraser, with the example of the new resort of Courchevel in the French
Alps in his mind, thought that there was; a great potential for development.
He managed to persuade the Government to offer a 25% building grant and
together with Scottish & Newcastle Breweries, United Caledonian Breweries
92
and Shell-Mex & B.P. financed the large new tourist centre of Aviemore.
90. Tumock, p.155*
91. George Pottinger, The Winning Counter: Hugh Fraser & Harrods. (Hutchinson, 
1971), Chapter 7. Pottinger - now notorious for his association with Poulson 
(the architect of Avienore) - was assigned by the Scottish Office to assist 
Fraser.
92. Pottinger, Chap. 8.
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It was opened in December 1966 just a year after H.I.D.B. set to work.
Though pursued on a much smaller scale, tourism increased in other 
parts of the region and may have done even better if communications had 
been better. But, whatever their affect on outsiders, poor communications 
are a persistent thorn in the sides of the local inhabitants and pro­
ductive of considerable militancy, as illustrated when Dr. Beeching 
announced his plans to close certain Highland railways. A group called 
the Scottish Vigilantes Association, led by Prank Thomson, later to become 
a member of H.I.D.B., was formed to protect them and conducted a 
vigorous press campaign under the name of fMacPuff *. This culminated
in March 1964 with a 1public inquiry', though it has been suggested
that by this time the Secretary of State had already committed himself
93to saving the lines.
Since the days of Telford's Parliamentary roads and the Caledonian
and Crinan canals in the early 19th Century the pattern of Highland trans-
94port has been transformed more than once. First the steamship revo­
lutionised communications with the hitherto inaccessible West Coast and 
Islands then, at the end of the 19th Century, railways penetrated to the 
far North and West Mainland though there was never a very extensive rail 
network in the Crofting Counties and the isles remained untouched. Both 
these methods of transport have declined in the present Century with rising 
costs confining the boats to fewer and fewer routes and posing a permanent 
threat to all railway lines north of the Great Glen. Instead there has 
been a return to the roads andlhe century has seen an increasing number of 
these black-topped, widened and even built from scratch - much of the 
money inevitably coming from the central government. Most recently of 
all, a network of air routes has begun to spread over the Highlands. The 
93• "Sunday Times11 19th March 1967.
94. See O'Dell & Walton, Chap.11 & p.232-5? Tumock, Chap.7 snd also ¥.1. 
Skewis, "Transport in the Highlands and Islands" (Ph.d. Thesis, Glasgow Univ. 
1962).
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complexity of transport organisation was described in Chapter 2 and 
no more will be said about it here except to note that the long distances 
plus the small amount of traffic necessitate both government subsidies 
and high charges - a perennial source of unrest in the region.
This mention of Government subsidies brings us back to what must be 
a major theme - the growth of state intervention in the Highlands since 
the Napier Commission. Much of this expansion is not peculiar to the 
Highlands but concerns the whole country, so for instance in 1882 a 
Fishery Board for Scotland was established and, following the Local Govern­
ment (Scotland) Acts of 1889 and 1894> County Councils were created under a 
Local Government Board. Special to the Crofting Counties at this time were 
the Crofters Commission and the Congested Districts Boards, already men­
tioned, and an extraordinary number of official enquiries: Napier, Walpole
and the Deer Forest Commission, also previously noted, plus a Medical 
Services (Highlands and Islands) Committee in 1912, a report on Home 
Industries in the Highlands and Islands in 1914, a Royal Commission on 
Housing in Scotland in 1917 (which devoted considerable attention to the
Crofting Counties) and no less than five special reports on Lewis running
95from 1888 to 1906. The Medical Services Committee led to the setting 
up of a Medical Services (Highlands and Islands) Board which served until 
the National Health Service was created. Government money has flowed in 
by increasing amounts - as aid to agriculture and forestry, transport 
subsidies, support grants for Local Authorities, unemployment benefits, old 
age pensions, and other welfare payments (which because of the higher rates 
of unemployment and large proportion of old people in the region would be 
larger than in other parts of the country) so that by 1965-66 the Scottish
Departments and the Forestry Commission alone were spending £35m. on the
96area and with 99^  of the population of Scotland the Highlands and Islands
95. Day, p.302.
96. H.C. Deb, Vol. 725, cols. 287-8.
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97were receiving 10ft. of government expenditure in that country. No
dewscription of Government activity in the Highlands can be complete without
mention of the defence establishments - though these are at least arguably
of little benefit to the region as such. Prom the Naval bases of Invergordon
and Scarpa Flow earlier in the Century to the Army rocket range on South
TJist and the Polaris Submarine in Holy Loch today, the Highlands and Islands
have been and remained a major centre of defence activity with all that this
implies in terms of inputs of cash, the growth of dependant local economies
and the introduction into the Gaelic areas of an alien language and culture.
Prom the appointment of the Napier Commission in 1883 to the burst
of land settlement that followed the Act of 1919# the Government were
active in dealing with Highland problems. Then for the next twenty
years there seems to have been a period of relative quiescence which
ended in 1943 with the creation of the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric
Board. After that administrative activity steps up again; the
was
Advisory Panel for the Highlands and Islands ./ formed in 1947; a "Programme
98of Highland Development" published in 1950; the Taylor Commission appointed,
and its recommendation for legislation carried out in 1955; a Review of
99Highland Policy published and the Red Beer Commission set up in 1959 5 
! the H. & I. Shipping Services Act passed in I960; a Highland Transport 
Enquiry began in 1961; the Highland Transport Board formed in 1963; a 
Committee to study general medical services in the Highlands and Islands 
appointed in 1964; and of course in 1965 the Highlands and Islands Develop­
ment (Scotland) Act passed.
and islands
Something more should be said about the Highlands/Advisory Panel which 
was under the chairmanship of Malcolm Macmillan, Labour M.P. for the
100Western Islestuntil 1954 and thereafter of Lord Cameron, the law lord.
97. Cmnd. 785# p.10. Ross confirmed this percentage in H.C. Deb, Vol.708, 
cols. 199-202.
98. Cmd. 7976.
99. Cmnd. 785*
P.T.0.
100. . a>nusson, "^i'"hi arid idmi'astration" in Thom son ^ C'rinble, o.P'J9»
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It was created as a general advisory body and coordinating link. The
sort of things it did are illustrated by the 1950 White paper which include
as appendices recommendations by the Panel on piers and harbours and on
fishing. In the 1960*s it organised a trip to Norway to see how the
Norwegians dealt with problems quite similar to those of the Highlands
and Islands, cooperated with the Scottish Transport Council in looking
102at transport in the Highlands which led to the Highland Transport Board being
set up, and in a moment of unusual militancy threatened to resign en bloc if
105Highland railways were closed down following the Beeching proposals.
Its final and perhaps most significant report, on land use in the region, 
was produced in December 1964. Its contents are discussed in chapter 4.
No description of the Highlands in modem times can be complete with­
out mention of one salient fact: depopulation. The seven crofting counties
reached their maximum recorded population in 1841» since then the population
105decreased steadily from census to census right down to 1961. The
figures are 396,045 people in the region in 1841 as against 277*900 i**
1961. Seen as a proportion of total Scottish population the changes look
even more dramatic: in 1751 it is estimated that the seven counties con-
106tain slightly over 20% of the people of Scotland. whereas in 1961 it 
was only around 5%. The chief reason for depopulation seems to have been 
out-migration particularly of the younger people who would normally be 
having families and a consequently unbalanced population structure (i.e. 
a disproportionately large number of old people). Emigration is clearly 
related to a lack of economic opportunity. The Highlands and Islands tend 
to have unemployment rates of over double those of Scotland as a whole 
(Stornoway leads the whole country with over 25% unemployed): for example
in the decade prior to 1965 the average unemployment rate was about 3* 5%
101. Advisory Panel on the Highlands & Islands "Report on a Visit to Norway, 
llth-28th September 1961" (1962).
102. Ministry of Transport, Highland and Transport Enquiry, Bus Services in the 
Highlands (1961); Transport Services in the Highlands and Islands (1963).
P.T.0. j
1C3. Magnusson, p.283.
104. Department of Agriculture & Fisheries for Scotland and the Advisory 
Panel on the Highlands and Islands, Land Use in the Highlands & Islands, 
(H.Iv.S.O. 1964).
105. Mention has already been made of depopul-tion in Chapter 2 and figures 
for 1951» 1961 and 1966 can be found in Table 1, which also show differences 
between areas.
106. Tumock, p. 191.
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107in Scotland and 7% in the Highlands. Net income per capita was
£262* 5 in the Highlands and Islands (plus Bute) in the fiscal year
1964-65 and £328*2 in Scotland as a whole. On top of this the structure
of the economy in the seven counties was unpromising; 11*5^ of the
emDlov«d copulation worked in primary production (5*89* in Scotland) and
1 Ofl
only 11*9% in manufacturing (34*8% in Scotland) in 1967.
These fio-n-res illustrate the "Highland problem" as generally perceived
in 1965s a declining and ageing population; lack of economic opportunity
reflected in high unemployment rates and low personal income; an economy
lacking manufacturing industries and whose traditional bases,
agriculture and fishing, showed few signs of being able to expand.
Certain people saw more to the problem than this, they would also add
the decline of the Gaelic language and culture and the Highland 'way of
life1 all threatened not only by the demographic and economic factors
mentioned but by the domination of the education system and mass
109communications by English speakers. It is as well to remember
that something becomes a 'problem' only when it is perceived as being 
one. The economic and demographic facts of life in the Highlands were 
not much different in the days of the Napier Commission than they are today 
yet the Highland problem, as they saw it was rather different than the one 
described above. They did not consider depopulation an evil but as a 
necessity to be encouraged by schemes to aid emigration. The evil was 
congestion, too many people crowded on a limited amount of land with 
consequent insecurity, poverty and a lack of incentive for the more enter­
prising whose advancement was blocked. The Highlands were low in resources 
and only a drop in population could allow their inhabitants to earn a
107. H.I.D.B., Fifth Report 1970, Appendix VII.
108. H.I.D.B., Third Report, 1968, Appendix VI.
109. An interesting illustration of this is given by Darling and Morley on
p. 320 of the West Highland Survey. School children in a Highland township
writing an essay about spring mentioned the song of the nightingale and the
P.T.0.
start of the cricket season, though the bird is not found or the game 
played in their part of the country.
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reasonable living. The idea of encouraging other industries to go into 
the region by government actions did not of course enter the head of any 
moderate person at that time. Between Napier and the 1960*3 there 
was a gradual change in definition of the Highland problem. De­
population came to be seen as the overriding evil and once that 
step is made it becomes important to create other sources of employment 
to allow the people of the area to earn their living without moving away.
This change of emphasis is reflected in Government policies for the 
Highlands. In the early years the stress was on land settlement as 
undertaken by the Congested Districts Board and later by the Board of 
Agriculture plus help with emigration given by the Crofters Colonisation 
Committee (1888-1904). In the years since the Second World War,
government reports have tended to stress the role of forestry, hydro­
electricity and industrial development.
Whatever may be thought about these responses it cannot be said 
that the Central Government has ignored the Highlands yet there seems to
be a persistent feeling in the region that they have been deliberately 
112neglected. Mythology is at least as strong a force as balanced
appraisal and loses none of its strength as a political weapon by being 
insecurely based on facts. Feelings of neglect and relative deprivation 
(the latter not at all mythological) surrounded the subject of Highland 
development with a highly charged atmosphere and this was, together with 
an intractable environment and an unfortunate history, one of the things 
the Highlands and Islands Development Board had to face when it came 
into office.
110. There were always certain people who opposed emigration. The official 
change of heart was probably a result of the First World War more than any­
thing else.
111. See for instance, Cmd. 7976, p.5.
112. See Lord Bannerman in H.L. Deb, Vol.291, Col.112 and Donald Stewart M.P. 
reported in Glasgow Herald. 17/4/73«
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Chapter 4: The Creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board
Pressures for a Highland development authority
Scotland has never been short of people willing to apply their 
minds to the ’Highland problem1 and as this century has worn on, increasing 
numbers of them have come to the conclusion that one of the necessary ele­
ments in a solution would be the creation of some form of regional develop­
ment authority. The Liberal Party must be given the prize for being 
first with this proposal - at least in a published form - as it appeared 
in one of the ’Tartan Book’ series produced in 1928 on behalf of the
Scottish Liberal Federation. The publication suggested that a Highland
of
Development Commission was needed ’to co-ordinate the efforts/the many
public departments now responsible for agriculture, fishing, transport,
electricity, mines and health' and to 'prepare and carry into effect a
comprehensive scheme for developing the full resources of the Highlands.
The sort of economic development that it was envisaged the Commission
would encourage mainly involved the primary sector of the economy
with a particular stress on land settlement and reclamation. ^
Throughout the 1930's there was a continuing interest in proposals
to revive the Highlands. In 1936 a Highland Development League was set
up and passed a resolution in favour of 'an administrative or central board
2
for the Highlands', a demand that it repeated before the 1945 election.
There were pamphlets by Hugh Quigley ('A plan for the Highlands'), Lachlan 
Grant ('A New Deal for the Highlands')  ^and Sir Alexander MacEwan and 
John Lome Campbell ('Act Now for the Highlands and Islands'), the latter
1. Russell Johnston, Highland Development (Scottish Liberal Party Publication, 
1964)» p.29 & 30 and The Liberal Magazine. June 1928, p.351*
2. M. Magnusson, "Highland Administration" in D.S. Thomson & I. Grimble (eds.) 
The Future of the Highlands. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), p.288.
3* Both pamphlets are mentioned in W.C. MacKenzie, Hie Highlands and Islands 
of Scotland. (Edinburgh, The Moray Press, 1936); p.293*
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calling for a Highland Development Board with four paid members including 
one Gaelic speaker which would give additional grants for infrastructural 
improvement and generally improve the economic and social life of the 
region - as with the Liberals the stress being placed on the primary 
sector. ^
On a more official plane the Scottish Economic Committee (forerunner 
of the Scottish Council (Dev. & Industry)) set up, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, a semi-official”Committee on the Highlands and 
Islands” which produced a fairly detailed report on the region. It too 
proposed the creation of a ^Development Commissioner* independent of 
local authorities or the Central government and with considerable dis-
5
cretionary powers to plan development and administer experimental schemes.
Its other recommendations covered all aspects of the Highland economy; bad
communications were identified as the largest single cause of depopulation
for
and as well as subsidies '/ sea transport it was proposed that the County 
Councils take over responsibility for all ferries, piers, harbours and 
township roads, receiving grants, if necessary, to allow them to improve 
these facilities. A central marketing agency was needed plus more technical 
training including experimental and demonstration crofts. In general, good 
agriculture required the extension of crofts and the development of ancillary 
activities such as poultry; crofters should be given the opportunity to 
own their own land. More forestry was called for, more government assist­
ance to tourism and encouragement of experimental approaches to fishing. 
Hydro-electric schemes were seen as a great potential source of expansion. 
Altogether this report adds up to a fairly comprehensive scheme of develop­
ment with the amphasis on the experimental and marks a decisive turn away
4. Magnusson, p.286.
5. Scottish Economic Committee, The Highlands and Islands of Scotland (1958)
P.29-31.
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from the more limited 1 crofter protection' approach that had hitherto 
characterised official policy, but it differs from the approach actually 
followed by Hil.D.B. when it came into existence by placing far less 
stress on manufacturing and tourism.
The assistant secretary to the Committee was Adam Collier and he 
produced his own work on the highland economy, "The Crofting Problem", 
shortly afterwards. (However he died before it was quite finished and 
it wasn't published, edited by A.K. Cairncross, until 1953)* Collier's 
book is above all an analysis of the economic changes that occurred in 
the crofting counties between the 1880's and 1940 but he has a chapter 
on 'What can be done?'^ Once again the stress is on the land - improve­
ment of grassland, intensification of cultivation, eradication of bracken, 
reclamation, more afforestation and the use of new techniques. Hopes are 
pinned on the expansion of the extractive industries (including the old 
favourites, peat and seaweed), but tourism and hydro-electric power, 
if used rightly, are promising. Collier is very pessimistic about a 
revival of the fishing industry. Published two years later than "The 
Crofting Problem" (though researched from 1944-49) was Fraser Darling's 
massive "essay in human ecology", the West Highland Survey. Darling is 
not primarily concerned with economic development but he does make a 
number of suggestions for improving agriculture and increasing forestry
while throwing some scorn at those who believe in the improvement of
7
communications or the establishment of industry. Regarding a develop­
ment authority he is frankly ambiguous for while he says such a body is 
necessary for effective rehabilitation he adds the curious rider that 
it might be "unconstitutional" and»if so, "most of us would feel some
6. A. Collier, Pie Crofting Problem, (Cambridge U.P., 1953) P*147.
7. F. F. Darling, West Highland Survey. (Oxford U.P., 1955) p.Vidil^ )p.322 
and pp.241-5.
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satisfaction in such a decision whatever the dictates rtf common sense".
The Government's own post-war policies for the Highlands and Islands
<
were set out in the 1950 White Paper "A Programme of Highland Development".
By this time although there was no regional body with executive powers of
the sort being proposed in the 1950’s, there were both the North of Scotland
Hydro-Electric Board and the Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel with the
duty, as its name suggests, to advise on the sort of things the public
authorities ought to be doing in the region. The White paper commits
the Government to an increased provision of 'basic services', i.e. housing,
water supply, health services, education, electricity, and roads and other
transport facilities. As much of this is the responsibility of the local
authorities, most of the central government assistance was to come via
increased exchequer grants as^for instance, in the Crofter Counties Scheme
for roads that had been in operation since 1955* Particular stress was
placed on transport and the white paper included a memorandum from the
Advisory Panel which listed essential piers and boatslips that needed
maintaining. The suggestions for the "principal industries" followed
the usual pattern: concerning agriculture, a land use survey was proposed,
rehabilitation of farms under the Hill Farming Act 1946 was to continue
and an increase in cattle stocks looked for; increased afforestation was
to go ahead and many of the Advisory Panel' s recommendations in their
report on fishing were accepted - including grants and loans for fishing
piers and harbours. Proposals for tourism were being 'considered' and
the further utilisation of minerals, seaweed and peat 'investigated'.
encouragement
For manufacturing the main ■ ' / .:rJ_ was the newly created development
area from Inverness to Tain and the chief disappointment the fact that 
the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board were not able to offer cheap
8. Ibid, p*362
9. Cad. 7976.
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electricity. Altogether the White paper offered little that was new, 
only bringing together in one document a statement of the various forms 
of Government involvement in the Highland economy that had come about 
in the previous decade or two. A further White paper in 1959, "Review 
of Highland Policy", ^  does much the same for the fifties, only bjfr ’that 
time the Crofters Commission was in existence (and offering financial 
assistance) and the Government were planning to help finance the Scottish 
Tourist Board.^
Meanwhile interest in a development authority continued. Resolutions 
byt the Scottish Liberal Party Conference several times proposed the
1 2
creation of such a body (for instance at the 1948 and 1962 Conferences)
but on the whole the Party did not pursue the idea very vigorously - they
did not for example put it before the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs -
and, lentil Russell Johnston*s 1964 pamphlet, neither were they very
specific about pbtaemp • In that pamphlet it emerged that they wanted
a small all-purpose body with the power to command the services of all
the existing development agencies in the Highlands and Islands but leaving
the implementation of its recommendations to these agencies so that it
did not become unwieldy. It was to be headed by an executive chairman
of vigour who was still in the middle of his career and not someone who
colonial
was merely being given a retirement award’for good service in military or / 
spheres’. (The Liberals were always to lay great stress on this). ^
For the period of its initial Development Plan it was to be controlled 
by a three man nominated executive advised by the Highland Panel but, 
after that, responsibility was to pass to a Council directly elected by
10. Cmnd. 785*
11. For dates and details see Chapter 2.
12. Johnston, p. 26 & 28.
15. In 1964 they were perhaps thinking of Sir Robert ¥r$uhart, ist Chairman 
of the Crofters Commission and an ex-diplomat. The tradition has been 
continued with the appointment of Sir Andrew Gilchrist and Rear Admiral 
Dunbar /Nasantitifti to H.I.D.B.
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the people of the Highlands. The authority was to have control of all 
development expenditure and be empowered to make development plans, offer 
grants and loans, compulsarily purchase land and initiate comprehensive 
development schemes. ^  Had such a body come into existence it would 
have been a radical administrative innovation - a local authority (albeit 
of regional scope) with control over central government agencies and 
expenditure. It is difficult to believe that the Scottish Office or the 
Treasury would have accepted that. Johnston's pamphlet goes on to discuss
what the development authority is to do and the theme that it is particularly 
emp^ucaiedd is the need to "make the Highlands pay", i.e. development 
which removes the need for subsidies. Compared with earlier proposals 
a much greater stress is placed on manufacturing industry and particularly 
those 'corner-stone plants' that the Norwegian Government had established, 
though the traditional industries all get their mention too.
The Labour Government of 1945“51 had not set up a development authority 
but after their defeat in 1951* which produced the usual policy rethink, 
the Executive Committee of the Scottish Council of the Labour Party came 
to the conclusion that such a body was necessary. Their ideas were put 
forward in a pamphlet entitled "Programme for the Highlands and Islands" 
which George Willis, (who later, as Minister of State, piloted the 19&5 
Highland Development Bill through Parliament), played a large part in 
writing. The example of T.V.A. impressed Labour but in fact the 'develop­
ment Corporation* proposed differed from the U.S. body in being directed 
by a large council containing a substantial number of elected members.
It was to take over a number of functions from the local authorities . 
tfoich were better administered on a regional basis (e.g. main drainage
schemes and technical colleges) and was to have power delegated to it
15-from the Secretary of State's departments. J This Coloration was to
14. Johnston, p. 26 & 28.
15. The Labour Party, Programme for the Highlands and Islands, pp.22-24.
110
be the chief body administering matters concerned with land, transport and 
and
tourisir^/it was to be able to erect its own factories and assist manu­
facturers though the pamphlet thought that the Highland economy *must
16continue to be based upon agriculture, fishing, tourism and forestry1.
The programme was put before the Scottish Labour Conference and accepted
but it did not receive the attention of the National Conference until
after the 1955 election. It was not therefore part of the official
party platform until the 1959 election (by which time the proposals for
a development corporation had been modified to take into account the
S.T.U.C.'s preference for a small appointed executive). The statement
of Labour policy for Scotland that preceded the 1959 election, "Let
Scotland Prosper" and the one that preceded the 19&4 election,"Signposts
for Scotland", both committed a Labour Government to creating a Highland 
17Board and Harold Wilson actually made a speech on the subject in
18Inverness in May 1964.
The most ardent proponents of a development authority throughout the
1 fifties and early1sixties was the Scottish Trade Union Congress under the
General Secretaryship first of George Middleton and then of James Jack.
Following motions by affiliated unions calling for a Highland development
authority at the 1951 and 1952 Annual Congress,the General Council of
S.T.U.C. asked that they should be allowed to give special attention to
19the idea and explore the possibilities. This they did and in their
evidence to the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs called for the
creation of such a body either as a corporation on the lines of New Town
20
Corporations or as a full-time Committee at St. Andrews House.
16. Ibid, p.20.
17. ©ie Labour Party, Let Scotland Prosper, p.40 and Signposts for Scotland. 
P.14.
18. Glasgow Herald, 25/5/64*
19. Scottish Trade Union Congress, 55th Annual Report (1952); P.275-6.
20. S.T.U.C. 57~th Annual Report (1954), p.110.
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Following a special Highland Conference in Inverness in May 1953 ,the
General Council produced a memorandum to be submitted to the Secretary
of State in which they came down in favour of the 'New Town Corporation*
idea. It was to be directed by full-time members appointed by the
Secretary of State for a specified period, would work alongside existing
bodies not taking over their functions but having an overall authority,
and would have a wide range of powers including those connected with land.
21It was to be given £250m. to spend over 10 years. Apart from the
money (which is a vast sum, given that existing bodies were to continue
with their functions and therefore presumably with thier expenditure) the
S.T.U.C.*s proposals came closer to the Board as it was actually to emerge
than any others. The Secretary of State (James Stuart) declared himself
interested in these proposals but would go no further until the Royal
Commission on Scottish Affairs had reported. In the event that body
came out against a development authority on the grounds that,(i) the
existing administrative system could not easily be adjusted to fit in
with a development corporation; (ii) the Highlands are not a ‘special
reserve1 which require different measurerss from elsewhere; (iii) such a
body could not operate without conflict with existing agencies; and (iv) it
would displace local authorities to some degree and the commission viewed
22
*with dismay* any ‘further attrition' of local authority powers. These
arguments convinced the Secretary of State but not the S.T.U.C. who claimed
that the Highlands palpably did need special treatment and there was no
23
reason why a development authority should cut across existing bodies.
Nothing daunted by this set-back the S.T.U.C. held another Highland 
Conference in 1955» and decided to seek the views of local authorities on
21. Ibid, p.113.
22. Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs, 1952-1954, Report, Cmd 9219, p.84.
23. S.T.U.C., 58th Annual Report (1955), p.184-5.
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the subject of a development authority. No doubt worried by the belief 
of the Royal Commission that they would lose powers, most of the larger 
authorities, with the exception of Zetland C.C., came out against the 
idea.^^ Consrress had more luck with the Labour Party National Executive, 
who were also being persuaded by the Scottish Council of the party, as 
was mentioned, and a development authority for the Highlands became 
official Party policy. Conservative Secretaries of State continued to 
resist and following renewed S.T.U.C. pressure in I960, Maclav (the 
current Secretary of State) told them that an authority was simply not 
necessary as the powers with regard to agriculture already existed and 
the new Local Employment Act permitted firms anywhere in the Crofting 
Counties to apply to the Board of Trade for grants or loans; further­
more the County Councils in the Highlands had recently appointed develop­
ment officers. This view was not exceptional or confined to Conservative
26Secretaries of State; many members of the Highland Panel and Civil
27Servants dealing with the Highlands as well as the Inverness Courier
all thought a development authority. - would be little help in solving the
28Highland problem. The Conservative Government retained this view, 
and the S.T.U.C. continued to try and persuade them otherwise, right up 
to October 1964 when the Conservatives lost the election (to Labour) and 
three out of their four Crofting County Seats (to the Liberals): it was
reckoned that the Highland electorate had given their verdict in favour 
of a development board.
It would be unduly harsh to claim that the many Grant programmes for 
the Highlands-from the War (and before) up tb 1965 were-a-complete failure: 
they undoubtedly had the effect of improving social conditions^communities 
linked by made-up roads to the out&ld'e^  Wottli^^st-families rtebeiving 
r ;_pi£ed whter and kl4ctriteity etc.)1 without %hibh 'd.eip^pbi^tion would surely
— ... .j.)!;, )-3 ’ -.1 1 . - 7
24. S.T.U.C., 59th Annual Report, (1956), p.60.
25. » 64th « " (1961), p.129-32.
P.T.O.
26. Prophet Smith (’- .1.1.p. member) , himself s. member of the Pi mb land 
Panel, s -»ys that most of then were •vertical about the need for a develo 
bo ard.
27. Inverness Courier. 12/7/60.
28. Though Piohael foble has since claimed (in a private interview) 
that he was thinking of creating some sort of d'. velorre.-nt body had the 
Conservatives won the election.
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have been worse. But it is true that these measures only marginally
effected the 'Highland problem'*, depopulation continued (at a worse rate
29for 1951-61 than in the previous 20 years), unemployment remained high 
and the regional economy was no more able to stand on its own feet without 
large inputs of subsidy that it was before. Amelioration -'keeping the 
Highlands happy' - and not development was the result, whether intentional 
or not, of government policies. These facts were commented on by econo­
mists in the early s i x t i e s s h o w e d  that from 1951-1960 the number of 
employed persons in the region fell, not only in the primary sector which 
might be expected, but also in the manufacturing sector - and by the same
amount. Even in the Invemess-Invergordon area, the number of insured 
30workers decreased.' He criticised the Government for concentrating too
much of the regions investment capital on 'social overheads' which produce
little direct increment in income or employment,and attacked any further
31investment in agriculture, forestry and fishing - a radical break with 
all previous recommendations and one which blandly ignored political 
pressures. His solutions were financial incentives directed at bringing 
ig more manufacturing industry and assisting tourism, systematic programming 
to calculate the effects of Government measures and check their compatability, 
greater coordination of the various administrative agencies plus enforoeraent
of a investment policy, and regional problems to be considered as a whole and
32not in an ad hoc way.
Similar in its clain that government policies in the Highlands had
33been hopeless but written with much more 'confident pessimism' "  is the 
analysis by D. I. MacKay and N. K. Baxter. They calculated that to
29. D. Simpson "Investment, Employment & Government Expenditure in the 
Highlands, 1951-60", Scottish Journal of Political Economy Vol.II, (Nov.1963)
p.260.
30. Ibid, p.263.
31. Ibid, p.261-78.
32. Ibid.
P.T.O.
3. The words are those oh Kenneth .11 exander see, o.T.U.U., henort oh 7t.h 
^i^nl/.’nd _inj_ Islands tonfe^ence, x>. 29.
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prevent further depopulation between 19,000 and 26,000 jobs would have
to be created and, as they differ from Simpson in considering the likelihood
of attracting manufacturing to the region remote, this is
34•virtually unachievable1. They allow tourism to expand and are
less dismissive than Simpson of forestry, but these two together will
not be enough to prevent further inevitable depopulation. The best
thing the Government can do is to stop propping up a decayed economy,
induce labour out of the area instead of capital in, and concentrate on
35developing the North-East instead.
The importance of the Highlands as a Scottish symbol is too great
for such drastic surgery ever to be acceptable and in their plan for
36the Scottish Economy, 1965-1970, the new Labour Government stuck to
more orthodox policies. The inevitability of further decline in
agricultural employment was accepted and it was thought wrong fto
imagine that fishing can be looked to as a significantly expanding
* 37
sector of the Highland economy, but forestry, tourism and manufacturing
were all seen as having a potential for growth particularly within thirteen
20
•consolidation1 areas (the largest of which was Invemess-Invergordon).
Perhaps the most original part of the plan was the declaration that hitherto 
the tendency had been to treat the Highlands as "something sui generis" re­
quiring special treatment and insulated from criteria applied elsewhere in 
Britain, whereas the plan attempted to get away from this view as *it is 
arguable that in the long run the Highlands have lost more than they have £•: 1
gained'. ^  It may be doubted whether this in fact brought any change in 
Government action but at the level of rhetoric it is a distinctive break.
J4I D.I. MacKay & N.K. Buxton, "The North of Scotland Economy - a case for 
Redevelopment". Scottish Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 12 (1965), p.25.
35. Ibid, p.23.
'36. Cmnd. 2864. This appeared in January 1966 i.e. shortly after the Board 
had taken office but most of it had been written before and Grieve was broadly 
aware of its contents. It is interesting to note that the earlier "inquiry 
into the Scottish Economy" (the Toothill Report of 1961) scarcely mentioned 
the Highlands.
P.T.O.
3 7. Cmnd . ?8 M  , p. 14 3.
38. I  i ; i d , r». v -3 150.
39. 15id, p.50.
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The official plan was not the only scheme to be produced about this 
time. Following their battle with Beeching^ the Highland Vigilantes ^  
commissioned Martech Consultants to produce a report on the possibilities 
for development. This report, called "Highland Opportunity" came out 
in 1964 and covered six of the Crofting Counties (Argyll was excluded).
Its general guidelines for people in the Highlands were that they should , 
(i) exploit the local resources; (ii) export; (iii) add value locally;
(iv) develop products of high value; (v) create volume flows. More 
specifically it urged the setting up of a marketing cooperative to engage 
in promotion, selling, distribution and finance, the creation of an ex­
tensively advertised Highland brand name for all products, industries 
based on animal and vegetable by-products and the development of engineer­
ing related to local needs. On a grander and more speculative scale it 
also identified some fibres later to be coursed by H.I.D.B. - such as 
cheap electricity for power - using industries and a petro-chemical 
complex.
The Highlands and Islands Advisory Panel also, naturally, had their 
own recommendations to make. Following a visit to Norway in 1961 they 
suggested that more financial assistance should be made available to 
developers; theare should be a carefully coordinated scheme of develop­
ment; better guidance and information should be available for County
42
development officers;and a growth point policy should be pursued.
Burt their most discussed report of the sixties, perhaps of their whole 
existence, was "Land use in the Highlands and Islands" produced in 1964* 
This was the work of a sub-committee including James Shaw Grant, Reay 
Clarke, John Robertson and Naomi Mitchison, and one of the reasons why
40. See Chapter 3*
- 41. Martech Consultants Ltd., Highland Opportunity (1964) p.17-18.
42. Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands, Report on a Visit to 
Norway^ 11th to 28th September, 1961 (July 1962) Paras. 48-52.
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they caused at stir was due to their insistence that compulsory purchase
43should not he shirked whether it he to obtain suitable land for the 
Forestry Commission (which has shied away from using its compulsory 
powers), to enforce efficient use of agricultural land or to ensure 
that fishings are being properly used. Among the other recommendations 
were the creation of better credit facilities, increased cooperative 
efforts, more reorganisation and enlargement of crofts, an increased 
rate of ’social1 planting of forests, land reclamation and a coordinated 
approach to the administration of land affairs including unified manage­
ment of all land owned by the Secretary of State. ^
The Growth of Regional Aid
In the course of this century the perception of the "Highland problem" 
and its solution has changed, as we have seen both in Chapter 3 and in the 
previous section, from being concerned with agricultural improvement and 
the creation of viable holdings to broad recommendations for regional 
development. This change was parallelled in Britain as a whole by an 
increasing concern with the problems of the less prosperous regions. 
Policies to deal with these problems began to grow up in the 1930's with 
the Special Areas Acts but these only covered those industrial and mining 
areas that had been worst hit by unemployment (in Scotland basically the 
Clydeside - North Lanarkshire area). After the vvar the basis of the 
policy was the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act which established 
Development Areas, among which was included, from 1949 onwards, the 
Inverness - Tain district. Under the Act the Board of Trade had power, 
within the Development Areas, to build factories, make loans to; industrials 
estate companies- (with Treasury Consent), make provision for basic public 
- services and reclaim derelict land. In addition the Treasury could give 
grants or loans to industrial undertakings on the advice of the Development
43. Advisory Panel etc. Land Use in the Highland and Ialands (1964) p.69.
44. IMd.
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Areas Treasury Advisory Committee/ (D.A.T.A.C.) The stick to match
these carrots was the need for firms to obtain Industrial Development
Certificates (from the B.O.T.) under the Town and Country Planning Acts.
The Distribution of Industry Act, amended in 1958» remained the’.basis 
policy
of regional /until i960 when it was replaced by the Local Employment Act.
This abolished the Development Areas and set up Development Districts based 
on Local Employment Exchange areas. As the B.O.T.fs rule of thumb for 
deciding if a Local Employment Exchange area should be declared a Develop­
ment District was an unemployment figure of 4^0 or above ^  this meant that 
for the first time the whole of the seven Crofting Counties came under the 
net of regional policy. Other charges were the replacement of D.A.T.A.C. 
by the Board of Trade Advisory Committee (B.O.T.A.C.), a more flexible 
approach to the giving of grants and loans, and the introduction of a 
building grant. By 1965 "total aid to the Highlands for the year,
from both the B.O.T. and the special Treasury Loan Scheme (channelled
x 47through the Highland Fund - see Chapter 2), was £590,000.
The system was changed again when Labour passed the 1966 Industrial 
Development Act. Development Districts were replaced by new Development 
Areas which were much larger than any previous areas (the whole of Scotland 
except Edinburgh was covered) and were later supplemented by Special Develop­
ment Areas (which comprised the unemployment black spots of the industrial 
and mining areas). The only affect these charges had on the Highlands and 
Islands was to decrease their competitiveness with previously unscheduled 
areas. The other major change introduced by the 1966 Act was the
replacement of the 10% grant for plant (introduced in 1965) and depreciation
45. G. McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (George Allen & Unwin, 1969)p.llO.
46. Ibid, p.122.
47. H.C. Deb, Vol.725, cols. 287-8.
48. This was also the estimation of H.I.D.B. See Inverness Courier. 22/1/66.
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allowances by a 40% (later 45%) investment grant. ^  Shortly afterwards 
Selective Employment Tax was introduced followed by the Regional Employment 
Premium which allowed every employer in manufacturing industry in a 
Development Area to claim a premium on each employee. Because of the 
small proportion of manufacturing industry in the Highlands these innova­
tions once again served only to put the region in a worse position wiih 
regard to other Development Areas.
These changes all occurred shortly after the creation of H.I.D.B.
Since that time regional policy has not remained constants the position of 
the Special Development Areas (none of them in the Highlands) has been 
strengthened; the Board of Trade lost responsibility for regional policy 
to the Ministry of Technology, which itself was absorbed by the Department 
of Trade and Industry (with corresponding changes in the name of the
Advisory Committee);and the Conservative Government abolished investment
grants in 1970 only to find it necessary to pump massive new amounts of
aid to the regions with the Industry Act of 1972.
The relative position of the Highlands and Islands viz-a-viz the 
other less prosperous areas seems to have first risen and then declined 
again since the War. Up until I960,except for the Invemess-Tain area, 
the region was not assisted and therefore must have been relatively dis­
advantaged compared with the Development Areas - but these Areas were of 
quite small extent and so Invemess-Tain was in a good position. After 
I960 all parts of the Crofting Counties, but not all parts of Scotland, 
became assisted areas - an increase in relative advantage that reached 
its peak in 1965 with the creation of HLI.D.B., able to offer 'special 
grants' (see Chapter 5) not available in other regions. This happy 
position however lasted only for a few months as the Industrial Development 
Act of 1966, S.E.T. and R.E.P. all worked to the disadvantage of the
49* McCrone, p.136.
119
Highlands (for the reasons given). The creation of Special Development
Areas, where firms could get 30% of their wage hills paid during the first
503 years of operation, had the same effect. The abolition of S.E.T. on
Highland hotels in 1968 was a gain for the region but by 1969 members of
H.I.D.B. were complaining that their ’unique inducement' of a special
grant was in fact being matched by 'disturbance grants' offered elsewhere
51by B.O.T.A.C. and that in purely financial terms they had no edge.
This last situation was rectified in 1970 when the Board were enabled to
52
give removal grants on top of the special grants but even so the 
Highlands must have remained a long way short of the advantageous position 
they had achieved at the end of 1965,and they still could not compete 
with the Special Development Areas in terms of assistance offered.
The Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland) Act 1965
A growing concern with the problems of the regions plus a specific 
commitment to give the Highlands a development board accompanied the 
Labour Party to Office in October 1964* William Ross became the 
Secretary of State for Scotland and George Willis the Minister of State 
with special responsibility for the Highlands. Willis found that the 
Scottish Office had already prepared a draft Highland Development Bill 
which covered most of the points Labour were interested in. (The 
practise of the Civil Service preparing draft policies for the implementa­
tion of the Opposition's main election commitments is apparantly a normal
As there were very few difficulties to be ironed out the Billwas^ 
by December I964 and its provisions were discussed with various interested
50. Department of Trade & Industiy, Incentives for Industry in the Assisted 
Areas, (1971)> p.21.
51. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1969-70, H.C. 267-I,p,42.
52. H.I.D.B., 5th Report, 1970, p.l6.
53. See R.H.S. Crossman, Inside View, (Jonathan Cape, 1972) p.13*
120
parties. It was given its first reading on February 22nd 1965* Public
response was generally favourable although there were reservations expressed
about some of the powers given to the proposed Board. The exception
to the general moderation was Michael Noble who called it a "measure of
pure Marxist ancestry" which would give the Socialists "power to nationalise
all the land in the Highlands", "acquire probably by compulsory purchase
every business, hotel and industry they want" and "extinguish the rights
55of every farmer, crofter or other person on the land". ^  The sharpness of
Conservatives
the attack hardly squares with the fact that the uon? x/ /a':ion did not force 
a vote on the second reading of the Bill or show any desire to amend the 
Act when they came into power, so perhaps Noble (who was speaking at a 
Young Unionist Weekend School) was just keeping up the spirits of the 
troops.
The second reading took place on the 16th March with both Labour and
Liberal Parties enthusiastically supporting the Bill. ^  The line of
argument of their speakers (including Ross and Willis) was simply that the
Highlands had been an economically underdeveloped region for too long and
there were few signs of improvement. A Highland development board was a
necessary first step in bringing about improvements and it had to be armed
with a wide range of powers to assure that it was not thwarted. The other
main theme of the Bill's supporters was the poor use to which much ^
Highland land was put and ^^need to force bad landlords to undertake de- 
57velopment. The Conservatives did not bother to attack the principle
of a development board and were not nearly as hostile to the Bill as
Noble1s speech might have suggested; nevertheless they were strongly critical
54. See Glasgow Herald 24/2/65 and Inverness Courier 26/2/65.
55.ffi§cotsman and Glasgow Herald. 1/3/65*
56. The debate is to be found in H.C. Deb, Vol.708, cols. 1079-1204.
57. e.g. see Archie Manuel's speech, E.C. Deb, Vol. 708, col. 1127.
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on certain points. Most notably they argued that the Bill gave to the 
Board (or rather to the Secretary of State - see next point) excessive 
powers; in particular they disliked clauses4» which dealt with compulsory 
purchase of land, 6, which allowed the Board to acquire or set up 
businesses and carry them on (and which the Conservatives interpreted as 
allowing the Board to take over businesses without the owner*s consent) 
and above all clause 11 which permitted the Board to require owners of 
land or businesses to furnish them with any information they thought necessary 
for the exercise of their functions. Secondly,the opposition claimed 
that the Board itself was practically powerless as almost all it was to 
be allowed to do depended on the agreement of the Secretary of State: the
(excessive) powers conferred by the Bill were not conferred upon an in­
dependent Board at all but on the Secretary of State. They wanted the 
Board to be more autonomous. Thirdly, and here they were joined by the 
Liberals and even a few Labour backbenchers (e.g. Malcolm MacMillan), they 
said that the amount of money being given to the Board - £150,000 in its
CQ
first year, expected to rise to about £lm. a year by 1968-69 - was much
too small. Not too much can be made of this money question as in fact
the £150,000 only covered a 5 month period and by 1968-69 the Board were
receiving a grant-in-aid of slightly over £2m. but even so this was a lot
development
less than many supporters of a c f:.o e^. Board had been demanding (the 
S.T.U.C. for example). A number of minor points were also made: for
instance Noble thought that the Board should take over the functions of 
some of the other bodies operating in the Highlands; for the Liberals,
George Mackie urged that the Board be allowed to have a revolving fund;
Malcolm MacMillan and Archie Manual from the Labour back benches attacked
58. H.C. Deb, Vol. 788, col.1084.
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the idea of growth point s;and there was disagreement between members of 
the two main parties about the relative merits of public and private 
enterprise for development,purposes.
Despite their criticisms the Conservatives did not force the issue 
and the Bill passed into Committee after an unopposed Second Reading.
In Committee it received a number of minor alterations including having 
its name changed from the Highland • to the Highlands and Islands De­
velopment (Scotland) Bill but the Government resisted any weakening of 
Clauses 6 and 11. The most important Committee change'irasLprobably the 
decision to ensure that the Board’s Chairman should be full time, which 
the government accepted after it appeared that it had support in all
59three parties. Other concessions were introduced at the Ateport state;
'by agreement1 was added to the phrase permitting the Board to acquire 
businesses, thus underlining, for the sake of the Conservatives, that the 
Board did not have the power to acquire businesses at will (which had 
never been the Government’s intention). Among the more hotable of the 
other amendments accepted during the Report on the Bill was one making 
it obligatory for the Board to consult with the Local Authorities and 
other relevant bodies before putting formal proposals to the Secretary of 
State, and one specifying procedure for appeal to a Sheriff by a person 
who considers that the Board's demand for information from him is un­
justified. The opposition forced votes on three of their amendments, 
all of which were defeated. The first sought to limit the right of the 
Secretary of State to give directions to the Board to those cases were it 
was ’in the public interest'. Labour and the Liberals claimed that this
added nothing. The second tried to limit the Boardfe right to acquire 
to
lan<ywithin the Crofting Counties or 'adjacent areas*. This was
59. The Report and Third Reading are in H.C. Deb, Vol.714» Cols.908-1046.
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rejected because it might be useful for the Board to acquire a base outside 
this area. The third concerned the contentious Clause 11 and sought to put 
limits on the Board's right to demand information.
The Bill passed directly from the report stage to the Third Reading 
where most of the old arguments were repeated. Ross claimed that the 
powers given were not excessive but merited by the problems of the Highlands 
and that most fears concerning them had now abated. Noble reiterated the 
points about the Board being too much in the pocket of the Secretary of 
State, not having enough money,and the Bill conferring powers "unprecendented 
in their combination". ^  He also challenged the Government to describe 
just what ideas they had about what the Board would do, saying that the 
Bill would in itself solve nothing. As was to be expected there was no 
dldwision on the Third Reading. The passage of the Bill through the Lords 
gave no problems. The Tory peers expressed the same sort of reservations 
as their colleagues in the Commons about the Board's powers but with a few 
exceptions (such as Lord Burton who was completely opposed to it) the 
measure received cautious support. ^  By the beginning of August 1965 
the Bill had become an Act.
The details of the Act are as follows: it sets up a Highlands and
Islands Development Board "which shall have the general function of pre-
aring, concerting, promoting, assisting and undertaking measures for the
62
economic and social development of the Highlands and Islands", the 
Highlands and Islands being the seven Crofting Counties plus any adjaisaiit 
areas designated by the Secretary of State by order of a statutory
60. H.C. Deb, Vol. 714, col. 1040.
61. H.L. Deb, Vol. 267, Cols.730-46, 750-3, 756-834.
62. The Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland) Act 1965, Section l(l).
124
instrument (no such area has yet been so designated). The Board is to 
consist of a chairman and not more than six other members all appointed 
by the Secretary of State and is to be advised by a Highlands and Islands 
Development Consultative Council. The Secretary of State can give the 
Board general directions as to the exercise of their functions. (This 
power has in fact never been used). The duties of the Board are (a) to 
keep under review everything relating to the economic and social well-being 
of their area; (b) after consultation with Local Authorities and other 
relevant bodies to submit proposals to the Secretary of State; (c) to 
undertake, assist etc. the implementation of any proposals approved; (d) 
to advise the Secretary of State and to prepare an annual report which 
will include any directions given by the Secretary of State and any pro­
posals submitted to him, plus, if he does not approve them, his reasons 
for not doing so. In order to carry out these duties the Board is given 
a wide array of powers. It can acquire land, if necessarily compulsorily, 
hold, manage and dispose of this land providing in each case it has the 
approval of the Secretary of State. It can erect buildings, carry out 
works, provide equipment and services 7 or in connection with land, either 
its own or, with the consent of the interested parties, any other.
The Industrial Estate Management Corporation for Scotland (which later 
became the Scottish Industrial Estates Corporation) is given the power to 
act as agent for the Board in connection with their various operations 
on land. With the approval of the Secretary of State and the Treasury 
the Board can acquire or set-up and carry on any business. It can 
provide training, management, accountancy and other services; promote 
the publicising of the Highlands and Islands; give grants and loans in 
accordance with arrangements approved by the Secretary of State and Treasury; 
engage in other activities that it thinks will encourage the development 
of industrial, commercial or other enterprises; carry out or commission
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research; make charges for its services; and accept gifts. With the
and
consent of the Secretary of State/the Treasury it can also borrow money. 
Further the Board is given the power to authorise the entry upon land 
in order to survey it (which includes boring for minerals) and to require 
any owner or occupier of land or any person carrying on a business to 
furnish it with specified information providing this information is not 
disclosed other than for the purposes of the Act. The Board has to keep 
proper account? to be inspected by the Controller and Auditor General, and 
to sumbit an annual financial statement to the Secretary of State. Finally, 
before granting approval to a development by the Board that would otherwise 
require planning permission from the Local Planning Authority the Secretary 
of State must consult with the relevant local authority. In addition to
the main body of the act there are also two Schedules, one concerning the 
constitution of the Board and the othero* that of the Consultative Council. 
Regarding the Board the most notable sections state that the majority of 
its members, including the chairman,shall be full time, describe 
the procedure if any member haSia pecuniary interest in anything the 
Board is considering (he must declare this interest and not take part in 
any discussion or vote on the matter), and give the Board the right to 
employ its own staff and pay them an amount approved by the Secretary of 
State and the Treasury. Concerning the Consultative Council the Act 
aasures that the Secretary of State must appoint members so that there is 
Appropriate representation* of the different parts of the Highlands and 
Islands and that the Secretary to the Council is an employee of the Board.
It was thought by everyone, including the Government, that the 1965 
Act gave the Board a more or less complete set of powers, but in fact a 
rather obvious gap appeared early in the Board*s life when they sought 
permission to take equity shares in Companies. The Lord Advocate ruled
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that as this^ power was not specifically mentioned it could not be held
to be possessed by the Board. They appealed to the Secretary of State
to give them this power but though the Government's intention had been
that they should have it, it was not possible to fit an amending Act
into the legislative timetable. Fortunately for the Board, Robert
Maclennan, M.P. for Caithness and Sutherland, had a chance to introduce
a private members' Bill and asked them if they wanted any amendments to
their Act. The result was the Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland)
Bill of 1968 (actually it began life under a slightly different name)
which sought to give the Board power to acquire (by agreement), hold and
65dispose of any part of the shares or stock of a company. Although the
Conservatives had earlier opposed a Bill giving similar powers to the
President of the Board of Trade they did not attempt to fight Maclennan's
Bill which therefore became an Act by July 1968.
The Board were not so successful in getting one other extension of
their powers that they would have liked. The 1967 Agriculture Act made
provision for the setting up of Rural Development Boards with power to
request knowledge of the transfer of land either from one person to
another or from one use to another; to control the allocation of land by
refusing to allow its transfer from one use to-another and, having done
so, to purchase the land from its owner if he no longer wanted it. The
to H.I.D.B.
Act also allowed these powers to be given/by order of a Statutory instrument 
and in their evidence to the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs the 
Board said that such powers would be useful. ^  However, they never 
got them, and when the Conservatives came to power in 1970 the Rural
63. The Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland) Act, 1968.
64* Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1969-70, Minutes of 
"Evidence, H. of C. Paper 267-1, p.24.
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Development Boards were wound up, making the question hypothetical. It 
could he said that the Board's original powers allowed them to do most 
of what a Rural Development Board could do,-hut this would have required 
the use of the powers of compulsion from which the Board, and particularly 
Grieve, shied away (see chapter 5)*
Together with its powers, the most important item controlling the 
Board’s scope and limits are its finances. By far the largest source of 
the Board's income is the Grant-in-Aid. home, until 1969, on vote of 
the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland which exercised 
departmental responsibility for the Board up to November 1968. Since
6Sthen responsibility has been exercised by the Scottish Development Department. 
(The change had no particular significance for the Board and was part of 
a general realignment of functions- see chapter 2). The Board's estimate 
contains four main subheads: ^  (i) Administration, which in turn is
divided into salaries, travelling expenses, general administration and 
the expenses of the Consultative Council. (ii) Research, Surveys and 
Publicity - which of course includes such things as the fees of consultants 
and the cost of industrial promotion. (iii) Grants and loans -self ex­
planatory and easily the largest item; (iv) Projects and developments - 
those schemes carried out at the Board's own hand. The main conditions 
attached to the grant-in Aid are: (i) approval is required for the
transfer savings from one head to meet excess expenditure on another;
(ii) approval is required for expenditure on a new service or any long 
term financial commitment or for the write-off of any losses; (iii) no 
additional increase in staff (or their salaries) can be made without prior 
approval; (iv) the Board must send the department (D.A.F.S or S.D.D.)
67
copies of their monthly accountsand the approved minutes of Board Meetings.
65. Ibid, p.7.
66. Ibid, p.11.
67. Ibid, p.12.
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Until 1968 the Scottish Office was even more intimately connected with 
the Board through an assessor who sat *in an!all Board meetings. Detailed 
regulations also controlled grants and loans given by the Board. These 
are discussed below (chapter 5) and will not be mentioned here except to 
say that the maximum the Board was allowed to give in toxal grant plus 
loan without asking approval was £25,000 up to mid 1969. After this it 
was raised togj0,000 and at the beginning of 1972 it was raised again to 
£75,000. With the approval of the Scottish Office the Board could give 
financial assistance of £50,000, £100,000 and £150,000 respectively, 
over the same periods. For amounts greater than these the case had to 
be referred to the Treasury and the Board of Trade (or successors).
This then was the institution created by the 1965 Highland and Islands 
Development (Scotland) Act and subsequent administrative arrangements.
How does it compare with the various suggestions for a development board 
that preceded.it?To begin with it is clear that the Board belongs broadly 
speaking to the genus of (non-trading) public corporations as found in 
Britain and has no relationship with the sort of regional local authority 
having exceptional powers that was favoured in^some quarters. (The idea 
was again brought up by John Mackintosh in 1967). It was therefore
quite close to the S.T.U.C.'s idea of what such a body should be. Secondly, 
it undoubtedly did have, as surely many of those who supported the creation 
of such a body had hoped for, powers that were in Michael Noble*s words 
"unprecedented in their combination". What other body could give grants 
and loans, purchase land compulsorily, start its own businesses and, perhaps 
most unusual of all, AtadrJ such wide powers to collect information whether 
or not those with the information wanted to impart it?
It was these powers that chiefly impressed observers at the time
68* fo^gofr'&ferald, 22/7/67.
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but in retrospect we can see that the limitations were equally important.
The Conservatives pointed out during the debate on the Second Reading 
that many of the powers were given to the Secretary of State and not the 
Board and it is true that the Secretary of State*s approval is needed 
for a wide range of things the Board might want to do. Not only can 
he give them general directions, and not only must they submit proposals 
for economic and social development to him, but before they acquire or
dispose of land, set up or acquire and carry on businesses, give financial
assistance over and above a fairly small total or borrow any money, they 
need his approval (and in the last three cases also that of the Treasury).
Some of these controls are probably inevitable; it is unlikely that any
Government would set tip a body with the unusual combination of powers of
the Board and then provide itself with no control over it. More significant, 
because involving a more detailed form of interference are the conditions 
attached to the Grant-in-Aid described on page 24. The Board is handi­
capped here in having no real source of its own revenue and therefore being 
highly dependent upon public money whose guardians in the departments cast 
a nervous eye on its expenditure. As we have seen the Board cannot add 
one member to its staff without approval; during the discussion of each 
year*s estimates it must defend all of its projects and its publicity 
campaigns; it needs approval for anything that will involve a long-term 
financial commitment and, unlike B.O.T.A.C. (and successors) whose decisions 
not even the Public Accounts Committee could (can) investigate, the 
H.I.D.B. is under the surveillance of the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
Altogether the Board*s freedom to manoeuvre independently of the central 
departments (i.e. the Scottish Office and the Treasury for the most part) 
has very definite limits.
The Board was limited in another way as wells in its scope. One
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of the objections to a development board put forward by the Royal 
Commission on Scottish Affairs was that it would cut across the re­
sponsibilities of existing bodies. As a matter of tactics, in order 
to avoid any unpleasant infighting that would have occurred if they 
had attempted to remove any of the existing functions from either the 
Local Authorities or the statutory bodies involved in some aspect of 
Highland development, the Government decided not to reallocate any of 
these functions to the Board. (To be precise, one body - the Scottish 
County Industries Development Trust - was limited to non-Highland Areas, * 
see chapter 2). Furthermore the Board was not given any sort of Commander- 
in-Chief role to direct these other bodies (as the Liberals had suggested) 
except in as far as they could persuade the Secretary of State to inter­
vene. This meant that a very large number of things relevenrfc to Highland 
Development including physical planning, provision of infrastructure, 
forestry, agricultural subsidies, hydro-electricity and transport were 
outside the Board's control. Of all the money spent by the Secretary 
of State's Departments and the Forestry Commission in the seven Crofting 
Counties (almost £44m. in 1967-68) ^  only a very small amount (about £1*5m. 
in the same year) came under the control of H.I.D.B. Far from being the 
organisation administering the Highlands, the Board was perhaps not even 
first among equals. To say this however is to indulge in hindsight, in 
1965 the importance of the Board was probably generally perceived in much 
more positive terms.
The Board's Members and Public Reaction
Having created a Development Board the next problem was to find 
members for it. It was clear that for the Board to look credible its
69. H.C. Deb, Vol.782, col.464
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Chairman had to be a man of some distinction and Ross and Willis cast
a
around for some time looking foi^ suitable person* Eventually George
Middleton, Vice-Chairman of the Scottish Economic Planning Council,
suggested Robert Grieve and, after seeing him, the Secretary of State
agreed* Grieve, newly appointed Professor of Town and Regional Planning
at Glasgow University, was a planner of international repute. He had been
a Senior Technical Officer involved in the preparation of the Clyde Valley
Regional Plan from 1944-46; the Regional Planning Officer, first for the
Highlands and Islands from 1946-49 and then for the West of Scotland until
I960, in the Department of Health for Scotland. Prom 1960-64 he was the
Chief Planner at the Scottish Office and after that he was appointed to the
70Glasgow University Chair. Though from Glasgow rather than the Highlands
by birth, he had always taken a great interest in the region and was
71characterised in the press as an * enthusiast' for Highland Development.
The Labour leaders were determined that the majority of the Board's 
members should be 'known* in the Highlands - either Highlanders themselves 
or people who had strong connections with the area. Of the remaining 
five Board members (excepting Grieve that is) net- less than four - John 
Rollo, Prophet Smith, John Robertson and William Scholes - were members
of the Highland Panel. The Deputy Chairman - who by the terms of the
72
1965 Act, Ross could only appoint after consultation with Grieve - was 
John Rollo. Rollo was a businessman who ran an engineering firm with its 
headquarters at Bonnybridge and two small branch factories in small townships 
in the Crofting Counties (as well as two in the Perthshire Highlands).
The branch factories were an example of Rollo's commitment to the re- 
juvenaiion-iof the crofting system by giving the crofters opportunities to
70. Who's Who 1970; most of the other biographical details of members came
from interviews and newspapers (e.g.Glasgow Herald 6/IO/65 and The Scotsman of
the same date).
71. e.g. in the Observer 5/5/66.
72. Though Grieve in fact denies that he was consulted.
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supplement their income from agriculture by part-time work in manufacturing 
industries. He himself had successfully run a croft in Argyllshire ^  
and was the Chairman of the Highland Fund. Prophet Smith was a 
Shetlander and had been the Convener of Shetland County Council for a 
number of years up to the early 1960's when he had gone to work in Edinburgh 
for the Scottish Agricultural Organisation Society. John Robertson, in 
his thirties the youngest member of the Board, was an Easter Ross farmer, 
but with an engineering degree from Cambridge. As things turned out 
(see chapter 6) his enthusiasm for technology considerably outran his 
commitment to farming. He was at the time of his appointment a part-time 
member of the Crofters Commission. The above people were all full-time 
Board members; in addition to them there were two part-timers's William 
Scholes had been the Secretary of the Scottish Region of the Transport 
and General Workers Union and was in effect the S.T.U.C.’s Highland 
Affairs man. As well as being on the Highland Panel he was a Development 
Commissioner. Finally there was the only member, other than Grieve, not 
on the Highland Panel - William Logan. Logan had built up his Muir of 
Ord building and construction firm to a conqpany of national reputation 
and had won the contract for the Tay Bridge; he was at that time undoubtedly 
the most famous entrepreneur based in the Crofting Counties.
This line up did not last very long as Logan was killed in an air 
crash early in 1966 and was replaced on the 7th March by Frank Thomson. 
Thomson was another entrepreneur who, beginning his career as a Dingwall 
Accountant, had taken over with a partner the huge but uncompleted grain 
whisky distillery at Invergordon in 1959* The capital to complete the 
distillery was provided by London Merchant Securities, a firm belonging 
to the financier Max Rayne, and Thomson was made managing director ’ *
'Sfythe He resigned this managing directorship shortly after
73. The croft was unusually successful and its accounts are described in the 
Taylor Commission's Report on Crofting - though without Rollo's name being 
mentioned.
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becoming a Board member. A number of his other activities had brought 
him considerable publicity: he was chairman of the Scottish Vigilantes
Association and had led that bddy's 'MacPuff' campaign to save Highland 
railways from Beeching; he took over Ross County Football Club which had 
considerable successes in 1965-66 and he formed a distillery pipe band
n  a
which won the European Championship. 4 By the time of his appointment
he was a notable local figure and had become none of the most prominent
75men in the Highlands'! Only a year later he was in the centre of the
worst controversy the Board has ever faced and resigned (see chapter 6 
for the full story). He was replaced by Tom Fraser, Labour M.P. for 
Hamilton from 1943-67 and Minister of Transport 1964-65. Fraser had also 
been appointed the Chairman of the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board 
to replace Lord Strathclyde, so his part-time membership of H.I.D.B. was 
doubtless to provide a -Link*: between the two bodies. Another change 
occurred in 1967s Robertson resigned (again the reasons are in chapter 6) 
and was replaced by Sir James Made ay, who had been a civil servant since
1940, serving in several different departments, and finally becoming a
76Deputy Secretary at the Home Office. MacKay became a member of the
Countryside Commission in 1968 and of the new statutory Scottish Tourist
77Board in 1969, providing H.I.D.B. links with those bodies. The two
resignations brought a decrease in the 'Highland' element of the Board's 
membership as (in spite of thoir names) neither Fraser or Mack ay could 
really be said to have very close links with the Crofting Counties. A
74« ^ Scotsman, 17/3/67.
The
75*/ Scotsman, 17/3/67.
76. Who's Who 1971.
77. H.I.D.B., Fourth Report 1969. p.2.
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summary of this changing pattern of membership over the years 1965-70 
is given in Table VI.
78It has been claimed that the members of the Board during these
first five years were ‘political’ (i.e. party political) appointments.
79The claim was put most insistantly with regard to Thomson 7 who very 
undiplomatically campaigned boisterously for Labour in the 1966 election» 
shortly after his appointment to the Board. However there is no reason 
to suppose that the Labour leaders knew of Thomson’s support for their
party until this electioneering was brought to their attention (by an
80irate Russell Johnston among others) after he had been appointed.
There were, as we have seen, rather obvious non-partisan reasons why 
he should have been appointed: besides he only replaced Logan because
of an accident and the latter was never suspected of Socialist sympathies. 
Of the others, Smith was known to have links with Labour which were 
borne in mind by those appointing him - but he has been since re-appointed 
by the Conservatives which suggests that he was not a mere "political” 
choice; Scholes as a trade unionist might have been expected to prefer 
Labour but his appointment was as a trade unionist - a category a Labour 
government would have found it difficult to omit from the Board in view 
of the S.T.U.C.’s years of work to get such a body created. Fraser 
hardly requires comment. None of the others had any connection with the 
Labour Party: as Civil servants who had worked for years under Conser­
vative Governments both Grieve and MacKay could be expected to be fairly 
neutral about such matters - certainly neither of them were appointed for 
party reasons. Robertson is at the moment (1973) the Liberal Candidate 
for Ross and Cromarty and Rollo has never been a Labour supporter. Taken
78. For instance by Lord Lovat and more significantly (and surprisingly) 
by Rollo (in interviews).
79. See Campbell in Scottish Grand Committee, Debate on the Scottish 
Estimates, 13/7/67» col. 287*
80. Ross in H.C. Deb, Vol.743» col. 1929*
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Table VI: H.I.D.B. Members 1965-70
Full-Time Members
l) Grieve: Appointed
(Chairman) 1 Nov. 1965
5 Year Appointment Term ended 31st 
©e*. 1970
2) Rollo: Appointed
(Deputy Chair 1 Nov.1965 
man)
5 Year Appointment Term ended 31st 
Oct. 1970
3) Smith: Appointed 
1 Nov. 1965
5 Year Appointment Reappointed for 2nd 
term, 1 Nov. 1970
4) Robertson: Appointed 5 Year
1 Nov. 1965 Appointment
Resigned 
7 July 1967
5) MacKay; Appointed 5 Year
7 Aug.1967 Appointment
Appointment continued 
until 6 Aug.1972
Part-Time Members
6) Scholes: Appointed 3 Year Re-appointed 2 Year Term ended 31st.
1 Nov. 1965 Appointment 1 Nov. 1968 Appointment Get. 1970
7) Logan t Appointed Died
1 Nov.1965 22 Jan. 1966
8) Ihomson: Appointed
7 March 1966
3 Year 
Appointment
Resigned 
31 March 1967
9) Fraser Appointed
1 Sept. 1967
3 Year Appointed 
plus 2 months extension
Term ended 31st 
Oct. 1970
Source: H.I.D.B. Reports.
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as a whole these do not really seem an especially partisan set of 
appo intments.
Other general criticisms directed at the Board*s membership were
that there was no Gaelic speakers among them and (a related point) no-one
81
from the Western Isles. These criticisms imply a conception of the
Board as in some sense a * representative * body which it was never 
supposed to be (that job going to the Consultative Council), though the 
idea was deeply rooted in some minds.
Reaction to the Board (as opposed to its members) in this period 
before it had actually got started, ranged from mild hostility to en­
thusiastic support - in other words the *median feeling* if such a thing can
82be spoken of, was in favour. Many of those who had been sceptical
development g*
about the usefulness of a :> e-; board remained so. Several
Highland peers and the Convenor of Inverness County Council, Sir Francis
Walker, agreed with the Tories that the powers given to the Board were 
84excessive - perhaps the commonest cause of concern. Some, at least,
of the landowners and their allies suspected the Board was **the army of
85an anti-laird crusade**,  ^ which is probably exactly what many of the 
more radical supporters of the Board hoped for. Was it the Government *s
intention? Almost certainly not. Although Ross in his speech on the
Second Reading made misuse of land a main point and no doubt expected
86that the Board would *do things on land* he made no attempt to use
81. See for instance the Chief of Inverness Gaelic Society*s comment in 
Inverness Courier 5/4/66 and Farquhar Gillanders in Thomson & Grimble, p.125.
82. Professor Grieve has suggested that the Board faced a good deal of sus­
picion at the beginning. This may be so but the public reaction was neverthe­
less generally favourable and Willis (the Minister of State) declared early
in 1966 that he was impressed by the welcome extended to the Board (Inverness
Courier 14/1/67).
83. See for instance the Glasgow Herald 24/2/65.
84. H.L. Dob, Vol.267, cols.741, 787 & H.C. Deb, Vol.708, col.1154.
85. James Holborn, "The Troubles of the Scottish Tories", Spectator, 23/4/65.
86. Robertson’s contemptuous expression for what he thought was expected of •
the Board.
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his powers to direct them on this issue and he did not select Board 
members who would make vigorous anti-laird crusaders - in fact in Grieve 
he chose a man temperamentally averse to compulsion. Altogether it is 
hard to believe that Ross or the other Labour leaders had anything but a 
hazy idea of what they wanted or expected the Board to do; Certainly the 
only suggestion they made to Board members was to do something visible 
quickly as otherwise Highlanders would see them as just another investi­
gating committee.
If the Government's expectations as to what the Board would do cannot 
be said to be more than indefinite - 'unanalysed abstrations* - a good 
many of its supporters had radical hopes: the creation of a new pattern
of land use and an experiment in Socialist planning with the 'commanding 
heights' of the economy really in public handswere talked of. ^  Every­
where expectations were high (probably excessively so), for here was 
an entirely new venture in British Regional policy: a body separate from 
the regular central departments (unlike, say, the Scottish Economic Planning
Board which consisted of feLvil servants) with "autonomy both to formulate
88its policy and carry it out" and a wide range of powers to back it up.
Some International Comparisons
The example in the minds of many of those who had pressed for a
89
Highland Board was the Tennessee Valley Authority. Just how did the
Board, as created in 1965* compare with T.V.A. and other foreign agencies 
whose duties were to bring regional economic revival? As this study is 
mainly concerned with the activities of one public agency in a multi-
87. K. Alexander, "Commanding Highlands". New Statesman. 8/IO/65.
88. G. McCrone, "The Highland Development Board", New Society, 2/12/65.
89. See for instance the Scottish Trade Union Congress, 60th Report (1957)» 
p. 132 in which mention is made of the Hydro-Electric General Committee's 
requests for a T.V.A.-like body in the Highlands and also George Mackie in 
H.C. Deb, Vol. 708, col. 1143.
137
organisational environment and not with comparative regional development, 
there is not space here to say much about oversees development nrganiaat* 
tfohsvbut a brief description of a few select cases might help to give some 
perspective on the powers and duties of H.I.D.B. I shall therefore 
limit myself to four examples: the T.V .A., inevitably, because of its
importance as a point of reference; another of the earliest, largest and 
most famous of regional development bodies - Italy* s C&ssa per il 
Mezzogiomo (Fund for the South), and two agencies dealing with areas 
whose problems are very similar to those of the Highlands n. the Regional 
Development Fund of Norway and the Atlantic Development Board of Canada*s 
Maritime Provinces. Before discussing these examples let us briefly 
recapitulate the distinctive features of H.I.D.B.: firstly of course 
it was a regional body; secondly it was independent of both the central 
departments (except that it depended on them for money) and the local 
authorities; thirdly it was an executive organization not just a planning 
and advisory one; fourthly it had a wide range of responsibilities covering 
all sectors of the economy (but no authority over other bodies involved in 
the same fields); and fifthly, subject to permission by the Secretary of 
State, it had some quite extensive powers, for instance it could acquire 
land (if necessary compulsorily) and do what it thought fit with it, 
start its own businesses,and give grants and loans to private developers.
Taking the overseas examples in reverse order, the Norwegian Regional
Development Fund was started in i960. Its main difference from H.I.D.B.
(and the other bodies to be described here) is that its activities are not
confined to one particular part of the country but take place wherever 1
there are "special employment difficulties or where under-developed
90industrial conditions prevail**. The reason for this is that the
90. Regional Policy in EFTA, Industrial Mobility. (Geneva, 1971)
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91national economic problem in Norway is regional development and the 
regions that need help in this respect are widely spread throughout the 
Country - though the problem is most acute in the North. The aim of the 
Fund is to promote measures to increase ’permanent and profitable* employ­
ment - a remit considerably narrower than the Board’s - and to do this 
it gives loans and guarantees for loans, compensation for relocation and 
commsncementnt costs, grants for the training of labour,and technical and
commercial guidance to firms. It also engages in research and planning
92
for possible new industries. Unlike H.I.D.B. it does not have powers
to acquire and manage land or start its own businesses,but if its powers 
finances
are smaller its fi/urcs axe much greater - between 1961 and 1968 its
average annual assistance to all projects was between £&Jm and £9m ^  -
but of course the area and population it has to deal with are much greater
than the Board’s. On the whole the Fund deals with larger projects than
the Board, indeed there is a small independent ”Fund for Handicrafts and
94Small Enterprises” which deals with firms employing under 20 people
(the bulk of projects given assistance by the Board are below this size),
al
and in this respect, as in the geographic/spread of its responsibilities, 
it is more sllki:-...- to BOTAC (DATAC, LEAFAC etc.) than like .e H.I.D.B.
On the other hand BOTAC is mainly concerned with aid to declining industrial 
areas in Britain whereas the regional problem in Norway is much closer to
91. "It is difficult to draw a rigid distinction between national policy and 
regional development policy in Norway** ibid, p. 138.
92. Ibid, p.138-9 and also Distriktenas Utbyggingsfond, Policies for 
Regional Development in Norway (Oslo, 1968) Sec. 2B.
93. Policies for Regional Development in Norway. Sec. 2B.
94. Ibid, Sec. 2C. '
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that of the Highlands. Like H.I.D.B. the Fund is an autonomous body, 
with its own Secretariat,Board and Council, responsible to a central 
department (the Ministry of Local Government and Labour). It can lend 
up to Kr. lm. (£58,000) ^  on its own authority but any larger amount 
must be submitted to the King in Council. Like the Board as well, it 
has to rely on the local authorities for the provision of infrastruetTire 
and physical planning.
In Canada the Atlantic Development Board was created in 1962 by the 
Conservative Government to be an advisory and planning body. Its 
original function was to consider how economic development could be 
furthered in the four provinces of New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia and Prince Edward Island. However, in 1965, only a few months 
after its creation, the new Liberal Government gave it executive functions 
by making it responsible for the newly created Atlantic Development Fund.
Since then the bulk of the Atlantic Board*s work has concerned the dis­
bursement of this fund. ^  ®ie remit of ADB - to foster the economic 
'gafeWth and development of the Atlantic region - is very similar to H.I.D.B.'s 
except that there is non®n^ 0n.> of ‘Social development*. But the pattern 
of its expenditure has been very different; particularly in its early 
years it concentrated heavily on infrastructural provision - electric
power, transport and water supplies in that order - and apenrt relatively
97little on financing private developersrr. "  As with Norway*s Regional 
Development Fund, ADB covers a larger area and a bigger population than 
H.I.D.B. and therefore has a larger budget. Its approved expenditure in
95* Ibid, Sec. 2B. This was in 1968 when the comparable figure for the Board 
was still £25,000. Though I have used the present tense throughout this section, 
the information about the various institutions in fact generally relates to the 
late'sixties and changes have no doubt occurred since. The exception is T.V.A., 
the facts about which are drawn from books published in 1955 or before. How­
ever I do not think there have been any relevant changes in the organisation 
since then.
96. F.T. Walton, "Atlantic Development - An Appraisal", The Business Quarterly. 
Vol.53, No.5. (Summer 1968), p.64-65.
97. T.N. Brewis, Regional Economic Policies in Canada (Toronto, Macmillan, 1969),
p.186.
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the five years from the creation of the Atlantic Development Fund to
mid-1968 was $187*9® ^  which in terms of assistance per head of
population per annum is somewhat greater than the amount spent by
H.I.D.B. in its first five years. ^
The Atlantic Development Board is another independent, specially
appointed organisation and in fact has more autonomy than H.I.D.B. in
that it reports directly to a specially designated Minister rather than
through one of the federal departments. On the other hand like the
Norwegian body it lacks many of H.I.D.B.*s powers - it cannot take over
land for instance or start up its own businesses. (it should perhaps
be said that neither in Canada or Norway is there the same problem of
large private estates such as are found in the Highlands and therefore
the power over land would be less relevant). Unlike the Norwegian
organisation (and H.I.D.B.) however ADB cannot authorize any grants or
loans without cabinet approval.
Italy*s regional development organisation, La Cassa per il 
on
Mezzogiomo is/an altogether different scale than any of the bodies 
mentioned so far. Started in 1950 (and therefore of an earlier genera­
tion than H,I.D.B., ADB or the Regional Development Fund) its responsi­
bilities cover most of Italy south of Rome, including Sicily and
Sardinia - some 40% of the area of the whole country and containing
102
about 20m people or 38% ®f its population. Ihe problems of the
Mezzogiomo are similar in some ways to those of Norway, the Highlands
manuf acturing
or the Atlantic Provinces in that it has a lack oy industry, heavy 
reliance on primary industries in which employment is contracting and
98. Ibid.
99* If *e call this figure approximately £75® and t*1® population of the 
Atlantic Provinces about 2m. (Bwewis, p.10) then the assistance per head per 
year is about £7*5. The equivalent H.I.D.B. figure (see Table viiii)Ls about 
£5* 4. But note that much of the money disbursed by ADB would, in Scotland, come 
through the Scottish Office rather than H.I.D.B.
100. F.T.Walton "The Early Work of the Atlantic Development Board; An Apprai­
sal” (Ubpublished, Uhivetrpf Glasgow, 1967) P«2.
101. Walton, (1968) p.63.
102. K. Allen & M.C. Maclennan, Regional Problems & Policies in Italy and 
France, (Allen & Unwin, 1970) p.19*
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remoteness from the main centres of national economic life. But it is 
very different in being relatively densely populated and having a much 
greater absolute level of poverty. The function of the Cassa is much 
the same as that of the other bodies already discussed - economic develop­
ment - and superficially it is the same sort of agency, an autonomous 
body separated from the traditional central departments and headed by a 
specially appointed beard. However because the problems it has to deal
with are on such a large:scale,its controlling committee consists not of
103Ministerial appointees but of Ministers themselves. It therefore
occupies a more important place in the administrative hierarchy than the 
other organisations mentioned. Because of both its wealth and the 
political traditions of its area of operation, the Cassa has become entangled 
in political patronage.
The Cassa has a very wide range of responsibilities, not only pro­
viding assistance to all sectors of the economy of the South but also
dealing with infrastructural matters like transport, power and water, to
for
the point that at one time it actually came to be a substitute/,rather than 
an addition to the ordinary Ministries. In its early period, up t©
1957 f the Cassa concentrated heavily on agriculture but since then there 
has been more stress on manufacturing industry with a wide range of
financial incentives being offered especially to those firms going to
105the designated growth areas. Despite the range of its responsibilities
the Cassa lacks several of the powers possessed by H.I.D.B.; it cannot 
for instance purchase land compulsorily and neither does it set up 
businesses on its own account (though this power is possessed by other
103. Ibid, p.47.
104. Ibid, p.48.
105. Ibid, p.50-61.
106. This was in the I960*s. Italian law concerning compulsory purchase 
has been recently changed.
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Italian State agencies operating in the region, e.g. the I.R.I.).
The most venerable of the institutions to be discussed here is the 
U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority. Created in 1933, T.V.A. is rather 
different from the other organisations described in that its sole, or 
perhaps even primaiy responsibility is not regional development. For 
although the Chairman of the House Committee that dealt with the T.V.A. 
bill described the Authority1s duty as being the balanced development 
of the resources of the Tennessee Valley, the resulting Act specifies 
T.V.A.fs purposes in considerably more detail; these are (i) flood control; 
(ii) improved navigation; (iii) generation of electric power; (iv) the 
proper use of marginal, lands; (v) re-afforestation; and (vi) securing the 
economic and social well-being of the region*s population. It also
operates the plant at Muscle Shoals, Alabama for the manufacture of
108fertilizers and explosives. Except for (vi) all these measures are
fairly specific and though it can be claimed that they will all encourage 
economic growth, the point is that this is incidental. Even if it could 
be diown that, say, flood control had little effect on economic growth 
T.V.A. would still have to undertake it whereas the other regional develop­
ment bodies are not tied to such specific measures. The second important 
distinction between T.V.A. and the rest is that the latter have to depend 
on grants from the central governments of their respective countries, T.V.A. 
through its sale of electricity and of fertilizers produced at the Muscle 
Shoals plant, has a substantial revenue of its own. (Though Congressional 
appropriations were still needed to finance the other functions)•
107. G.R. Clapp, The T.V.A.: An Approach to the Development of a Region
(University of Chicago, 1955)» p.6.
108. Ibid, p.9.
109. Ibid, p.12. For a complete breakdown of T.V.A.*s finances in the years 
1938-42 see H. Finer. The T.V.A.: Lessons for International Application 
(Montreal, The International Labour Office, 1944)> Appendix I.
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As a body deeply involved in the generation and distribution of electricity
T.V.A, is perhaps better compared in the Highland context with the North
of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board rather than with H.I.D.B. The major
difference however is that,whatever might have been intended, N.S.H.E.B.
is more or less a purely electricity producing body and lacks the wide
range of regional development activities of T.V.A.
Despite these differences the Tennessee Valley Authority has enough 
with
similarities /o the other regional development bodies to show a family
an
resemblance. Like them it is/autonomous body with its own controlling
board, - separate from both the Central/Federal government and from the
it
State or local governments; also, like the Cassa and the A.D.B,/is directly 
accountable to the political executive (i.e. the President in T.V.A.*s 
case) and does not come under the wing of any of the ordinary government 
departments. Unlike the Cassa,the Authority has escaped involvement 
with patronage politics but instead has had its agricultural programme 
•captured* by local interests. It deals with a distinctive regional
problem, one aspect of which applies to a considerable extent to the 
other regions described: they all have an economy excessively dependent
on a declining primary sector. (On the other hand the flood control and 
erosion problems are exceptional). In terms of population the 
Tennessee Valley is of broadly comparable size to the Atlantic provinces 
or Norway and is therefore much smaller than the Mezzgiomo and much 
bigger than the Highlands.
Though it has a wider range of responsibilities and a greater amount 
of autonomy than H.I.D.B., T.V.A. lacks some of the Board's powers. It 
cannot, for instance, start up its own businesses and more significantly, 
a fact which distinguishes it not only from H.I.D.B. but also from the
110. Ihich is the central theme of Philip Selznick's T.V.A. and the Grass 
Roots (New York, Harper Forchback, 1966).
111. About 3 million in 1933 (Finer, p.l.).
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other regional bodies, it cannot give grants and loans to private 
businesses. In fact not until the creation of the Area Development 
Administration in 1961 did the U.S. Federal Government have the power 
to stimulate development in stagnating areas by giving direct grants
112and loans to private individuals or firms pursuing industrialisation.
The T.V.A.'s lack of powers in this respect, together with its specific
responsibilities for power generations, flood control, river navigation
etc. make it, of all three bodies mentioned here, the one that is least
comparable to H.I.D.B.
To stun up the international comparisons that have been made with the
Board we can perhaps say that three points stand out. One is relative
sizes the Highlands are much smaller in terms of both population and
area than any of the other problem regions mentioned and consequently
H.I.D.B. is smaller than the other regional bodies and has less money
to spend. This inevitably means that it is taken less seriously by the
Government. Secondly, though the Board is similar to the Norwegian
Regional Development Fund in this respect, it differs from the other
three organisations in being responsible to one of the regular central
departments rather than reporting directly to the political executive.
The result of this is greater departmental control of its activities.
And thirdly H.I.D.B. has powers, such as those to start its own businesses
or compulsorily acquire land for development purposes, that are not
11*5possessed by the other bodies. These powers were the most distinctive
and initially controversial feature of the Board but their sparing use 
(or non-use in the case of those involving compulsion) has meant that it 
has been more like other regional development organisations than might 
seem to be the case from its statute.
112. International Information Centre for Local Credit, Government Measures 
for the Promotion of Regional Economic Development (The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1964) p.157-9.
113» Except of course that T.V.A. has the power to acquire land compulsorily 
for its dams, reservoirs, power houses etc.
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Chapter 5. The Work of the Highlands and Islands Development Board.
±2$5=2Q
The Board1a Strategy
Wien the Board came to consider what its strategy was to he it was 
faced with a variety of different, and in practice incompatible points 
of view about what should be done with the Highlands. At one extreme 
were those who thought nothing should be done. This view had both a 
negative and a positive side. The negative side was that the Highlands 
were really a hopeless case for development, attempts at it were futile, 
and only wasted money which could be better spent in assisting the 
other parts of Scotland which had problems enough and contained far 
more people. What did it matter if the Highlands continued to depopulate 
anyway? The positive side was that the Highlands were a great natural 
wilderness which a densely populated, over-urbanised country like Britain 
really needed.'^ Any development could only adversely affect this wilder­
ness: conservation was much better. This *do nothing1 view had few
representatives within the Highlands but was to be found among certain
the
economists (e.g. Buxton and MacKay who stressed / hopelessness of trying 
to develop the region), was (according to Grieve and Robertson) influential 
within the Scottish Office where there were those who saw Government action 
chiefly as a means to keep the Highlanders relatively quiet, and is often 
found among Englishmen. Needless to say this was hardly a possible 
position for the Board to have taken (even if any of the members had 
wanted to - which they did not) as it was statutorily committed to 
pursuing development.
The other views on Highland Development accepted depopulation as
1. The view is mentioned (in order to reject it) in H.I.D.B. 1966, p.2.
2. D.I. MacKay & N.K. Buxton, "The North of Scotland Economy - A case for 
redevelopment?" in Scottish Journal of Political Economy. Vol.12 (19^5)*
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the fundamental evil but split between those who saw land as the re­
source that required development above all and those who attributed much 
less importance to it. The "pro-land" group were in turn divided be­
tween radicals who wished to see the big landowners hit hard and their 
land acquired compulsorily as soon as they showed any signs of •misusing1 
it and those who objected to anything smacking of nationalisation. y 
Most of those who were primarily interested in land development also 
wished to preserve the *Highland way of life* but again there was a 
range of views from those who idealised crofting or saw forestry as a 
threat to the 'traditional Highlands' to those who considered that many 
crofters were themselves some of the worst offenders when it came to mis­
use of land or were prepared to welcome forestry as a useful provider of 
employment. Those who gave land development or preservation of the 
'Highland way of life' lower priority (because they reckoned that both 
were marginal to a genuine economic revival of the region) were probably
more homogeneous in their views though there was some disagreement as to
4
the relative importance of manufacturing industry and tourism.
In report the Board claimed to recognise'elements of
truth* in all these points of view and thought that in an area as large
5
as the Highlands all of them could find anqpression. An unexceptionable
action
sentiment peiifaps ibut: in transforming it into/the Board had to jump 
one way or another: in fact they effectively took the position of the
3* The "land development" school of thought were well represented in the 
debates on the Highlands & Islands Development Bill, a number of Labour 
speakers taking a radical view with regard to land ownership and the 
Conservatives (not surprisingly) tending to oppose them. See H.C. Deb,
Vol. 708, Cols. 1079-1204 and H.L. Deb, Vol. 267, Cols. 730-46, 750-3 & 
756-834.
4. D. Simpson "Investment, Employment & Government Expenditure in the 
Highlands, 1951-60", Scottish Journal of Political Economy. Nov.1963 and P. 
Gillanders, "The Economic Life of Gaelic Scotland Today" in D.S. Thomson &
I. Grimble (eds.). The Future of the Highlands (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968) 
both deprecate land development but Simpson thinks tourism valuable whereas 
Gillanders does not.
5. let Report. 1966, p.3. (Henceforward H.I.D.B. reports will be identified 
only by date.
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last view described. Accepting that depopulation had to be stopped and 
even reversed they concluded that this could only be done by bringing 
the level of economic. opportunity in the Highlands up to the level of 
the rest of the country - and this essentially meant more jobs. Not 
just more in terms of absolute numbers, though in a region with as big 
an unemployment problem as the Highlands this was of primary importance, 
but also a wider range of jobs that would allow for the use of skills 
that at present had no outlet in the Highlands and,furthermore, jobs 
that permitted Highlanders to have a standard of living comparable with 
that of people in other areas of Britain.
From this followed the basic elements of their strategy: agriculture
must remain an important part of the Highland economy but the trends with­
in the industry were towards less employment because of more efficient 
methods; fishing in certain particular localities - especially the islands 
could be very important; but the three great ’props* of the regional 
economy, those sectors that provided the best employment hopes, were 
forestry, tourism and manufacturing. ^ Given that forestry remained 
the responsibility of the Forestry Commission, this amounted to a 
declaration that the Board's main efforts would be concentrated in 
tourism and manufacturing. Tourism was for many areas almost the only 
hope for an expansion in employment and the Board rejected the attitude, 
common enough in the Highlands, that it was in some way morally ’inferior 
to other occupations. Manufacturing was of central importance because 
it greatly widened the range of potential employment - it could utilize 
technical skills that might otherwise not be usable in the Highlands - and 
because it would provide balance to an economy unusually deficient in
6. Ibid, p. 3-4^ Pages 1-5 of this first report describe the Board's 
basic approach.
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a secondary sector. Industry was to be concentrated in small holding 
points dotted around the region and above all in three major growth 
points - the areas around Wick - Thurso, Fort William and the Inner
7
Moray Firth of which the third was "unquestionably the most important".
These three areas contained the most significant nuclei of industry in 
the crofting counties.
All in all it is probably fair to say that while not explicitly 
rejecting the ‘Highland way of life* the Board committed itself to doing 
those things that they perceived would be most likely to revive the region's 
economy, irrespective of any effect they might have on traditional patterns 
of living.
financial Assistance and Management Services
How was this 'strategy' worked out in practice by the first Board 
under Grieve? What did the Board actually do in its first five years?
One of their first actions was to formulate the details of the grants 
and loans scheme that the 1965 Act permitted them to set up. It was 
in operation by December 1965 has retained an important place in 
the Board's activities ever since.
The initial conditions attached to the grants and loans scheme 
were as follows: the Board was allowed to assist any activity that
would contribute to the economic or social development of the Highlands 
and Islands provided it was located in the crofting counties. This 
meant that they could help 'economic' projects - i.e. commercial or 
industrial ventures - or 'non-economic' ones - i.e. those that had some 
social purpose — by either grant or loan. The maximum assistance the
7. Ibid, p.4. The identification of "growth points" was a fairly standard 
exercise in the planning of the time - see for instance "The Scottish 
Economy 1965-70", Cmnd. 2864, p.56-61 „ for a description of its practical 
significance see the section on manufacturing later on in this chapter.
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Board could give to any one project was £25,000; requests for between 
£25,000 and £50,000 or for assistance to projects wholly outside the 
Board*s area had to be cleared by the Scottish Office and anything 
above that sum was referred to the Treasury and B.O.T. Applicants 
could choose whether to apply initially to H.I.D.B. or B.O.T.A.C. but 
could not receive assistance from both, neither could they apply to 
the Board within 12 months of being rejected by B.O.T.A.C. (The regulations 
do not make it clear if an applicant could turn to B.O.T.A.C. after re­
jection by H.I.D.B. but as the former body was reckoned to be stiffer in 
its assessments this was unlikely to be a fruitful approach). Board 
assistance was divided into *normal' and 'special' categories. Normal 
assistance included a Building Grant at the standard Local Employment 
Act rate (25% or 35% depending on conditions in 1965, going up to 35% 
or 45% in 1970) or alternatively a Building Loan of up to 80% of 
approved cost; loans for plant and equipment; and working capital loans; 
the last two repayable over five years. Special assistance, which the 
Board called their 'unique inducement', was a grant of up to £5000 given 
to those projects that looked as if they would be economically successful 
but because of special costs needed something more than the normal 
assistance to start them off. All the 'economic' projects applying 
for Board assistance had to show that they would create employment or 
prevent unemployment. All interest charged on Board loans was the 
prevailing B.O.T.A.C. rate and, on average, Board assistance could not 
exceed 50% of the total cost of the projects ^which did not mean that 
certain individual ventures could not be assisted to a considerably 
greater degree). 8
These regulations have undergone minor revisions in the course of
8. All the details in this paragraph can be found either in H.I.D.B. 1966, 
p.11 and Appendix X or in the Memorandum submitted by H.I.D.B. to the 
Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1969-70, H.C.267-1, p*12.
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the Board*s life. In 1969 the total assistance it was allowed to 
give to any one project became £50,000 (and £100,000 with Scottish 
Office clearance) which in turn went up to £75*000 (and £150,000) in 
1972. The period of repayment of loans some rose from 5 to 10 years.
The maximum 'Special Grant* went up to £10,000 as early as December 
1966 and in 1969 was made £10,000 or 20% of the total cost of the 
project, whichever was greater; by 1970 it had become £15,000 or 20%.^
Also in 1970 Removal Grants were introduced for firms moving into the 
region from non-Development Areas and loan arrangements became more 
flexible. 10
The financial inducements offered by the Board to firms coming
into (or expanding in) the Highlands and Islands are much the same as
those offered by B.0.T./D«T»!« *n other Development areas, the only
addition being the Special Grant. The variations in the region's
relative attractiveness to incomings firms were discussed in Chapter 4,
but it should be noted here that almost 80% of the Board's financial
assistance in the years 1965-72 went to existing Highland businesses.^
Grants and loans are easily the largest item of the Board's expend-
12iture, seldom under 50% and usually over 60% of the total. As can
be seen from Table VII,approvals of financial assistance have increased 
steadily year by year with the exception of 1969 when there was a drop.
The Government were, at this time, worried about the increasing cost of 
aid to industry and the Secretary of State warned the Board not to expect
9. H.c.267-I, (1969-70), p.9, 11, 16 & 17; Glasgow Herald 11/1/72 and 
H.I.D.B. Constitution. Functions & Administration of the Highlands & Islands 
Development Board (Dnnublished. Feb.1972). Appendix II (Henceforward called 
the "Administration of H.I.D.B.**).
10. H.I.D.B., 1970, p.16.
11. H.I.D.B., Seventh Report. 1972, p.21. Throughout this chapter I will 
attempt to confine myself to the 1965-70 period but occasionally, as here, 
the figures are only available for a slightly longer period.
12. "Administration of H.I.D.B.M, Appendix II.
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Table VII: H.I.D.B, Financial Assistance 1966 - 70 by Sector
Grants and Loans approved (£,000)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Total
Manuf acturing 194 385 684 336 741 2404
Tourism 292 469 851 427 282 2186
Fisheries* 173 326 244 539 1602
Agriculture > 549 117 105 62 143 404
Other 291 507
>34
138 850
Non-economic 3 20 74 J 50 163
All sectors 838 1455 2347 1103 1893 7609
♦Assistance to fish processing and boat building included under 
manufacturing. Of the undivided figure for fisheries, agriculture etc. 
in 1966 the largest amount went to fisheries.
Source: H.I.D.B. Reports 1966-70.
(Note that the horizontal rows do not quite add up due to discrepancies in 
the Board’s figures)
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an automatic increase in income. The Board publicly announced that 
they might have to be tougher about grants and loans with the result 
that applications dropped and money spent on financial assistance was 
cut back rather more than had been intended. Since then the curve 
has returned to its upward trend. Table YII also illustrates that 
the manufacturing sector has been the chief beneficiary of financial 
assistance taken as a whole, followed by tourism and then by fisheries 
(i»e. Fishing boats and fish farms. Fish processing and boatyards 
are included and manufacturing.) These are the three big recipients 
of aid, nothing else can really compare. If grants alone are considered 
it is tourism that comes off best. In terms of Counties (Table VIII) 
by far and away the largest amount of assistance per head over the years 
1965-70 went to Shetland. This was chiefly a result of the fact that 
Shetlanders were ready for the Board and poured in applications. The 
other counties received quite similar amounts of assistance per head 
except for Caithness which lagged a bit.
Total Board assistance to approved projects in the five years 
ending 51st December 1970 was about £7*6m., in addition to which a 
little over £7m. was invested by private sources; this combined invest­
ment productivity an estimated 5>000 jobs, some 2,500 of which were in 
15manufacturing. Naturally some of the projects helped by the Board
failed and were unable to pay back their loans; over the same five 
year period about 6^% of the Board's total loan investment was lost. ^  
Inevitably, as a body distributing largesse, the Board came under fire 
from two sides: for assisting the wrong people and for not assisting
15. H.I.D.B., 1970, p.16 and Appendix IX.
14. Ibid, p.17.
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Table VIII: Financial Assistance per head by County (1965-1970)
Population 
(1971 Census)
Assistance Approved 
1965 - 70*
Assistance per head
Argyll 59394 £1,675,725 £28*2
Caithness 27915 £ 390,679 £14*0
Inverness 89409 £2,324,389 £26-0
Orkney 17254 £ 361,015 £20» 9
Ross &Cromarty 58770 £1,501,261 £25*6
Shetland 17567 £ 962,271 £54-8
Sutherland 13140 £ 394,207 £30*0
Total 283,449 £7,609,547 £26-9
*Source: H.I.D.B., 1970, Appendix IX.
(For a similar but more extensive calculation see Carter (1973), Table I)
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the right people. We will return to this again when considering criticisms 
of the Board (in chapter 7) Twit the main drift of the first argument was 
that all manner of dubious characters were getting public money. On the 
other hand in order to avoid * fruitless controversy1 the Board followed
15the B.O.T. line of not giving reasons for their refusals of applications -
which probably had the desired affect but had the concomitant disadvantage 
of leaving a number of aggrieved people certain they had been unfairly dis­
criminated against.
The large majority of enterprises assisted by the Board were small and 
suffered from the usual difficulties of small firms. The Board therefore 
set up a Management Services division in 1966 to provide an 'after care* 
service for the enterprises it had assisted so that they could receive 
expert help and advice in accountancy, marketing, hotel management and the 
like. These management services were not in fact confined to firms 
assisted by the Board - though in practice most of the work concerned 
such firms - but were available to any small business with problems in 
the Highlands.
As we have seen,the largest amounts of Board assistance went to 
manufacturing, tourism and fishing; smaller sums were spent on projects 
involving land use, mineral resources and what is vaguely called 'social 
development'.. These six sectors included the great bulk of the Board's 
executive (as opposed to purely advisory) activity and each of them will 
be considered in turn.
Manufacturing Industry
"We appreciate", says the first Annual Report, "that the Board will 
be judged particularly by its successes in the field of industrial pro­
motion" H.I.D.B. itself accepted the primary importance of encouraging
T5I H.I.D.B., 19667 p.12.
16. Ibid, p.14*
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manufacturing industry and, as has been seen, gave more assistance to
this sector than any other. It was hardly the first body helping or pro-
17mo ting Highland industry. The Highland Fund had been giving small
loans for a decade and continued to function. The Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry) had been prominent in bringing Wiggins Teape 
to Lochaber and had a Highland Office at Inverness. There was little 
cooperation between them and the Board and until the advent of North Sea 
Oil their role was small. The other body involved in industrial promotion 
was the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board who had the duty to bring 
in industry tacked onto their main function of generating and distributing 
electricity. In order to help cooperation between the two Boards on 
promotional matters it was agreed that J.C.N. Baillie, N.S.H.E.B.'s chief 
Commercial officer should also be employed by H.I.D.B. The arrangement 
did not work completely and there still seems to have been a certain 
amount of jealousy between the two organisations until it was agreed by 
Tom Fraser, from 1967 N.S.H.E.B. Chairman and part-time member of H.I.D.B., 
that the Hydro-Board should limit itself to attracting industry into that 
part of its area outwith the Crofting Counties.
The Board* s strategy we saw was to try and concentrate industry in 
three major growth points - the Inner Moray Firth, Wick-Thurso and Fort 
William and to have additionally a number of * holding points* in the 
remoter parts and the islands. Moray Firth Development is dealt with 
elsewhere (chapter 6) and the other two growth points will be discussed 
below. The Board were especially anxious to attract modem *science- 
based' industries to the Highlands and in this they had a limited amount 
of success but it is particularly unfortunate that two of these - Marchvale 
Music Ltd. which manufactured electronic organs and Antech Ltd. producing
17. See chapter 2.
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resin-encapsulating machines, both of which moved from the Midlands to
Inverness - as well as the much heralded spectacle frame factory of
Afocal Optical that was established on remote Barra - were among the
18(relatively few) Board assisted firms to fail.
TSie Board’s promotional activities gradually built up over the 
period considered here, culminating in the first phase of a major cam­
paign that started in October 1970 and was aimed mainly at the Midlands 
and South of England. It included television advertising and the film 
"The Top Country". As well as financial assistance and promotion the 
Board undertook a number of other things to attract industry. Their
experience showed them that two of the features businessmen looked for
were
first / a good supply of trained or trainable labour and suitable
cheap sites ,so they attempted to meet both these demands. Clearly the
Highlands with its sparse population cannot be said to have a plentiful
supply of labour with a wide range of skills and in order to overcome this
difficulty the Board started 'Project Counterdrift' in November 1966.
They advertised in the press for those willing to retuxn^or come and
work in the Highlands and compiled a register of their names, addresses
and skills. This register was then offered to employers who might
otherwise find a lack of potential employees with the requisite skills
19or experience. By 1970 the total number of registrants was 7*747•
As by the end of the same year the Board could only identify 70 people
20
from this list who had successfully secured a job, it may be doubted 
that the scheme had much practical effect though it was probably a
18. Scotsman, 6/5/70 & 4/11/70. According to the Chairman of Marchvale 
the firm could have become profitable with a little more assistance and 
though the Board were prepared to give it, the "Government" would not allow 
them to.
19. H.I.D.B., 1970, p.25.
20. Ibid.
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useful publicity exercise even if it did induce the Board*s unfriendlier
21critics such as Lord Lovat to pour scorn upon its * crackpot* ways.
More orthodox Methods of overcoming the labour problem were also used: 
in the industrial training field the Board was represented on the Joint 
Committee of Industrial Training Boards for the Highlands and Islands 
to which it gave financial help to purchase instructional equipment; it 
joined with particular training boards to provide schemes of training in 
which small businesses, not normally eligible for such schemes,were able
22to participate, and in 1970 it ran its own business management seminar.
The other businessman’s requirement - suitable sites - received 
similar Board attention. As at the beginning of its life the Board 
owned little land of its own,its job consisted chiefly in persuading the 
the Local Authorities to provide zoned and, better still, serviced sites 
for potential developers. Until 1969 the lack of such sites made the 
promotional work of the Board difficult but by that year enough had been 
found for the Board to start compiling a register. Particularly notable 
were the industrial estates at Inverness Airport (Dalcross) and Wick 
Airport. By the summer of 1970 the Board had received permission from 
the Secretary of State to buy sites at Inverness, at Muir of Ord, and in 
Shetland and were seeking the authority to acquire a number of others.
Even more attractive to potential developers than serviced sites are 
advance or ’bespoke* factories. The Board’s first ’bespoke* factory 
was completed in October 1970 at the Dalcross Airport Industrial Estate 
and work was going ahead on their first advance factory at Thurso. By 
the end of the period they were negotiating with the Scottish Office to
21. See People’s Journal. 25/5/68.
22. H.I.D.B. 1970, p.27.
158
be allowed to build a number of other factories of both types.
Finally the Board has attempted to help Highland industry in a 
number of other ways such as in initiating detailed studies into par­
ticular industries, and helping with marketing. In fact during our 
period neither of these approaches was well developed. Only one de-
25tailed study had been completed - on the Shetland Knitwear industry. J 
The report arising from this investigation, which, among other things, 
urged more rationalisation and cooperation between producers,was strongly 
criticised in Shetland for not taking enough account of local conditions 
particularly the inveterate individualism of the Shetlander. By the end 
of 1970 another detailed study, this time of Harris Tweed weaving, was 
being drawn up. In the marketing field the Board prepared a ’Buyers 
Guide* in 1970 and had decided on a symbol to denote goods produced in 
the Highlands and Islands - but neither of these had been launched by the 
end of the year.
The main concentrations of industrial development were supposed to 
be at the three growth points. There is no doubt that the Inner Moray 
Firth got its fair share of projects - apart from the big developments dis­
cussed in chapter 6 a lot of smaller businesses also came there, particular­
ly to the Inverness area. Neither Fort William or Wick-Thurso did so well 
however. When the Board started work, in late 1965» the Fort William dis­
trict with its brand new pulp and paper mill as well as older enterprises 
like the aluminium smelter had one of the greatest concentrations of industry 
in the Highlands. Unfortunately it was beginning to suffer from * second 
generation* problems such as a shortage of housing, a lack of sites for 
new industry and few employment opportunities for women or recent school-leavers
23. H.I.D.B., Special Report No. 4, "Shetland Wollen Industry - Planning
for Progress".
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0  A
coming from the families who moved into the area. Grieve was fond of
saying that the problems.-, of Port William were the problems "of life" where-
2Sas throughout most of the Highlands you had the problems of death; J but, 
for all that,one of the major components of the problem - unemployment - was 
the same in both cases. The Board was hampered in doing much for the 
Port William area by the lack of zoned sites and by a certain lack of co­
operation between the two local authorities concerned (Inverness County 
Council and Port William Town Council) in which the Board did not want to 
interfere. In fact though pious sentiments were regularly uttered, except 
for one clothing factory, the only major thing that wasl done for the district 
was to get the County Council to zone more sites and to begin negotiations 
with the Ministry of Technology (at that time responsible for these things) 
for the provision of an advance factory.
The Caithness, or more precisely Wick-Thurso, growth point provided 
the Board with one of its first challenges. In early 1966 Prank Cousins, 
as Minister of Technology, was having to decide whether to site the Atomic 
Energy Authority’s new Pro type Past Reactor (PFR) at Dounreay or at Winfrith 
in Dorset. As the existence of the atomic energy establishment was one of 
the important reasons for declaring Wick-Thurso a growth point and as it 
provided one of the few examples in the Highlands of the modem scientific 
activity dear to the Board’s heart,its run down would have been a serious 
blow. Amid increasing pessimism in Scotland, Board representatives led 
by Grieve went to London in February and put their case to Cousins. Soon 
afterwards the decision was made in favour of Dounreay and in making his 
announcement to the House of Commons Cousins went out of his way to stress
24. H.I.D.B., 1967, p.18.
25. Observer, 5/6/66, H.I.D.B., 1968, p.56.
160
the part the Board had played,saying that they had 'presented one of the
best cases I have ever heard about the need for this kind of approach to
26the question of the Northern part of Scotland'.
The threat of a run-down of Dounreay underlined just how vulnerable 
Caithnes was to such an occurance and indicated a pressing need for di­
versification of employment. To look into this the Board set up, in 
August 1967» a working party consisting of representations from U . K . A . E .A., 
the Ministry of Technology, the Scottish Office, the County Council and
27H.I.D.B. itself. Their report, a synopsis of which was published in 1969 
made few very startling recommendations: an urgent need was for More manu­
facturing firms and in order to attract them sites should be zoned and 
advance factories built; the possibilities of a magnesia plant using 
Sutherland dolomite and hot sea water and electricity from Dounreay should 
be investigated; that old, old chestnut, the utilisation of peat - this 
time for the extraction of wax - was brought up and also recommended for 
investigation; the fishing industry should be strengthened perhaps by the 
development of a modem harbour at Scrabster; and finally the John 0 'Groats 
area should be used as a tourist magnet. All of these suggestions were 
followed up - we have seen that an industrial estate was created at Wick 
Airport and an advance factory built at Thurso - but it was quickly apparent
after preliminary studies that the use of peat would not be a commercial 
28proposition. In spite of this activity Caithness has not done parti-
29
cularly well, at least over the period 1965-70, from H.I.D.B. attentions.
2S1 H.C. Deb, Vol.724, col. 410.
27. H.I.D.B., Special Report No. 1, "Wick-Thurso Working Party".
28. H.I.D.B., 1969, p.32.
29. A point made by Ian Carter, "Six Years on: an evaluative study of the
Highlands and Islands Development Board". Aberdeen University Review,
XLV (Spring 1973)» p.64.
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We saw in Table VIII that Caithness came off worst of the seven counties in
terms of assistance per head, and although if we look at new jobs provided
(again proportional to population} it does rather better ^  it still lags
behind Shetland, Inverness and Argyll and only does better than Orkney and
Sutherland. For neither Fort William or Caithness does the designation
*growth point* seem to have brought special advantages by 1970.
One other activity should be mentioned under the heading of manufacturing:
the crafts. A Board survey completed in 1969 revealed that the value of
the craft industry in the Highlands and Islands expressed in terms of
total turnover was f^m. and that the potential existed to double this 
31figure. ' The Board began looking into the development of the crafts, gave 
financial assistance to craft businesses and helped them with marketing.
By the end of 1970 they had submitted a scheme to S.D.D. for the provision 
of craft/tourism units including workshop, shop and tourist accomodation 
and, with the Scottish Joint Crafts Committee, were offering a scholarship 
for the training of a suitable art graduate in craft work.
Tourism
Whatever happened to other sectors of the Highland economy even the 
most pessimistic commentators had grudgingly to admit that the tourist 
industry was likely to grow (though there was not a lack of people to
claim that given the shortness of the season this growth would do little
32 33to keep Highland communities viable). And all the indicators
suggest that over the years 1965-70* tourism did indeed grow. Of course
30. Ibid, Table 1, p.64.
31. H.I.D.B., 1969, P.24.
32. e.g. Gillanders, p.114.
33. Such as those used by the Board in it® reports,e.g. number of cars 
carried on Kyleskfc.Ferry, number of visitors to specified *Tourist 
attractions*, etc.
162
all of this growth cannot be attributed to the work of the Board, there 
were other developments, such as those at Aviemore, which were quite in­
dependent of them, and (besides) increased tourism is probably related to 
general social changes such as greater affluence or leisure as much as 
anything else. But given the impossibility of properly untangling the 
various causal factors it would be uncharitable not to allot an important 
place to the Board’s efforts.
To begin with the Board had to combat the belief, common enough in the
Highlands and even held by one or two of the Board’s own members^that
34catering for tourism was an inferior occupations ' serving behind a bar is 
somehow lacking^he solid moral worth of haddock gutting. Grieve opposed 
this view, but even if he had not the logic of the situation would pro­
bably have demanded that the Board devote a fair amount of their attention 
to tourism. They worked out a tourist development plan with four
objectives: (i) a lengthening of the season; (ii) an increase in the amount 
of accommodation and of the tourist's knowledge of where it could be obtained;
(iii) an improvement in hotel and catering standards; and (iv) an extension
35of tourist facilities and better means of publicising them. Among
the chief instruments for achieving these aims were ( as with manufacturing) 
the grants and loans scheme, promotion /publicity campaigns and research.
The grants and loans went mainly t <7/increasing accommodation of which there 
was an acute shortage in some areas, but also to^cfeveloping recreational 
facilities such as sand yachting, sea angling and of course skiing - of 
which more below. Perhaps the most notable of such facilities aided by 
the Board was the 'Landmark* centre at Carrbridge which included a nature 
trail and an 'audio-visuai exhibition area'. It was opened in 1970 and
34. d!he-view-is mentioned, in order to deprecate it,in H.I.D.B. 1966, p.24.
35. H.I.D.B. 1967, p.19-20.
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won a major award from the British Tourist Authority. The Board’s first 
big publicity campaign was in 1968 under the banner of ’Escape to the 
Scottish Highlands and Islands'; it was followed up by an even bigger 
1969 campaign which especially stressed the off-peak months of April,
May, September and October using the inducement of a ’’Highland Holiday 
Ticket” - a special scheme offering discounts on a wide range of services 
and facilities in the off-peak months. The whole scheme was repeated 
and extended in 1970. In the same year the Board in conjunction with 
the area tourist organisations (see below) arranged two special events - 
a 'Festival of the Countryside' in Wester Ross during May and a 'Festival 
of the Sea* in Orkney in September.
Special attention was paid to the development of winter sports in the 
Cairngorms. In April 1966 the Cairngorm Winter Sports Development Board, 
who had pioneered the development of the area as a ski centre from 1957» 
formed a new company, Cairngorm Sports Development Ltd., to take over their 
assets. The Board assisted the new company by taking up €25,000 of 
debentures (it was at this time they discovered that they did not have 
the power to take equity)^ Grieve becoming one of its directors. The 
following year another £25,000 was given to the company, this time an 
grants and loans, and by 1968 some £73,000 of aid had been given, £38,400 
in the form of debentures. The Board also financed a road to a new
ski slope, ran a marketing scheme called 'Spey Valley/Ski Valley' and 
organised Cairngorm Winter Sports Festivals. In 1970 the Board actually 
acquired the upper slopes of Cairngorm, which includes the skiing area, 
previously in the hands of the Forestry Commission. Towards the end of 
the period the Board also began to look into the possibility of developing 
skiing facilities on Ben Wyvis following a request by a local voluntary 
ski development association. On the other hand they could do nothing 
for the possibly more promising slopes above Braemar as these were not
36. H.I.D.B. 1968, p.45 and 1970 Appendix III.
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within the Crofting Counties.
More than most of the other industries which it assisted the Board
was involved in the detailed running of tourism: it had a senior staff
member specifically employed to give advice on hotel management; it held
hotel management courses to increase the level of professional management;
and it was responsible for creating thirteen Area Tourist Organisations to
cover the seven counties. The main function of these area organisations
was to provide information and booking services. Voluntary information
centres had existed before and were sometimes successful but they tended
to be run on a hand-to-mouth basis and to depend on the efforts of one or
two individuals. The Board's plan, worked out in 1968 and put into
practice in the following year, was for a comprehensive network of area
organisations covering the whole region and each employing a full-time
tourist officer with a paid staff. Each area also had its own elected
executive council representing the local tourist industry plus appointees
from H.I.D.B., the Scottish Tourist Board and the local authorities to help
37ensure "that overall regional policy is kept in mind? The Board met
the basic cost of running each area organisation while the industry plus 
the local authorities paid for the operation of the satellite information 
offices and other work of the organisation (such as the provision of 
special entertainments for instance). The thirteen area organisations 
created in I969 - which operated a total of 46 information centres in that 
season - were joined by a fourteenth in 1970 when the Easter Ross and 
Inverness area was divided into two.
Promotional campaigns, financial assistance to those wishing to increase 
accommodation or improve recreational facilities and the provision of 
information services were all necessary but uncontroversial matters (in
37. H.I.D.B. 1968, p.43.
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as much as any help to tourism was uncontroversial). Far more daring -
and far more expensive - was the Board's first project conducted at their
own hand, the 'Hotel/Motel Scheme'. This was simply to build five hotels
(or motels) at the total cost of £lm., on the islands or west mainland
in places where private developers were unwilling to risk going. The
scheme was submitted as a formal proposal to the Secretary of State in mid-
1966 (the second such proposal put forward by the Board) and accepted
59by the end of the year in principle. (Juite apart from anything else
it must be accounted a notable success for the Board that they managed to 
get £lm. from the Treasury for building hotels; presumably as the Govern­
ment were at this time still anxious to show they were in earnest about 
Highland development, particularly after the recent introduction of S.E.T. 
(see below). After intensive market research it was decided to site the
first hotel at Craignure in Mull and building started in 1969* The hotel,
leased by the Board on a profit-sharing basis to Scottish Highland Hotels 
Ltd., opened for the 1971 season by which time plans were going forward 
for the second hotel to be built on Barra. Unfortunately rising costs 
made it obvious that to build five hotels would cost rather more than the 
£lm. originally suggested. The hotel scheme had its detractors of course. 
Many people thought that large hotels in out of the way places would simply
be 'white elephants', that if the Board had £lm. to throw around it ought
40to have given it to a lot of small projects, and that tourism wasn't 
the sort of thing that they should be helping anyway. In fairness to the 
Board it must be said that from the evidence of the first two seasons (1971 
and'72) at the Mull hotel the 'white elephant' argument seems to have
38. See Table IX for a full list of formal proposals.
39. H.I.D.B., 1966, Appendix VI.
40. Theme points were made for instance in a rather carping article by J. 
Kerr in the Glasgow Herald. 1/3/67.
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Table IX: Proposals
Pate of Submission 
7th Feb. 1966
11th Aug. 1966
4th Nov. 1966
28th Dec. 1966
6th June 1967
11th July 1967
submitted by H.I.D.B. to the Secretary of State. 
1965-70
Results
Approved 9th March 1966
Approved (in principle) 
29th November 1966
Approved 30th November 
19 66
Description of Proposals
Fisheries Development Scheme 
To add 25 boats to the Highlands 
and Islands fishing fleet and to 
train crews
Hotel/Motel Development 
To provide hotels/motels in the 
Islands and remoter mainland 
areas
Seaman*s Strike
Measures to mitigate the social 
and economic effects of the 
strike on the Highlands and (par­
ticularly) Islands
Moray Firth Development 
To initiate the necessary studies 
and consultations in preparation 
for the consideration and decisions 
that would arise if any specific 
project or prospects should 
materialise
Power Leasing for Special Industrial Board told that "ma- 
Development jor issues of National
To provide competitively priced power policy" were involved & 
for special industrial development in that that Government
Approved early in 1967
the Moray Firth area
Achnacon Caravan Site 
To.establish and manage a caravan 
and camp site at Achnacon in Glen­
coe, planned to a high standard of 
amenity, landscaping & management 
control
were considering the 
whole question of 
electricity for power 
intensive industries
Proposal withdrawn in 
1968 (because of high 
cost)
Date of Submission 
24th Aug. 1967
12th June 1968 
25th Feb. 1969
23rd April 1969 
2nd April 1970
30th Sept. 1970
I65B
(Table IX continued)
Description of Proposal
Extension of the Board's Fishery 
Development Scheme 
To provide an additional 10 fishing 
boats (25 in the original scheme) 
within the next five years mainly 
in the Orkney Isles/Pentland Firth 
area
To accelerate approvals under the 
Board's Fisheries Development scheme
To modify the Fisheries Development 
Scheme to permit the Board to assist 
applicants in the Orkney/Pentland 
Firth area to acquire new fishing 
boats of under 50ft. overall
To reclaim and develop the Valley 
Strand, North Uist, for the 
commercial growing of bulbs
To develop the resource potential 
of the Strath of Kildonan
To develop further the fishing indus^ 
try in the Highlands and Islands
Result
Approved in November 
1967
Proposal withdrawn 
in 1969
In March 1969 an 
amendment allowing 
the Board to assist 
the purchase of 
boats from minimum 
length of 40ft. was 
approved
Proposal withdrawn 
in 1971
Reply on 16th Nov. 
Secretary of State 
supported the main 
conclusions and hoped 
it would be possible 
to implement many of 
the proposals
Reply in April 1971 
deferring a decision 
on the proposal. 
Approval to further 
develop fishing given 
in Feb. 1973
Source: H.I.D.B. Reports 1966-71
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little validity. ^
Using for the first time their power to take equity, newly acquired 
in 1968, the Board became involved in the possession of another hotel, 
this time in Lerwick. In this instance the Board took the initiave in 
bringing together local people, the Scottish Northern Investment Trust 
and the North of Scotland Shipping Company who together with H.I.D.B. 
itself became the shareholders of Shetland Hotels Ltd. (The Board's 
contribution was about 15% of the company's ordinary shares). ^  In 
1970 the same company also leased a hetel that the Board had been respon­
sible for starting on Unst.
The hotel scheme was not the only controversial matter concerning 
tourism that involved the Boards one of their earliest actions was to 
commission a plan of a modem camping and caravan site at Achnacon at 
the northern entrance to Glencoe. On amenity grounds such a site was 
unexceptionable enough, indeed one of the chief reasons for it was to
remove"the eyesore that was being made of one of Scotland's most dramatic
43and best known glens by indiscriminate camping and caravanning." This 
was not enough for Clan Donald's representatives however who worked them­
selves into a rage over the possibility of such a violation of the scene
44of the massacre, clearly illustrating one of the points that most im­
pressed Grieve during his period as Board - the passion that Highland 
affairs arouse. Despite this the Board vrent as far as to make a formal 
proposal to the Secretary of State on the subject in 1967 but subsequent
discussion with the S.D.D. led to the plan being dropped because of the
45very high costs. Secondly, and rather more seriously, was the fric­
tion between the Scottish Tourist Board and H.I.D.B. The Tourist Board,
41. H.I.D.B., 1972, p.39.
42. H.I.D.B., 1969, Appendix III.
43. H.I.D.B., 1966, p.25.
44. Scottish Daily Express. 17/10/66.
45. H.I.D.B., 1967, p.21 and Appendix IX.
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an institution of many years standing, was at the time of the Highland 
Board1s creation still a non-statutory body which though it received 
a small sum from the government was plagued with lack of money. Be­
tween them and the Board was a straightforward clash of perspective: 
they saw tourism in Scotland as something that needed developing as a 
whole and, being the body to do it, they hoped for H.I.D.B. assistance 
in financing the Highland side of things. H.I.D.B. themselves on the 
other hand were interested in tourism only as an important means to 
another end - Highland development - and were determined to keep control 
of the tourist side of things in their region.^ The result was a 
persistent friction between the two bodies which also involved those 
parts of the Scottish Office that were concerned with tourism. The 
creation, in 1969» of the statutory Scottish Tourist Board, which was 
better off financially, led to the working out of a modus vivendi between 
the two boards - including for instance the setting up of a joint office 
in Inverness to deal with applications for assistance for hotel develop­
ment - and since then the problem seems to have diminished. Even so the 
Highland Board have effectively retained responsibility for tourist de­
velopments in the seven Crofting Counties and as late as 1971 a Times 
report claimed that relations between the two bodies were 'abrasive*
47with H.I.D.B. stealing the thunder from the S.T.B.'s promotional events. 
Incidentally, these difficulties illustrate that when two bodies are re­
solutely facing different directions cross cutting membership of their 
boards is not necessarily a solution: John Robertson became a member of
the S.T.B. in September 1966 and after his resignation his place was taken 
by Sir James MacKay who later became a part-time member of the statutory 
Tourist Board.
46. See Scotsman. 11/2/69; the correctness of this article was borne out 
by my own interviews.
The
47. 77Hj»«s. 13/5/72.
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Finally there was the controversy over Selective Employment Tax.
Introduced early in 1966 soon after the creation of the Board this tax 
hit the Highlands particularly hard because of the small amount of manu­
facturing industry in the region and the importance of the service sectors 
one unofficial estimate was that S.E.T. removed £2^m. from the Highlands. ^  
Criticism of S.E.T. was not of course directed against the Board but they
became involved when the Deputy Chairman, John Rollo, publicly called the
49new tax a 'body blow' to the Highlands. It was a personal opinion
but tended to get reported as the official H.I.D.B. view - which led to 
furious
a r  : row within the Board and helped convince Rollo that the Board 
was the creature of the Labour Government. After persistent pressure 
by the Board S.E.T. was in fact removed from Highland hotels in 1968.
50
Fishing
51Undoubtedly the most popular - and also the best analysed - of the 
Board*s activities has been the help it has given to the Highland fishing 
industry - not just the actual catching of fish but also associated de­
velopments like processing and boat-building (both of which are included 
under 'manufacturing* for statistical purposes, but are always described 
along with fishing proper in Board literature). Its popularity stems 
from the fact that while it is clearly a sound economic development - 
in the face of the pessimism of the white paper, The- Scottish Economy.
1965-70 which declared that "it would be quite wrong to imagine that fishing
can be looked to as a significantly expanding sector of the Highland 
52economy" J - it also utilises an indigenous Highland resource and has 
helped those remote and island communities particularly dear to the hearts
48. Glasgow Herald. 1/3/67*
49* Inverness Courier. 6/5/66.
50. Though we are primarily dealing with the years 1965-70 many of the figures 
in this sector also include 1971 as these are the statistics given in the ana­
lysis of the Board's assistance to the fishing industry, "In Great Waters".
51. The analysis being H.I.D.B., Special Report No.7, "In Great Waters"(by
William Russell).
52. Cmnd. 2864. Appendix A, p.145*
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of partisans of the highland way of life* and others inclined to look 
askance at tourism or big developments round the Moray Firth. The Board 
were well aware that the best way to win acceptability for themselves was 
to do something for the true crofting areas quickly and so, excepting only 
the organisation of the grants and loans scheme, fisheries development in 
the Western Isles was their first major undertaking.
In a sense this development was not breaking any new ground but 
merely following the lead given by the earlier (1959-63) Outer Isles 
Fisheries Training Scheme. This earlier scheme(mentioned in chapter 2) 
which had involved the statutory fishing authorities, D.A.F.S., the 
Highland Fund and the Macauley Trust, had been set up in response to the 
very depressed level of the formerly important Western Isles fishing 
fleet and the high unemployment levels of the area. It consisted of the 
fishing authorities^ providing their normal assistance with the Highland
53Fund stepping in to loan the 19% qualifying deposit statutorily required 
and to this financial help was added training. In all twelve boats were 
provided, eight going to the Stornoway district, two to Barra and one 
each to Scalpay and Eriskay. The Board considered this scheme had been 
successful enough to bear repeating and so on the 7th February 1966 sub­
mitted a formal proposal to the Secretary of State (their first) that they 
be permitted to go ahead with a Fisheries Development Scheme (F.D.S.); 
the proposal was accepted in March of the same year.
The original F.D.S. was for 23 new boats in the 30 to 80 foot range 
to be added to the Highland fleet mainly, though not entirely,in the Outer 
Isles. Successful applicants, who need have no previous experience in the 
fishing industry,received both grant and loan for a new boat, the grant 
being provided by the fishing authorities (who were associated with the
53. The Highland Fund, 1971 Annual Report, p.9; see also P«8 of 
'In Great Waters'.
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Board in selecting applicants) and the loan by H.I.D.B. ^  (hence the 
unusually low proportion of grants to loans in the Board's assistance to 
fishing). If necessary two sorts of training were provided: while waiting
for the delivery of their boats successful applicants were trained as 
separate individuals on board existing local boats having spare berths; 
then after their own boat came a Board employed training skipper 
was placed on the vessel together with owner and crew for as long as was 
necessary. By 1968 the Board were employing four training skippers and 
since then an additional two have been used from time to time. ^
Once again inter-organisational conflicts played their part. The 
fishing authorities - particularly the W.F.A. - had little faith in the 
capacity of Highlanders as fishermen and were upset at the thought that 
the F.D.S. would oblige them to use up some of their limited finance for 
grants to what they considered to be dubious propositions. Feelings were 
strong for a time but the fishing authorities were induced to cooperate and 
found that their worst fears did not materialise. In fact the Board were 
sufficiently impressed with the success of the scheme to propose its ex­
tension from 25 to 35 boats in 1967» the extra 10 boats to go mainly to
56the Orkney/pentland Firth area. This proposal was also accepted by the
Secretary of State. Applications from Orkney and Caithness were much less 
brisk than they had been from the Western Isles and it appeared that 
Orcadians were unwilling to risk starting their fishing careers in such 
large boats. The Board therefore sought (and got) a change in the re­
gulations covering the F.D.S. to allow them to assist the purchase of
57boats down to a minimum length of 40ft. The whole five year scheme
54. 'In Great Waters', p.7. The fishing authorities are only permitted to give 
financial assistance for boats or tackle provided the fisherman himself makes a 
contribution. Many Highlanders could not afford this, hence the need for H.I.D. 
B. loans.
55« H.I.D.B. 1968, p.50 and 'In Great Waters', p.55*
56. H.I.D.B. 1967, Appendix IX.
57. H.I.D.B. 1969» Appendix V.
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came to an end at the beginning of 1971 a*id because of its success the 
Board made proposals in 1970 for its extension. In his reply the 
Secretary of State said that because of uncertainties arising out of 
E.E.C. negotiations and the Cameron report on Inshore Fisheries a decision 
on the proposals should be deferred. The Board decided to take stock of
the position and commissioned a report by William Russell, formerly of
and eg
D.A.F.S., on the F.D.S./their other assistance to fishing (see below).
By 1971 some 38 applications covered by the F.D.S. had been approved al­
together, exactly half of them going from the Outer Hebrides with the next 
largest group (six) in Orkney. In all some 30 boats were operational. ^  
Though quite a small number compared with, say, the concentration of 600 
boats between Aberdeen and Lossiemouth, ^  in the Highland dontext this 
was a substantial increase in new boats of medium size.
The Fisheries Development Scheme was not the only form of assistance 
given by the Board to the purchase of fishing boats; it was complemented by 
two other schemes covering (i) second hand boats and (ii) 1 dual-purpose' 
boats. Assistance for the purchase of second hand boats was designed*: to 
cover the needs of experienced fishermen who for financial reasons did 
not want to buy a new boat. The fishing authorities did not touch this 
sector of possible development and it seemed to the Board that it would 
be a useful way of adding to the Highland fleet (or preventing its deple­
tion) relatively cheaply. Only loans were made available in this instance 
and as it was confined to experienced fisherman no training was required. 
Assistance was approved in a total of 122 cases by 1971 *nd these were 
spread throughout the Highlands, large numbers going to areas like Shetland 
and the Mallaig - Campbeltown stretch of coast which had not been greatly 
involved in the F.D.S.^
58. H.I.D.B. 1971» p.44. The report is of course 'In Great Waters'.
59* *In Great Waters', p.9*
60. H.I.D.B. 1968, p.55.
61. 'In Great Waters* p*9*
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The third type of boat whose purchase H.I.D.B. assisted were the so 
called 'dual-purpose1 boats, i.e. small boats (under 40ft.) which could be 
used for shell-fishing and sea-angling or even pleasure cruising,oferxybwoik 
and the like. Not being intended for full time fishing such boats, like 
the sdcond hand ones, were not eligible for assistance from the fishing 
authorities. Because of the boom in shell-fish landings these boats did 
very well; in fact shell-fishing became one of the important growth indus­
tries in the Highlands during the late sixties with the Board assisting not 
just the boats but also lobster storage ponds and the marketing of the
products. By 1971 assistance had been approved for 75 boats again spread
62
fairly evenly throughout the region;
Taking all three types of boats together we find that by 1971
applications approved totalled 235* the number of boats actually operational
wan 172 and the direct employment provided calculated at 850 jobs. To
achieve this the Board had given £204*538 in grants and £1,962,171 in
loans on top of which the contributions of the fishing authorities to F.D.S.
63was £507*546 in grants. It is illustrative of the success of the policy
that 28% of those who reveived loans were ahead of schedule with repayments, 
whereas only 17% were behind. ^  The number of fishing boats between 30 
and 80ft. based in the Highlands and Islands showed an increase of140% 
between 1966 and 1971 as against a slight overall decrease elsewhere in
Scotland; from 1964-70 employment in fishing increased by 7% (counting
65
Crofter-fisherman, who declined in numbers, as $ full-time). J Altogether 
this represents a significant revival of Highland fishing.
62T Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid, p.56.
65. Ibid, p.15.
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"The Board recognises that for every man fishing at sea, processing 
can provide two jobs ashore". ^  So the Board*s first report boldly 
announced. In fact they have not as yet managed to do quite this well.
The calculation of the employment multiplier that accompanied 'In Great 
Waters' showed that for the region as whole "the creation of one job on
67a fishing boat will generate a further one to one-and-a half jobs on shore". 
These blanket figures obscure regional differences however: on Shetland
where in response to local initiative most Board money has been concentrat­
ed in fish processing, the sub-regional multiplier for employment shows
that something very close to two jobs are generated on shore for every one 
68at sea. Altogether the Board assisted 24 firms engaged in processing,
7 of them in Shetland, and created an estimated 598 jobs, 243 of them in 
Shetland. ^  (Once again this is up to the end of 1971). Except for 
Shetland, where white fish formed the basis for expansion, the bulk of 
these processing factories dealt with the growing shellfish sector - such 
things as scallop processing (Tarbert, Argyll) and crab canning (Yell).
One of the major problems of the processing industry was its depend­
ence on regular supplies of fish which do not always materialise. This 
problem became particularly acute on Shetland in 1968 when the processing 
capacity had been greatly increased but several of the larger Shetland 
boats continued to land in Aberdeen. Things became so serious that the 
Board sought the permission of the Scottish Office to acquire a mid-water 
trawler to be used to fish exclusively for the local factories. They were 
not allowed to proceed but fortunately for the processing firms a plenti­
ful supply of fish began to come to them in 1969*
66. H.I.D.B. 1966, p.21.
67. 'In Great Waters*, p.18.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid, p.11.
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Two processing ventures deserve special mention - Ice Atlantic in 
Shetland and Gaelfish, Stornoway. The first was a private company,one 
of the largest of Shetland processors, which received progressively more 
and more financial assistance until, when it got into management diffi­
culties, it was effectively taken over by the Board and new management 
brought in - considerable losses having to be written off in the process. 
Gaelfish was one of the projects undertaken at the Board’s own hand. Its 
premises began life as a Herring Industry Board freezing factory and cold 
store but the H.I.B. thought it would ,be more suitable for the Board
(H.I.D.B.) to own it as the latter were "free to deal with all kinds of 
70fish". (Though it is a moot point whether this was not just an excuse
to get rid of something they considered a certain loser). The Board
accepted the offer and took over the factory in 1968. It cannot be said
that the Board went into the project with its eyes closed; ri,$it at the
beginning they declared that it was "doubtful whether the factory could
71run profitably in the early years" but having spent over £jm. on the 
Western Isles fleet it was important to try and build up a complementary 
processing industry. The Board were quite realistic in not expecting 
profits: in the first nine months of its existence (July 1968 - March
1969) Gaelfish had trading losses of €11,143; in 1969-70 the losses were 
£16,696 and in 1970-71* £5*964 ^  (actually trading ceased on 28th February 
1971 so this was not quite a full year). Once again management difficulties 
and irregular supplies of fish posed major problems for the enterprise.
In 1970 the Board decided to sell Gaelfish. It is not clear how far this 
decision was due to the new Conservative Government, elected in June 1970,
70. H.I.D.B. 1968, p.51.
71. Ibid.
72. H.I.D.B. 1969f Appendix IV, 1970, Appendix IV and 1971* Appendix IV.
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and at that time committed to a "lame ducks'* policy; informants who are 
in a position to know the truth (i.e. Board Members) are simply contra­
dictory on this point. In my judgement the fact that the sale came when
it did - with Gaelfish still making losses - indicates that the change of
77
Government must have played some part. ' The factory was duly sold in 
1971 to a Norwegian company who, it appears, having been running it 
successfully. ^
The other significant manufacturing industry associated with fishing
is boat building. Of some' seventeen yards situated in the Highlands and
75Islands the Board assisted eleven, the bulk of this aid going to Orkney
(3 projects) and Campbeltown. As well as financial assistance the Board
helped boatyards by pressing for boats built under their own schemes to
come from the Highlands if possible. Two completely new ventures were
supported. (i) A shipbuilding and repair yard in Campbeltown (the first
in the region to construct steel boats) started in 1969, *n 1970 the
76Board subscribed to 29,000 £1 shares in this enterprise. (ii) A
company specialising in using glass reinforced plastic (its main premises
were in the South of England) was attracted to Orkney. Altogether an
estimated 110-120 additional jobs in boat-building were created by H.I.D.B.
77assistance.
More experimentally, the Board concerned itself with fish farming.
Projects imder this heading can be divided into 3 groups. (i) Salmon and
73. An assesraent supported by C.C. Hood in his unpublished paper "Pishing 
Politics & Administration" (Glasgow, 1972) and by R. MacFarquar, Secretary of 
the Highland Fund (which gave the factory a loan to help it through the transi­
tion period from H„I.D.B. to private hands).
74. H.I.D.B. 1971, p.47.
75* number of yards in the region was said to be 16 in H.I.D.B. 1969, P-57*
Since then the glass reinforced plastic boatyard has been set up. For the 
number of projects assisted see p.11 of ’In Great Waters*.
76. H.I.D.B. 1971, Appendix III.
77. 'In Great Waters', p.11.
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trout - the largest single number of fish farming ventures supported by
the Board concerned the breeding of rainbow trout. (ii) Marine fish;
the W.F.A. already had an important experimental plaice-rearing farm at
Ardtoe and the Board contented themselves with backing this. (iii) Shell
fish farming; assistance was given for the cultivation of mussels, oysters
and lobsters in various parts of the region. One of the schemes the
Board became most involved with was the creation of a large Oyster
hatchery at Loch Creran promoted by Scottish Sea Farms Ltd. (20,000 of
whose £1 shares are owned by H.I.D.B.). Local opinion held that the
entrepreneur who started the project was a highly dubious character and the
Board were criticised for supporting him. Local opinion seems to have had
some grounds for its assertions in this instance and there has since been
a change in management. By the end of 1971 the Board had given a total
78of £535>000 worth of assistance to fish farming and retained the services 
of a consultant. They continued to be worried by a number of problems 
including the lack of training facilities or advisory services and the 
possibilities of disease.
The other new venture that the Board began to take an interest in 
from 1970 was industrial fishing - i.e. fishing for species (especially 
Norway Pout) not usually eaten but which could be used for the production 
of fishmeal. Together with the W.F.A. and a fishmeal company they 
helped sponsor trial fishing to investigate its possibilities. If the 
experiment were taken any further there is a good chance it would provoke 
opposition from regular fishermen who feel that it might be detrimental to 
conventional fish stocks.
Although the Board* s fishing policy has in general been both popular 
and successful it has not been without its disappointments, the most
78. Ibid, p.12.
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important of which are listed by William Russell in his analysis 'In Great 
79Waters'. Among them are included the lack of shore developments
(particularly processing) to balance the increase in the size of the fleet 
at Stornoway, the slowness of the development of Orkney fishing, the al­
most complete lack of advance in Caithness and the failure to make an im­
pact of the Skye community (a failure of public relations as much as any­
thing, Skye has in fact received a good deal of Board money). Against 
this must be balanced the achievements and especially the two most notable 
of them: the complete revival of the Western Isles fleet and the prosperity
of Shetland. Stornoway was the chief beneficiary from the expansion of 
the fishing fleet but several of the small communities of the tiny islands - 
notably Scalpay and Eriskay - have done extremely well. Shetland did not 
participate much in the F.D.S. as it already had a large number of professional 
fishermen who could utilise the financial assistance offered by the fishing 
authorities but it did well out of the second-hand boats and 'dual-purpose* 
boat schemes. Far more important, though, was the boost given to the 
Shetland processing industry which permitted the benefits from the expansion 
of fishing to be spread widely throughout the community. The precise ex­
tent of H.I.D.B.'s contribution to Shetland's boom is difficult to assess 
but generally Shetlanders seem agreed that the Board's finance at least was 
a vital factor. ^
Land Use
If their fishing policy won the Board wide approval, their actions 
(and lack of them) on land use were perhaps the greatest source of contro­
versy they had to face (with the exception of Moray Firth Development).
79- On p.66.
80. See Scotsman 8/3/72, 'In Great Waters' p.45.
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The controversy centred on two quite separate aspects of the problems
land use policy in general and assistance to agriculture in particular.
Concerning land use in general it is certain that any policy pursued by
any board in the Highlands would have been controversial. Land is the
great emotional symbol of the region and its history together with its
present division into large estates ensures that positions taken on land
use are likely to be firmly entrenched and not susceptible to compromise.
The Board avoided this minefield by taking no action.
That is not of course entirely fair but they did put greatest stress
in their development policies on the provision of jobs and on no reasonable
analysis could it be thought that the land would produce much in the way of
employment whatever was done to it. In its first report the Board claimed
81that a"land use plan "was "essential to our long-term programme" but
partly because it received a lower priority than employment producing schemes
and partly out of a genuine believe that such a plan should not be hurried
and should, when it emerged, be •comprehensive' little was seen to happen.
82Needless-to-say the Board was criticised for not acting more vigorously; 
many of the most enthusiastic supporters of the idea of a Highland Board 
has seen land use as one of the central problems that needed tackling. The 
more radical among them had hoped to see the landowners taken on and beaten - 
and here lay another reason why the Board was slow to act: Grieve was deeply
averse to engaging in a bitter conflict, probably involving compulsory pur­
chase, which, in his view, even if won would give few advantages.
So the Board disappointed many people over land but it did do something: 
in 1966 it set in motion comprehensive development surveys of the Strath of 
Kildonan and Mull - both areas having been selected as suitable for detailed
81. H.I.D.B. 1966, p.28.
82. See for instance Ian Carter, "The Highland Board and Strath Kildonan", 
Catalyst. Spring 1972.
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study by the Highland Panel and were inherited by the Board, The reports 
of both of these surveys took some time to see the light of day - the 
Kildonan study was published in Spring 1970 and the Mull one not until 
August 1973 (although it had been completed over a year before and spent 
the remaining time getting through the Scottish Office), The chief reason 
for the protracted period of gestation of these surveys was the enormous 
number of different bodies that had to be consulted, both in the course of 
the survey and after it has received its draft form, so that their assorted 
comments could be considered before final publication. In the case of the 
Kildonan study no less than 28 bodies - public authorities, interest groups 
and the local estates - were sent copies of the draft report. And this 
for a report startling only in its lack of recommendations, a lack that 
can hardly be blamed on the Board as it seems unlikely that Kildonan ever 
had much potential for development. In fact concerning land use in the 
Strath (as opposed to development in Helmsdale) only two conclusions seem 
to emerge; that an extra 15>000 acreas (out of a total area of 200 sq. 
miles) should be afforested over a period of 20 years and that 1,500 acres
07
should be improved in order to increase agricultural output. Such un­
exciting recommendations produced considerable disappointment, but even 
moving this far from the status quo the Board was criticised for ignoring
the sporting value "which is and always has been the land use giving the
84highest economic return" - a charge the Board flatly denied. On the 
other side, it has been claimed that the Board accepted the landowners1 case 
far too uncritically and should have used amount of employment created, 
rather than return on capital>as the test of the best land use; a change, 
it is said, that would have produced more emphasis on agriculture and less 
on deer. ^  In dealing with land use in the Highlands you can never please
83. H.I.D.B. Special Report 5, 'Strath of Kildonan - proposals for develop­
ment' , p.16.
84. Ibid, p.14*
85. Points made by Robert Maclennan, M.P. Carter 1 . . . (1972) makes similar 
criticisms when he says that the Board defined development in "economic" terms 
only and ignored its "social" aspects.
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everybody but it is quite easy to please nobody.
The Mull survey was/Si altogether grander scale and the Board* s
86proposals for development were correspondingly more significant.
Aiming at ‘comprehensive development* it dealt with fisheries, tourism,
manufacturing industry, transport, housing and education as well as land
use (the Kildonan report also considered tourism and fisheries) but it is
the latter that has already provoked controversy. Once again the estates
have placed a higher value on sport - particularly deer-stalking - than the
Board and have "indicated that they would resist any attempt to impose any
87changing emphasis in their estate enterprises". It remains to be seen
whether the Board will back down. The other main line of controversy that
has emerged is a traditional one on Mull - the dislike of most landowners
and occupiers, large and small, whether concerned with agriculture or
sport, for increasing afforestation. Yet forestry brings one of the best
hopes for land development. The Board got into trouble on this score
quite early in their life in fact. Following an outspoken speech by
John Robertson a number of Mull farmers angrily accused them of being
88against agriculture and favouring forestry and tourism instead.
bne other aspect of land development deserves mention because like 
the utilisation of peat it has its hallowed place in the litany of de­
sirable undertakings - the reclamation of tidal land. In 1966 Lord Lovat 
proposed a scheme to Inverness County Council involving the reclamation of 
land from the Beauly Firth and was somewhat annoyed when the Board were un­
willing to foot th^fer further investigations.^ However the following
86. As the report did not come out until well after 1970 I will not say much 
about it here.
87. H.I.D.B., "Island of Mull", April 1972 (draft), Appendix 6, p.2.
88. Scottish Daily Express 14/3/66 & 18/3/66.
89. Inverness Courier. 9/9/66 and 24/2/67.
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year they did arrange for D.A.F.S. engineers to carry out preliminary
surveys of tidal land in the Dornoch, Cromarty, Beauly and Inverness Firths,
the Kyle of Tongue and Baleshare Island, North Uist. The results showed
that reclamation in most of these areas would be technically feasible, but
that the cost would be high. Not committing themselves, the Board said
that the choice would "depend on national decisions on the fundemental
90value in the long-term as against the short term extra cost". Nothing
further has happened.
If we compare the total assistance given to agriculture over the 
years 1965-70 (£404,132) with the assistance provided in any of the other 
main sectors of the Highland economy during the same period - manufacturing, 
tourism and fisheries (all of whicE8?6^ ^  over £l«5m.) ^  it becomes clear 
that it was not one of the Board’s main priorities. There were two reasons 
for this: first, the point already mentioned when discussing the Board's
strategy, because agriculture offered little prospect of extra employment 
however well assisted and the Board considered the provision of jobs as the 
core of Highland development; secondly, and a point apparently not much 
appreciated by the Board's agricultural critics, the whole field was already 
covered by other bodies offering a wide array of various sorts of financial 
assistance so that it was not easy to see where the Board could fit in.
Chief among these other bodies was of course the Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for Scotland, flanked by the colleges of agriculture and research 
institutes and reinforced in the crofting areas by the Crofters Commission.
Not surprisingly D.A.F.S. did not want to see the Board entering the agri­
cultural assistance game merely in order to duplicate work already being 
done. In general the Board was happy enough to accept this though there
90. H.I.D.B. 1969, P.65.
91. All figures from H.I.D.B. 1970, Appendix IX.
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were occasions when they wished to help certain developments and were
shooed off by the department. For instance in 1969, 18 Argyll farmers put
forward a land development scheme and the Board planned to give them
assistance until the idea was vetoed by D.A.F.S. on the grounds of H.I.D.B.'s
92limited remit on the question of 'topping-up' existing grant aided schemes.
As a result the Board's involvement in agriculture,especially in its early
years ,was limited and tended to concentrate on marketing assistance or
help for the more experimental projects - notably the Uist calf marketing
scheme started by Hebridian Calf Producers Ltd. and the development of
intensive pig production units.
Unfortunately for the Board these minimal activities brought continual
93criticism upon its head. Not only were agricultural interests quite
strong in the Highlands but there were numerous people outside the industry
who believed agriculture - far more than manufacturing or tourism - to be
particularly "right" for the region; not to stress the importance of
agriculture was in a sense to challenge the faith of a substantial body of
Highland opinion and therefore produced adverse reactions. It became
apparent that it would be politically desirable, at the very last, to
involve the Board more closely in agricultural assistance in order to draw
the fire and in 1969 a concordat was worked out with D.A.F.S. and the
Crofters Commission specifying clearly just how the Board could fit into
94the-agricultural assistance programme. Even so the total aid given
in 1970, though greater than in any previous year, was still quite small 
(£143,000) .  95
92. Scotsman IO/4/69.
93* For instance from Reay Clarke, President of the Easter Ross Branch of 
the N.F.U. see Inverness Courier 30/9/66; Michael Noble in the Scottish Grand 
Committee, Debate on the Scottish Estimates, 11/7/67, col.213 and Lord 
Lovat, H.L. Deb, Vol.291, col.192.
94. H.I.D.B. 1969, Appendix XII. |feseait±a!}ythe new rules allowed a farmer to 
go to either H.I.D.B. or D.A.F.S. (of the Crofters Commission if eligible)
for assistance.
95. H.I.D.B., 1970, Appendix VIII.
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As with all other sectors of the economy the Board were active in 
commissioning research and surveys. Aside from the Kildonan and Mull 
reports, which of course dealt with agriculture in part, a survey of 
the trends in Orkney fanning was commissioned in 1966 and a comprehensive 
study of agriculture in Caithness, Orkney and Shetland began in 1968. 
Following the conflicts over land use caused by Moray Firth development 
(see next chapter) the Board got together with the Moray Firth Committee 
of the N.F.U. plus other official bodies and interests, to study the affect 
of urban developments on the farming of the area. By the end of 1970 
neither this nor the Caithness, Orkney and Shetland study had been completed.
In addition the Board undertook one major land use project at its own 
hand - the experimental growing of bulbs in North TJist. One of the most 
interesting of the Board's schemes and perhaps in the end their biggest 
failure, the antecedents of this project pre-date H.I.D.B. by a number of 
years. In 1957 the cooperative,Hebridean Bulb Growers, was set up with 
the support of the West of Scotland College of Agriculture, the Crofters 
Commission and D.A.F.S. to encourage crofters to grow bulbs and to market 
them. The experiment began on Tiree but by 1965 spread to many other 
parts of the West Highlands. financial difficulties made Hebridean Bulb 
Growers apply to the Board for a loan and the latter responded by getting one 
of their staff to produce a feasibility study. His conclusions were that 
the bulb scheme as it stood was undercapitalised, too geographically dis­
persed and suffering from poor management; nevertheless bulb growing in the 
Hebrides looked like a viable proposition and he recommended instead that 
the Board set up a new concern to carry it forward, perhaps based on Islay.^ 
The Board accepted that they should involve themselves in bulb growing ex­
periments but chose the Outer Hebrides as the location and by mid 1967 a
96. R. Dean, Bulbs from the Western Isles, A feasibility study (H.I.D.B. 
unpublished), p.l, 17» 82 and 125. chapter 2.
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Batch soil expert had. investigated suitable areas. Perhaps because of
their experience with Hebridean Bulb Growers the Scottish Office were
sceptical of the idea from the beginning - one of John Robertson's
complaints at his resignation was that they had procrastinated over 
97the scheme however they did not stand in the way absolutely and by
98the end of 1967 six acres of bulbs had been planted in North Uist.
The crop was successful and the experiment was repeated in 1968 and 1969 
using larger acreages while research was done for the Board on the 
possibilities of using reclaimed land and on the marketing of bulbs.
By April 1969» when a formal proposal on the subject was put to 
the Secretary of State,the scheme had reached grandiose proportions.
The Board wished to reclaim 1,500 acres of tidal sands in North TJist,
99known as the Valley Strand, for 'large-scale concentrated bulb growing' 
and to set up a company to take over the assets of the Hortico Group Ltd. - 
a Lincolnshire bulb marketing firm that waus acting as their commercial 
advisers - the company to be 80% owned by H.I.D.B. and 20% by the Hortico 
people. In all the finance required - over a period of 8 years -
would be between £2^m. and £2-Jm. It was thought that there could
be legal difficulties over the ownership of the land, almost all fore­
shore, which was in private hands but in which there were public rights 
that would have to be extinguished or by-passed. Most of this land was 
owned by the Granville Trustees and as the Granvilles are related to 
the Royal Family when the scheme was curtailed an (unfounded)local 
rumour had it that undue influence had been brought to bear. In fact 
the project never reached that stage for although the bulbs lifted in
97. Scotsman 8/7/67
98. H.I.D.B. 1967, p.30.
99. H.I.D.B. 1969, p.66.
100. Proposal from the H.I.D.B. to the S. of S. for Scotland, "The Reclamation 
of Valley Strand in North TJist as a Comprehensive Bulbs Project", p. 1-5.
101. Ibid, p.l.
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1969 showed promising results the harvests of the next two years were not
good enough to convince either the Technical Committee set up by D.A.F.S.
to look into the Board's proposals or H.I.D.B.'s new commercial advisors
(Hortico had sold out to another group), that the scheme would be viable;
the chief problem seems to have been the effects of salt-bearing winds.
Faced with these results and a Scottish Office very unwilling to see more
money lost on the project, the Board decided to discontinue tulip growing
and to limit further work to daffodils and crocuses. Without tulips, the
most profitable bulb, the reclamation scheme could not be justified and the
102Board withdrew their proposals in 1971* Since then daffodil and crocus
103growing has also been discontinued. y
The Bulb Scheme was a bold experiment which, had it worked, would have 
been an important addition to the economy of the TJists. In the event how­
ever it must be judged a complete failure - but this does not mean that it
should not have been tried. No doubt there were people who from the 
beginning were sceptical about the possibilities of such a development; they 
turned out to be right but the grounds for their doubts were never so 
overwhelming as to make bulb-growing a risk not worth taking. It probably 
would have been more discreditable for the Board not to have taken this 
risk than to have tried and failed.
Towards the end of the 1965-70 period the Board started to consider 
some other small land use projects - they began to experiment with the
growing of shrubs in Argyllshire and made plans to set up a pilot blueberry
growing project. Earlier on they had ^ vey^ f^(ate|he market for venison 
with a view to encouraging the farming of deer and a survey they had commis­
sioned showed that the conditions for the development of mink farming in 
Shetland and Lewis were favourable.
102. H.I.D.B. 1971, p.53.
103. H.I.D.B. 1972, p.55.
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With all the success in the world none of these experimental schemes
could hope to come remotely close in importance to the major use of land
their
not yet mentioned: forestry. The Board in the outline of y strategy
had called forestry one of the three main props of the Highland economy -
especially important as it was a considerable employer of labour in areas
where there was little else to be found. However because the planting 
of trees using public money is the responsibility of the Forestry Commission 
the part played by the Board has been a rather marginal one. Apart from
discussionswith the Commission and D.A.F.S. as to where large scale
afforestation could best take place (and assistance to timber using in­
dustries) its role was largely exhortatory - continually trying to per­
suade the Government not to engage in economy at the expense of forestry.
Mineral Extraction
There is a use for land other than growing things on it (for whatever
purpose) - to dig it up and extract its mineral content. This has its
disadvantages: if large scale new mining ventures were brought into the
Highlands under Board auspices there would be a head on clash with those
concerned with amenity or the environment. The Board*s view was that 
almost any development would improve the prospects of * difficult' areas 
(like North West Sutherland) but by 1970 no conflict had emerged as asses- 
ment of mineral potential had got no further than the exploratory stages.
By the end of the period the most detailed search for minerals conducted 
by the Board was in North West Sutherland. Feldsper, quartzite, shell 
sands and garnets were found, as well as non-ferous minerals and the 
option on a feldsper deposit discovered near Durness was taken by an inter­
national mining company. Preliminary mineral assesments of mainland 
Ross-shire and S.E. Skye were also under way. Together with these general
104. H.I.D.B. 1969, p.35.
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surveys there were some specific studies concerning the revival of the
extraction of diatomite in Skye; the expansion of the Caithness flagstone
industry; the possibilities of magnesium production; and the development
prospects for Kildonan gold - not so much a commercial venture this, as
a possible tourist attraction that the Kildonan report had recommended.
All these things were only possibilities and so cannot compare with
the other mining ventures the Board had assisted: the Coalmine at Brora.
105This mine had a long history; it had been helped by the Highland Fund
and by the time the Board took office was owned and run by the miners.
In 1966, when it seemed that the coal resources had been exhausted, the
Board paid for test bores and reserves of over eight million tons were
discovered. Much of the cost of driving a new mine shaft and providing
associated equipment was financed by the Board through loans, grants and
shareholding so that in 19^9 the Brora mine became the Board*s largest
single investment in an industrial undertaking - an investment that in-
107eluded 20,000 25p. preference shares.
Special development Areas and Social development
Certain other of the Board*s activities deserve brief mention and 
can be conveniently discussed Tinder the headings * special development 
areas' and 'social developments'. The 'special development areas' (the 
title is the Board's) are those areas, mainly islands, which have special 
problems. In 1967 the Board and the Crofters Commission collaborated 
in drawing up a list of 'industrial holding points' at centres of labour 
supply in the crofting North and West and H.I.D.B. employed a Consultant 
(Robert Storey, later to become the Board's Social Research and Development
105. See chapter 3*
106. With John Rollo as the Chairman of the Company - see Glasgow Herald
6/10/65. 3
107.H.I.D*B/p.23-25 and H.I.D.B. 1970, Appendix III.
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Officer) on community development who began by looking at Raasay, Barra 
and the Uists. Earlier still the Board had had to grapple with the 
problems of Colonsay - which three senior staff members visited late in 
1966; their conclusions were that modest tourist developments offered the 
best hope.
Tourism might perhaps have helped Kassay's economy too but progress 
on that score has been subjected to the most extreme delays. The heart of 
the problem was the lack of a proper ferry service to the island. This 
question was first considered by the Inverness County Council as early as 
1965 and in response to a Parliamentary question by Russell Johnston in 
1966, George Willis (the Minister of State) announced that the Board would 
be looking into the possibilities of development. A Board team did not 
actually manage to get to Raasay until late 1967 and then,just as D.A.F.S., 
the County Council, H.I.D.B. and MacBraynes had come to an agreement about 
a ferry, the 1968 Transport Act intervened and the Council postponed a final 
decision until they could assess their other Island commitments. In October 
1969 the Board announced their intention of spending £110,000 on Raasay to 
develop tourism and fishing, but further action depended on the provision of 
an adequate transport service. And this never came: at first the extremely
high costs led to protracted discussionsbetween the County Council and the
S.D.D. as to how they should be divided;then, when the County County were 
ready to move, they ran into the obstacle of a local absentee landlord,
Dr. Green, who refused to sell them the land needed for a ferry terminal .
(on amenity grounds). The County Council are at present going ahead with 
compulsory purchase but this will inevitably mean more delays. The Board 
were not responsible for the transport problem as such but have been critic­
ised by Islanders and by Russell Johnston for neglecting to push ahead with
108any developments until a ferry service had been started. It might
108. Ihe whole story (up until Spring 1972) is to be found in the Glasgow 
Herald 14/3/72.
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also be said that in the multi-organisational situation of Highland
administration any hopes that H.I.D.B. would act as an overall coordinating
body have proved unrealistic.
Certain mainland areas also got special attention (though admittedly
such a description sounds ironic when applied to Raasay). In 1969 the
Board set up a working group with the local authorities and the Crofters
Commission to see what could be done to provide employment in the Kyle
area, threatened with the loss of the Stornoway ferry and its railway.
The following year a consultative group and a technical working party
were set up to produce a planning strategy for Torridon; the Board was
represented on both bodies.
The Board was empowered to give grants to projects ‘contributing to
the social, cultural or recreational development of the Hi^ilands and 
109Islands’ and it disbursed sums ranging from a little over £3,000 in 
1966 (when there were very few applications because not many groups realised 
they could apply for Board assistance), to £74,000 in 1968, for these
purposes. The sort of projects helped ranged from sea-angling festivals
to the activities of An Comunn Gaidhealach. The other action by the Board 
that might be classed under social development was the plan to assist 
communities 'that had poor television reception to receive piped television 
on a communal basis.
Transport and other Advisory Functions
So far we have been considering only those fields where the Board 
had executive responsibilities. But on top of this it had the duty to 
advise the Secretary of State on practically aH aspects of Highland affairs 
that may have some bearing on economic or social development. In practice
109. H.I.D.B. 1968, p.20.
110. H.I.D.B. 1966, p.11 and 1968, p.20.
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this has meant, above all, advice on transport policy - the Board took over
from the Highland Transport Board, wound up at the end of 1966, as the main
advisory body for this most sensitive of subjects. Grieve said in 1966
that the Highlands had a 'communications neurosis' and certainly a
persistant feeling of remoteness exacerbated by poor transport services,
has made communications a continuous source of grievance. The seamen's
strike in the summer of 1966 demonstrated the special problem of the
islands and one of the recommendations made by the Board in their report
on the strike was that freight and passenger charges should be held steady
over the next two years. The Secretary of State promised only to take the
Board's arguments "fully into account" if and when transport charges came 
112to be considered.
Following the report of the Highland Transport Board, published in May 
1967, H.I.D.B. took up a number of its proposals - such as charging sea 
freight at the same rate per mile as road freight and providing Islay and 
Jura with an 'overland' route to the mainland (i.e. a combination of improved 
roads and short ferry crossings) and continued to urge them on the
Government (with little effect). Transport to the South Argyllshire
islands again became controversial with the decision of a private company - 
Western Ferries - to introduce a vehicle ferry service there. The Board 
wished to give grant assistance to Western Ferries for piers etc. but 
the Secretary of State considered assistance from public funds unjustified. 
Western Ferries nevertheless went ahead. Of the other sea routes 
to the islands, H.I.D.B. accepted MacBrayne's case for a vehicle ferry
111. Glasgow Herald. 5/2/66.
112. H.I.D.B. 1966, p.37.
113. D.A.F.S., Highland Transport Services, (1967)* paras.4.109 & 6.25.
These were the most radical of the Transport Board's proposals; most of 
the others concerned more mundane things such as road improvements, the 
retention of the main Highland railways and increased use of vehicle ferries.
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between Ullapool and Stornoway to replace the old Mailaig-Kyle-Stomoway 
route, recommended improvements to the Kyle-Kyleakin ferry, recommenda­
tions that were promptly put into practice by the new Scottish Transport Group, 
and investigated the need for a new fast ferry between Caithness and Orkney.
In the period under consideration a Committee of Inquiry Chaired by 
Professor Edwards was considering British Air transport. The Board gave 
evidence to them, suggesting that the network of air services in the region 
should be further extended and that in order that losses should be less,B.E.A. 
should increase the sector lengths of the large aircraft and use small planes 
on other routes. The Edwards Committee accepted much of what the Board had 
to say. As part of the general scheme to bring more and more places
into the air network the army were persuaded to build airstrips in a number 
of places (particularly islands) under their O.P.M.A.C. scheme with the 
Board occasionally assisting in the cost of the materials when these proved 
too expensive for the local authorities. The Board*s whole conception of 
Inverness as the main air transport centre with feeder services coming to 
it from other parts of the region did not go unchallenged however - 
Zetland County Council considered that Shetland with its Aberdeen links 
did not really fit into such a regional scheme.
As for road transport, apart from submitting detailed proposals about 
the improvements they thought ; ■ should be included in the Government*s 
Roads Programme for the 1970*s, the Board was mainly concerned with working 
out the implications of 1968 Transport Act for the region. (important 
amendments to the original Bill had in fact been made after representations 
from the Board). Another extraneous change that affected Highland transport 
was the transformation of the Post Office into a public corporation.
Previously bus companies had often received mail contracts which helped
Office
maintain them even though it meant that the Post/was paying rather more than
114. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Civil Air Transport, Cmnd.4016, 
paras. 432, 753 and 786-9.
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if they used their own vehicles. The Board was anxious to make sure that 
in the event of the G.P.O. becoming more economy conscious, an arrangement 
would be made safeguarding bus services and in response to this the Post 
Office began investigations into the suitability of minibuses on certain 
postal routes. A number of these have since been introduced - but this 
takes us beyond 1970.
Finally, rail. An axe hung precariously over both the Fort William -
Mallaig and Dingwall -Kyle of Lochalsh lines throughout the period and in
1970 fell on the latter. The Board were left with the problem of what
advice to give the Secretary of State, and in 1971 grudgingly accepted
that there was "no compelling case for the permanent retention of the rail-
115way on strict economic grounds". They therefore recommended its
closure provided that adequate arrangements for alternative road transport 
were made. (However events have since moved on - see appendix). Mention 
might also be made of two other Board activities in the transport field Atsc 
the publication of regional transport guides for tourists and the setting up 
of a Transport Operators Group in 1967 to solve a number of problems of 
transport coordination.
Much of the other advice tendered by the Board was in fact the work
of the Consultative Council. For instance in their first year H.I.D.B.
were asked to submit their views to the Birsay Committee (dealing with
medical Services in the Highlands and Islands) and to Wheatley, and to
advise the Secretary of State on the application of the principal of
comprehensive education to the Highlands. In each case the Board sought
the advice of the Consultative Council and passed this on with their own
endorsement - which did not save them from beafcisgthe brunt of the
attack when these views were disliked, as was the report on secondary educa-
117tion by some of the Local Education Authorities. Later on it was
115. H.I.D.B. 1971, p.55-56.
116. H.I.D.B. 1966, p.45-46.
117. Inverness Courier. 10/3/67.
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evidence produced by the Council, or rather its education sub-cemmittee,
that was accepted by the Board for submission to the Alexander Committee
on Adult Education in Scotland. This reflects the fact that in matters
such as education the Board did not consider itself to have any particular
expertise, and concerning local government reform it had to be careful not
to offend the authorities it had to deal with. (it is interesting to see
the determination with which the Board representative avoided committing
themselves in their oral evidence to Wheatley). Only on matters they
considered to be directly in their own sphere of competence - for instance
the problems of small firms being investigated by the Bolton Committee -
would the Board give their views without reference to the Council. Finally,
though this really comes under the heading of vague considerations rather 
there
than * advice*,/was the Board' s interest in Inverness as a higher education 
centre. In their 1966 report they discussed the case for a Highland
118University but admitted that the time for pressing for one was not ripe - 
the 8th Scottish University having recently gone to Stirling. Instead 
they hoped a research institute might be set up; since then little 
further seems to have happened.
Summary of the Board's Activities
All the most salient of H.I.D.B.'s activities since its inception in 
November 1965 until the end of 1970 (and sometimes beyond) are described 
above. How can these activities be summarised, or perhaps categorised, 
to give a broader picture of the functions the Board has created for 
itself in its work for 'development'? Four functions seem to emerge 
as especially prominent. First the Board was a provider of cash, in 
the form of grants, loans or share capital* to any venture they considered
118. H.I.D.B. 1966, p.35.
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would boost the region's economy (as well as some reckoned to be socially
desirable). Secondly, it provided a centre of expertise and advice;
this covers a wide variety of activities - its management services, its
fishery training, its organisational skills (manifested for instance in
the setting up of the area tourist organisation) and its advice on transport
policy. Thirdly, it was a promoter of research, surveys and investigations,
that is it provided the information necessary for further development.
And fourthly it was a salesman of the Highlands - through its publicity
and promotional activities it attempted both to sell the region to the
outside world and to boost the confidence of those in it. Like all
categorisations this leaves things out of account, but it seems to draw
out the main points. To make them more prominent it might be worth saying
what the Board was not. It was not on the whole an extrepreneurial body;
of course it did have its own projects, notably the hotel scheme, Gaelfish
and the Bulb scheme, but in a sense they were exceptions (certainly the
Board would not be happy if its success were judged mainly by them), on the
whole projects 'at the Board's own hand' did not figure prominently.
Secondly it was not a greater owner or manager of property; the Act gives
it the power to hold land etc. etc. but by 1970 the Board's property in terms
119of land, buildings and equipment was only moderate. ' Thirdly it was not 
a central planning body, deciding the region!apriorities, setting targets 
and marshalling the other public bodies behind its goals. Of course, there 
are good reasons for all these negatives and we will return to them in 
chapter seven.
The
The Structure and Growth of/Board
What of the organisation that did (or did not do) all these various
119. For details of the Board's assets see Table XII.
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120things? The Board, it has been said,is one of its own greatest successes.
And, irony apart, in terms of employment provided there is something
in this. Table X shows the growth in numbers of staff over the five years
121and it can be seen that from having 42 employees by 31st December 1966
122its staff numbers increased to 180 by the end of 1970 - by no means huge
by the standards of government agencies but a fair employer of labour in a
small town like Inverness and the envy of the generally under-staffed County
Development Offices. The organisation of the Board*s staff evolved over
the years: the earliest divisions were concerned with administration and
grants and loans respectively. In the course of 1966 management services,
planning and research,projects, and information were added; and in the
following year land development, and transport and tourism divisions were
set up. In 1968 after the addition of a few new divisions and the splitting
up of the 1 catch all* headingsof grants and loans and projects the Board more
or less reached its mature structure of nine divisions: (i) administration;
(ii) administrative planning; (iii) agriculture and land use; (iv) Financial
and Management services; (v) fisheries; (vi) industrial promotion; (vii)
Information services; (viii) planning and research; (ix) transport and 
123tourism. There was no further change in 1969 but in 1970 the curiously
named administrative planning division was wound up and transport was
shifted from its association with tourism to being part of the industrial 
promotion division. The overwhelming majority of the Board*s staff were 
based in Inverness - though they often made forays into wilder parts - first 
at 6, Castle Wynd, then (but this was in 1971) into new leased accommodation 
at Bridge House. The only real exception to this was the small office opened 
in Lerwick in 1968.
120. Russell Johnston, M.P. in an interview.
121. H.I.D.B. 1966, Appendix I.
122. H.I.D.B. 1970, Appendix I.
123. H.I.D.B. 1968, Appendix I.
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Table X : Growth of H.I.D.B. Staff (all numbers as at 51st Dec.)
1966 >4967 1968 1969 1970
Senior Officials V8 8 20 21 21
Other executive staff J 29 51 58 71
Supporting staff • 24 47 76 85 88
Total 42 84 147 164 180
Source: H.I.D.B. reports 1966-70. Appendix I.
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In charge of this growing number of staff were the four full-time and 
two part-time Board members. The individuals concerned were named in the 
last chapter; their division of interests was as follows. Grieve as chairman 
kept an eye on everything. Rollo, the deputy Chairman, specialised throughout 
the period on industrial promotion. Initially the other aspects of the Board*s 
work were divided between Robertson - tourism, agriculture and forestry - and 
Smith - fishing, transport, power and liaison with the Consultative Council. 
However, in order to give more time for Robertson to concentrate on Moray Firth 
development (which would normally have been part of Rollofs work - but see next 
chapter) in mid-1966 agriculture and forestry were transferred to Smith whose 
responsibilities for power went to Rollo and for liaison with the Council to
1 0 A
Scholes. 4 Though the scope for action on the part of the part-time members 
is limited Scholes also took an interest in education, training and labour 
availability. With the resignation of Robertson, MacKay took over tourism and 
M.F.D. The sixth Board Member (part-time), successively Logan, Thomson and 
Fraser did not have any special duties though as will be seen (chapter 6)
Thomson took a close interest in M.F.D. Board members provided links with other 
bodies of which they were also members: Grieve was on the Scottish Economic
Planning Council, Rollo was chairman of the Highland Fund, Robertson and then 
MacKay were, as we have seen, on the old Scottish Tourist Board, MacHay went on 
to become a part-time member of the Statutory S.T.B. and was also on the Country­
side Commission after its formation. Fraser was chairman of the North of 
Scotland Hydro-Electric Boa±d and Scholes was on the Joint Committee of 
Industrial Training Boards for the Highlands and Islands and was also a member 
of the Scottish Economic Planning Committee.
The Board met regularly y once a fortnight plus on a few other occasions 
making an average of JC - 35 meetings per year (substantially more in 1967).
124. Minutes of an informal meeting of the Board on 17/9/66 (i.M. 7/66).
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Up until 1968 these meetings were in the presence of a Scottish Office
assessor (William Russell) whose job was to act as a sort of guide in
the administrative maze. The practice was discontinued however with
the mutual agreement of Board and Scottish Office, the latter*s position
being that once H.I.D.B. had some experience it was better to let them
work out their own policies without any possibly inhibiting influence
(not that Russell seems to have had that effect in practice). Another
temporary practice,used between 1967 and 1969 to clear the backlog of
applications for financial assistance, was the convening of a General
Purposes Committee of which all the Board were members. This practice
when it started was mistakenly believed by a number of outsiders to be an
125attempt by the Scottish Office to increase control.
The growth of the Board’s total expenditure up until 31st March 1971 
is given in Table XI. It can he seen that there was a steady increase 
up to 1969-70 when about £2-Jm. was being spent but in 1970-71 there was 
a levelling off. In every year the largest item of expenditure has been 
grants and loans. Over the whole 54 years the Board has spent a little 
over £10m. Table XII gives the growth of the Board*s assets which reach
a total of about £4m. in value at the end of 1970-71; the overwhelming
126
bulk of this (£2,877,552) was tied up in loans.
Consultative Council
Set up by the same Act as the Board in order to advise them *on the
127exercise and performance of their functions* was the Highlands and 
Islands Development Consultative Council. The Act established that the
125. For example, by Chris Baur in The Scotsman. 14/7/67.
126. H.I.D.B. 1971, Appendix III.
127. Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland) Act, 1965> Section 2(2).
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Table XI: Growth of H.I.D.B. Expenditure and Income
1965-661 
: C‘£*000)
1966-67
(£’000)
1967-68 
(£ *000)
1968-69
(£•000)
1969-70
(£•000)
1970-71
(£’000)
Admin. 41 140 211 550 424 588
Research & 
Publicity 5 27 104 211 230 417
Grants & 
Loans 59 584 1,140 1,603 1,663 1,203
Projects & 2 
Developments - 5 68 143 411 541
Total
Expenditure
105 756 1,523 2,507 2,728 2,749
Receipts'* — 6 94 279 496 700
Grant-in-
aid 106 790 1,400 2*025 2,300 2,000
1 - Not a full year - only November 1965 “ March 1966
2 - The schemes done at the Board*3 own hand
3 - e.g. Interest from loans
Source: "Administration of H.I.D.B.", Appendix II.
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Table XII: H.I.D.B.'s Assets and Investments
(as at 31st March of each year)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Fixed Assets 12 30 51 131 442 866
at cost(£,000)
Loans to Industry 60 566 1,379 2,237 _2*851 2,878
(£,000)
Investments (un- - - - , 3 98 141*
quoted} at cost 
(£,000)
Current Assets 4 49 34 40 134 120
(£ ,000)
Net Assets 76 645 1,464 2,411 3,525 4,005
(£,000)
♦Details of investments as at 31/3/71 as follows:
Ordinary Shares: Caithness Glass Ltd., Wick - 10,000 Shares £1 Value (fully paid)
Gateway West Argyll Ltd., Lochgilphead - 3,000 Shares £1 Value
(fully paid)
**Lennon & Kean Ltd., Glasgow - 15,000 Shares £1 Value (fully paid) 
Manor Hotel (Stornoway) Ltd., - 6,000 Shares £1 Value (fully paid) 
Shetland Hotels (Lerwick) Ltd. - 15,000 Shares £1 Value (fully paid) 
Scottish Sea Farms Ltd., Oban - 20,000 Shares £1 Value (fully paid)
Preference Shares: Highland Colliery Ltd., Brora - 20,000 Shares 25p Value (fully ■
paid)
Campbeltown Shipyard Ltd., Campbeltown - 29,000 Shares £1 Value
(fully paid)
Debentures: Cairngorm Sports Development Ltd., Inverness - £38,400 {ityo
Debentures 1981-86)
(** Company in liquidation)
Source: H.I.D.B. Reports 1966-71; Appendix III
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unpaid members of the Council would be appointed by the Secretary of State 
subject only to "appropriate representation" being given to the various 
parts of the region. The Council's only official, their secretary, was 
to be an employee of the Board and appointed by them. The membership of 
the Council, as appointed in 1966, shows clearly the extent to which it 
was the direct successor to the Highland and Islands Advisory Panel. Not 
only was the chairman of the two bodies, Lord Cameron, the same but practi­
cally half the Panel members of 1964» not including those who were to be
1 9ft
appointed to the Board (four people) became members of the new Council.
In total the Council contained some thirty members, a fair proportion of 
them from the Local Authorities, and it included one Board member - Prophet
Smith up until late 1966 and W. Scholes thereafter. The finance of
the Council (i.e. for allowances and expenses) comes through the Board's 
grant-in-aid and at no time from 1966-70 exceeded £2,000.
The Council as a whole tended to meet four times a year but most of its
detailed work was done in a variety of sub-committees, the three oldest of 
which dealt with roads, education and local government. Some of their work 
has already been mentioned: the Council provided the Board with evidence to
place before the Birsay and Wheatley Committees and it was responsible for 
considering how  ^ comprehensive pducatj-on should be applied in the region. 
Later they were to consider a variety of subjects from crofting tenure and 
industrial training to air services and the Transport Bill. Prom the be­
ginning the Council gave itself three main duties; (i) to provide a two way 
channel of communication between Board and publics,(ii) to initiate and offer
advice to the Board and (iii) to deal with requests from the Board for inform- 
150at ion. The third duty seems to have been performed well enough; it is
128. The list of Panel members is to be found in their report Land Use in the 
Highlands and Islands (1964); Council members are from H.I.D.B. 1966, Appendix 
VIII.
129. H.I.D.B. 1966, Appendix VIII.
130. Ibid.
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impossible to say much about the first; but the second duty was in many 
ways a dead letter. It is impossible to find any Board policy that 
originated from, or was substantially changed by Council advice. This 
does not mean that they were completely uncritical of the Board - they 
responded even if they did not initiate. The sorts of criticism made 
reflected those made in the Highlands at large (which are considered in 
more detail in chapter 7)> e.g. concern about a *linear city* round the 
Moray Firth and demands that more be done for the crofting areas. There 
were also some niggling personality difficulties - not all of the Council 
had the highest regard for the abilities of some Board members. Neverthe­
less, the Board on the whole were happy enough with the Council, particularly, 
according to Grieve, in the latter part of the period when the two bodies 
came to understand one another better and the Council were able to make 
useful constructive comments on Board policies.
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Chapter 6: Moray Firth Development
The Origins and Early Stages of the Policy
The most radical and adventurous (or to its opponents, grandiose 
and ’crackpot1) of H.I.D.B. policies was Moray Firth Development (M.F.D.): 
the concentration of a substantial urban population, working mainly in 
technologically advanced manufacturing industries, on the flat lands 
fringing the Moray, Cromarty and Beauly Firths between Tain and Nairn. ^
The Board have been anxious to emphasise that this was only one element 
in their strategy, that it has been balanced by other developments else­
where but this does not detract from its central role in their plans for 
the regeneration of the Highland economy.
The area was first recognised as a serious candidate for manufacturing 
industry shortly after the Second World War when the possibility of a New 
Town there was mooted. Robert Grieve, then the Scottish Office’s Regional 
Planning Officer for the Highlands and Islands, prepared an initial study 
and the Secretary of State went as far as to make a premature announcement.
The result was merely to embarrass the New Town people in the Scottish
2
Office who were unenthusiastic about the idea, and it was dropped.
Official recognition of the advantages of the Moray Firth area did come 
in 1949 however when it was made a development area "because of its 
suitability as a focal centre of industrial development for the Highlands 
as a whole and not merely because of its local unemployment." Already
1. Occasionally described as Domoch-Ardesi9££‘ the precise outer limits 
were not of practical importance.
2. This story was obtained in an interview with Professor Grieve; much of 
the subsequent information in this chapter that is not attributed to published 
sources comes from interviews with the main actors.
3. "A Programme of Highland Development", Cmd*. 7976, p.20. Bie 1950 White 
Paper is in fact quoting an earlier one in which the Inverness-Tain Development 
Area was first announced.
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its potential as a growth cent*** had been perceived. Things remained very 
much at the ’potential* stage for a decade and a half when the theme was 
again returned to by the 1965-70 plan for the Scottish Economy which es­
tablished the 'Invergordon/Evanton/Dingwall/lnvemess area as by far the 
largest of those areas in the Highland region with a ’potential for con­
solidation'. ^ The reasons why it should have been so selected are set 
out clearly in the Board’s first report: it contained a sheltered deep
water harbour with flat land adjacent to it (this refers particularly to 
the Invergordon area of the Cromarty Firth which of course had for a long 
time been a Naval base) and it also had ample supplies of fresh water and 
a good climate. To this might be added the fact that it already had a 
higher concentration of population and hence a bigger labour pool than any­
where else in the Highlands. Later on, in the 1968 public enquiry (see 
below p.46) Ross and Cromarty County Council were to claim the "existing 
communications by rail and road" were an advantage,  ^but this was only 
relative to other parts of the region.
Through his considerable experience as a planner in the Scottish Office 
Professor Grieve was well aware of these advantages and he came to the job
of Chairman of H.I.D.B. determined that they should not be ignored. He
7
was deeply impressed with the idea, or vision, that only by bringing in
4. "The Scottish Economy 1965 to 1970", Cmnd. 2864» p.150. The commitment to 
the development of the Moray Firth expressed in this white paper was only of the 
most vague and long-term sort.
5. H.I.D.B. First Report. 1966; p.17.
6. Report of the Public Inquiry concerning Amendment? No. 5 to the Ross and
Cromarty County Development PJLan, (May 1968); p. 7*
7. Grieve has been called a visionary by both supporters and critics and this 
aspect of his character is brought out by an article in the Scotsman of
27th September, 1965*
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"major manufacturing urban complexes** to the Highlands and "getting the
0
centre of gravity up Britain" could the area really be revived. And of
all the areas of the Highlands that might be major growth points the Moray
9
Firth was "unquestionably the most important". The payoffs from such a
concentrated development were hopefully to be many and varied: it would 
provide a degree of balance to the Highland economy which was seriously 
deficient in manufacturing industry; it would establish "a major centre of 
modem job opportunity" for those in the Highlands, especially the "clever 
boy" with a technical bent who was otherwise almost bound to leave the region; 
the increase in population would lead to the creation of a centre which could 
offer "a full range of modem commercial, social, cultural and other activi­
ties"; there would be a sizeable "home market" for the region’s traditional 
products, such as food, which would be freed from the tyranny of long lines 
of communication; and the increased bulk of freight and greater numbers of 
people would justify "major improvements in communications between the 
Highlands and the South". There would be less tangible benefits too: 
the area would become a breeding ground for new skills and initiative which 
would "broaden the range of social and cultural leadership" and all this 
would in turn bring confidence - the quality that the Highlands had hitherto 
most notably lacked. Finally it would "assist in the improvement of the 
U.K.’s balance of payments"; but this perhaps was a rhetorical flourish, 
there is no reason to suppose that industry on the Moray Firth would export 
more than if it had been situated elsewhere. ^
Though most of the other Board members had probably not such a detailed
8. The Scotsman 20/1/66 (an article by Grieve).
9. H.I.D.B. First Report. 1966; p.17.
10. The description of the possible benefits of M.F.D. comes from H.I.D.B. 
1966; p.4 & 16 - 17 and The Scotsman 20/1/66.
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vision of what developing the Moray Firth might bring they were neverthe­
less highly receptive to the idea and were easily convinced of its 
importance. This was particularly true of John Robertson who became 
one of the most enthusiastic partisans of M.F.D. The notable exception 
was the Deputy Chairman, John Rollo. He too had a vision of the Highland 
future - a vision that typified a distinctive aoproach to Highland develop­
ment and one held by many other people. It was a very different approach 
from Grieve*sj instead of integrating the Highlands with the national 
economy it wanted the region*s distinct ways to be preserved; instead of 
utilising the natural resources of the east it wanted effort to be concen­
trated on the decaying West; instead of large urban complexes it wanted 
the traditional township revived. The vision was of the crofting popula­
tion living in the places and in the ways they had traditionall^ilitfednin, 
except that their decayed agriculture was to be given new life and they 
were to have the opportunity to supplement their incomes by a revival of 
fishing and part-time work in small manufacturing enterprises such as 
those Rollo himself had started in several places. According to this 
view the Board should be assisting with land reclamation, aiding crofting 
agriculture and fishing and persuading small businessmen to set up factor­
ies in the townships of the West and Islands. M.F.D. was objectionable 
not just because it used up the Board*s money and energy on an area that 
could be left to develop itself, but also because if the policy succeeded, 
a large urban area would be created around the Moray Firth and would act 
as a magnet drawing people from the remoter areas and completing their 
depopulation. Against this the remainder of the Board took the view that 
development of the Moray Firth would not increase migration from the re­
mote areas, it would merely give their inhabitants the opportunity to 
stay within the Highland region rather than going to Clydeside or beyond.
But there was no combining the two visions and though he did not formally
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commit himself to opposition at Board meetings, Rollo's antipathy to 
M.F.D. was well known and continued throughout his period as Deputy 
Chairman. It was for this reason that in mid-1966 special responsibility 
for M.F.D. was given to Robertson - a duty that would otherwise have fallen 
to Rollo as the Board's .'industrial promotion' man.
The Board had already set its sights on M.F.D. before Frank Thomson 
became a member, but he too was a strong supporter of the idea. In August 
1964 he had been active in forming Polyscot Ltd. from which sprang a number 
of other firms concerned with a variety of things from farm supplies to 
property in the Moray Firth area. (One of these, Polyscot Polysaat Ltd., 
applied for financial assistance from the Board soon after the Batter's 
formation and received a £23,500 loan and a £1,500 grant‘d). On an al­
together vaster scale Thomson had become anxious to try and bring a large 
petro-chmmiaal complex to Invergordon. This idea had originated while he 
was managing director of the distillery at Invergordon and had been consider­
ing uses for its by-products, which he commissioned a firm of chemical
12consultants to investigate. Even before their report came out m
October I965, however, the story that an American Company was interested 
in starting a petro-chemical complex at Invergohdon had found its way into 
the press ^  and as a "friendly gesture" an I.C.I. representative had had 
a meeting with Thomson and the Chairman of the distillery company (Max 
Rayne) to give them I.C.I.'s assessment of the situation. ^  Following 
this, Rayne forbad the use of distillery funds for any further exploration 
of the idea? but Thomson remained enthusiastic about Its prospects. In
11. The Scotsman 17/3/67;"The Business World of Frank Thomson" by M. 
Magnusson and D. Kemp.
12. The Times. 14/4/67? "International Intrigue Grips the Highlands (& 
Islands)". See also the Sunday Times. 19/3/67; "How the Highland Board was 
Railroaded" which suggests the other directors of the distillery were unhappy 
about Thomson's actions.
15. e.g. Glasgow Herald. 30/8/65.
14. Pie Times, 14/4/67.
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November 196 5 a company called Invergordon Chemical Enterprises was regist­
ered and he was later listed as one of the two directors. When the Board 
was formed he immediately contacted them and got them interested in the 
possibility of a petro-chemical complex - as early as the S.T.B.C. Highland
Conference in February 1966 Grieve mentioned the possibility of a ”£30m”
15complex.  ^ The Company considering this development was the Occidental
Petroleum Corporation of California, Invergordon Chemical Enterprises being
the legal shell which, presumably, they were to use if their plans for the
Cromarty Firth materialised. By the time he was appointed to the Board in
March 1966 Thomson’s commitment to petro-chemical complexes was common
knowledge and was mentioned in the press. ^  Surprisingly, considering the
cries of outrage that were to occur a year later, no one seems to have
thought it worth mentioning the possible clash between private interests
and public duties.
The Board*s first major action over M.F.D. came in April 1966 when
it commissioned Product Planning (Proplan) Ltd.to do a ’Moray Firth
17Industrial Credibility Study* in order to decide on the feasibility of 
bringing any industry - not just petro-chemical complexes - into the area 
on the basis of an estimated population of million. Meanwhile the Board’s 
ideas on M.F.D. began to be aired in public: in a speech to the Scottish
Woodland Owners Association Grieve talked of the possibility of a large new
18linear city of million round the Moray Firth. This turned out to be a
most unfortunate diplomatic blunder for whatever the unemployed or otherwise
deprived sections of the population may have thought of it, a good many of
19the more prosperous people reacted with *gloom and horror* at the idea
15. Inverness Courier. 1/3/66.
16. e.g. Scottish Daily Erpress. 8/3/66.
17. H.I.D.B., 1966, p.43.
18. The Scotsman. 22/4/66.
19. Inverness Courier, 22/4/66.
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of good farm land being buried in concrete - an image that was to persist -
the amenity of the area destroyed and its way of life radically altered.
In the event the Product Planning report suggested that 250,000 was more
realistic than 500,000 as a population target and this figure - a 3 to 4
fold increase in the existing population - hardly required the creation
of a new Glasgow, The report came out in August 1966 and also suggested
20the bait of cheap electricity to attract firms. It had the effectt
says the first Annual Report of H.I.D.B., of confirming the Board in their
thinking "that major growth was not only credible but should be pursued as a
21key element’; in our longer term strategy".
After this the pace increased. Proplan were commissioned to do a 
number of anciliary studies in the Autumn of 1966, and later, in the first 
few months of 1967* a crop of studies (by other teams) concerning
M.F.D. were also commissioned, among them one by Merz&; McLellan on the 
generation of cheap electricity and the Jack Holmes Planning Group’s huge
22study of physical planning and infrastructure in the Moray Firth region.
At the same time detailed negotiations with Occidental Petroleum began and 
contacts with other potential developers increased. A meeting between the 
Board and Occidental occured on 11th October in London where it was decided, 
among other things, that both parties would commit themselves to prosecute 
the project vigorously, the Board dealing with the governmental side of things - 
investment grants, infrastructure, part facilities etc. - while Occidental
considered the economic feasibility of apreAtoo-chemical complex. Thomson
take of 2 3
was to nnflrr /runnmrtipra trtWr /;he activities of the two bodies.
Another meeting, this time in the U.S. early in December 1966,, brought
20. Minutes of the 17th Plenary Meeting of H.I.D.B., 18/8/66.
21. H.I.D.B., 1966, p.16.
22. H.I.D.B., 1967* Appendix VIII.
23. Board Minutes, N.V. 255/66.
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the project to the stage where it was sufficiently concrete for a formal pro­
posal to be put to the Secretary of State. Such a proposal was made on
p  i
28/12/66. It started with a general statement of the case for M.F.D.
and asked for permission 'to initiate the necessary studies and consultations'
for any projects which might materialise. Specifically it described
'8 decision to commission a $300,000 feasibility study by K.W.
Kellog & Co. starting in January 1967 and to be completed by the end of March.
On the basis of this,Occidental were to say definitely by June, whether they
wished to proceed on the understanding that their conmitment depends upon
the approval of the British Government being obtained by the end of the year.
In the event of general agreement Invergordon Chemical Enterprises was to
be the vehicle for the Complex, and, in addition to Government grants,the
capital was to be provided half by U.S. sources and half by Scottish. The
Board also pressed (although at this stage it was not a formal proposal) for
cheap electric power at £d. per unit to be offered to industries coming to
the area. This did not affect the petro-chemical complex, a relatively
small user of power, but would it was hoped, attract other industries - like
aluminium producers. ^
The Secretary of State's approval of the proposal had been given by
early 1967 by which time the Board had already set up a 'special team'
26(led by Robertson) to pursue the development of the Moray Firth. Official
public announcement of the scheme came on 18th January when Robertson told 
Ross and Cromarty County Council, who gave approval in principle, of the 
possible developments. But by that time rumours had been floating round for
24. H.I.D.B.1966, p.44.
25. Proposal to the Secretary of State concerning Moray Firth Development 
(Unpublished).
26. H.I.D.B. 1966, p.18.
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a long while and the Scottish Daily Express of 27th December had announced
27a Hop secret1 plan to create *jobs for hundreds*. The article also
reported concern among local farmers about the possible use of arable land 
for industry. It was an early indication of a source of opposition that 
was to persist throughout the subsequent years. The land to be used for 
any industrial development near Invergordon was recognised by the Board as 
being a likely cause of anxiety among farmers and early in January Robertson 
had told the Executive Committee of the Easter Ross branch of the N.F.U. about
the proposals to establish a petro-chemical complex and about the provisional
28choice of the farm of Inverbreakie as its site. As a result of this
meeting the Easter Ross Land Use Committee (E.R.L.U.C.) was formed as a 
sub-committee of the Easter Ross Branch of the N.F.U. E.R.L.U.C. consisted 
of all those farmers in the Invergordon area who might be affected by indus­
trial development and was under the Chairmanship of Reay Clarke, a past 
President of the Easter Ross N.F.U. who, though he lived in a different part 
of the area, had a long-standing interest in Land Use questions (He was a
member of the Committee of the Highland Panel who had produced its Land Use
29report) - a total of 12 people altogether. The farmers*declared position
was that while they welcomed industry they did not want it sited on good 
arable land; ^  unfortunately Inverbreakie was first class arable land.
,fThe Thomson Affair*1 and its Aftermath
The loss of good farming land to industry was not the only source of 
concern over the Board*s burgeoning policies for the Moray Firth; there was
27. Express. 27/12/66.
28. 1968, Public Etoquiry, p.6.
29. Ibid.
30. Inverness Courier 20/1/67.
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also increasing curiousity about the position of Frank Thomson. Interest 
in this topic sprang primarily from Phil Durham, himself an Easter Ross 
farmer and a part-time employee of the Board since its inception. He had 
been secretary of the Vigilantes group when Thomson had been the Chairman, 
and in those days the two men had been friendly. Since then however 
Durham had become deeply suspicious of Thomson's motives and had systemati­
cally begun to take confidential H.I.D.B. documents from the office whenever 
he thought they proved that Thomson was putting himself in an invidious 
position. ^  Discussing the situation with a friend, Ian Grimble (the 
historian), at that time Chairman of the Caithness and Sutherland con-: 
stituency Labour Party, he was persuaded to write a memorandum on the subject 
of Thomson's business interests which Grimble showed to Robert Maclennan, (the
newly elected Labour M.P. for Caithness and Sutherland) who in turn contacted
52George Willis at the Scottish Office in late November. Although Durham
55was at this time concerned about the petro-chemical complex, ' many of the 
documents that were to form the basis of his later explosive memorandum were 
not then available, and it appears that the main issue Maclennan raised with 
Willis concerned H.I.D.B. loans to companies Thomson had an interest in. The 
M.P. was given an assurance that the official regulations for dealing with
such cases had been rigidly adhered to.
Durham was not satisfied and as the Board's involvement with a possible 
petro-chemical complex increased rapidly during December and January he con­
tinued to steal Board documents. By 20th January he had built up a fair 
collection and prepared a second memorandum on Thomson's business interests, 
this time putting most stress on Invergordon Chemical Enterprises. The 
memorandum reached the Scottish Office (where Dickson Mabon had now replaced 
Willis) by the same route as before, and Durham
51. This story occurs in a number of newspapers in the course of March/April
1967 and it is confirmed by Durham himself.
32. Letter from Durham to Franks Committee (investigating Official Secrets 
Act), 15/6/71.
33. Ibid.
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received a reply to the effect that they were looking into it hut would need
'more time1. As this second document had been accompanied by an 'Ultimatum'
that unless the Government took action within a fortnight the matter would be
34raised in public, Durham considered that he must make good the threat.
In early February he contacted The Times and sent them his information but
they decided not to use it until they had seen a Board member. John Robertson
duly visited their offices on 22nd February and managed to convince them that
there were no unsavoury occurances concerning the petro-chemical complex. As
a result The Times withdrew their offer to Durham to submit an article based
on his memorandum and instead produced their own, on 25th February, which,if *
not completely uncritical of the Board, was basically friendly and declared
33that they saw nothing 'dubious' aibout Thomson's financial interests.
It is still a matter of controversy whether The Times told the Board that
Durham was the source of the leaks: Durham himself declares flatly that they
did (having been assured of this by other journalists), Robertson states equally
categorically that they did not - that Durham was discovered simply through
the Board's own investigation, as they had been worried for a number of weeks
about the loss of confidential information from their office. Whatever the
truth of the matter, Durham was dismissed on 24th February, the official reason
at this time being that the Board were dispensing with all temporary staff due
36to pressure on office space; but a week later he was sent another letter 
from the Board, at the request of The Timea to the effect that he was sacked 
because of evidence 'from within the Board* that he had been taking confidential 
documents. ^  Outraged by the actions of The Times. Grimble took Durham's 
case to the Sunday Express and in his "Current Events" column of 5'th March
34. Ibid.
35. The Times 25/2/67.
36. The Times 3/3/67
37. Scottish Sunday Erpress 5/3/67.
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John Gordon described Durham’s dismissal, sympathetically portraying him 
as a man concerned about the misuse of public money and using the only 
recourse open to him. What, asked Gordon, are the Board*s motives in trying
to conceal what is going on? It was a question that was to precipate a
20
vigorous press campaign that, in the eyes of many involved at the time,
came close to destroying the Board.
The dpprobrium that was to be heaped on the Board during March had
certain minor precursors during the previous month. It is not possible,
and perhaps is not true, to say that the Board was unpopular in some general
way during the early part of 1967» but there was a larger volume of sniping
from various quarters directed against it than at any other time. Some of
this was concerned with the petro-chemical complex; the fear of the farmers
for their land has already been mentioned; even in December 1966 they were
39expressing worry about compulsory purchase and by February John Kerr in 
the Glasgow Herald was writing luridly of * super-nationalisation* and 
* mini-clearances*. ^  In some quarters there was a distaste for industry 
as sucfe ^  (but in fact very few people seemed willing to attack industrial­
isation in general),in others the dislike was directed at ’foreign trade
competitors*. ^  Even before Durham’s memorandum became public there were
those who strongly disliked Thomson and suspected him of using the Board for
43his own purposes. Above all there was a common feeling that the Board
38. Including Grieve himself.
39. The Scotsman 23/12/66.
40. Glasgow Herald 27/2/66.
41. Inverness Courier 27/1/67.
42. The Scotsman 28/1/67 (letter)
43* Inverness Courier 3/3/67.
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was obssessed with 'secretiveness*. ^  This was partly due, as the Board
pointed out, to the fact that they were dealing with private concerns and
must respect confidences ^  but, as Grieve has since admitted, ^  the feeling
of being surrounded by enemies at this time might have led them to 'clam up'
more than necessary. On top of this there was a certain amount of sheer
misinformation. There seems to have been a fairly common feeling that the
Board themselves were in a position to decide to give Occidental millions of
47pounds in grants. More specifically, doubt was cast on the project when
the Sunday Times reported that Occidental would not be contributing the bulk
of the £50m. required and Thomson had to repeat carefully that a lot of the
finance (about 40%) would have to come from the Government while the remainder
would be £ from Scotland and £ from the U.S. ^  Even more ludicrous was the
result of the description, in an otherwise friendly article in The Scotsman.
of Occidental's $85 million "debt" (i.e. debenture capital) as an "overdraft". ^
Presumably the financially sophisticed Iweye not fooled but it caused a certain
51amount of confusion in the Highlands. But silliest of all was the way that
the £50m. cost of the project would suddenly, and for no apparent reason,
52
expand to £150m. in the minds of those criticising it.
Quite seperate from the petro-chemical complex were a number of other 
criticisms of the Board, some of them merely niggles that might ordinarily 
have been quickly forgotten about but which in the context helped to add to the
44. See for instance, Jean Forsythe's letter to The Scotsman on 28/1/67* 
(mentioned above), Glasgow Herald, 27/2/67 and the Scottish Sunday Express. 5/3/67*
45. Glasgow Herald 4/3/67 (article by J. Grassie - Board's Information Officer); 
Express. 6/5/67.
46. In an interview.
47. see Scottish Sunday Express 19/3/67.
48. Sunday Times 21/1/67.
49. Glasgow Herald. 23/1/67.
50. The Scotsman. 22/2/67.
51. Including the Inverness Courier, see Leader of 28/2/67.
P.T.O.
S2. See for instance John Gordon in the Scottish Sunday Express of 5 
Lovat sneaking to Inverness County Council (reported in The Scotsman, 10/3/*h 
and the Sunday Times 19/3/67 where the headline talks of £150m. but the 
of the article brings the firure ba.ck to £50rn’
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general tension. There was for instance Lord Lovat*s plan for reclaiming
the land from the Beauly Firth which he and other members of Inverness County
53Council angrily accused the Board of refusing to look into. There wan
the Board’s grant to the Loch Ness Monster Investigation Bureau which seems
54to have brought down general scorn upon their heads. There was, more
seriously, the estrangement of the local press, notably the Inverness Courier.
The Courier, an individualistic (even eccentric) paper, had never supported
the Board wholeheartedly, but until 1967 it never been unfriendly to it
either; however, on 27th January a leader sarcastically referred to the Board's
"genius for developing itself, its staff, its claims, its ambitions, its
55pronouncements and even its accommodation at a surprising rate"  ^and in the
next issue, with considerable fury if little wit, described them as 'the
High-hand Board' which had got 'too big for its boots' and wouldn't 'heed
56Highlanders own ideas about development'. The immediate cause of this
outburst was the Courier's belief that the Board had a casual and arrogant
attitude to the local press and always arranged their press announcements in
57a way that made it impossible for local papers to publish the story first.
Added together, all these criticisms amounted to a situation in which, 
if the Courier's claim on 17th February that the Board "seems to be able to do 
nothing right in the eyes of local people" is exaggerated, nevertheless 
their popularity was at a low ebb.
This was the situation when John Gordon produced his short piece on 
Durham's dismissal. The Board immediately called a press conference, thus
53. Inverness Courier 24/2/67 and Glasgow Herald 10/3/67.
54* Inverness Courier. 17/2/67.
55. Inverness Courier. 2j/l/6rf.
36. Inverness Courier. 31/1/67*
57. The paper had made a similar, though less emphasised, accusation on 22/11/66.
58. Inverness Courier 17/2/67.
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ensuring that the incident did not go un-noticed, and the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board next day reached the headlines of the popular papers, 
a position they were to keep on and off for the next three weeks. At first 
little information came out, Durham's memorandum seemed forgotten about and 
Durham himself refused to say anything except that he believed people have a 
democratic right to a say in their own future. The Board claimed that they 
did not wish to be secretive but had to protect confidences; they also con-
59sidered the possibility of prosecuting Durham under the Official Secrets Act.
In the event this possibility was dropped but the threat probably lost the
Board some sympathy in the press.
The meeting of Inverness County Council that week brought some extreme,
and in places almost hysterical, criticism of the Board, as well as strong
attacks on the petro-chemical complex, ^  but by the end of the week relative
calm returned. Thomson (who in fact had only been obliquely mentioned in
the press^) claimed to have "stepped out" of any situation in which he
could be accused of having "a pecuniary interest in the Invergordon situation".
Dickson Mabon having seen the Board stated that all members had correctly
63declared their interest whenever grants and loans had been concerned and 
after talking to both Durham and Mabon, Alaisdair MacKenzie the Liberal M.P.
64
for Ross and Cromarty declared that he considered the matter now closed.
Unfortunately for the Board MacKenzie was quite wrong and things had 
only just started. The next turn of the screw was again provided by John 
Gordon, on 12th March. In his Sunday Express column he insisted that all 
financial aid to companies in which any Board members had interests should
59. The Times. Glasgow Herald et. al. 6/3/67*
60. The Scotsman. 10/3/67*
61. Express. 7/3/67*
62. Express. 11/3/67*
63. Glasgow Herald, II/3/67.
Glasgow Herald. 13/3/67*
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be made public and, in connection with the petro-chemical complex, he asked 
if Thomson's inside knowledge would not give him a considerable advantage 
over his potential business rivals. The tone of the article was in fact 
quite moderate and in other circumstances might have produced nothing more 
than an unexciting reply from the Board or the Scottish Office politicians.
But somehow the atmosphere of deep suspicion and hostility, of widespread 
belief in plots, counter-plots and secret agreements rendered moderate de­
bate impossible. It is difficult to understand now how such an emotional
6Ssituation could have been generated, yet it undoubtedly existed, J and it 
had the affect of making the H.I.D.B. side (for want of a better label) less 
open than they might have been and prevented their critics from being able 
to accept a simple answer when it was given.
Throughout the following week the rumours intensified. In the Commons 
Gordon Campbell put down a written question asking for details of all business­
es, in which Board members had interests, that had received H.I.D.B. loans. 
Replying, Ross would say no more than that the total amount of assistance 
where interests were involved was £58*187 and had gone to four projects.
He would, he said, give details if the businesses concerned agreed. It 
was an answer that satisfied nobody and it remains uncertain whether this re­
ticence was the result of requests by the members chiefly concerned (above all 
Prank Thomson) or whether it was Ross's (and/or the Scottish Office's) own 
choice - on the principle of the less said, the soonest mended. The latter 
explanation was given forcefully much later by Thomson himself when he 
complained bitterly of not being allowed to speak out by Ross. ^
By the end of the week events had come to a head as a result of two
65. Most of the participants at the time made the point in interviews and it 
can be seen in the tone of articles in the press.
66. The Scotsman. 28/12/67.
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things: the announcement of a declaration of support for Durham by another
H.I.D.B. staff member who had resigned earlier and the dissemination, by a
process no-one seems to understand properly, of Durham*s memorandum to all
interested journalists and others. The first point in fact illustrates
nothing as much as the disappearance of good sense; althou^i the * revelations*
extensively
of Anthony Miller, the staff member concerned, were o ' .  / ~  ~ a l y  reported and
67even given headlines in the Express (which was beginning to emerge as the 
chief Board-basher) they amounted to virtually nothing. To begin with, 
despite the impression given that his resignation was somehow connected with 
the Durham*s, it had in fact taken place on 8th February, long before the 
affair had started. Secondly he added nothing whatever to the facts of the 
case and merely said that Durham was an * honourable man* who wouldn*t twist 
the facts for his own end. ^  The only two points of interest he did bring
up were that he thought himself suspected of being the source of leaks at the
69time of his resignation, ' and that he disliked the ‘factions playing a
. reference
power game' dn the Board. (Presumably a : j__ ; to the split between Rollo
and the rest of the Board over the whole M.F.D. issue).
Much more important was the publication of much of the substance of 
Durham's memorandum in three newspaper articles; two serious ones, one in 
The Scotsman of 17/3/67 by Magnus Magnusson and David Kemp, the other in the 
Sunday Times of 19/3/67 by their Insight team (this was the subject of a 
libel action by Thomson both of which also contained background information 
on Thomson's business career; and a masterpiece of tendentiousness by Charles 
Graham in the Express of 18/3/67. The memorandum itself is hardly written in
67. Express. 17/3/67.
68. All this emerges from a careful reading of the Express article itself.
69. A point confirmed by Grieve and Robertson.
70. Which has since been allowed to lapse.
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a neutral or impartial style and makes a wide variety of charges against 
Thomson, some of which really seem of little significance (for instance it is 
claimed that he tried to get himself on the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric 
Board). The serious charges fall into 3 groups: (i) preferential treat­
ment shown by the Board to Thomson*s Companies; (ii) the Board's involvement
• j.1. T ,Enterprises ,. N
with Invergordon Chemical ’ / --i-'*; (n) Thomson's ownership of land that
71might be needed for industry. Dealing with the Companies first, it has
already been mentioned that Polyi-scot applied for financial assistance shortly
before Thomson became a Board member and, soon afterwards, received a grant of
£1,500 and a loan of £23,500. As the proper procedure for dealing with cases 
where Board members have interests was gone through and as, back in November 
1966, the Minister of State had assured Robert Maciennan that the Government 
were convinced that everything had been above board it is difficult to see 
why this should still have been an issue in March 1967. The memorandum 
stresses the financial weakness of Polyscot, but why else would a loan have been 
needed? The Scottish Daily Express, though’ Lnot the memorandum, also made a
72fuss about the grant having been paid for a building that was already completed! 
As grant* applications take some time to be decided upon this is hardly an 
unusual situation. Another Company, Ross-shire Engineering (Dingwall) Ltd., 
which had already received a loan of £20,000 from the B.O.T. and had since 
become a Polyscot Subsidiary also applied for Board assistance. The signifi­
cant fact in this case however is that it did not get it. Yet another of the 
Polyscot group, Timber Systems Ltd. was paid £300 to make draft plans and 
sketch elevations on which an approximate quotation for building the Board's 
new hotels in the Western Isles could be based. The implication seems to
71. This, and the following details are taken directly from Durham's 
memorandum which together with most of the 'supporting documents' (i.e. the 
documents he stole from the Board) he showed me.
72. Express. 21/3/67*
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have been that tnoe other company was offered this job, but one of the documents 
used by Durham to support his memorandum make it clear that Timber Systems was
only one of the firms7i&ich the Board had been in touch. ^  A further charge,
7 A
not made in the memorandum but brought up in Parliament was that the Board
brought all its business to a travel agency owned by Thomson. The full story
was that the Board had from the beginning used the firm of Duncan Duffy in
Inverness as its travel agents and this firm had later been taken over by a
75trust controlled by Mrs. Thomson. J Finally there was a hotel bill for
£21. 12s which the memorandum claimed had been run up by Thomson but paid for
by the Board. Though not all that much was made of it in the press this
76charge particularly outraged Ross and Grieve who flatly denied it.
Leaving aside for a moment the question of Invergordon Chemical Enterprises,
- the land
the third set of charges against Thomson concerned his ownership of land/in 
question being Kincraig farm. This farm had been bought originally by a 
consortium of eight local farmers (including three later on the Easter Ross 
Land Use Committee) and they had allowed Thomson to join the Consortium in 
late 1965* Part of his interest was in Kincraig House which stood on the 
land, and became the headquarters of Polyscot. However by late 1966 Thomson 
was finding his position in the Kincraig Consortium increasingly embarrassing, 
he had been accused of land speculation and was anxious to extract himself 
from a position that might be awkward for both him and the Board. Unfortunate­
ly for him the other owners of the land were unwilling to let him out for 
financial reasons (he had earlier agreed to buy Kincraig House and the farmers 
were relying on this) so that by March 1967 k® was s'tiH °n "^e Consortium.
As he had bought his share of the Kincraig before becoming a Board member and
73* Secretariat Paper No. 170.
74. H.C. Deb, Vol. 743t cols.1927.
75. Ross in H.C. Deb, Vol.74% col. 1927.
76. Inverness Courier. 24/3/67.
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as his attempts to get out of the Consortium towards the end of 1966 were 
quite genuine (Durham's memorandum, hardly biased in Thomson*s favour, makes 
this clear) his conduct was not particularly disreputable. However, by 
claiming on 10th March that he had 'stepped out1 of any situation in which he 
could be accused of having a pecuniary interest in the petro-chemical complex 
although he was still in the Kincraig Consortium he left himself open to 
attack. According to the Sunday Times (this point is not in the memorandum) 
he left himself open to attack on another score as wells in a sort of pro­
motional report concerning the petro-chemical complex he claimed to have an
option on a 1,200 acre site near Invergordon but all the owners of the land
77shown on the accompanying plan denied giving him such an option. ' This point 
is not very relevant to Thomson's position as a Board member but it helped to 
cast general suspicion on him.
Enterprises
Finally there was Invergordon Chemical . / 3 and Thomson's role in
setting up a petro-chemical complex. When Thomson became a member of the
78Board and ceased to be managing director of Invergordon Distillers (the 
two things happening quite close together) he brought with him the study he 
had previously commissioned on the feasability of a petro-chemical complex. 
Invergordon Distillers later complained to the Board that they were in 
possession of the Company's private property, and the Board hurriedly returned 
the study. This was perhaps the most serious personal crime that can be 
definitely laid at Thomson's door. The main drift of the argument in 
Durham's memorandum however developed a much more serious lines namely that 
the Board were spending, or committing the Government to spend large sums of 
money to make Invergordon Chemical Enterprises a going concern and that this 
would directly benefit Frank Thomson. It is true that Invergordon Chemical
77. Sunday Times. 19/3/67*
78. Durham claimed that he was sacked (p.2 of the Memorandum).
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Enterprises (which would have presumably been a British subsidiary of 
Occidental), if financed in the way suggested, i.e. 40^ of the capital from 
investment grants and other government aids, would have meant a masslevs ex­
penditure (£20m.) by the Government to say nothing of infrastructure. But 
it is not true that the Government was in any way 'committed* (as suggested 
by the Memorandum) by H.I.D.B.'s negotiations with Occidental; the decision 
would have had to be made at Cabinet level. Secondly, none of the studies 
commissioned by the Board, except one concerned with fertiliser distribution, 
were concerned with a petro-chemical complex as such; they were all relevant 
to general industrial development of the Cromarty Firth. Furthermore neither 
the memorandum nor the newspaper articles based on it seemed able to show any
way in which Thomson's activities relative to setting up a petro-chemical
79complex were underhand: he had been committed to it when he was appointed
to the Board and he had made no bones about remaining committed to it after­
wards.
Nevertheless, if Thomson cannot be fairly accused of corruption on the 
evidence given (and this surely was what all the rumpus was about), he ob­
viously did hope to gain something out of a petro-chemical complex. Just 
what it was becomes clear in Ross's speech announcing his resignation. Ross 
said that Thomson was not able to promise that he would not accept an
appointment in the new chemical company, should it materialise, and he had
80therefore resigned. The implication must be that Thomson was hoping for
such an appointment and therefore there really was a situation in which a 
member of a public body was in a position to make private gains by the actions
79. The memorandum is in fact full of dark hints but it is impossible to say 
that they establish Thomson's venality. In fact they are rather insubstantial - 
such as the much stressed point about the size of the fee paid to Dr. Jenkins, 
first as a Proplan employee than as a private consultant.
80. H.C. Deb, Vol. 743, cols. 1924-5.
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of that body. There is a genuine problem here: was Thomson to be expected 
to give up his pet idea of a petro-chemical complex - a project that was at 
least mxgwto&fyyfoT the good of the Highlands as a whole - just because he had
become a member of the Board? Or was the real fault, as the CtanTOrtfcatdivee_,«ere
81to claim, Ross's for appointing him in the first place. But does this
mean that no entrepreneurs should be allowed to serve on a development board 
for fear of a clash of interests? The answer must depend on the balance that 
is struck between the desire to utilize entreprenurial talents and the concern 
over individuals in a public position being able to further their own interests.
Prom this time that the contents of Durham's memorandum began to be made 
public, press attention was firmly fixed on the Board, the lead being taken by 
the Scottish Daily Express crusading under the banner of"letting the people
know the truth." A full statement by Thomson on 20th March concerning the
82
Polyscot group and its many off-shoots did little to dampen things down.
Seven Conservative M.P.'s led by Noble demanded a statement by Ross. For 
the Liberals, Alaisdair MacKenzie claimed that there was a rift between the 
Board and the people of the Highlands, and Russell Johnston criticised the 
Board's handling of the whole affair. But the nadir of H.I.D.Bisfortunes
came when even the two Highland Labour M.P.s, Malcolm Macmillan and Robert
02
Maclennan sharply accused them of lack of judgement. After emergency
meetings between Thomson, Grieve and Ross in London the drama moved to its 
almost inevitable denouement when Ross announced Thomson's resignation to the 
House of Commons on the 23rd. The ostensible reason for the resignation has 
already been mentioned but it is not unlikely that Ross also considered the 
sacrifice of Thomson necessary for the survival of the Board. In his statement
81. See Campbell in H.C. Deb, Vol.743> col. 1929.
82. The Express. 21/3/67.
83. Glasgow Herald. 20, 21 and 23/3/67.
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Ross gave details of the four businesses receiving Board assistance in which
members had declared interests - though as regards Thomson this was hardly 
84
news now. In reply the Tories demanded a White paper to clear up the
whole issue and attacked the original appointment of Thomson as *unwise* both 
because of his "commercial entanglements" and because he had shortly before 
he became a Board member "publicly declared his full support for the Labour
QC
Party". (in fact he had declared support for Labour only after being
made a Board member; the idea that he was "a political appointment" was 
discussed and rejected in chapter 4 )•
After the resignation of Thomson the pressure on the Board was consider­
ably eased but it was not the end of their troubles. To begin with, the 
petro-chemical complex, with or without Thomson, still had its enemies. Sir 
John Brooke, a former engineer and or. by 1967 a landowner and Deputy-Lieu- 
tenant of Ross and Cromarty, had written an article for the Express declaring 
that a modern petro-chemical plant at Invergordon was not the sort of industry 
the Highlands needed as it would be fully automated and would employ few people.
In his view H.I.B.B. should not "set themselves up as sponsors and advocates
86of certain types of factories". (Rather a caricature of their position).
More importantly,Hugh Fraser M.P., Lord Lovat*s brother,wrote a long and 
technical letter to both The Scotsman and the Inverness Courier setting out 
what was surely the position of the British Chemical industry. In it he 
claimed that two-thirds of the revenue of the petro-chemical complex would de­
pend on fertilisers for which there was a weak world market, prices for urea
and compounds having dropped by 30% in la-st 12 months. Furthermore "A form-
centre
idable combination of geography, nationalism and crude economics is tending to/
84. H.C. Deb, Vol.743, col. 1923. The other members concerned were John 
Robertson and, in a very minor way, Prophet Smith. Robertson*s interest in 
R.T.S. Potatoes, a firm receiving Board assistance, was the subject of a 
smear in Private Eye. 31/5/67.
85. H.C. Deb, Vol.743» col. 1929.
86. Express, 14/3/57.
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the industry's growth at the oil-well head" or near other raw materials,
with the result that in the long term fertilisers would "be more cheaply
produced in Africa and the Middle East and the industry was therefore
threatened with over-production. In his view Occidental's interest in the
project stemmed from the fact that it had a lot of raw materials for which
it had no market and would be only too glad to dump them in Britain to be
87used by a production plant largely financed by others. The fertiliser
argument was at least debatable as only 10 days later Lord Beeching for
I.C.I. admitted that there was not a surplus of fertiliser production
88capacity. lhat is more certain is that the British chemical industry
was not happy about about Occidental's plans.
Only two days after Fraser's letter was published the Board received
another jolt from a quite different quarters on 6th April the County Planning
Officer for Ross and Cromarty resigned with 3 of his staf$ claiming that
the Invergordon project was shrouded in secrecy and that they were not
89involved enough in the consultation process. However in an article
written later it appeared that the Planning Officer put the blame not so
much on the Board themselves as on an administrative structure that separated
90planning from development. At the same time the House of Lords was
having its dig at the Board. ^Hiring a debate on land use in the Highlands,
Lovat launched a vigorous attack on them, demanding that the whole Board be 
'reshuffled' as their proposals were 'entirely incompatible with the Highland 
way of life'. Similarly the Earl of Cromartie and the Duke of Atholl, while 
saying that they supported the idea of a Board, expressed dislike of the way
91in which the present one was going about its business.
87. The Scotsman. 4/4/67.
88. The Times. 14/4/67*
89. The Scotsman. 7/4/67.
90. The Scotsman. 8/4/67.
91. H.L. Deb, Vol.281. Debate on Land Use in the Higilands and Rural Areas, 
5/4/67, col.1004-H, 1018-20, 1965-6.
227
Such opponents were perhaps more useful to the Board than otherwise
for with the lairds against you, support from other quarters is certain.
Sure enough the Federation of Crofters Unions sprang to the Board's
defence, and accused the "landed gentry" of conducting a vendetta against 
92
them; a statement which in turn caused the Highland Committee of the
co-
Scottish Landowners Federation to declare that they were pledged to/operate 
95with H.I.D.B. ' The General Council of the S.T.U.C. took much the same
line as the crofters: the landowners were responsible for the attacks of
94the Board because they did not want to see any change in the Highlands. y
As the dust began to settle it soon appeared that the Board were not quite
so friendless as they had once seemed. In fact even before Thomson's
resignation public support for the Board had come from the Councils of
Social Service of both Mull and Iona and Shetland - the latter reiterating
95the point a few days later. At the Scottish Labour Party Conference
at the end of March, despite Grimble's vigorous condemnation of all members
of the Board except Hollo, the majority seemed more inclined to believe
that the responsibility for the crises lay in the machinations of the
96Scottish Dai<2y Express, the Conservatives and Aims of Industry.
Ross and Cromarty County Council had been in favour of the petro­
chemical complex from the time it was first put to them and continued to
support it throughout. On the 9th March their Planning Committee re-
97commended the re-zoning of Inverbreakie farm for industry. and at the 
full Council meeting on 19th April, after giving overwhelming support (with
only two councillors expressing reservations) to Hil.D.B., they formally
92. The Scotsman. IO/4/67.
93. Glasgow Herald. 12/4/67.
94. Glasgow Herald. 13/4/67.
95. Glasgow Herald. 21/3/67* 24/3/67 and 28/3/67.
96. Express. 1/3/67 and 3/3/67*
97* Glasgow Herald. 11/3/67*
228
decided to submit the relevant amendment of their Development Plan to the 
Secretary of State for approval. Shortly afterwards a crowded public 
meeting was held at Invergordon at which a unaminous resolution welcomed 
the petro-chemical complex and any other industry to the town and supported 
the Board.
In the event any welcome for the complex was premature as it was not 
to materialise. Whether the Kellog study had come to the conclusion that 
a petro-chemical complex was not really feasible at Invergordon or whether 
Occidental had been discouraged by the sharpness of the controversy is not 
certain. Thomson in two speeches implied the latter. On 27th June he 
stated that he expected Occidental to give up their petro-chemical complex 
idea because of *lack of confidence* and towards the end of 1967 be mentioned 
that he had been in contact with Dr. Hammer of Occidental and they agreed to 
let the aluminium companies (see below) do the trail blazing. ^  Whatever 
their reasons, when June came round - the time they had agreed to submit 
any proposals they might have - Occidental had not got in touch with either 
the Board or the Government. On 29th June a Guardian article appeared 
which claimed that the Kellog study had found the project financially 
worth while for Occidental, given generous support by the British Government, 
but that the Scottish Office had decided not to allow the complex "for at 
least two years" because of the large sums of money involved. The
Scottish Office hurried to deny this report, claiming that as they had had 
no proposals they were "not in a position to accept or refuse. It is
quite possible that both sides were correct - the Scottish Office had not 
received any proposals but had it done so and they required the expenditure
98. Express. 20/4/67 and p.5 of the 1968 Public Enquiry Report.
99* Pie Scotsman. 27/6/72 and Highland News 29/12/67.
100. Guardian. 29/6/67.
101. Glasgow Herald. 30/6/67.
229
of as much money as had been implied in the original Board - Occidental
agreement then they would, as the Guardian claimed, have turned them down.
102As no proposals ever came the issue remained hypothetical.
The controversy over the petro-chemical complex produced opposition
to and criticism of the Board, its activities and individuals connected
with it, for a very wide range of different reasons. First there was the
objection to M.F.D. as a wholes made by those who, like Rollo, were concerned
that it would be a •magnet1 drawing people from the remoter areas; or by
those who disliked the idea of industry or urban developments changing
the way of life of the area (as mentioned above this view is expressed
by the Inverness Courier); or because, as with the Glasgow Herald, it was
103considered that big industry was 'not suitable* for the Highlands.
(The implication being perhaps, that if anything big was going it should 
go to the Lowlands). Secondly there were those who took the position that 
industry was acceptable provided that it did not use up land already in­
tensively used for agriculture. Thirdly there was the quite specific 
opposition to a petro-chemical complex either because such a project was 
undesirable in itself or because it was to be run by an American Company 
in effect subsidised by the British Government. Opposition on this score 
was represented by Hugh Fraser. Lying alongside and threaded through these 
general objections was a personal dislike of Thomson found in many quarters: 
he was seen as a pusher, a publicity-hunter, a parvenu, a single-mindedly 
self-interested man concerned only to feather his own nest at anybody's 
expense, and a "political appointment" to the Board. In addition at 
the very lowest point of the Board's fortunes, we have those critics who, 
while basically friendly both to the Board and industry in the Highlands, 
were nevertheless worried about possible clashes of public and private
102.Another possibility suggested in the Guardian of 6/7/67, was that Occidental 
were waiting for some sort of go—ahead from the Government. The Corporation 
however refused either to confirm or deny this, and it does conflict with the 
original Occidental -H.I.B.B. agreement.
103. Clasgow Herald. 4/4/67.
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interests or thought the Board were being too secretive. At the
other end of the scale there were people like Lovat who, quite apart from 
the "Thomson affair”, had a very poor view of the Board*s members as a 
whole and wanted to see them replaced. Finally to round things off, 
there were the Conservative leaders, more concerned to direct their attacks 
at Ross than at the Board, and the press - more especially the Express - 
who knew a good story when they saw one and did not mind much who got 
hurt in the process of dragging it out.
With such a variety of critics and opponents and so many levels of
attack why was the Board not destroyed? It certainly seemed to be close
to it in those March days just before Thomson’s resignation. At least
three reasons can be offered. Firstly, though the critics had the upper
hand in terms of publicity, there was always a solid core of supportc
from those who saw the Board as ’their Board* either because, as with
S.T.U.C., it was to an extent their baby or because, like the Shetland
Council of Social Service,they saw it as giving very real help to them;
from those who perceived the opposition to the Board as some frightful
cabal of landowners and assorted reactionaries; and from all those people
in Easter Ross who were enthusiastic about the possibility of petro-chemical
complexes or indeed anything else that might mean jobs. Secondly was
the fact that Grieve determined to sit out the storm. But the third and
most important reason why the Board was not destroyed was that nobody
wanted to destroy it - or if they did they kept quiet about it. The most
that the severest critic demanded was that there should be a complete
change of membership and with it a change of priorities. Nobody at this
105
time seems to have challenged the very idea of having a Board.
104. e.g. the Liberals.
105. The Times of 14/4/67 said there were people "who want no Board at all** 
but did not name them.
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One of the most interesting features of the controversy was the 
inability of either side (it is of course an oversimplification to think 
in terms of two 'sides1 though many of the actors themselves seem to think 
in such terms) to admit the sincerity or good sense of the other; And 
in the atmosphere of deep mistrust both sides said and did things that 
could only inflame the suspicions of the other. (This is perhaps a 
general feature of political conflict). To those opposed to the petro­
chemical complex Prank Thomson was of course the blackest of characters, 
a man solely interested in private gain, but the Board as a whole did not 
come off much better - it was a sort of megalomaniac bureaucratic body 
determined to impose its view of development whatever the ideas of local 
people. Grieve in particular was an 'urban planner' who neither
understood nor was sympathetic to rural life and had to turn Easter Ross
107into an urban area so that he could 'plan' it; more extreme still,
Thomson, understanding Grieve*s need to 'p}.an* things (apparently a
compulsive condition^ was able to manipulate him. The Board and its
allies were little kinder to their opponents. Grieve publicly reflected
that all the fuss about land use being made by the Easter Ross farmers
108was probably only a way of pushing up the amount of compensation.
It was suggested that the opposition to industry among farmers and land­
owners sprang from the fear of having their position on the top of the
106. See Inverness Courier, 5l/l/67 and Jean Forsyth's letter to The Scotsman 
of 28/1/67T Incidentally in the eyes of Board members the David and Goliath 
roles were reversed - they were the smaller side fighting against a powerful 
combination of opponents.
107. This sort of accusation occured at the meeting of Inverness County 
Council reported in Ihe Scotsman. 10/5/67.
108. Glasgow Herald. 7/3/67*
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social ladder displaced by the incoming managers and professional people
109that industry would inevitably bring. ' Finally the local objectors
were the dupes of "sophisticated entrepreneurs out to smash a potentially
formidable rival. Men*s motives being mixed some of these accusations
from one side or the other probably contain elements of truth, but all
chracatureoe the position of the people they attack.
Mention of the "sophisticated entrepreneurs" using local people raises
another interesting point thrown up by the controversy: the widespread
belief in undercover machinations and secret deals. Many of the opponents
of the complex were obsessed with the idea of * secret agreements* between
[Thomson, Occidental and the Board; what these agreements might have
consisted of (unless it was that Thomson had been promised the managing
directorship of any chemical company that might emerge) was never made
very specific. Besides, without substantial government assistance the
project had no hope of viability and such assistance would have required
cabinet approval whatever * agreements* had been made.
However it was on the pro-Board side that conspiracy spotting was
112
really allowed the free play of imagination. At their first press
conference after Durham*s dismissal had become public,a spokesman for the
Board declared that *a small group put him Tip to it*,a statement which the
Easter Ross Land Use Committee naturally understood to refer to them as the
113only small group then involved, and threatened to take legal action.
109. A motive mentioned in The Times. 23/2/67 and firmly believed by several 
Board members.
110. The Times. 14/4/67.
111. See for instance Sunday Times. 26/3/67.
112. The full trappings of conspiracy including phone-tapping and a strange 
story of some anonymous person creeping around a hotel at night to push papers 
under Lord Strathclyde*s (Chairman of N.S.H.E.B.) door are brought out splendid­
ly by The Times on 14/4/67. John Robertson still insists the Strathclyde story 
is true.
113. The Scotsman. 7/3/67.
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In fact there is no evidence that E.R.L.U.C. were involved (though some mem­
bers were Durham's friends and his wife's relatives) and Durham specifically 
denies being 'put up to it' by anyone. At the Scottish Labour Party Con­
ference, it has already been mentioned, gossip had itihat the plotters 
against the Board included Aims of Industry, the Conservatives and the 
Scottish Daily Express. Aims of Industry (who played no part in the episode). 
and the Conservatives (who took a fairly moderate line) can be exempted but 
the Express seems a more likely (candidate* Yet the Express had originally 
supported the Board and was to do so again, it had welcomed Thomson's 
appointment and been enthusiastic about the petro-chemical complex, so
what was it against? It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the 
Express just liked dirt, without bothering too much to check whether the 
dirt might be in fact quite wholesome soil. The paper declared itself
(after the accusations at the Labour Conference) 'in league with nobody'
115and once again there is no evidence to the contrary. The Federation
of Crofters Unions and S.T.U.C. blamed 'landowners' (unspecified) for being 
behind the whole attack of the Board (see p227 above) but the Board's 
sympathisers further south were even less specific: the New Statesman
thought the affair was perhaps intended to seriously damage 'the only 
example of real socialist planning put into practice since 1964’ without 
naming the villains. The Guardian, apparently unaware that literacy
had spread so far north, considered that Durham's memorandum "was so ex­
pertly assembled that it suggested skilled activity possibly beyond the
117range of Easter Ross farmers." Others were not content with such
114. Express. 19/1/67, 3/4/67 and^g/7/67.
115. Express. 3/4/67.
116. New Statesman. 31/3/67.
117. Guardian. 23/3/67.
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obscure hints? a long time after his resignation Thomson blamed "private
118monopolistic interests" outwith the Highlands for thwarting development 
and the Times had left no doubt as to who these interests were: the big
British Chemical companies (those "sophisticated entrepreneurs" mentioned 
above).
The idea that the chemical or oil concerns played a part in the whole
crisis needs to be looked at if only because it was strongly believed by
120Board members other than Thomson. It can hardly be denied these companies 
were unhappy about the possibility of Occidental starting up a petro­
chemical complex: an I.C.I. representative had seen Rayne and Thomson about
it (p. 207 above); in June 1966 Ifliomson had claimed to have chemical
121companies up and down the country worried; and shortly after Thomsons
resignation Hugh Fraser had attacked plans for a complex. No doubt, had
Occidental submitted their proposals to the Government, the British com-
122panies would have made their views very clear, and perhaps they would 
have tried to make it difficult for Invergordon Chemical Enterprises to 
find finance in Britain. The point however is that no proposals were ever 
submitted so at what point did the chemical companies have a chance to take 
action? My personal conclusion is that the seeds of the whole affair lay 
in the personalities of Frank Thomson and Phil Durham; they germinated 
because Durham decided to keep a dossier on Thomson’s business activities 
and write a memorandum about them; they came into flower because this 
memorandum got to the press in a fairly dramatic situation, the press 
raised a hue and cry and (to switch metaphors) an enormous amount of smoke 
issued from a very small fire. Occidental’s plans for a petro-chemical
118. The Scotsman. 28/12/67.
119. The Times. 14/4/67.
120. e.g. Grieve and Robertson. Both are still inclined to believe that their 
opponents in this and later episodes got money from big business.
121. Observer. 5/6/67.
122. Perhaps they had already done so hence the Guardian report of 29/6/67.
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complex did raise a number of major issues - international competition in
the chemical industry, Government support of foreign companies that pose
a threat to British ones, and, more locally, good land use but none of
these played any real part in the events leading to Thomson's resignation.
That the 'Thomson Affair* was above all a newspaper stoim is indicated
by the nearly complete lack of further comment after about the middle of
April despite the fact that few of the serious issues had changed. The
exception was the debate on the Board in the Scottish Grand Committee in
out
July when the Conservatives revived, with/ very much passion, the old
charges about Thomson's 'pecuniary interest* in a petro-chemical complex.
But nothing more came of that, and it was perhaps no more than a good
123political stick with which to beat the Secretary of State. y Anyway 
by this time the unfortunate Highland Board had staggered into quite a
1 0  A
different crisis: the resignation of a second member, John Robertson,
after a conflict with the Scottish Office also rooted in the issue of Moray 
Firth Development.
Conflict with the Scottish Office
The attitude of the Scottish Office to M.F.D. is perceived differently 
by different people; they themselves deny that they were ever against the 
idea as such* but they undoubtedly lacked the Board's enthusiastic commit­
ment, had doubts about scale and timing, and were embarrassed by the
123. House of Commons Standing Committee Reports, Session 1966-67, Vol.Xll; 
Debate on Scottish Estimates by Scottish Grand Committee, 11/7/67.
124. And Thomson had troubles of his own. All the fuss surrounding him 
caused confidence in companies associated with him to decline sharply.
Later in 1967 the whole Polyscot Group collapsed. Thomson got a job with 
an American company concerned with tourism and emigrated in 1968.
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hullaballoo* that had broken out. These hesitations alone were enou^i 
to bring them into conflict with Robertson who as the Board member in 
charge of M.F.D. was a passionate exponent of the idea and had no 
sympathy for Civil Service caution. This caution was manifested in 
connection with the Jack Holmed> Report, the massive study commissioned 
by the Board dealing with the physical planning aspects of M.F.D. The 
Scottish Office were deeply concerned at the expense of the study and 
tried to induce the Board to have second thoughts. Grieve however 
refused to budge and in the end made his point.
The issues that precipitated Robertson*s resignation were once again 
on the grand scale. One of the most attractive baits the Board hoped to 
use in bringing large industries to the Moray Firth was the provision of 
cheap power. Dr. Jenkins for Proplan had originally suggested a cost 
of under ^ d per unit and the Board had commissioned the Consulting 
Engineers, Merz & McLellan to investigate the possibilities. Using 
power from a purpose built nuclear reactor the engineers decided it could 
be done - provided that the industrial concerns were only asked to pay 
for the electricity specifically produced for them. In other words the 
national policy of * averaging* by which each consumer pays the same average 
price to cover the costs of generation and distribution (and therefore 
consumers in remote areas, where distribution costs are expensive, are 
subsidised) would have to be breached. On 6th June 1967 "the Board sub­
mitted a formal proposal to the Secretary of State concerning 'competi­
tively priced power for special industrial development in the Moray 
Firth area'. The Board's hopes to turn the Moray Firth area into
a 'cheap power* zone were to be disappointed, but their proposal was not 
rejected outright. The official reply from the Secretary of State was
125. H.I.D.B., 1967, Appendix IX.
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that "in view of the major issues of national policy involved, the
question of electricity supplies for power intensive industries was under
126active consideration by the Government." As it happened this was to
turn out to be something more than an anodyne, though it must have seemed
like one at the time.
Another project was closely connected with the provision of cheap
power: the provision of an aluminium smelter. As early as mid-1966
the Board had contacted British Aluminium who at that time had shown
little interest. While in the U.S.A. on a visit to Occidental in
December a Board party had also got in touch with Alcan, the Canadian
Aluminium Company. Here they met with a more positive response and by
early May that company had already made a number of specific proposals
to the Board, who were however told by the Scottish Office to take the
127negotiations no further as "great issues of policy were involved.”
By early July with the prospects of any further action by Occidental
receding and the cheap electricity and Aluminium smelters taken firmly
out of the Board*s hand, the possibility of making much more progress
with M.F.D. must have seemed to the Board to be declining. The more
patient memb e rs/ prep ared to wait and see, the less patient - John
Robertson - to force the issue. Rumours reached the papers that he
would resign if the Government backed down on the petro-chemical project
and he launched an attack on Sir Douglas Haddow, the permanent Under-
128Secretary of State, later portrayed by him as the villain of the
129piece and against Highland industrialisation.  ^ Ross visited the 
Board to try and smooth things out and get a retraction from Robertson
126. Ibid.
127. Glasgow Herald. 21/8/67.
128. Glasgow Herald. 4/7/67 and Inverness Courier. 4/7/67.
129. Express, 6/9/67.
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of his attack on Haddow ,but to no avail. Robertson refused to apologise 
and resigned.
This was not the first resignation the Board had suffered over
relations with the Scottish Office. In early April one of their Staff,
Roy Brown (Chief Management and Accountancy Officer) who had a commercial
background, had also left, complaining of Scottish Office control.
In June, Frank Thomson (no longer connected with the Board of course)
bitterly described the Scottish Office as those "loving Victorian parents ....
172
who insist on knowing what is best for their youngest child". All
this evidence of friction between H.I.D.B., especially the more commer­
cially minded part, and the Scottish Office naturally provoked speculation 
over their future - speculation that was increased by the announcement of 
two new members to replace Thomson and Robertson, as these two new members,
Sir James Mackay, a former civil servant and Tom Fraser, both seemed to 
represent a central government point of view. It was also thought by 
many at the time that a new procedure, introduced in the Spring of 19^7, 
in which the Board sat as a "General Purposes Committee" making recommend­
ations to itself as a full Board represented a tightening of Scottish Office 
133control? in fact it was only a minor technical alteration introduced to
speed up decisions on grants and loans (see chapter 5). Altogether it was
134suggested the Board was about "to become powerless" J or simply "a grants
135and loans sub-agency of St. Andrews House". This was over-dramatic
but when the Minister of State, declared in a speech at the
end of August that H.I.D.B. did not have the money or expertise for multi-
136million pound projects and that their business was * small concerns*,
130. lj/7/67.
131. Glasgow Herald. 12/4/67.
132. The Scotsman. 27/6/67.
133. Express. 23/5/67 and The Scotsman. 14/7/67.
134. The Scotsman. 14/7/67.
135. Glasgow Herald, 21/7/67.
136. Bgpyejg.g, 31/8/72.
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it definitely seemed that the Board was having its scope firmly limited.
Mahon's speech placed the Board in the centre of yet another row,
mercifully their last in 1967» only this time the tenor of public opinion
was definitely on their side. From the local Labour and Liberal parties
to the Inverness Courier and the Scottish Daily Express the idea that the
137Board should be limited to 'little things' was strongly deprecated.
Frank Thomson claimed that it was the work of Sir Matthew Campbell (Secretary
of D.A.F.S.) and Sir Douglas Haddow who had never liked the Board and
1 ^8
were hiding behind Ross and Mabon;  ^ John Robertson also put the blame on 
a 'small clique of senior officials' (specifically mentioning Haddow). 
The Board's staff sent a telegram to Grieve (away at a Conference in 
Europe) urging him to continue to 'think big'. Whatever had been
the intention of the speech it had met a barrage of opposition. Mabon 
himself claimed to have been misunderstood - there was no question of the 
Board's sights being lowered or a change of policy towards them, he had 
only meant that when projects involved millions of pounds they must 
necessarily be considered by government departments. After a meeting
between Ross, Mabon and Grieve at which the Ministers declared their support 
for the Board and Grieve said that H.I.D.B. will be pressing on with pro­
jects large and small, the controversy petered out, though not before 
a final comic touch when Alasdair Mackenzie (the M.P. for Ross and Cromarty) 
asked the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration to investigate
137. Express, 2/9/67 and Glasgow Herald. 4/9/67*
138. Express. 5/9/67.
139. Express. 6/9/67.
140. The Scotsman. 2/9/67.
141. Glasgow Herald. 5/9/67*
142. Express. 8/9/67 and 9/9/67*
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whether
/ the Scottish Office were hampering the Board’s work. He refused. 
Whether Mahon's words were in fact innocuous or an accurate expression of 
official feeling hastily abandoned in fcaoee of hostile criticism atari
impossible to determine with any certainty but the concensus of opinion
favours
among those connected with the Board rather fo^ iio the latter view.
While there seems no doubt that the friction between the Board and 
the Scottish Office over M .F .D . did go deeper than the clash of differing 
personalities it is not at all easy to see where the lines of battle were 
drawn. The Scottish Office accepted that general principle of M .F .D . ,
(at least at the vague and abstract level of the 1966 White Paper on the 
Scottish economy), the role of the Board in investigating the area's 
possibilities and promoting it,and the fact that the Board needed a 
certain amount of independence. The Board for its part could hardly 
deny that any major commitments or large expenditures as well as overall 
control were the responsiblities of the departments. But somewhere in 
between these fixed points lies the 'grey and bloodless ground of bureau­
cratic warfare*. The issues presented for battle included how much 
the Board could spend on research and promotion without check; how far 
they could go in their relations with interested companies like Occidental 
and Alcanj what industries were 'suitable' for the Highlands - Grieve 
claimed that "Civil Service planners in Edinburgh" ^^were against
situating large industries there; at what point did considerations raiscfcL
went
serious issues of 'national policy* and hence fft.- beyond the Board's 
scope; and how much independence they should be allowed in general.
143. Glasgow Herald. 23/9/67.
144. Sunday Telegraph. 14/1/68. There is a time factor at work here. 
Whatever they may have thought before, in the course of 1968 the Scottish 
Office was prepared to accept big industry in the Moray Firth area - as 
we shall see when looking at the aluminium smelter episode.
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145Miles' law tells us that 'where one stands depends on where one sits: ' 
what looks like an exceptional degree of autonomy from St. Andrews House 
can seem like tight control in Inverness. While to the Board it seems 
that they had a tough battle to get anywhere with M.F.D., the Scottish 
Office might see themselves as merely exercising a normal degree of 
caution.
It cannot really be said that the Board was in much danger of 'becoming 
powerless' (or more powerful) as a result of their tribulations in the 
first nine months of 1967- What had happened was that their position 
was better defined. The fears that were expressed in the summer of 
that year were mostly groundlessj because MacKay was an ex-Civil Servant 
it did not mean that Civil Service control was increased; MacKay sitting 
in Inverness saw things from that standpoint. Similarly , as events 
were to show, the policy of M.F.D. though buffeted by the resignations 
of Thomson and Robertson and the Mabon controversy, was still alive and 
kicking. But it still had no positive achievements to its name and be­
fore it could enter the next stage a decision quite unconnected with the 
Highlands was required.
The Aluminium Smelter. Grampian Chemicals and Land Use Controversies
This decision came when Peter Shore announced that the Government
146
wanted a British Aluminium industry established and it was taken a step
145* See chapter 1.
146. The Times. 21/9/67. Much of the story concerning the development 
around Invergordon from this date onwards can be found in a dissertation 
by Sandy Walkington called "Invergordon - White Hope or Elephant for the 
Highlands" ( Cheltenham College Press, 1972).
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further when Harold Wilson told the Labour Party Conference in October 
1967 that they would build power stations linked to the aluminium
1 A  7
smelters - some sort of arrangement like this being hecessary if 
power were to be provided cheaply enough to attract Aluminium Companies. 
Alcan was not the only such company to show an interest in building 
smelters in Britain. British Aluminium had come round to the idea by
the spring of 1967 was also interested in a site at Invergordon.
Quite independently, Rio Tinto-Zinc had proposed setting up a smelter 
in Anglesey, taking power from a nuclear power station. The advantages 
to the Government of setting up an Aluminium industry were that it would 
lower the country*s dependence on imports and would assist the develop­
ment areas (where the smelters were to be placed); the difficulties were 
that cheap power had to be provided and that it would cause trouble within 
Efta.
Thus began a rather complicated struggle which raised a number of 
issues many of them quite unconnected with either the Highlands or the 
Board. $*irst there was the question of which companies should be 
allowed to build smelters; to begin with there were five in the race;
Rio Tinto - Zinc, Alcan, British Aluminium, Alusuisse and Impalcan - 
but the last named (a company controlled jointly by I.C.I. and Alcoa)
1 i Q
very quickly dropped out. British Aluminium and Alcan were both
149likely candidates because they had British based fabricating capacity.
RT-Z were favoured as the only purely British owned Company - even though
they had no foothold in the aluminium industry. There was the issue of
how the cheap power was to be provided: the Government favoured advanced
150gas—cooled reactors and carried B,Aand R.T.—Z with them. Alcan how-
147* The Scotsman. 5/10/67*
148. The Times. 16/10/67 and 3/11/67*
149* The Times. 3/11/67*
150. The Scotsman. 25/7/68.
243
ever managed to throw the whole plan into confusion by proposing to 
build a (much cheaper) coal-fired generating station and gained an en­
thusiastic ally in the National Coal Board. (it is obviously very 
difficult for a Labour government to reject outright any plan that is 
very advantageous to the coal industry). As the Coal Board agreed to 
sell coal to Alcan at a lower price than they were selling it to the
electricity boards (a result of new pricing policies), not surprisingly
151the latter were unhappy about the idea. Then there was competition
between development areas as to who should get the smelters. The Highlands
were never in too much danger of losing out here, as both B.A. and Alcan
had fixed on Invergordon as their first choice, had taken options on
land there and later fought side by side in a public enquiry to get the
land rezoned (see below) - all of which gave a powerful fillip to M.F.D.
Finally there were objections from Norway which claimed that the plans
to set up a British aluminium industry were a breach of E.F.T.A. agree-
152ments because they involved state subsidies.
The Government had originally planned to give a decision on the 
smelters by early 1968 but because of all the complexities the final 
agreement did not come until late July by which time Alusuisse had also 
dropped out of the race. The other three companies were all allowed to 
build smelters. R.T.-Z. and B.A. got very similar deals, the former in 
Anglesey as they had always intended, and the latter at Invergordon.
The B.A. smelter was to have a capacity of 100,000 tons annually and to 
employ about 65O people; the company would get a £29m* loan from the 
government which it would use to pay the electicity board for generating 
capacity and in return would buy the electricity it consumed (generated
151. The Scotsman. 12/2/68.
152. The Times. 12/10/67.
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at Hunterston "B") at the cost of its production - i.e. no averaging.
The agreement was signed at the end of July/which time Alcan had been 
given what looked like a consultation prize (both to them and to the North 
East of England): ttyey were to be allowed to build a much smaller smelter,
using a coal-fired power station, at Lynemoutfc in Northumberland. -^*4
Once they had succeeded in interesting both B.A. and Alcan in 
Invergordon the role of the Board in the smelter decision was minimal.
Yet if no smelter had come to the area the policy of M.F.D. would have 
locked very shaky and in the interview with the Sunday Telegraph in which 
he stated that 'civil service planners in Edinburgh' resented the idea of 
large industries in the Highlands, Grieve hinted that he might resign should 
no smelter come to I n v e r g o r d o n . ^^5 with hindsight it is possible to 
say that as soon as Shore had made his announcement about a British 
aluminium industry such a negative outcome was unlikely. But there was 
one local hurdle that had to be cleared - getting the land re-zoned for 
industry-and in this H.I.D.B. fought with B.A., Alcan and Ross and 
Cromarty County Council on one side of the public inquiry; on the other 
were the Easter Ross Land Use Committee supported by the N.F.U. and a number 
of private objectors.
The land use question had been raised before there was any talk of 
smelters on the Cromarty Firth. It had come up when Occidental first 
started making serious moves and Inverbreakie had been selected as a likely 
site for a petro-chemical complex. The Easter Ross Land Use Committee had
been set up (see p.211) with the aim of opposing the loss of good arable 
land to industry. In order to establish firmly just what was good arable 
land they commissioned Hunting Technical Services to survey the Invergordon
153* The Times, 25/7/68 and 7/11/68. 
154* Glasgow Herald, 24/7/68.
155• Sunday Telegraph, 14/1/68.
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area and their report, together with one by the North of Scotland College 
of Agriculture,established without a shade of doubt that the land around 
Invergordon being considered for industry was excellent by any standards 
and remarkable for the Highlands. The core of E.R.L.U.C.'s argument
was that good development meant balanced development , not merely indus­
trialisation and that with such a dearth of good arable land in the Hi$i- 
lands the sterilisation of any of it would mean imbalanced develelopment.
The County Council and the Board had not been nearly active enough in
looking for alternative sites for industry that would not mean destroying 
157good land. This argument convinced farmers: in May 1967 the
Agricultural Executive Committee of the Highlands officially opposed
Ross and Cromarty County Councildecision to recommend the'- re-zoning
for industry of JOO acres near Invergordon (i.e. Inverbreakie) and
when it came to a Public Enquiry the N.F.U. supported E.R.L.U.C.
However neither Ross and Cromarty County Council or H.I.D.B. were
persuaded. They were moved by quite a different picture: the dearth of
manufacturing industry in the Highlands as a whole and Easter Ross in parti- 
meant
cular, v yc 1 an over-dependence on primary industries; the decline in demand 
for labour in the agricultural sector exacerbated : an already serious 
unemployment problem and in turn encouraged:: a steady depopulation of the 
area. The County Council were also worried by the low rateable value of 
its area and its dependence on Government grants. In their view no
other sites offered the same advantages as those near Invergordon and though
156. Hunting Technical Services Ltd., "Report on a Land Capability Survey 
of the area around Invergordon"; North of Scotland College of Agriculture,
An Agro-Economic Appraisal of Agriculture in Easter Ross (1967)*
157. 1968 Public Enquiry Report, p.8.
158. For its position in the administrative framework see chapter 2.
159. The Scotsman. 24/5/67.
160. 1968 Public Enquiry Report, p.7-
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it was unfortunate that these were on good farming land their use for 
heavy industry would give 'the best return from the land for the largest 
number of people'. It was for these reasons that the county decided
to seek the Secretary of State's approval for rezoning the land. In 
early 1967 it was only Inverbreakie that was affected, but after October 
when the smelter race warmed up, B.A. applied for planning permission to 
build at Inverbreakie where they had an option, and Alcan at the neigh­
bouring Ord and Broomhill Farms, where they had options. On the 6th 
December, Ross and Cromarty County Councils decided to consider these 
applications favourably but to go no further with them until approval 
from the Secretary of State to re-zone the land had been given. They 
therefore submitted Amendment No.3 to their County Development Plan which
sought permission to re-zone Inverbreakie, Ord and some land around for
162
industry and to allocate land at Alness for housing. As 28 objections
to this amendment were officially laid, a Public ^lquiry became inevitable, 
but it is probable that with the exception of the farming community the 
large majority of local people supported bringing in industry wherever it 
went: in November 1967 a series of public meetings at Alness, Dingwall,
Invergordon and Tain unaminously supported the establishment of smelters 
in the district.
The Public Enquiry was held from 27th Februaiy to 20th March 1968.
By this time E.R.L.U.C. was somewhat changed, having ceased to be a 
committee of the Easter Ross Branch of the N.F.U. (it now stood as a
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid, p.5 - 6.
163. Ibid, p.5.
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group in its own right) and having lost a few of its members, notably
John Mann of Inverbreakie and J.W.G. Paterson of Ord who having given
options to the aluminium companies could hardly oppose re—zoning.
Supporting them were a number of private objectors who included Phil
Durham and Sir John Brooke. The main thrust of E.R.L.U.C.'s argument
was that the aluminium smelter would be better placed on reclaimed land
in Nigg bay as not only would this save the farms near Invergordon but
it would put the smelter much closer to deep water than it would be on
the projected site. The argument was in fact developed in considerable
detail and two firms of oivil and structural engineers were engaged to
report on the possibilities of reclamation. Against this the County
Council and the Board agreed that though it might be possible it would
be too costly, take too long for the purposes of present requirements and
(besides) B.A. and Alcan had flatly declared that they would not erect
165smelters on reclaimed land. The recommendations of the Reporter,
which came out in May 1968 and were later accepted by the Secretary of 
State, were that the land be re-zoned; however the rider was added that 
the case for reclaiming Nigg Bay was very strong and a survey should be
166made of the possibilities to avoid a further loss of agricultural land.
The scene was then set for the next confrontation.
As with the controversy over the petro-chemical complex there was a 
tendency for each side to caricature the position of the other. The 
land-use people were often portrayed as mere reactionary farmers whose 
statements that they were not opposed to industry as such were just 
hypocrisy, engaged in out of political necessity. While there may have
164. Ibid, p.6. By the time of the Public Enquiry E.R.L.U.C. had shrunk to 
7 members.
165. Ibid, p.6 - 7.
166. Ibid, p.50*
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"been some root-and-branch opponents of industry, this description hardly 
does justice to men like Reay Clarke, the Chairman of E.R.L.U.C. who 
had a far more complex view, and besides, his committee did engage 
civil engineers to show that Nigg Bay could be reclaimed for industry. 
The farmers for their part saw themselves fighting ’the combined forces 
of big business and bureaucracy with the Board as chief villaim; 
coupled with the common accusation that the Board was anti-agriculture 
this adds up to an equally partial and unfair picture. Nevertheless 
if such black and white views cannot be accepted there still was a con­
siderable gulf between the two sides. E.R.L.U.C. and its allies were 
not deeply moved by the need to get industry into Easter Ross, whereas 
the County Council and the Board saw this as such an urgent necessity 
that agricultural and to some extent environmental considerations be­
came decidedly secondary.
As soon as British Aluminium signed the agreement with the Board 
of Trade, the development of the Moray Firth had jumped its first 
hurdle: it was now at last off the ground. The spectacle of two
international companies competing hard to come to the area gave M.F.D. 
a much greater plausibility than it ever had before, and even the most 
sceptical of the inhabitants of St. Andrews House had to take notice.
According to Ross the * critical factor in the Invergordon project (i.e.
166the smelter) .... was the research work done by H.I.D.B.*; add 
’promotion1 to research and the judgement can be accepted. It is 
possible to argue that the flat land/deep water combinatiotr of the 
Cromarty Firth would inevitably have drawn in industries sooner or
167. The Scotsman. 12/2/68 and 1968 Public Enquiry Report, p.24.
S.
168. The Scotsman. 12/9/68.
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later and it has been suggested that one of the reasons British Aluminium
got the favoured Invergordon site was because Alcan had worked through
the Board initially whereas B.A. had their chief contacts with the 
169Scottish Office, J but it would be churlish to claim that the Board's 
vigorous promotional activities had no affect in attracting interest in 
the area.
In order to expedite all the infrastructural additions that the
Smelter would require, a body called the Invergordon Steering Committee,
consisting of representatives from the Scottish Development Department,
H.I.D.B., B.A., Ross and Cromarty County Council and Invergordon Town
Council (they were later joined by Qiaanpdaibs - see below) was set up
in the summer of 1968. It completed its work and was wound up in
September 1971 having arranged for the provision of 600 houses, roads,
a water supply, educational facilities, health and welfare services
170and a Community centre complex.
Nothing succeeds like success; whereas in January 1968 Grieve had
171talked of opposition being felt everywhere, by the second half of
172the year the Board were in calm waters and one of the journalists
who in mid-1967 had seen the Board slipping into impotence stated at
the end of 1968 that the storms had been weathered and it had dis-
173covered "how to accomplish its uncomfortably novel task."
Even before the smelter agreement was settled H.I.D.B. had become
involved in another major scheme. EoinReki*v mother entrepreneur
of flamboyant tendencies, had come to them in January 1968 with another
plan for a petro-chemical complex. It is a tribute to the Board's 
1^9*. The Scotsman*...25/7/68.
170. Scottish Development Department, 1971 Report, Cmnd. 4945> p.18.
171. Sunday Telegraph. 14/1/68.
172. The general air of euphoria was reflected by the Press Conference 
that marked the publication of the Board's Second Report (in June 1968).
173. Chris Baur (Scotsman's Industrial Correspondent) in The Scotsman of 
7/11/68.
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stamina at least that the mere mention of petro-chemical complexes did 
not make them hack away in horror. However they determined to avoid 
laying themselves open to the same sort of attacks as before, and immed­
iately put Mekie in touch with the Scottish Office as well as persuading 
him to give a press conference in March outlining his plans.
Grampian Chemicals, as the petro-chemical company was called, did not in 
fact emerge successful and unscathed but this time no harm was done to 
the Board. Mekie was later joined as director by Angus Morrison, 
formerly of C.I.B.A., and Jonathan Jenkins who had been first a Propl-as- 
employee and then the Board*s consultant on M.F.D. In August 1968 the 
Planet Oil Corporation, a new offshoot of Allen A Co. the large New York
Investment bank, took a major stake in Grampian and Planet's executive
17*5Vice-President became another Grampian director.
Following discussion with the Board the company applied for planning
176permission from Ross and Cromarty County Council in October. As
they too wanted to use the flat land around Invergordon their application 
(which the County Council supported) once again required re-zoning of 
agricultural land. The land use controversy flared up for a second time 
and^fa a was another public enquiry (of which more below). This time the 
Reporter found against re-zoning, but his recommendations were not accepted 
by the Secretary of St’ate who considered re-zoning for industry was in the 
interests of Highland development - a clear indication that whatever had
been the Scottish Office attitude to Occidental they had swung behind
177Grampian. Unfortunately for Grampian they only successfully cleared
the land-use hurdle in order to fall flat on their faces over finance.
174. Glasgow Herald. 28/3/68.
175. The Scotsman. 18/9/68; Sunday Times. 15/5/70 which gives a full account 
of Grampian's attempts to set up a petro-chemical complex. See also Private 
Eye No. 161 (Nov.1968) which attacks Grampian with innuendo in a manner 
bearing a marked resemblance to the earlier attack on Thomson.
176. H.I.D.B. 1968, p. 34.
!77. Sunday Times. 15/5/70 and H.I.D.B., 1969, p.28.
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The scheme, initially planned to cost about £50m. but later going up to 
£100m., was to have a substantial proportion of its capital from the 
U.S., but in March 1970 Planet Oil suspended finance to Grampian.
The directors had turned to possible European sources when they were over­
taken by the General Election of 1970 bringing in a Conservative Government 
opposed (at that time) to the investment grants on which Grampian had been
reckoning. (Interestingly, Edward Heath, when in opposition,had used the
179example of Grampian to illustrate the wastefulness of such grants 7).
180Morrison and Jenkins resigned from the Company and the project simply
faded away; their land at Invergordon and Nigg was bought in 1972 by the
181Cromarty Firth Development Company.
Much of the opposition to Grampian’s scheme was the same as the
opposition to the earlier petro-chemical complex. Naturally there were
those farmers and others who were alarmed by the spectacle of yet more
arable land disappearing, and there were the British Oil and Chemical
companies who thought that Grampian’s scheme could only ruin the market 
182
for everyone. The drama of 1967 was 110^  re-enacted however for
several good reasons: this time *.no Board member could conceivably be
accused of having pecuniary interests in the development; no Board employee 
was purloining their documents and writing memoranda; and none of the 
initiators of the scheme were local people who aroused deep emotions on 
personal grounds. On top of this,M.F.D. was now established and the 
Scottish Office had vetted Grampian. All the same, Grampian came in for
178. Sunday Times. 15/5/70.
179« Sunday Times. 15/5/70.
180. Walkington, p.63.
181. Glasgow Herald. 11/9/72.
182. Sunday Times. 15/5/70.
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its fair share of execration: it was portrayed as a thoroughly unsound
set-up run by men with no experience of what they were attempting and 
whose official London Office was no more than the private house of one 
of the directors,; furthermore, despite its claims to be on the verge of 
winning contracts, it declined to give any information about possible out­
lets for its products.
Doubts about the viability of Grampian were used by the objectors to 
the re-zoning of land at the 1969 Public Enquiry but the main thrust of the 
opposition, again provided by E.R.L.U.C., was on the old grounds of good 
land use. Grampian had tqken an option on about 200 acres at Nigg and 
400 at Delny which adjoined the land now belonging to B.A. and was also 
of first class quality. E.R.L.U.C. had argued at the previous enquiry that 
the danger was if one industry were introduced on good land others would 
follow and a lot of land would be lost. Grampian*s project seemed to
bear out their fears and they again pressed for the reclamation of Nigg 
184Bay.
The enquiry was held in March 1969; the following month a report
commissioned by the Board, (on the recommendation of the Secretary of State)
dealing with the feasability of reclaiming whole or part of Nigg Bay was
completed. The report established (as had the engineers consulted by
E.R.L.U.C.) that such reclamation would be quite feasible and the reporter
kb the 1969 Enquiry (on the basis of an interim report produced by 24/2/69)
concluded that the cost to Grampian of using a reclaimed site would be no
more than the cost of Delay vy(the preferred site). Disputes over just how
much more time, if any, this would mean before the complex could be in
185production were not resolved. It has already been said that the reporter
183. The Scotsman. 19/12/68; Sunday Times. 15/3/70. See also the Report of 
the 1969 Public Enquiry into Ross and Cromarty Development Plan, Amendment 
No.6, p.13 and 17.
184. 1969 Public Enquiry Report, p.23.
185. 1969 Public Enquiry Report, p.22-25.
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recommended against re-zoning, on land-use grounds, but the Secretary of
State decided the pther way (in July 1969) having been"advised” that the
186reporter was wrong in his calculation of the cost of reclamation.
Some of the objectors^ appealed against the Secretary of State's decision 
in the Court of Session on the grounds that the County Council had not 
properly consulted the Agricultural Executive Committee of the Highlands, 
but they lost.
One other public enquiry has been fought since then - in 1971 - con­
cerning the re-zoning of land for housing near Alness; at the time of
writing, the report, considerably delayed has still not been produced.
The Jack Holmes report, the plan for the physical development of the 
Moray Firth area, which appeared in 1968 has also been attacked by those 
concerned with land use. It was claimed that it paid no more than lip- 
service to the idea of conserving that best agriculture land. Specifically 
the Holmes plan to keep the A9 along the same route as the present road, 
i.e. round the head of the Beauly and Cromarty Firthswas criticised by 
a number of people including Reay Clarke (the E.R.L U.C. Chairman) who
with two friends produced an alternative route crossing the Beauly, Cromarty
187and Dornoch Firths. S.D.D. have since decided that they will take the
A9 across the first two of these firths.
In order to try and mitigate further conflict with agriculturalists 
the Board began to have joint meetings with the special sub-committee 
concerned with developments in the Moray Firth area set up by the Highland 
Committee of the N.F.U. in 1968. In 1969 the Board collaborated with 
this sub-committee to investigate the effect on agriculture resulting
186. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1971-72, Vol.V., 
"Memorandum Submitted by the Easter Ross Land Use Committee" (H. of C. 511-V) 
p.42. This Memorandum is a good statement of E.R.L.U.C.'s criticism of the 
Public Enquiry process.
187. "The Crossing of the Three Firths", R.D.G. Clarke, P. Hunter Gordon and 
J.S. Smith.
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from an increasing urban population around the Moray Firth. In the same
year they also joined with British Aluminium and Ross and Cromarty County
Council in commissioning Aberdeen University to study the economic, social
and environmental changes associated with industrial growth in Easter 
188
Ross. A recent progress report from the team studying the environ­
ment claims that desire for short term gain has led planning committees
189to pay insufficient attention to conservation. Such criticisms were to
be expected. While there is no doubt that both H.I.D.B. and Ross and
Cromarty County Council would completely reject any suggestion that they
had no interest in environmental matters,it is equally certain that the
primary objective of both bodies is economic development, which in the
case of the Cromarty Firth means industrial development. It would be
miraculous if such development never clashed with the requirements of
conservation. The Board*s position is clearly brought out in their
evidence to the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs where F.D.N.Speven
(the head of the Board’s Planning and Research Division) said ,**I think
it is our business to give the first priority to economic development and
there are many bodies such as the Nature Conservancy whose primary objective 
190is conservation” or as Sir Andrew Gilchrist more colourfully put it,
’’You are faced with the choice of driving Highland youths to Glasgow to
worlq or Australia, or asking 15 Solan Geese to build their nest somewhere 
191else”. 7 A recent example of just such a dilemna occured in the 
clash between Ross and Cromarty County Council and the Nature Conservancy.
The latter refused to give their blessing to industrial developments in 
parts of the Cromarty Firth unless the council on their side gave assurances
188. H.I.D.B. 1969, P.30.
189. Aberdeen University, Moray Firth Ecological Study, 1969-74; Summary of 
Progress, March 1972, p. 9.
190. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1971-72, Sub-Committee A. 
Minutes of Evidence of H.I.D.B. (H. of C. 51~X)>P«283.
191. Ibid, p.284.
that other parts would be reserved for wildlife. The result was that 
the Council were unable to grant planning permission for months until 
the Secretary of State decided to allow them to go ahead.
This discussion of conservation versus development has taken us 
beyond the 1965-70 period, for it is more recent events that have brought 
the issue to a head. In this instance, 1970 makes for once a convenient 
point at which to stop. By the time the Board members were changed in 
November 1970, Grampian's scheme was as good as dead and no other large 
projects were on the horizon. Perhaps the new Chairman, Sir Andrew 
Gilchrist, would have laid less stress on Moray Firth Development had he 
got the chance. In fact any such choice was rendered impossible by a 
totally new situation: the discovery of North Sea oil. The Board had
taken an interest in North Sea oil in the days when its existence was 
still speculative; in 1967 "they got in touch with Total who were ex­
ploring the outer Moray Firth but nothing more came of that. It was 
from late 1971 onwards that oil began to have an impact on the Highlands 
and as this is outside our period no more will be said about it in here. 
(A brief description of recent developments is given in the appendix).
192. Glasgow Herald, 18/10/72 and 20/10/72.
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Chapter 7: The Board and Its World
B.I.D.B. 1965-1970: An Assessment and Some Common Criticising
In this final chapter I will attempt to bring together the threads 
running through the preceding parts of the thesis. The first section 
takes a broad look at the Board's first five years and discusses the 
criticisms that have been made of them. In sections two and three we 
return to the themes raised in chapter 1.
Even if we were to take the whole life of H.I.D.B., now in its eighth 
year, it would, in the Chairman of the Consultative Council, Lord Cameron's 
words "be unfair to attempt to judge the Board on the results to date"  ^
because many of their schemes need to be considered in perspective. The 
unfairness is compounded if the first five years or so only are considered 
nevertheless it is necessary to make some sort of assessment here in order 
that the various actions described in previous chapters can be seen as a 
whole. The most obvious crude indicators of economic change in the re­
gion are those vairables used by the Board themselves in their Annual 
Reports: population, unemployment, incomes, and activity in the agricul­
tural, fisheries and tourism sectoral (no measure of change in output in 
manufacturing industries is available).
It is by now fairly well known that the decade 1961-71 saw the first 
increase in the population of the seven Crofting Counties taken as a whole 
since 1841. Better still for the purposes of the Board the whole of this 
increase, of about 6000 people, occured between 1966 and 1971* the first 
half of the decade actually showing continued depopulation. (See Table 
XIIl). At least part of the reason for the increase in population must
1. Personal letter from Lord Cameron.
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Table XIII: The Population of the Crofting Counties 1961-71
(absolute numbers and percentages of 1961 total)
1961 1966 1971
Area Number - % of 1961 Number - % of 1961 Number - % of 1961
1/ Shetland 17812 — 100 17371 — 98 17567 _ 99
2/ Orkney 18747 - 100 18102 - 97 17254 - 92
5/ Caithness 27370 - 100 28257 103 27915 - 102
4/ N.W. Sutherland 3961 - 100 3750 - 95 3782 - 95
5/ S.E. Sutherland 9546 - 100 9393 - 98 9358 - 98
6/ Wester Ross 6807 - 100 6600 - 97 6809 - 100
7/ Easter Ross 28898 - 100 29208 - 101 31222 - 108
8/ Inverness 45820 - 100 46178 - 101 49468 - 108
9/ Badenoch 6473 - 100 6429 - 99 6635 - 102
10/Skye 7772 - 100 7150 - 92 7481 - 96
ll/Lewis & Harris 25222 - 100 24302 - 96 23702 - 94
12/Uists & Barra 7387 - 100 6600 - 89 6765 - 102
13/ Lochaber & W. 
Argyll 4236 _ 100 16586 _ 117 17597 _ 124
14/ Argyll Islands 7772 - 100 7617 - 98 7480 - 96
15/ Oban & Lorn 15162 - 100 15238 - 101 15078 - 99
16/ Mid Argyll & 
Kintyre 18716 _ 100 18022 — 96 18564 _ 99
17/ Dunoon & Cowal 16247 - 100 16533 - 102 16772 - 103
Total, Crofting
Counties277>948 100 277,334 100 283,449 _ 102
Source: H.I.D.B., 1971, Appendix VI
(The extent of the statistical areas 1-17 is shown on Map l)
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have been the decline in the rate of out-migration from the region. In 
1951“6l the annual net migration rate per 1000 was - 6.1 (rate for Scotland 
as a whole - -4*8) whereas in 1961-71 this rate was down to -0.4 (Scotland 
= -5*7) • Naturally not all parts of the Highlands fared equally well.
The Inverness area, Easter Ross and Lochaber showed the biggest increases 
and the population of Shetland was stabilised after decades of continuous 
depopulation. But Orkney and the Outer Hebrides continued to lose people. 
Regional unemployment figures were not so hopeful; from standing at about 
6.85k in 1965 they had risen to 8% by 1970 and 8,6% by 1971* This however 
must be seen against the background of increasing national unemployment in 
the same period and in fact the gap between the Scottish unemployment rate 
and the Highland one was narrowed between 1965 and 1971 (Scottish rate in 
1965 ■ 3% and in 1971 ■ 6%)»  ^ On the other hand with regard to personal 
incomes, though the figures here are less reliable, "it seems that there 
has been little or no narrowing in the income differential between the 
region and Scotland or Britain over the last five years" (i.e. 1965-70). ^
A similarly mixed picture emerges from a study of the changes in the 
various sectors of the economy. In agriculture there were decreases in the 
acreage of oats and in the number of sheep and of dairy cattle but increases 
in the acreage of barley and in the number of beef cattle; the number of 
full-time farm workers slumped by a drastic 34% between 1965 and 1970*
5
Forestry also employed less people though its acreage increased substantially. 
The amount and value of fish landings shows more variability but broadly it 
would seem that there was a decline in both white fish and herring landings 
between I966 and 1968 but a strong recovery thereafter so that by 1970 
the 1966 levels were exceeded; the
2. H.I.D.B., Sixth Report, 1971> Appendix VI, table 2.
3. H.I.D.B., 1971» Appendix VI, Graph I.
4. H.I.D.B. 1971, p.14. This might be due in part to a large percentage of
old people.
5* H.I.D.B., p.14 and Appendix VI, tables 4 and 5*
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increase continued in 1971* SEell-fish catches on the other hand were 
exceptionally good in 1969 and 1970 but declined in 1971.  ^ All the 
indicators of the amount of tourist activity e.g. road counts, number of 
cars carried on the Kylesta Ferry and the number of visitors to National 
Trust places of interest, showed steady increases throughout the period. ^
As with all such measures it is well nigh impossible to ascertain to 
what extent the change was caused by any single factor. Any or all of 
these changes might have occurred>had H.I.D.B. not existed. It could be 
argued for instance that the decline in out-migration and hence the popula­
tion increase was solely a result of the decline in ’pull* factors outwith 
0
the Highlands. This is not completely plausible however as it is certain
that there have been other periods since 1841 when ’pull* factors were as
weak yet depopulation was not stopped. It is a fair presumption that the
creation of-a special development board for the region weakened ’push*
factors by introducing new hope among those who might otherwise leave.
(Which is not of course to say that a decline in ’pull1 factors was not
operating at the same time). At least it is possible to say that one factor
which will in future complicate all efforts to%assess the Board’s success,
the discovery of North Sea oil, had not up until the end of 1971 had any
effect on the Highlands.
The fact that unemployment increased during their first five years does
engineer
not suggest that the Board was able to e _/jvr.-r any dramatic economic revival 
(hardly surprisingly) yet the gap between Highland and Scottish unemployment 
figures was closed and in the face of a big decline in the numbers employed 
in one of the most important electors of the Highland economy-agriculture.
6. H.I.D.B., 1971, Appendix VI, tables 6(a), (b) and (c).
7. H.I.D.B., 1971, Appendix VI, tables 7 (*), (c) and (d).
8. A point the Board were uneasily aware of; see H.I.D.B., 1971» P»13»
260
Against this it is difficult to maintain that the conditions of the 
Highlands would have'been much the same had nothing been done in 19^5 
but it can still be argued that either (a) a different Board or (b) no 
Board, but an equivalent amount of money, channelled through the County 
Development Officers, would have had better results. There is no sett-r 
ling this argument to everyone’s satisfaction (i must say that I am not . • 
convinced by it); all we can do is to look at the various ways in which il; 
has been claimed that the Board were particularly successful or unsuccess­
ful.
The most spectacular economic change that came to any area of the 
Highlands and Islands in the years 19&5-70 occurred in Shetland. De­
population came to an end and landingsof fish rose rapidly: by 1971 the
volume of white fish landed in Orkney and Shetland (Shetland being the 
senior partner by a long way) was 172% of its 1966 value (and in terms of
money c earned the increase was 252%). Even greater increases were recorded
9
for herring landings. Ays increasingly large amounts of fish began
to be processed locally a considerable amount of income was generated in 
the islands and there was agreement that Shetland was ’booming’. Once 
again it is not certain how far any change for the better can be attri­
buted to the existence of H.I.D.B., the Shetlanders’ own initiative and 
preparedness must earn much of the credit but, as was said in chapter 5> 
there is little doubt that Board money played an essential part, not so 
much in providing new boats - Shetland did not participate greatly in the 
Fisheries Development Scheme - but in assisting processing factories as 
well as helping the other parts of the economy such as knitwear and 
tourism. As assistance per head from H.I.D.B. was greater in Shetland 
than in any other Highland area (see chapter 5? Table VIIl) it would be 
difficult to argue that the boom was quite unrelated to the Board.
9. H.I.D.B., 1971» Appendix VI, tables 6 (a) and (b).
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(Though it is conceivable that the money could have been obtained from 
other sources).
More purely the Board*s own work and their most widely acclaimed 
success was the build up of the Western Isles fishing fleet. Starting 
from the basis provided by the Outer Isles Fisheries Training Scheme they 
succeeded in reviving Hebridean fisheries. As far as it went this policy 
seems to have me?ea^^universal approval until quite recently when a plan 
to extend the Fisheries Development Scheme (not limited to the Western 
Isles) was criticised by the Aberdeen economist G.A. MacKay on the grounds 
that there was simply no more room for expansion and that it would create 
an excess of boats in Highland waters. ^  The expansion of tourism is 
ai more controversial success. Once again how much of this was due to the 
Board is open to question. Perhaps increasing numbers of tourists would 
have poured into the Highlands anyway and it has to be remembered that 
the biggest tourist venture, the Aviemore complex, which opened in 1966, 
had nothing to do with H.I.D.B. On the other hand the Board put much 
money and energy into promotional campaigns, setting up local organisations, 
improving and extending accommodation, and assisting the expansion of 
tourist facilities. It would be strange if all this effort were quite 
unrelated to the tourist boom. The Board*s success is controversial 
because, as was noted in chapter 5» there are a number of people who con­
sider that tourism means Highland ruin not Highland development. MacKay 
is again a critic, contending that the extra employment generated by 
increased tourism is in fact small and, besides, that it is in direct 
opposition to **the expressed needs and wishes of local communities**.
Controversy also racks another candidate for the title of successful
10. G.A. MacKay in a letter to The Scotsman 14/2/73.
11. G.A. MacKay "Regional Development Problems; Scotland" in M. Broady (ed.), 
Marginal Regions (Bedford Square Press, 1973)> P*27* A recent Church of 
Scotland Report also criticised the Board*s support of tourism; see The 
Scotsman. 3^5/73.
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Board undertaking - Moray Firth Development. There are two quite serrate 
arguments against calling this a Board success: (i) that whatever develop­
ment occured there, was independent of the Board; and (ii) it was not some­
thing they should have been pursuing anyway. Taking the first argument, 
it is fair to say that between 1965 and the advent of North Sea Oil there 
was only one large-scale development in the area - British Aluminium's 
smelter (the other project the Board steadfastly pursued, a petro-chemical 
complex, never materialised) and, according to Ian Carter, an Aberdeen
sociologist," the Board played an insignificant part in the process leading
12to British Aluminium's decision to locate its smelter at Invergordon". 
Chapter 6 dealt with this episode in detail and I think shows that Carter 
is oversimplifying. True, the decision to set up an Aluminium industry 
in the first place, the choice of the aluminium companies to get smelter 
contracts, and the selection of sites were all out of Board hqnds. Never­
theless it was because the Board had "sold" the Cromarty Firth site to 
both Alcan and British Aluminium, months before the Government decision 
to give the go-ahead for smelters, that an Invergordon plant became such 
a strong probability from the start. It is open to anyone to insist 
that without all the Board's promotion and planning the Aluminium Companies 
would still have selected Invergordon because of its inherent advantages 
but it seems harsh simply to call the Boards role 'insignificant'. The 
second argument, that it was not the Board's job to develop the Moray 
Firth springs from the view that the success of the Board can only be 
judged by their activities in the remoter parts; we return to this point 
below.
One more major claim to success is often made for the Board and it 
is this claim that is most difficult to assess: that their existence
12. Ian Carter, "Six Years On: An Evaluative Study of H.I.D.B." Aberdeen
University Review. Vol.XLV, 1 (Spring, 1973)» P*73«
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produced a new spirit of hope and confidence in the Highlands. Nothing
less than a full-scale public opinion poll, and perhaps not even that,
could establish this point, but perhaps the dramatic fall in migration
rate is some argument in its favour. Apart from that we have to rely on
13the testimony of a number of different observers and perhaps also the 
fact that, to my knowledge at least, even the Board’s critics have not 
specifically denied the point.
What are the Board’s main failures? It ought to be said that a fair 
number of the criticisms of H.I.D.B. are either ill-informed, or parochial 
("our area is not getting enough assistance”), or involve personalities 
rather than actions, or are simply vague expressions of antipathy towards 
’’them” - the Government, the authorities, the powers that be. ^  In 
addition there are the not unnatural feelings of disappointment of those 
whose schemes have been turned down^who, resenting the probably sensible 
policy of the Board not to tell them why, manage to convince others that 
the real reason is that the Board are out of touch and do not really 
understand what the Highlands need (a theme common to many critics). ^
There may be cases where such points hace some validity but what we have 
to consider here are the broader policy failures, although like the 
successes many of these will be disputable.
Within the context of the generally successfuly fishing policy, the 
report on that policy ("In Great Waters") identified a number of areas 
of failure.1^ These are specified in chapter 5, and include such things
1 %  See for instance the B.B.C. "Current Account" programme on H.I.D.B. in 
Autumn 1970 (transcript available) and R.D. Lobban in The Scotsman 15/1/72.
14. This assertion is based on a number of conversationsand interviews.
Much of the material in this chapter necessarily comes from verbal sources 
and if no reference is given it can be assumed that the source i^ an inter — 
view.
15. See for instance an article on Mull in The Scotsman. 7/6/71.
16. H.I.D.B., Special Report 7> "In Great Waters" (1972).
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as the failure of processing factories and other short developments 
in Stornoway to increase at a rate matching the growth of the fishing 
fleet, and the lack of any advance at all in Caithness. Caithness is 
a failure from another point of view as well; described as one of the 
growth centres for manufacturing industry it seems to have made very 
little advance on this front either (see chapter 5) • In fact, while 
the Moray Firth area seems to have done well enough in picking up a 
number of small developments, neither of the two smaller growth points 
(the other being Fort William) seem to live up to their name. Members
17
of the Board itself have suggested that they failed to go hard enough for 
manufacturing industry at the beginning; although they gave more by way of 
financial assistance to this sector than any other, big promotional campaigns 
were not started until the end of the 1965-70 period.
In addition to these relatively minor criticisms there are those 
which take issue with the Board*s whole approach to Highland Development.
Most of these thorough-going criticisms fall naturally into one of a 
small number of groups composed of related points linked by a general 
conception of what Highland development should be about. One such group 
is centred round the idea of a special and valuable "Highland way of life" 
which should be preserved. The exponents of this view agree that depopu­
lation must be stopped and hence that employment must be increased - but 
not at the expense of making the Highlands like the rest of Britain. In 
the words of Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the second Chairman of H.I.D.B., "though
everyone is for development, it must be so carried out as not to change 
18
anything.1" The view has two components; one, more relevant to the
Western parts of the region, is concerned with the preservation of a
17. e.g. Prophet Smith and Sir James MacKay.
18. H.I.D.B., 1972, p.8.
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distinctive culture and of the Gaelic language. At its most extreme
romanticises
it the Gael and seeks to protect him from the 11 Commercial"
19and "competitive" values of the urban south. 7 The other component
concerns the preservation of the beauty and physical environment of the
Highlands. That Grieve himself had some sympathy with such views is
illustrated by his statement that the "primary objective" of Highland
development should be "to offer another perfectly possible way of life
20to that in the cities". But Grieve was ambivalent for he also talked
about "the introduction of major manufacturing urban complexes" as being
21the main hope for Highland economic revival and it was this aspect of
the Board’s thinking that was more visible to the critics.
The criticisms that were derived from the "Highland way of lifeM idea'
were various. Firstly there was the accusation that the Board did not
22care enough about 1 social development'. The retort of some Board
members was to ask, with a certain amount of justification, what was
meant by 'social development'. The details are not always clear but
it is undoubtedly connected to the belief that helping the economy,
bringing in jobs etc. is not enough and that wider social variables
23must be considered. It is true that the Board did give a certain
amount of money by way of 'social' grant and from 1967 employed a 
Consultant on community development but I think it is fair to say that
19. There is a letter expressing this point of view in the Glasgow Herald.
3/2/73.
20. Sir Robert Grieve, "Problems & Objectives in the Highlands and Islands", 
in J. Ashton & W.H. Long (eds.), The Remoter Rural Areas of Britain 
(Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd for the Agricultural Adjustment Unit, 1972), p.143. 
Grieve made a very similar statement in H.I.D.B. 1966, Foreword.
21. The Scotsman. 20/1/66.
22. e.g. Carter, p.75-77; the previously mentioned Church of Scotland report 
(The Scotsman 30/5/73); and a letter in The Scotsman. 30/6/73*
23. Which Carter accused the Board of not doing in their Kildonan report, 
see Ian Carter, "The Highland Board and Strath Kildonan", Catalyst.
Spring 1972.
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they did not consider non-economic development as being a very important 
part of their function. They tended rather to take the view that their 
job was mainly to provide economic opportunities and let people make of 
them what they would.
A closely related criticism was that the Board had a negative attitude 
to Gaelic. One of the first objections, made to H.I.D.B. was that it con­
tained no member who spoke Gaelic. ^  The sin was compounded when, in a 
television programme, Grieve undiplomatically said that, unfortunate though
it was, he saw no future for the language. The outcry was immediate, An
OR
Comunn Gaidhealach were sharply critical, and they remained cool to­
wards the Board for a long time afterwards. Grieve regretted his frank­
ness but the Board continued to insist that their job was not to prop up 
Gaelic.
The use of Gaelic and hence the most distinctive "Highland way of
life" is confined to the remoter Western parts of the Highlands and, to a
greater extent, the Islands. From this springs what is perhaps the most
controversial criticism of the Board: that they have not managed to do
much for these parts or, worse, that they have deliberately favoured the 
26east. Right at the beginning of the Board's life Grieve wrote, "No
matter what success is achieved in the eastern or central Highlands ....
the Board will be judged by its ability to hold the population in the true 
27crofting areas". Both he and most of the other Board members consider
that they accepted this challenge and reject any accusation to the contrary.
24. Made by the Chief of Inverness Gaelic Society; see Inverness Courier. 
5/4/66.
25. Inverness Courier. 21/10/66.
26. MacKay, p.27, makes the milder version of this criticism. The stronger 
one was made by one of the people interviewed for the "Current Account" pro­
gramme. In one or other of the two versions the criticism is in fact quite 
common.
27. H.I.D.B., 1966, p.5; the phrase is a quote from a paper submitted to the
Board by Grieve.
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They say that the money they spent in, say, Skye or the Outer Isles
compares well with that spent in any other area, they point out that
setting up the Fisheries Development Scheme was one of their first
actions, and they mention the bulb scheme as a bold and determined (if
in the end unsuccessful) attempt to bring development to the West,
Furthermore they can point to the fact that depopulation did cease
in many of the Mtrue crofting areas" between 1966 and 1971 (see Table
XIII and below).
These are good points but the argument is impossible to resolve
finally because it involves a clash of basic priorities. To many of
the partisans of the west, almost all of the development effort should
have been concentrated there and practically any attention paid to«.the
28more prosperous parts was too much. The Board on the other hand
interpreted its duty as developing the whole region and as their
practice was guided by the precept of "encouraging local economic
29enterprise wherever and whatever it might be" - which unfortunately 
often meant in the Moray Firth area and not in the Western Isles.
A very similar strand of criticism concerns the Board's "growth 
point" policy and in particular Moray Firth development. There are 
two aspects to this, one from the point of view of the non-growth points 
and the other from the point of view of the growth points. Taking the 
latter first, as far as I am aware there were no objections from Lochaber 
or Caithness to being labelled "growth points" but, as we have seen in 
chapter 6, some people in the Moray Firth area were not at all happy 
about being in a "growth point" when they saw what it entailed. The
28. This seems to be the view of D. Thomson in "The Highland Dilemna: 
Redevelopment or Re—exploitation", Scottish International, May—June—July,
1973, p.20-21.
29. Grieve in Ashton and Long, p.137*
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criticisms of the Board on this score have already been discussed in the
last chapter and need not be repeated here.
The first aspect of the criticism is essentially that a vigorous
and effective growth point policy would necessarily draw people from
30the remoter parts. Against this the Board argue that they drew
up a list of "industrial holding points” in the Crofting north and west
to balance the three growth points. If one of the growth points had
really boomed, as has happened to the Cromarty Firth since the North
Sea Oil rush, it is unlikely that these ”holding points” would have had
much effect (there is evidence to suggest a flow of people from the west
to the oil-related developments of Easter Ross ^); but as this did not
happen between 1965 1970 the non-growth points were notdenuded of
people. In fact if we look at the population change in the crofting
areas between 1966 and 1971 it can be seen that (while Lewis and Harris
lost people), Shetland, Sutherland, Wester Ross, the Uists and Barra,
Lochaber, and the Ardnamurchan/Morven areas of Argyll all either held their
population or, more frequently, increased it. In the previous decade
none of these areas except Lochaber had seen population increases.
Curiously, Orkney and the Argyllshire Islands, which are not major croft-
32ing areas, continued to depopulate.
To sum up the issue between the Board and its detractors whose 
criticisms fall in this first group, it can be said that the Board*s 
primary concern was the long term economic revival of the Highlands and, 
despite Grieve*s phrase about "adding another perfectly possible way of 
life to that in the great cities”, what this amounted to in practice was 
pursuing developments that made the region more like the rest of Britain.
30. Carter (1973)» p.69-70.
31. Thomson, p.20.
32. See Table XIII.
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The critics on the other hand were less concerned with economies and more
with maintaining Highland distinctiveness.
The second group of criticisms derives from the perception of the '
Board as a "remote” and "bureaucratic" body. Among the views in this
group was a general objection to centralised direction or planning. The
main thrust of the argument was that local communities should be allowed
to have a greater say in their own development and to participate in it.
The Board should at least make greater efforts to gain contact with ordinary
Highlanders, for instance by decentralising and having field officers. In
the extreme case H.I.D.B. was accused of having a "Colonial mentality", of
being a creature of the central government set up to administer the natives
whether they liked it or not, or even of being "powerhung]^" and seeking
34control over the whole of the Highlands. ' In this extreme form the 
criticism is unfair, anything done by a body like the Board is likely to 
displease somebody but this does not mean that the "people’s wishes" are 
being ignored; on the contrary, much of what H.I.D.B. did pleased many 
people. Nevertheless the Board did feel vulnerable to this sort of 
criticism, perhaps because they were a completely appointed body, and 
members were quidk to point out that they or their members of staff often 
made visits to various parts of the region and spoke with local people.
Grieve has even asserted that in their willingness to hear and act Qn 
local advice the Board was more democratic than the average local authority.
On decentralisation and the creation of field officers there was no 
difference of principle between the Board and its critics — if anything 
the division is within the Board. Grieve has said that his original hope
35. Adrian Varwell, "Community Development Projects - Scotland: Highlands and 
Islands Communities", in Broady. Varwell is criticising central government in 
general rather than the Board in particular.
34. Grieve reported the accusation of the Board being a colonial body (in an 
interview), the quote about power hungriness was made at the 1969 Public Ehquiry 
into the Amendment of Ross & Cromarty's development plan (The Scotsman, 3/4/69).
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had been to set up local funds which would give small amounts of financial 
assistance on the basis of "good character". The idea however was not 
accepted by the Scottish office, worried about public money. He regarded 
field officers as inevitable, just a matter of time, and saw the Shetland 
office as the first step in that direction. Not all Board members agree - 
Smith's view is that they would be unnecessary and that the Board's strength 
lies in having a body of experts concentrated at Inverness. ^
Another criticism in the second group is that the Board is slow moving, 
inefficient and surrounded by red tape. This criticism only emerged to­
wards the end of the 1965-70 period and is probably a simple function of 
size. V/hether the accusations are just, that is, whether H.I.D.B. is more 
slow-moving wtoc. than any other organisation of its type is difficult to 
say, but it should be remembered that the necessity to consult with a 
plethora of other bodies cannot but slow things up.
The third group of criticisms may loosely be labelled "conservative" for 
reasons that I hope will be obvious. The conception of the Board in this 
case was of a hopelessly impractical set of people pursuing hairbrained 
ideas - or as Lord Lovat put it,of engaging in "crackpot" schemes (among 
which he included taking an interest in the search for North Sea oil, then 
undiscovered). ^  Russell Johnston has said that one of the commonest 
criticisms of the Board that he encountered concerned their supposed.tendency
to give financial assistance to "dubious" characters or projects. A certain
made
amount of criticism of this sort came from local businessmen who had/ their
37way without Board assistance and disliked the thought of pampered competition, 
but much of it was a product of hard-headed caution. In fact the figures
35. Information fron interviews. Robert Storey, the Board's "Social Research 
& Development" officer is also very much in favour of decentralising, see 
Broady, p.100.
36. People's Journal, 25/5/68.
37* Sunday Telegraph. 14/1/68.
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for Board losses, already given (in chapter 5) simply do not bear out this 
criticism, and the Comptroller and Auditor General has never found any 
H.I.D.B. financial mismanagement serious enough to refer to the Public 
Accounts Committee. This same strand of conservative criticism also in­
cluded the view that the Board were not taking enough interest in "indi­
genous resources", chiefly meaning agriculture, and were obsessed with 
"unsuitable" importations such as petro-chemical complexes; which takes 
us back to M.F.D.^
Associated with the above views and usually voiced by the same people, 
was the criticism that the first Board (i.e. from 1965-70) consisted of a 
poor set of people, for the most part impractical and lacking the necessary 
business experience. They were, the argument goes on, basically 'political
appointees'. The last point was examined in chapter 4 and cannot seriously
. Itautological
be sustained (except in the / sense that all appointments made by
a politician will necessarily be political). As for the Board's imprac­
ticability there is little evidence for it, though of course it is possible 
to continue to believe that a group with more business experience would 
have done ttetter. In the extreme form of the argument it has been claimed
39that not only the Board's members but their staff were political appointees.
Apart from the inherent implausibility of this, it has been implicitly denied 
by Sir Andrew Gilchrist who has said that he found no need to change any of 
the heads of departments who were there when he became Chairman. That such 
a thing could be believed is indicative of the suspicion felt for the Board 
in some quarters. Gilchrist told the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs
38. References to the numerous criticisms of the Board's agricultural policies 
were given in chapter 5. In general the Inverness Courier leaders contain a 
good expression of the "conservative’' feeling about Highland development.
39. A claim made by John Rollo of all people (in an interview). It should be 
remembered that Rollo felt himself the odd-man-out on the Board (see his position 
OH M.F.D. in chapter 6) and agreed with many of the criticisms described above.
r
272
that before becoming Chairman he "was conscious of the fact that the Board 
was by no means popular with land proprietors in the Highlands". ^  As 
the Board was notable more for its failure to attack landed interests than 
otherwise (see below), such unpopularity can only reflect a dislike of the 
"Socialist" origins of H.I.D.B.
If those of conservative tendencies disliked the Board’s Socialist 
origins, radicals criticised it for precisely opposite reasons: for failing
to live up to these origins. Such criticisms constitute a fourth and final 
group. Many of the most enthusiastic supporters of the creation of a de­
velopment board in 1965 saw it as a bold new socialist experiment. ^
Five years later they were rather disappointed and tended to criticise the 
Board for not using its powers vigorously enough in one or more of three 
ways: (i) over the question of land ownership; (ii) in setting up businesses 
at their own hand; and (iii) in the field of economic planning.
The radical view on the land question was that a complete land use 
plan should be prepared and powers of compulsory purchase used to tackle
A 0
uncooperative landowners. As the Board's first commitment was to in­
creasing employment, land use problems were not given a high priority and 
although studies of Mull and Kildonan were started, that was the nearest 
they got to a land use plan. It has already been said that the Board- and 
especially Grieve - were not enthusiastic about compulsory purchase in any 
circumstances as they had no desire to get involved in a difficult battle. 
They did not rule it out altogether, however, but decided that when they 
first used it, it would have to be over a piece of land large enough to make
40. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1971-72, Sub-Committee A, 
Minutes of Evidence of H.I.D.B., (H.C.51-X), p.278.
41. K. Alexander, "Commanding Highlands", New Statesman. 8/IO/65.
42. Ibid.
273
it worth while. It is their claim that although they came across small 
pockets of land that they would have been justified in purchasing compul­
sorily, a suitably large parcel of land never found. Such a cautious
attitude has naturally brought criticism from those who place more importance
43on the land question. '
If not getting involved with land use was a matter of Board policy, 
not setting up more of their own businesses was more a matter of constraints. 
The chief constraints were two: money and managers. Under any government
the Treasury takes a severe view of the loss of public money and a project 
launched by the Board because no private developer would take it must ob­
viously be highly risky. (The Treasury also like private involvement in 
a project as an independent check on its viability). But Grieve has 
claimed that it was not lack of money that was the major constraint but 
lack of managerial ability in the region. It is difficult to set up a new 
business unless suitable management is available and in at least two of the 
cases where the Board was closely involved with an enterprise - Gaelfish and 
Ice Atlantic - management difficulties posed a major problem.
The Board's failure, for whatever reason, to act radically on the 
question of land and the setting up of its own businesses led Ian Carter 
in his article on H.I.D.B., "Six Years On", to declare that they should not 
be viewed "as a thrusting dynamic combination of research agency and action 
agency on the Tennessee Valley Authority model but rather as a fairly passive 
milch-cow". ^  Similarly in another assessment of the Board's first six 
years, Chris Baur, The Scotsman's Industrial Correspondent, declared that 
H.I.D.B. began as "an experiment in Socialism itself", a weapon for "storming 
the citadels of free enterprise and of confronting the landowning interests
43. e.g. Carter (1972); letter in The Scotsman, 22/8/73-
44. Carter (1973)» P*73»
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which have regarded the Highlands as their privileged sanctuary". As such,
Baur claimed, it failed because it "quite soon ceased to be 50% of what it
4 5
was intended to be". On a less grandiose plane the Board has been
criticised by Robert Maclennan M.P. for not engaging in any indicative 
economic planning and earlier, in 1968, Professor K.J.W. Alexander had 
strongly urged such planning on them. ^
It can hardly be disputed that these critics are quite right in saying 
that H.I.D.B. has not become a Socialist weapon, a disposeesor of the lairds, 
a powerful planning body,or whatever, but it can be asked just to what extent 
these things were ever intended, and, perhaps more geannanely, how likely they 
ever were? Any final assessment of the Board is necessarily a personal 
matter and I must state that I find many of the criticisms of them miscon­
ceived. In my view the more root-and-branch critics are fundamentally mis­
taken about what was at all likely. I contend that what the Board did and 
what it became was broadly speaking inevitable; in the neatt section, among 
other things, I will try to defend this assertion.
H.I.D.B. and the Policy Process
Let us return to the model of the policy process discussed in chapter 1 - 
the gradual move from highly general and usually unanalysed statements of 
intent through a series of choices until specific commitments are reached.
This process, we saw, can be illustrated diagrammatically by a "tree" of 
possible future choices. In the present case, once the problem had been 
perceived, the "tree" had four main forks: whether to have a development
board or not, what sort of board to have - in terms of powers, remit etc.» 
the Strategy of the Board, and their tactics. Starting with problem
45. Chris Baur, "Political Failure of the Highland Board", The Scotsman.
14/6/73.
46. Scottish Trad. Union Congress, Report of 7th Highland & Islands Conference
(1968), p.31.
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perception let us look at each of these stages in turn.
The Highlands have been perceived as a problem for the Central government 
at least as far back as the 18th Century (and almost certainly before that) 
but the nature of the problem has not always been the same. As was said 
in chapter the 18th century problem was seen in military terms - how to 
pacify the Highlands, The Government response was a combination of re­
pressive measures - e.g, the banning of the tartan - and attempts to turn 
Highlanders away from <viixLesnce by encouraging them to take up 1 industrious1 
pursuits (or to channel their martial tendencies in approved ways by getting 
them to join Highland regiments). By the end of the century the area was 
no longer a military threat and successive governments began to forget about 
it until the acute famine of the middle of the 19th century. Continued 
misery and (by the 1880's) actual unrest forced attention back to the 
problems of the Highlands - this time perceived as being those of rural 
poverty and congestion. The responses by the government to this problem 
can be seen from the names of some of the bodies set up to deal with it 
e.g. the Congested Districts Board and the Crofters Emigration Commission.
It was really only after the First World War that the problem began to
be perceived as one of depopulation rather than congestion. Once this step
had been taken and the general remedy of improving economic opportunities
identified (rather than creating viable small farms),the question of a
development board became relevant. Summarising the early part of chapter 4»
we can say that the Liberals began the debate in 1928 and it was taken up at
a more official level by the Scottish Economic Committee in the late ’thirties.
However the issue did not have any great importance until after 1950 when
the S.T.U.C. and the Scottish Council of the Labour Party became interested
it
and successfully urged/on Labour as official policy. The Tories resisted 
S.T.U.C. arguments on the grounds that an independent board could do little 
good and would confuse administrative arrangements. The debate was finally
27 6
ended with the 1964 Labour victory.
The sort of Board it was to be had largely been decided upon in the 
preceding discussion and it was further refined as the Bill went through 
the Commons. The S.T.U.C. had pressed for a body similar to a New Town 
Corporation and that is something like what emerged: an organisation
independent of both the local authorities and the Scottish Office, directed 
by a small executive Board appointed by the Secretary of State, and equipped 
with a formidable array of potential powers, ( though unlike a New Town 
Corporation, H.I.D.B. had no planning or infrastructural powers). An 
appointed rather than an elected body had been decided on in order that the 
Board could have men suitably equipped for the job and able to devote all 
their energy to it (also a reason for making members full-time). There 
was very little opposition to this provision. The extensive powers, a^more 
controversial matter, were given because Labour were determined to create a 
body that would be able to pursue any development it thought fib. Several 
other factors of considerable importance also determined the sort of Board 
it was to be in practice: the fact that it replaced no existing body with
executive powers; the need to get the approval of the Secretary of State and 
the Treasury before anything substantial was done; and its relatively small 
budget hedged about by restrictions as to how it could be used.
The other aspect of the policy choice at this stage was the remit of 
the new Board. The Act is notably vague about this,merely insisting on the 
double nature of the Board's work - to improve social and economic conditions 
in the Highlands and to help the region to play a more effective part in the 
development of the nation. What the government intended the Board to do was 
not made any more precise during the course of the parliamentary debates on 
the Highland Development Bill. Ross and Willis refused to commit themselves 
to anything specific, to the point of being accused by Michael Noble of
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having ’’absolutely no ideas ... about how to deal with this problem". ^
The conclusion is inescapable that the new Secretary of State and his 
associates only had the haziest ideas of what was expected of the Board be­
yond that most unanalysed and unexceptionable of abstractions, 'development1.
However it is, I think, clear that the Labour leaders were not expecting a
radical attack on the whole landowning system. Carter’s tentative im-
48
plications to the contrary are contradicted by Ross's cautious approach
in the debate on the Bill and the Opposition's decision not to force a 
49division. Further evidence of the Government's ’’moderate” intention
is provided by the men they appointed to be the Board's first members - 
hardly the men who would have been chosen if the Board was to be an in­
strument of radical change in land ownership - and by the fact that the
Secretary of State gave the new Board no instructions other than a sugges­
tion that they achieve some visible results as soon as possible.
Thus H.I.D.B. began life with no clear directions as to what sort of 
'development' it should pursue, but at the same time with a formidable set 
of limiting factors: the need to go at least some way to ending depopula­
tion in order to be credible; a relatively small budget not wholly under 
its own control; numerous other administrative institutions, with their 
own policies, in this same field; an expectation that they should show 
results quickly; and a area whose prospects for development were decidely 
limited.
The next stage in the policy process was the choice of strategy. The
47. H.C. Deb, Vol. 714, Col. 1040.
48. Carter (1973), P*58 and 76.
49. And also by George Willis (the Minister of State in 1965) who said, in an 
interview, that the Board under Grieve had done the sort of things they had 
expected it to do.
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Board tock. one step away from ■unexceptionable sentiments anc towcrds the 
"terror of action** bux continued to hedge its bets: tourism, forestry
and manufacturing were the "three great props" for the region's economy 
but fishing "is very important ... in certain island and other communities" 
and in agriculture "the Board will back any move in the direction of more 
production". Major growth points must be generated but the Board also has 
to "hold population in the true crofting areas". A major urban centre is 
desirable around the Moray Firth yet there is also the aim "of adding 
another perfectly possible way of life to that in the great cities".
ISiough made less explicit two themes run through this strategy and through 
the Board's subsequent actions: the overriding need to bring in more jobs
to all parts of the Highlands and the necessity of supporting initiative 
wherever it is found. Given the Board's circumstances there is a strong
sense of the inevitable about these two commitments. How would it be
possible to prevent depopulation without providing jobs for people in their
own areas? And, in an area with such meagre resources and lack of entre­
preneurs as the Crofting Counties, could the Board afford to ignore initiative
51that looked promising whatever its source?
Equally inevitable (it seems to me) were a large proportion of the 
Board's specific commitments - the final stage of the policy tree. They 
gave most grants and loans to manufacturing and tourism, for manufacturing is, 
almost without doubt, the greatest producer of jobs, and in many areas 
tourism was about the only activity that looked as if it stood a chance of 
success - or at least the only one that the Board could find people to
50. The various quotes are from H.I.D.B., 1966, Foreword and p. 1-5 and 
H.I.D.B., 1967, p.14-15*
51. Some would say that they did hut that is because there is plenty of room 
for disagreement about what looks "promising".
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undertake. Many of the new manufacturing enterprises came to the Moray 
Firth area because, of all parts of the Highlands, it had the most to offer - 
and the Board could not have risked driving firms away by trying to force 
them to go elsewhere. There was a big build-up of fishing in the Y.estem 
Isles because it was absolutely necessary that something be done for these 
parts and fishing looked the most promising. Shetland received the most 
help from the Board because here was the greatest concentration of initiative. 
Agriculture, at first the Cinderella of the economic sectors because of its 
inability to offer much hope of increased employment, eventually forced it­
self on the Board as much as anything because of the need to satisfy the 
agricultural interests that they were not being forgotten.
The same mark of inevitability stands over much that they did not do.
To criticise them for not engaging in economic planning or analysis, though 
perhaps valid now, hardly has any relevance in the early years when the 
need was to act and to establish themselves as something other than one of 
the interminable commissions investigating Highland conditions. Their 
failure to take over any land springs directly from the political and 
economic costs of such a move together with the likelihood that it would 
provide little in the way of jobs or return on capital. Their stress on 
the ’economic1 as opposed to the 'social' aspects of development is a result 
of a belief - difficult to quarrel with - that without a means of livelihood 
communities would collapse anyway. As for the criticism that they never 
really tried any socialist experimenting, I doubt if Ross and the other 
Labour leaders had the necessary political will for that to have been a 
genuine possibility. Certainly it would have taken far more money than 
the Board received and an ability to direct the other administrative bodies 
in the area.
Lack of resources, lack of entrepreneurs and a perceived need for 
increased employment and immediate action - theaeffaciars alone serve to
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explain much of what the Board did and did not do. But not everything.
It would be going too far to rule out altogether the element of personal 
choice by the Board and declare that whoever had been appointed the same 
things would have been done. Clearly, assessments of the viability of 
invividual projects is to some extent a personal matter, and with a different 
Board different projects may have been supported. (But within limits, the 
Board did not have all that much choice). More significantly there were 
two major abd controversial schemes that were far from being "inevitable" - 
the attempt to attract big developments to the Moray Firth and the building 
of hotels in the Western Isles. It has already been said that because of 
its advantages the Moray Firth area would certainly have benefited most 
from new firms starting up, but that does not mean that the Board was bound 
to go out and try and attract multi-million pound projects like petro­
chemical complexes; this was a genuinely individual decision by the Board 
and one that we saw divided it deeply. Similarly, though I cannot accept 
that H.I.D.B. really had any choice over whether to support increased tourism 
or not, they were not bound to build their own hotels in the remoter Western 
areas.
I have drawn a highly, perhaps exaggeratedly, deterministic picture of 
the development of H.I.D.B. policy, stressing all the time the force of 
circumstances and playing down the role of personal choice. The result 
is no doubt an over-simplification but I believe it is a more realistic one 
than that which exaggerates the options open to the Board and praises 
(or more usually, castigates) them for taking the ones they did. I should 
perhaps stress that I am not asserting the existance of any inexorable 
’’historical forces" before which human beings are mere puppets. I am only 
saying that, given the situation in which they found themselves, many (but 
not all) of the Board's choices were those that it was highly probable that 
they would make irrespective of personalities; and while it is not absurd»to
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criticise them for in fact making these choices, it is to pay insufficient 
attention to the constraints they faced. To relate my claims about "in­
evitability" (in this rather weak sense) to the "tree" of possible choices,
I would say that, while the various choices were possibilities, circumstances 
loaded the dice strongly in favour of one group of them.
The "inevitability" hypothesis creates somewhat of a paradox however: 
how was it, if much of what the Board did was inevitable, that those who 
supported it at first were later disappointed? The answer is probably that 
the irosnaalysddnature of the phrase 'social and economic development1 left a 
lot of room for wishful thinking. As long as the circumstances in which 
the new Board would find itself were not properly analysed it was possible 
for those who disliked tourism, say, to ignore the fact that it would be 
well nigh impossible for any development board to give up such a potential 
source of economic growth, or for those who wanted to see the remoter parts 
developed to forget that - as long as the crofting counties were the de­
velopment unit - they would always be in competition with the more favoured 
Moray Firth area. So it was that many different visions of Highland develop­
ment could coalesce behind H.I.D.B. only to be divided again by the Board's 
actions.
Halations with the Political and Administrative Environment
A biological analogy might be used: a new organism, a mutation, is
b o m  and immediately begins a struggle for survival; if it can adapt to 
its environment it will survive, otherwise not. The analogy has its 
limitations when applied to H.I.D.B., the biological struggle is essentially 
to eat and avoid being eaten whereas the need of a body like the Board is 
for political support, not quite the same. Besides we can see with the 
clarity of hindsight that at least since it weathered the Thomson affair
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there has been little likelihood of the Board actually ceasing to exist.
(This has not always been apparent, there were many who wondered about the 
Board’s future after the Conservative election victory in 1970). It would 
be very difficult for any Government to end its existence now because of 
the immediate outcry from the Highlands (with reverberations elsewhere) 
that they were once again being abandoned. As Sir Andrew Gilchrist has 
said, the one thing that would unite all Highlanders behind the Board would 
be a threat to its survival. But if we replace "survival" with "emascula­
tion" the analogy becomes more relevant: it would be quite possible for
the Board to be kept in existence but reduced to a mere shadow. Unfortun­
ately whereas there can be no doubt whether a body has survived or not, 
emasculation is more problematic. It could be argued that as one of the 
Board’s most distinctive features, its great powers arcar ..land the obtaining 
of information, have never been used it has in fact been emasculated already. 
Against this it can be said that the powers still exist and might be used
yet and that where Government support really shows, in the supply of finance,
52the Board has gone from strength to strength. ' Personally I find these 
latter arguments the more convincing and if the Board has not been effectively 
emasculated then it must have successfully adapted to its environment.
In chapter one we characterised that environment as consisting of three 
levels - the Scottish Office and other central departments above, statutory 
bodies and the local authorities on the same level as the Board, interest 
groups and the public below. Each level brings its own problems of adaptation. 
The most acute differences between the Scottish Office and H I.D.B. occurred 
in the context of M.F.D., and were explored in chapter 6, It was in this 
context that the differences in perspective and style between the two bodies 
were most clearly brought out: the Scottish Office cautious, taking the
52. See Appendix.
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"national view", concerned about the expenditure of public money and the
possibility of the Board exceeding its jurisdiction; the Board eager to
strike out, to try bold but risky new ventures and generally to "think bign
(as H.I.D.B, staff put it in a telegran supporting Grieve at the time of
Mahon's speech ).
Since those days relations have been more amicable. The Board never
gave up its1entreprenurial'spirit but after 1967 was less radical (or
merely more diplomatic?) in its proposals - a fact probably connected with
the departure of John Robertson and Frank Thomson. For its part the
Scottish Office learnt to accept the Board's ways while not losing the
desire to prevent things from getting out of hand. Points of friction still
remained however: the Board chafed somewhat at Scottish Office controls and
sought more autonomy, particularly in financial matters. In their evidence
to the Commission on the Constitution they said that, "we have found that
the central government machine is in the main too ready to control executive
54work at regional level"; and to the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs 
they expressed the desire to have more say in the writing-off of moderate 
losses, to be able to decide on the numbers and salaries of their employees 
without continual reference to the Scottish Office, and to have more flex­
ibility in the deployment of interest rates instead of being rigidly tied to 
B.O.T.A.C., (a rule they considered had been applied more flexibly in the 
early years of their life). ^  They also complained that they were treated 
as just one of the bodies to be consulted on matters relating to the
56Highlands whereas they thought they should be treated as the major body.
53. Glasgow Herald 2/9/67.
54. Commission on the Constitution, Minutes of Evidence IV - Scotland (1971), 
p.144.
55. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1969-70, Minutes of Evidence 
of H.I.D.B. (H.C. 267-1), p.40-41.
56. Ibid, p.43.
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It is clear that by 1970, though the mutual adaptation of H.I.D.B. and the 
Scottish Office had gone far enough to prevent open conflict, there 
remained an ineradicable difference in what was perceived as the Board*s 
proper place in the administrative structure.
The "Scottish Office" loosely referred to above means the civil 
servants in that department; the politicians, with certain exceptions 
(e.g. Ross at the time of Thomson's resignation, Mabon when he made his 
controversial speech), do not seem to have played an important independent 
role. For instance, Ross followed bis officials in being sceptical about 
M.F.D. in 1967; later he told Grieve that he had been wrong but had been 
badly advised.
Apart from the Scottish Office the Board had only slight contact with 
the central departments. The ubiquitous Treasury was always a factor to 
be considered but negotiations with it were conducted by the Scottish Office. 
H.I.D.B. was associated directly with the Ministry of Technology on the 
Caithness Working Party; the Ministry of Labour (and successors) assisted 
with project Counterdrift; and there was an agreement with the Board of Trade 
defining the respective roles of the two bodies in giving financial assistance 
to Highland developments.
The second group of relationships, between the Board and other bodies 
at the same level, was conditioned by the multi-organisational nature of 
public administration - the situation in which all administrative functions 
(e.g. assistance to agriculture, the promotion of tourism) are the province 
of parts of several different organisations. In the case of the Highlands 
the two chfcdf problems caused by this situation were those of "fitting in" 
new bodies and of coordination. As a new body in 1965 Board faced the
problem of fitting in - that is of finding itself a place in each of the 
various policy areas relevant to development and defining its relationships 
with the organisations already operating there. We saw in chapter 5 that 
this process was not always achieved without friction; there was, for instance^
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the disagreement with the Tourist Board and the initial hostility of
the fishing authorities towards the Fisheries Development Scheme. Relations
wit&fcrofters Commission were not of tfce best either; the two bodies did not
quarrel about anything substantial but the Commission considered that they
were simply ignored. In fact the Board was accused by hostile critics of
being jealous of its status, unwilling to cooperate and interested in
5 7boosting its own image. Once again different perceptions play a parts
from the Board's side it seemed that the existing bodies were simply upset 
because their own position in the pecking order had been disturbed.
It is not possible to generalise about relations with the local author­
ities as these varied from case to case. The best relations seem to have 
been with Ross and Cromarty County Council as that Council was an .enthusias­
tic supporter of M.F.D.,working hand in hand with the Board to bring industry 
to Invergordon. Relations were perhaps worst with Inverness-shire, possibly 
because several large landowners hostile to the Board as it was constituted, 
e.g. Lords Burton and Lovat, were prominent on the Council. Even a© there 
were no serious clashes between Inverness-shire and the Board and the worst 
the Board said about any local authority was that there were one or two 
cases of undue delays over planning permission for projects they thought 
important.
Considering that one of the chief reasons the Royal Commission on 
Scottish Affairs had given for rejecting the idea of a Highland development 
board and the main argument used by subsequent Conservative Secretaries of 
State for not setting one up was that it would clash with existing bodies and 
sap the powers of the local authorities, the bureaucratic warfare actually
57. For mild criticism along these lines see P. Wass, "Rural Development in 
the Highlands of Scotland", Journal of Administration Overseas.Vol.X (July 1971) 
and, for a stronger statement, Lord Lovat in People's Journal 25/5/68.
58. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1969-70, Minutes of Evidence 
of H.I.D.B. (H.C.267-1), p.34.
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brought about by the creation of H.I.D.B. does not seem to be excessive.
Of course there were territorial skirmishes but the bad feeling produced
by them did not lead to anything resembling an administrative crisis. Most
of the friction produced when the Board was a new arrival was dissipated as
it became an accepted part of the landscape and even newer bodies (e.g.
the Countryside Commission) had to be digested. However the potential
for organisational clashes remains as long as there are a variety of bodies
with remits to do rather different things; for exampleTS&e slopes of Cairngorm
passed into the Board*s hands (in 1971) there has been a clash with the
Hature conservancy who wished to conserve what the Board were anxious to 
59develop.
The other problem iS coordination. Sometimes lack of coordinaUwa arises 
from what looks suspiciously like buck passing. In the Raasay case for in­
stance the Board, having put forward its development plans, refrained from do­
ing anything until the County Council and S.D.D. had provided a ferry.
Sometimes there is no coordination because the two or more bodies concerned do
not wish to cooperate, but as often as not coordination problems arise, with 
the best will in the world on all sides, simply because of the sheer practical 
difficulties involved. J.S. Grant, Chairman of the Crofters Commission, 
pointed out that coordinating the activities of his Commission and H.I.D.B. 
was difficult because whereas the Commission was organised by area, each area 
Commissioner having responsibility for all the.Commission*s activities, H.I.D.B. 
was organised by function and concentrated in Inverness, so that there were 
no equivalent people in both organisations who could keep in touch regularly 
(except at the very top). R.A. Faskin, the Board*s Secretary has described 
situations where the number of bodies to be coordinated became so great that 
it was a problem simply finding a room large enough to hold all their
59. Glasgow Herald, 20/1/72.
i
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representatives and a time suitable for everybody. The result, not 
surprisingly, is a temptation for each organisation to work independently 
and to hope its activities are not at cross purposes with those of another 
body. Attempts to overcome this problem by having overlapping memberships 
of the various organisations (e.g. a member of H.I.D.B. is also a member of 
the Countryside Commission) does not really seem to work and short of making 
the situation less multi-organisational - perhaps by combining a lot of the 
bodies into one or by defining their spheres of action more precisely so that 
there are less overlapping responsibilities - it is difficult to think of a 
solution.
Thirdly we have the Board*s relationship with the lowest level of its 
political environment - the public, organised in the form of interest groups 
or amorphous as "public opinion". If, as I showed in the first section of 
this chapter, those whose hopes were highest for H.I.D.B. in 1965 were dis­
appointed five years later then, equally, the people who were most suspicious 
or sceptical of the Board at the beginning had been won round by 1970 (or at 
least become relatively neutral on the question). It is obviously difficult 
to be precise about the changing pattern of public support for the Board as, 
in the absence of any survey data, all impressions are necessarily subjective. 
Grieve's view is that at beginning H.I.D.B. faced "wary defensiveness, and 
even sometimes acute suspicion" but by 1968-69 this had been transformed into 
"a sort of wish you well atmosphere". My own feeling, gleaned from the
press, is that, despite the suspicions of a minority, the Board was accorded 
a general and, not uncommonly, enthusiastic welcome to begin with but that 
their popularity slumped in the dark days of the Thomson controversy. 1968 
brought them a substantial comeback and since then the public attitude has 
been increasingly marked by growing indifference; By 1970 (and since) I
60. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1969-70, Minutes of Evidence 
of H.I.D.B. (H.C.267-1), p.46-47.
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would say that there was a general acceptance of the need for a Highland 
development board but very little excitement over t : H.I.D.B.'s activities.
Whatever the facts about the level of public support, there can be 
little doubt that the Board, while surrounded by critics (as we have seen), 
had very few enemies at the end of its first five years of existence - there 
were very few people, that is, who actually wanted to see it destroyed. It 
is probable on the face of it that government bodies which do things for 
people (service agencies) are much less likely to make enemies than those 
that make or prevent people from doing things (regulatory agencies). By 
avoiding using its compulsory powers the Board became wholly a service agency 
and as such could expect to win support from those benefitting from its ser­
vices and from those who hoped to benefit in the future. One form of 
opposition that might have emerged, an ideological antipathy on the part of 
Conservatives, never in fact materialised. In opposition the Party was 
generally friendly towards the Board and after the 1970 general election 
the new Government assured them of complete support. ^  What has happened 
to the Board since 1970 is outside our period and is relegated to an appendix 
but it is perhaps worth mentioning that when Lord Burton (an original opponent 
of H.I.D.B.) attempted to get a debate going at the 1972 Scottish Conservative 
Conference on the Motion that the Board should be wound up and its powers
transferred to the new Highland regional authority, he could not even find a
62
seconder and was forced to drop the idea.
The Board*s relationship with the organised interests in the Highlands 
gave rise to many of the same problems as their relationships with other 
statutory bodies - that is, there were difficulties in developing a consul­
tative network and in coordination. Many of the bodies with which H.I.D.B.
61. The Scotsman, 31/7/70.
62. Glasgow Herald, 28/2/72.
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was expected to consult before doing- anything were interest groups and 
their numbers swelled the list of organisations with which the Board had 
to try and "fit in". H.I.D.B. were not unresponsive to such bodies when 
they spoke with a clear voice - as did the agricultural interests led 
by the N.F.TJ. - though there are the usual problems here in determining how 
far the growth in Board assistance to agriculture was caused by outside 
pressure. On the other hand there has been little adaptation to the demands 
of the unorganised public - "public opinion" - except in one instance following 
the Thomson affair when the Secretary of State decided that in future any re­
quest for financial assistance from a firm in which a Board member had an
considered
interest would have to be decider; by him. This is simply because "public
opinion" about the Board has not had a coherent voice. Board members are
quick to claim that they do their best to find out the views of the ordinary
Highlander; travelling regularly for this purpose and using the Rural Councils
of Social Service as sources of local opinion^i&ey can always quite justly
63point out, as Grieve did in a recent lecture, that they are invariably 
faced with contradictory demands. It might be said that H.I.D.B. should 
spend more time finding out the relative strengths of these demands (it would 
be a brave - or foolhardy-move) but until this is done they can simply choose 
to react to the one that suits them.
This is a far cry from the sort of control by local interests that
64Selznick found in connection with T.V.A.*s agricultural programme and 
it is fair to say that any threat to the Board*s autonomy comes from the 
Central Government rather than from local authorities or interest groups. 
Neither has H.I.D.B. run into the Cassa*s problem in Southern Italy of be­
coming entangled in political patronage though how much this is due to the 
different political traditions of the countries concerned and how much to
63. To the University of Glasgow Economic History Society, early in 1973.
64. P. Selznick, T.V.A. and the Grass Roots (New York, Harper Torchbook 
19o6)•
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the fact that the Board is a much less important organisation, is not clear.
Finally, what of the future? The appendix following this chapter
briefly describes the Board's activities from 1970 to date (mid 1973)
and shows that while the pattern has remained much the same as in the 1965-
70 period, the growing importance of oil-related developments is changing
the situation in which the Board must work. The next few years will also
see another important change in the Board's environments the reorganisation
of local government. Government spokesmen have insisted that this reform
6t5will not lead to the phasing out of H.I.D.B. and since the decision to 
give special authorities, outside the main regional structure, to the 
island groups of Shetland, Orkney and the Western Isles, it has not been 
possible to consider transferring some of the Board's powers to a single 
unified Highland authority. In fact the Board's position may not change 
all that much for instead of having relations with seven top-tier authori­
ties (the Crofting Counties) it will have them with five; the three island 
groups, the Highland region and the Strathclyde region (if it survives) 
containing Argyll.
There is no reason to suppose that Board relations with Orkney and 
Shetland will change and the Western Isles may simply follow the same 
pattern. The two mainland authorities offer more scope for speculation.
The Strathclyde region is in the anomolous position of having only a part - 
and not a very important part - of its area coming within the Board^s 
domain. The likely result of this is that the region, preoccupied with 
Lowland areas, will have little time for the Board's schemes and this might 
lead to delays. On the other hand the district authority (i.e. Argyll) 
will have responsibility for local planning and building control so perhaps
65. The Scotsman, 31/7/70.
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H.I.D.B. will hardly need to deal with the region. The Highland regional 
authority, administering most of the area covered "by the Board and based 
in Inverness, will have more intimate relations with H.I.D.B. but it is 
an arguable point whether this closeness will lead to effective mutual 
cooperation or whether the division of development and planning powers 
between two quite powerful bodies is a recipe for conflict.
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Appendix
The Board Since 1970
We have been looking at the Highlands and Islands Development Board 
during its first five years of existence - the period when Professor (later 
Sir) Robert Grieve was Chairman - which ended on 31st October 1970. The 
last months of 1970 are a good place to stop for several reasons; not only 
was there a change of Board members but a little earlier - in June - the 
Labour Government that had created H.I.D.B. was replaced by a Conservative 
Government, and in the following year the first signs of the effect of 
North Sea Oil made their appearance in the Highlands.  ^ However, good 
place to stop or not, 1970 certainly does not provide an absolute break.
The Board was not abolished or allowed to run down; on the contrary, there 
has been a considerable degree of continuity in its activities, and its 
expenditure has increased by steady increments. Therefore in order to 
give some perspective to the years 1965-70 I propose to briefly describe 
what the Board has done since that period and to ask what effect the change 
of members and of government had on it.
Perhaps the first thing to say is that the change of Board members 
was by no means total; Sir Andrew Gilchrist, a retired diplomat, replaced 
Professor Grieve but only one of the other full-time members - John Rollo - 
left. Sir James MacKay''still had almost two years of his term to go; 
he was promoted to Deputy Chairman. Prophet Smith was re-appointed for a 
further five years. The fourth, and newly appointed, full-time member was 
Alexander Forsyth, an Edinburgh businessman. The turnover of part-time 
members was more complete; Scholes and Fraser were replaced by James Shaw 
Grant, fchfcirman of the Crofters Commission, Colonel H.A.C. MacKenzie, a 
whisky distiller from Easter Ross and a member of N.S.H.E.B., and James
1. Rig builders and other oil-related firms began to take an interest in the 
Highlands in the last few months of 1971 tat no developments took place until
1972.
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Raffan, a retired Inverness bank manager. The reaction to the appoint­
ments, particularly that of Gilchrist, was somewhat unfavourable - the 
commonest criticism being that, though they might be . excellent men,
retired diplomats are not the most suitable people to be in charge of
2
Highland development.
What did this new Board do? They continued of course to give 
financial assistance; the total amount approved in 1971 £2*7m., a
sharp increase over 1970, and in 1972 it rose to £4*5m., the highest 
amount (in real terms) for any single year.  ^ The balance was much the 
same as before, manufacturing got most, tourism came close behind, etc.
The maximum assistance the Board could give without reference to the 
Scottish Office was raised from £50,000 to £75>000. Following the Industry 
Act 1972, regional development grants for new building and machinery for 
many industrial projects in the Highlands and Islands became available.
These however were , processed and paid by D.T.I. rather than the Board.
In the manufacturing field the Board continued to press ahead with 
promotional and marketing activities and it completed a study of the 
Harris Tweed industry, using its finances to help follow up the recommend­
ations. New developments occurred in the field of industrial sites and 
factories: in 1971 'the Secretary of State gave the Board permission to
acquire 12 sites^to build four advance factories - at Dalcross, Alness, 
Dingwall and Aviemore - and a *nest* of factory units at Stornoway. By 
the end of the year the Board was for the first time becoming a significant 
owner of industrial property. The Board*s factory at Thurso was L&&86d to 
an industrial glove manufacturer and the second of the two smaller growth 
pointq,Fort William, got a large modem Sawmill and an "industrial underwater 
proving ground" (concerned with the technology of opening up underwater 
mineral resources). ^ Altogether 1972 proved a boom year for industrial
2~ Glasgow Herald 9/10/70. This was an old Liberal theme - see chapter 4.
3. H.I.D.B., 1971, p.23 and H.I.D.B., 1972, p.21.
4. H.I.D.B., 1972, p.28.
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projects quite apart from oil related developments.
In tourism the Board1s policies continued without significant changes;
among the most important new developments were the starting of a Highland
Wildlife Park in the Spey Valley with considerable Board assistance, the
building of the second hotel in the Board's special scheme (this one on
Barra), and the start of a scheme to help people build holiday cottages
5
which was later confined to crofters. Fishing developments have already 
been described up to the end of 1971 as this period was included in William 
Russell's assessment of Board policy. Since then the Secretary of State 
has approved a massive extension of the Board's aid to the fishing industry 
so that assistance can be given towards the purchase of 40 new boats and 
larger numbers of second-hand and "dual purpose" boats. ^ Fish farming 
continued but its vulnerability to disease was dramatically underlined on 
one trout farm. The Board decided to combat this in future by building 
its own hatchery to produce a supply of certified disease free trout eggs.
More has been done for agriculture as time has gone on; in terms of 
financial assistance it still lags behind fishing, tourism and manufacturing 
but assistance approved in 1971» £245>000>was much greater than in the 
previous year, and in 1972 there was another dramatic increase (to 
£592,000).  ^ The major agricultural survey of Caithness, Orkney and 
Shetland commissioned by the Board has been completed and so has the study
of the effect of Moray Firth developments on the agriculture of the area.
The small experimental project to grow bludberries on the Black Isle was 
started in 1971. Searches for minerals continued but the coalmine at 
Brora which the Board have helped so much is to close for economic reasons.
5. Before this limitation the scheme was proving highly embarrassing with 
thousands of people wanting to take advantage of the Board's generosity and 
no sites for them to build on.
6. Glasgow Herald. 8/2/73-
7. H.I.D.B., 1971, P-56 and H.I.D.B., 1972, p.51-
Scotsman, 26/6/73.
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None of these developments can compare in scope with those related
to North Sea Oil which promise, or threaten, to change the face of some
parts of the Highlands. By mid-1973 the area most affected was that
round the Moray Firth, where two rig building companies were definitely
established - Highland Fabricators at Nigg on the Cromarty Firth and
IlfeDennotits at Whiteness Point, Inverness - and several more planned
to come in. The result has been to create a labour shortage in the
Dingwall - Invergordon area where there had formerly been high and per-
9
sistent unemployment. But the spin-off is not confined to these parts; 
Shetland, Orkney, Caithness, Southern Argyllshire and even perhaps the 
West Coast will be affected by oil-related developments and battles over 
conservation and amenity are beginning to become lively. Oil is the pro­
vince^ of large companies which dwarf the Board,and their role in these 
developments is somewhat marginal - in 1972 approved assistance to oil-
1 10related projects was less than ££ million. In fact oil has changed
the whole situation in which the Board must work and poses problems quite 
different from those encountered in 1965-70. One immediate result is that 
the Board have changed their minds about the Kyle railway and now recommend 
that it be retained. Another extraneous event will effect the Highlands 
as least as much as the Board can ever do: Britain*s membership of the
EEC. Naturally the Board*s only part in this was an advisory and informa­
tion-gathering one* it has considered the effect of membership on fishing 
and produced a report on the implications for hill farming. ^  As before, 
the Board*s main advisory role has been in transport. They commissioned 
Professor Gaskin of Aberdeen University to study freight rates to the 
Islands and his report somewhat embarrassed them by stating that transport
9. Glasgow Herald. 5/7/72.
10. H.I.D.B., 1972, p.21 gives the figure of £0*87 million for approved in­
vestment in oil-related projects but this includes the private contribution so 
that no more than 50% of this figure would be Board money.
11. H.I.D.B., Special Report 6, **Hill and Upland Farming in the Highlands**.
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12charges were probably "not a significant deterrent to development."
The Board itself changed little after 1970 except to expand - by the end
15of 1972 its staff total was 201  ^- though a new Finance division was set
up to replace the old Financial and Management Services. The Board's
grant-in-aid and expenditure has continued to increase (faster than the
rate of inflation!); in 1971-72, total payments were £3*710,372 ^  and the
estimate for the grant-in-aid for 1973-74 is £5m. (which with other receipts
15will mean H.I.D.B. have about £6iri. at their disposal).
It is clear from the above that the period since 1970 has brought no 
major changes in Board policy. In other words neither the change of 
Government nor the change of Board members resulted in a new direction being 
given to H.I.D.B. activities - a point agreed on by most informed observers 
including the Board themselves. This can be brought out more clearly by
looking at the sort of changes a Conservative Government or a Board selected
by them might have initiated. Firstly the fear that the Conservatives were 
in some way hostile to the Board and wished to see it run down has turned 
out to be quite unfounded: it has in fact been supported in the most tan­
gible way - the graph of its grant-in-aid shows a steady rise unbroken by 
the change of Government. This is not really surprising, despite Michael 
Noble and his "Marxist measure" attack on the Highland Development Bill, 
the Tories have never been hostile to the Board, and they could hardly have 
been dissatisfied with the way it was doing its job under Grieve as he was 
asked by Gordon Campbell to remain Chairman. ^  Furthermore Gilchrist 
insists that he was given no general directions as to what the Board should 
do when he took office. Perhaps the Conservatives would never have supported 
big developments in the Moray Firth area but, whatever their theoretical
12. M», ,G«Aikin "Freight Bates and Prices in the Islands" (H.I.D.B., 1971)» P*45*
13. H.I.D.B., 1972, Appendix I.
14. H.I.D.B., 1972, Appendix IV.
15. Glasgow Herald, 5/2/73*
16. Information from Professor Grieve. He refused the offer as he felt 
committed to returning to Glasgow University.
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views on this subject, they have been rendered irrelevant by North Sea
Oil. Besides, the principle of making the Moray Firth a major growth 
area is still obviously intact - 3 of the 4 advance factories are being 
built there.
The area where a Conservatively - minded Board (if that is really
a correct description of the present Board) might be most expected to 
is /by
make changes / indulging in less projects at its own hand. The idea
that there has been a change here seems to be b o m  out by Gilchrist’s
17description of the Board as a ’’merchant bank with a social purpose” '
and his evidence to the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs that running
18a thing at their own hand was not ’’the most efficient way of doing it".
Not too much can be made of this however, the previous Board did not do 
very many things at its own hand and since 1970 the Board has continued to 
build its hotels and advance factories and has gone ahead with its scheme 
to produce trout ova. The sale of Gaelfish does genuinely seem to have 
been, at least in part, a result of the Conservative preference for private 
enterprise (on the part of the Government) but there is no evidence that the 
discontinuation of the bulb scheme is related to any change in policy by 
either Board or the Government.
One change that has occurred is an increased Board involvement with
agriculture. More financial assistance has been given to this sector since 
1970 and the farming interests, hitherto highly critical of the Board, now 
seem to be satisfied. ^  But even here it is not certain that the change 
of Board members was really responsible for the increase in activity.
Gilchrist himself believes that he brought a greater concern for farming
17. H.I.D.B., 1970, p.5.
18. Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, Session 1971-72. Minutes of evidence 
of H.I.D.B. to Sub-Committee A. (H.C.51-x),p.277.
19. Glasgow Herald. 15/7/72 and 29/9/72.
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with him to the Board, but Prophet Smith, the member responsible for
agriculture, insists that the increased aid since 1970 is only the result
of a change that occurred in 1969 when the Board worked out with D.A.F.S.
a clear role for themselves in this sector of the economy.
The fundamental continuity of policy is obscured somewhat by a difference
in personality - and in rhetoric - between Grieve and Gilchrist. Grieve,
the plannfer and 'visionary* always saw the Board's work in grand macro
20terms - "getting the centre of gravity further up Britain" and "adding
21another perfectly possible way of life to that in the great cities".
Gilchrist and his "merchant bank with a social purpose" is more of a mar- 
ginal incrementalist. What the Board actually did never quite lived up to 
Grieye's vision; Gilchrist has accepted the reality while changing the 
rhetoric. It perhaps should also be borne in mind that even if Gilchrist 
had wished to make some serious changes he would have had to contend with 
an experienced senior staff who had had a considerable influence on existing 
policies and hence some commitment to them. The problems of a new Minister 
coming to a department must be reflected on a small scale when a new Chairman 
comes to H.I.D.B.
20. Scotsman. 20/1/66.
21. H.I.D.B., 1966, Foreword.
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Bibliography
Unpublished Sources
A fair amount of information was obtained from personal interviews with 
many of those people who played some part in the events described in the 
thesis. Whenever such interview material has been the main source of
evidence £ have given a footnote to that effect in the text. It would be 
tedious to list all the many people who were kind enough to tell me what 
they knew or thought of H.I.D.B. but special mention should be made of
Professor Sir Robert Grieve with whom I had three fairly lengthy interviews;
I also went to a lecture on the work of the Board that he gave to the 
Glasgow University Economic History Society early in 1973* In one case, 
that of Lord Cameron, Chairman of the Consultative Council, my queries were 
answered in a letter from which I have quoted in one place.
In addition a certain amount of unpublished written material was used. 
This falls in two groups: (i) documents produced by or for the Board; (ii)
other material. Many of the documents in the first group are freely avail­
able in the Board's own library; the following list includes the ones I 
found most useful (given in rough chronological order).
Product Planning Ltd., "Moray Pirth Industrial Credibility Study" (1966) 
Short H.I.D.B. report on Colonsay (1366) and Memorandum of one year later
(1967)
R. Dean, "Bulbs from the Western Isles. A feasibility study" (1967) 
Conwell Greene & Co., "Hotel project feasibility study (Mull)" (1967) 
Giouitmij Ltd., "Land reclamation in the West" (1968)
"The reclamation of Valley Strand in North Uist as a Caprehensive Bulbs 
Project" (Proposal by H.I.D.B. to the Secretary of State for Scotland;
1969)
H.I.D.B. study of the feasibility of a hotel on Barra (1970)
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Aberdeen University, Department of Geography," Moray Firth
Ecological Study 1969-74: Summary of Progress March 1972"
H.I.D.B., "Constitution, Functions and Administration of H.I.D.B."
(1972)
In general I was not permitted to see any confidential Board material 
but in one instance this rule did not hold. It will be remembered that 
Mr. P.E. Durham took a number of the Board's private documents to use as 
evidence for his memorandum about Frank Thomson. Mr. Durham still has 
these documents and very kindly let me see them; they consist mostly of 
Board minutes from between March and December 1966 and have been mentioned 
in footnotes where appropriate. A copy of the proposal by the Board to 
the Secretary of State concerning Moray Firth Development (December 1966) 
was also included in the documents.
The other material, that not produced by or for H.I.D.B. is smaller
in volume. It includes P.E. Durham's memorandum and his letter of 15/6/71
to the Franks Committee on the Official Secrets Act (this letter describes
the events leading up to Durham's dismisal from H.I.D.B. and the subsequent
threat by the Board to prosecute him under the Official Secrets Act). In 
addition the following were also used:
Report on the Public Enquiry
(i) Into Amendment Number 3 to Ross and Cromarty Development Plan
(1968)
(ii) i» «r » £ t» 1 1 1 1
(1969)
Transcripts of two of the programmes in the B.B.C.'s "Current Account"
series, one on H.I.D.B. (in Autumn 1970) and the other on Shetland.
National Farmers Union of Scotland, "Notes on Union Organisation".
C.C. Hood, "Fishing Politics and Administration" (Glasgow University, 1972)
F.T. Walton, "The Early Work of the Atlantic Development Board; An
Appraisal" (Glasgow University, 19^7)•
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Newspapers
It will "be apparent from the footnotes that newspapers represent a 
major source of information. The Glasgow Herald (Glasgow), Inverness 
Courier (Inverness), The Scotsman (Edinburgh) and (especially in 1967) the 
Scottish Daily Express (Glasgow) were consulted most extensively but each 
of the following were used from time to time: The Guardian (Manchester);
Highland Hews and Northern Chronicle (Inverness); The Observer (London);
People’s Journal (Dundee); Press & Journal (Aberdeen); Scottish Daily Mail 
(Glasgow - ceased publication in 1968); Scottish Sunday Express (Glasgow);
Sunday Telegraph (London); Sunday Times (London); The Times (London).
Official Publications
(I include in this section not only all publications by H.M.S.O. and 
H.I.D.B. itself, as would be expected, but also the reports etc. of the 
various semi-official bodies mentioned in chapter 2).
(a) H.I.D.B. Publications:
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Reports 
(1966-1972)
Special Report Humber 1: "Wick-Thurso Working Party" (1969)
" 11 " 2: "Of Special Importance" (Fisheries Development
Report) (1969)
" " " 3: "Fishing in Shetland - A Manpower Survey"
(1970)
» « " 4 :  "Shetland Woollen Industry - Planning for
Progress (1970)
«• " *» 5: "Strath of Kildonan - Proposals for Development" j
(1970)
h »• •» "Hill and Upland Farming in the Highlands and
Islands - Implications of Entry into the 
E.E.C. (1972)
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Special Report Number 7s "In Great Waters" (1972)
" " " 8: "Survey of Agriculture in Caithness,
Orkney and Shetland" (1972)
Occasional Bulletin Number 1: "Pishing" (1968)
" " " 2 :  "Agriculture" (1968)
" " " 3 s  "The Caithness Pishing Industry"
(1969)
Jack Holmes Planning Group, "Moray Pirth - a plan for growth" (1968) 
Professor M. Gaskin, "Freight Bates and Prices in the Islands"(1971) 
"Island of Mull - Survey and Proposals for Development" (1973)
H.I.D.B. also produces a periodical, North 7» which has appeared 3 
or 4 times yearly since October 1967*
(b) Command Papers (in date order):
Report of the Royal Commission on the Condition of Crofters and Cottars 
in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, (Napier), C.3980, 1884 
Reports of the Royal Commission on the Highlands and Islands (Walpole), 
C.6138, 1890 and C.6242, 1891-2 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Highlands and Islands ('Deer Forest1 
Commission), C.768I, 1895 
Report of the Committee on Hydro-electric Development in Scotland 
(Cooper), Cmd 6406, 1943 
"A Programme of Highland Development", Cmd. 7976, 1950 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Crofting Conditions (Taylor),
Cmd. 9091, 1954.
Report of the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs (Balfour), Cmd. 9212,
1954.
Report of the Hill Lands (North of Scotland) Committee, Cmd. 9759» 1956. 
"Review of Highland Policy", Cmnd. 785» 1959*
"Agriculture in Scotland", Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture
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for Scotland, Crand. 1315> I960; Cmnd. 1641, 1961; Cmnd. 1946, 1962;
Cmnd. 2281, 1963; Cmnd. 2597, 1964; Cmnd. 2913, 1965; Cmnd. 3214,
1966; Cmnd. 3548, 1967; Cmnd. 4003, 1968; Cmnd. 4302, 1969; Cmnd.
4626, 1970.
Annual Reports of the Scottish Development Department, Cmnd. 2004, 1962; 
Cmnd. 2326, 1963; Cmnd. 2635, 1964; Cmnd. 3553, 1967; Cmnd. 3961, 1968;
Cmnd. 4313, 1969; Cmnd. 4625, 1970; Cmnd. 4945, 1971.
"The Scottish Economy 1965-70", Cmnd. 2864, 1966 
1965 Report of the Scottish Land Court, Cmnd. 2967, 1965 
31st Annual Report of the Herring Industry Board, Cmnd. 3003, 1966 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Civil Air Transport (Edwards), 
Cmnd. 4018, 1969.
Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland (Wheatly) 
Cmnd. 4150, 1969
Report of the Scottish Inshore Fisheries Committee (Cameron) Cmnd.
4453, 1970.
(c) Parliamentary Debates and Papers.
(i) Hansard. There are a large number of references to H.I.D.B. between 
I965 and 1970; they have been footnoted where appropriate.
The most important deba,tes on the Board are as follows:
House of Commons Debates
Volume 708, columns 1079-1204 
« 714, » 908-1046
h 743, » 1923-32
House of Lords Debates
Volume 267, columns 736-46, 750-3, 756-834 
» 281 ” 963-83, 987-95, 1002-60
» 291, " 1089-1194
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(ii) Standing Committees. Two main references here:
Scottish Standing Committee, Session 1964-65,
Consideration of the Highland Development (Scotland) Bill 
Scottish Grand Committee, Session 1966-67,
Debate on the Scottish Estimates
(iii) Select Committees. The Select Committee on Scottish Affairs
has conducted twc inquiries relevant to H.I.D.B. and its work: 
Session 1968-69, "Economic Planning in Scotland”,
Report H.C. 267; Minutes of Evidence H.C. 267-1 
and H.C. 397* (Note especially the memorandum and 
minutes of evidence of H.I.D.B., H.C.267-1, p.1-49)
Session 1970-71? "Land Resource Use in Scotland",
Report and Minutes of Evidence, H.C. 5H-i, ii» iii, iv and v.
(iv) Other House of Commons Papers.
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